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ALEXANDER IST OF RUSSIA.

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South Shore

THE
CAMPAIGNS
OF
1812, 1813, 1814, AND 1815,
ALSO,
THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES
OF THE
FRENCH REVOLUTION.

TO WHICH IS ADDED,
The French Confiscations, Contributions, Requisitions, &c. &c.
FROM 1793, TILL 1814.

By JAMES M^CQUEEN.

IN THREE VOLUMES.

*O, these were hours, when thrilling joy repaid
A long, long course of darkness, doubts, and fears!
The heart sick faintness of the hope delay'd,
The waste, the woe, the bloodshed and the tears,
That track'd with terror twenty rolling years,
All was forgot in that blithe Jubilee!
Her downcast eye even pale affliction rears,
To sigh a thankful prayer amid the glee,
That hail'd the Despot's fall, and peace and liberty!*

SCOTT'S LORD OF THE ISLES, Canto VI.

VOL. I.

GLASGOW:

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1816.

TO

KIRKMAN FINLAY ESQ. M. P.

SIR,

IN committing to the world, the result of my observations and labours, relative to the stupendous events of the period to which I have confined the following NARRATIVE; I desire to express the deep sense I entertain, of the honour conferred upon me, by your permission to Dedicate it to you. I am fully sensible, that these labours as little merit your attention and regard, as my abilities are unequal to do justice to the highly important, and truly memorable occurrences which I have attempted to detail. Yet, in the midst of all the wants and defects, with which the succeeding pages abound, I still hope, that there will be found some parts, which the feelings of every Briton will lead him to contemplate with satisfaction; and, if, from the perusal of these, you shall derive either information or amusement, my labours have not been in vain.

As a debt of gratitude, which I owe to this flourishing City, whose prosperity I shall never behold but with pleasure, nor contemplate but with satisfaction, I cannot, and ought not to forget, that you held the honourable office of Chief Magistrate of the same, during that eventful and glorious period, when Europe in arms, hurled Gallic ambition from his blood-stained throne, and reared her renovated standard under her

legitimate sovereigns. As a member of the most enterprising and flourishing quarter of your native country, whose improvement and prosperity, your Commercial abilities, knowledge, and wealth, tends so much to increase: As the Representative of the first Commercial City in Scotland—a City, which has at all times been distinguished for its steady support of, and affectionate loyalty to our venerable Sovereign, our happy Constitution and Laws: As one who can appreciate and understand the extent and solidity of the power, the interest, and the resources of the British Empire: and as an independent member of that August Assembly, whose deliberations and decisions are looked up to, and felt by the world, who have saved themselves by their firmness, as they have preserved Europe by their example, I cannot choose any other individual better deserving, or more proper than yourself, to whom I could address the Narrative of those important events, which formed the triumphant termination of twenty-two arduous years of toil, and labour, and danger. We have seen the complete triumph of those principles and those Counsels, through good report and through bad report. In the battle, and in the breeze, they bravely resisted, and successfully overcame that hideous and destructive torrent of immorality, irreligion, anarchy and despotism, scattered over Europe by the Governors of France. In this honourable and glorious resistance, we have warded off from our native land, all those horrors and evils, which so heavily pressed upon others, and with which we were threatened by a powerful, a rancorous, and a vindictive foe.

BUT our toils and our dangers are not yet at an end. These are lessened, but not removed. The sweet prospect of peace and happiness amongst

men is again banished from the earth. Arising from their former abodes, the dark clouds of the approaching tempest once more envelope the political horizon of Europe. Great Britain has again an arduous, an honourable, and a glorious task to perform. To her the assembled world looks up,

"Confiding still amidst these dire alarms,"

In George's Councils, and in Well'sley's arms:

She stands forth again the champion of all that is praiseworthy and good, against the last dreadful and concentrated effort of furious Atheism, and of expiring tyranny. The resolutions of Europe upon this subject have been taken, and "*her opinion pronounced in a manner VERY POSITIVE AND VERY SOLEMN.*" Never did a British Senate stand in a more conspicuous, a more elevated, or a more honourable situation; and never did the Representatives of the British nation, amongst whose honourable ranks you are seen, so conspicuous and so useful, appear in a situation where their wisdom and their firmness can gain more glory to themselves, and procure greater security to their country. Distressing, notwithstanding all this, is the prospect before us, to humanity. But there is no alternative. In following the pursuits of mischief and ambition, "*FRANCE AND NAPOLEON WILL NEVER CHANGE.*" No, never! Destruction as certainly belongs to his sceptre, as "*WAR TO HIS AGE.*" It is not so much an individual as his principles. It is not whether Louis or Bonaparte is to be Sovereign of France; but whether the French with Bonaparte at their head, are to break treaties as it suits their convenience, trample upon every law, and at last upon the world; or whether the assembled world ought to put it out of the power of either to alarm or injure her any more. This is the true state of this import-

ant subject. Death or Victory—Freedom or Slavery, is again the watchword of indignant millions. This spirit we must cherish—these we must lead; for in the animated and just language of Mr. GRATTAN, “*whenever we cease to be the first among nations, we will sink to the condition of the last.*” The path before us is so plain, that it cannot be mistaken. It is thorny and difficult, but it must be trode, and trode with firmness and decision. With the same spirit of courage and unanimity, once more displayed by Europe, and in a particular manner by Great Britain, there can be little doubt, but that under the blessing of Heaven, the Allies will succeed in overthrowing again, and FOREVER, the last remnant of that system of iniquity, hatched in Paris, from thence disseminated over France, and now with all its votaries, friends, and supporters, collected into one body, to fall beneath the sword of indignant nations, and the arm of unerring justice.

THAT you may long continue to perform the important and praiseworthy duties of a British Senator, and with your colleagues in that honourable office, soon participate in, and enjoy the glory and satisfaction, which must overspread and be experienced by the world, upon the happy conclusion of these fresh toils, and the overthrow of the still numerous and dangerous, implacable enemies of Europe, is the wish of,

SIR,

Your most respectful and most obedient servant,

JAMES M^CQUEEN.

GLASGOW,
June 19th, 1815.

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PREFACE.

THE memorable Campaigns of 1812, 1813, and 1814, are, considering every circumstance, unequalled in the annals of the world. Europe had never seen war conducted on such an extensive scale, with such immense means, nor directed with greater talents. In laying before the World, a Narrative of these memorable occurrences, I am deeply sensible of my own inability, to do the subject the justice which it merits. I have therefore, to throw myself upon the indulgence of a generous Public; and hope, that for the sake of the subject, the reader will in some degree overlook the faults of the Author. To literary abilities I lay no claim; of the praise due to these I have no expectations. As the present Work is the first, so it is more than probable, that it will be the last subject of the kind in which I can occupy my time, or employ my pen. The indulgence with which the public received many detached pieces upon the subject now before them, as these were given at different times, through the medium of the respectable Public journals of this place; and the earnest solicitations of some private friends, emboldened me to lay before it, in an enlarged and connected form, the results of a continued series of notes and observations, which I had kept from time to time, and made upon these memorable occurrences. With what success I have acquitted myself, the public will now judge; and should the reader receive either instruction or information from this work, or should it be of the smallest service, in shewing my countrymen the superior security and happiness of their native land, and excellence of the government under which they live, I shall think my labour well bestowed, and amply rewarded.

The plan I have adopted, is rather novel. The labour it has occasioned was great. In many pages, there is scarcely a

line that did not only require important references, but these required to be compared and connected with others. Observing, as I had done, the growth and progress of French tyranny, which it was obvious, from its violence, contained in itself the seeds of its own dissolution; and contemplating, as I did, from the moment that the armies of Napoleon entered Russia, the rapid destruction of that stupendous fabric, which his injustice and ambition had raised; every feeling of my soul became interested in the progress of the events; and every document which concerned it, and occurrence which took place, became so imprinted on my memory, that I either needed no reference to many of the official documents containing the details, or knew where to find them; otherwise, no inducement could have made me undertake the labour, which would otherwise have been necessary to have completed the plan which I have followed, in the manner it is done. In it, I have endeavoured to single out, and embody with my own sentiments and narrative, the most striking passages of the official dispatches, which bear upon, and concern the important particulars related, and to form the whole into one connected chain. I have also carefully compared the dispatches of the different chiefs to their respective governments, where I could obtain these, in order that I might supply from one, what was deficient in another; while, at the same time, I have endeavoured to point out the wilful inaccuracies and misrepresentations of the French accounts; adopting, however, the narrative of the enemy, where, in a few instances, his accounts remain wholly uncontradicted by any official document published by the Allies. The principal object which I had in view, in this Work, was to compress into as little bounds as possible, and at the least possible expense, a faithful account of the principal events of these three remarkable campaigns, in which that colossal power was destroyed, which at their commencement, seemed to defy human might; which had overturned the liberties of Europe; and whose utmost strength was directed, with a peculiar rancour and hostility, against the interests and the independence of this happy country. In following out this important subject, I have been guided by the official dispatches of the contending parties, and, by these alone, as I hold it injudicious and very improper, to

to demi-official relations, in opposition to these, or to differ from these without subsequent official information, as a reason for doing so; as no one, not even an eye-witness, can know or appreciate the operations and the losses of an army, equal to the Commander in Chief thereof, (like the Executive Government of the country. These should not be deviated from on common grounds. This is however, but too little attended to; and such practices, in many instances, where they are followed, instead of clearing up, tend only to darken the subject. In the reflections I at different times make, and in the conclusions which I at different times draw from the narrative before me, I have formed my judgment from the official documents, which I have taken for my guide. But as the words and the actions of the population of Europe and their leaders were, during the period to which I have confined my narrative, equally remarkable, and deserving our consideration and our attention; I have endeavoured to preserve the *manner* as well as the *matter* of the subject—not only what they *did*, but what they *said*, and how far I have succeeded in copying with fidelity, the spirit of the contending parties, it is for the reader to determine.

The tables of the strength and losses of the different armies, I have compiled with great care, from authentic documents, as these were noted by me from the commencement of 1812, in a regular journal, and in the same form as these are now given in this work. To the curious these may form amusement, and to the accurate, information. With regard to these, but particularly the French, I have adhered to the official dispatches of both parties. Immense as these appear, and as they in reality were, still it is plain, that they are not exaggerated. During 1812, and 1813, it was indeed, the only thing in which the French journals adhered to truth, in stating the force of their armies. These were in reality so numerous, that no exaggeration was necessary to make them appear most formidable. Nor is the accounts of the losses which the enemy sustained, as given by the Allies, at all exaggerated; because, if these had been so from design, the losses would never have corresponded with the force led against them; but which these do in a very remarkable manner, in every instance, where the official accounts touch upon these points. If the Allies had

begun a system of exaggeration, in their returns of the French losses, and carried it on as the latter did with regard to theirs, they would have done as he did at Moscow, have disposed of the whole force, they allowed the enemy to possess at the beginning of the campaign, before it was half finished, and while two thirds of that force still remained to oppose them. I need only call the Reader's attention, to the striking coincidence on the preceding head, at the end of the campaign of 1813. France during these two fatal years, led against Russia in the first, and brought into Germany and Italy on the second, about 1,300,000 men. The Reader will see, by the tables I have kept, that about 43,000 remained in Italy at the end of 1813, and 51,000 escaped across the Rhine, besides what remained, cooped up in fortified places. Lord Cathcart expressly states the number which escaped across the Rhine at about 50,000, and all other accounts at from 50,000 to 60,000. Here, there is a coincidence, almost to 10,000 men out of 1,300,000!! In Italy, the tables I have kept, make Beauharnois' army for the campaign of 1814, including re-enforcements, to be 89,000 men. Mr. Horner in the House of Commons, May 2d, 1815, states, that he understood it was 84,000. With regard to the French army, according to the accounts which I have kept, it appears, that on the 1st April, 1814, it consisted of 494,000, including about 40,000 national guards in Paris and Strasburgh, &c. On the 13th June, 1815, during the fresh reign of Bonaparte, Regnault St. Jean de Angley states positively, that the number in arms at that date, exclusive of prisoners, and 115,000 conscripts, of the levy of 1815, actually amounted to 450,000 men, all regulars, which is within 4000 men of the number I have stated it, in the journal which I kept from the former French official accounts. Following the losses for the three campaigns in Spain, the remainder of Soult's army remaining after the overthrow of Bonaparte, amounted by the tables in this work, to 50,000 men, and long after these were printed, I find, that Lord Liverpool in the House of Lords, May 7th, 1815, stated that force as the number remaining. The same may be noticed of Suchet's army, and the garrisons on the east coast of Spain. These I state, first under Decaen, 12,000 men, and from the trial of Sir John Murray, I find, that these

actually amounted to 23,000, including garrisons, leaving 13,600 disposable. Suchet's army under his immediate command, is stated at 20,000, independent of garrisons. By the same authority it is stated at 24,000. Altogether, at the end of 1813, I enumerate the force in the field and in garrisons on the east coast at 52,000, Sir John Murray makes it 55,000.

Formidable as I have stated, the armies of the Allies to have been, it is obvious, that the authorities from which I have selected these, have been correct. In confirmation of the numbers given, as being accurate, I have here only to add the authority of Lord Castlereagh, when speaking of the strength to be brought into action in this fresh contest. During the negotiations in the Congress at Vienna, in 1814; "*Independent of the enormous military power of Russia, there were certainly a million of men in Germany alone, independent of the defensive force of the Landwehr.*"* The Reader will also observe, that this was the amount, besides all the military power of Great Britain, Portugal and Spain, together, above 700,000 men, and which joined with the force of Russia, gives at least 1,300,000 additional. In the numbers also to be brought forward in the fresh contest, now to be carried on; the Reader will also observe, the striking coincidence between these and the forces of the principal powers engaged against France in 1814, as enumerated in page 521 viz.

Austria	..	..	300,000
Russia	..	..	225,000 besides 150,000 ready if wanted.
Collected States of Germany	..	..	150,000
Prussia	..	..	236,000
Great Britain	..	..	50,000
Holland	..	..	50,000
† 1,011,000			

With regard to the list of French Contributions, Requisitions, Loans, and Confiscations, I need scarcely add, that these have cost me much trouble to collect. These are the fruits of long observation and attention; and are, I believe, as accurate as the nature of such a subject will admit. It is sometimes difficult

* House of Commons, May 25th, 1815.

† Do. do. 26th, 1815.

to know exactly the currency in which the contributions are stated, but wherever that is the case, I have adopted the lowest value. Many however, of the items of this odious system are still wanting, and no doubt amount to an enormous sum; but the present list compiled almost entirely from French authority, may serve to give the Reader an idea of the terrible nature of this profligate and vicious system, which has seized by lawless violence, and squandered away in iniquitous pursuits, the wealth and industry of Europe.

The Tables of the account of the Destruction of Property, are in many instances, taken from good authority; and in others, from an estimation from those instances, that are authenticated. In such a subject, perfect accuracy is unattainable; but it is obvious, that the amount was prodigious. The same may be said, with regard to the expenditure of the different nations by war. In many of these it is impossible for me to obtain the accurate sums, which has forced me to follow a probable sum, considering the revenues, and the demands. I am certain, where this is the case, that I am rather below than above the real amount.

The French Revolution and its consequences, are an inexhaustible subject. I have endeavoured to embody a few of its most prominent features and bitter consequences, into a short compass, which may prove a warning to my deluded countrymen, who in some instances, are yet endeavoured to be made the tools of those, who profess under other names, the principles which gave it birth, but whose object, and whose aims are the same. That tremendous event, the consequences of which, humanity will long deplore, in its birth, progress, and effects, stands unequalled in the history of man. The crimes it has perpetrated—the misery and wretchedness it has heaped on the world—the awful scenes of carnage and bloodshed, which it has occasioned amongst mankind, were never equalled and can never be surpassed. In vain will we search the records of history, for the conduct of tyrants, the most despotic—into the policy or institutions of nations, the most barbarous and rude, for any thing to form a parallel to it, or to equal the cause by which it was produced. The most ferocious savage of New Zealand—the most ignorant human being, who traverses Af-

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rica's benighted wilds, acknowledges a Supreme Being, and profess to obey his will. The devils themselves, believe and tremble. France acknowledged none. Like the other animals which cover the face of the earth, man lived—he died and perished forever—he slept, to awake no more. No wonder then, that his actions became like those of the brutes that perish, when his conduct was regulated by principles similar to, and as fierce and more ruinous than theirs—Human nature seemed degraded, beyond the darkest limits of debasement—the reasoning powers of the human mind, were inverted; and the end and design of human beings, seemed altogether reversed. Whence sprung such a system as this? From political causes alone, we shall search for the source of the mischief in vain. These no doubt, had their influence, and aggravated the evil; but these in all their most odious forms, and most acrimonious consequences, could never have carried any nation the lengths which the French nation have gone. Political frenzy has its limits. It soon works its own cure, and a change of Government may be brought about, without a complete change of property, and above all, without a total change and destruction of the moral and religious principles of mankind. It was to the destruction of the latter, that we have to attribute the woes of France, and the miseries of Europe. From this polluted and baneful source, has issued all the destruction and carnage of the last twenty-five years. The sacred name of liberty, under this new system, was made use of, as a cloak for the wildest licentiousness. Europe suffered herself to be deceived, and to be lulled into security, by the deceitful sound.—She never reflected, that robbery and murder could not be freedom—that the actors in the dreadful drama, were all of this class, who neither deserved, nor could enjoy it, but who could only be employed in forging fetters for their neighbours, when they became satiated with the blood of their friends—Europe trusted their deceitful promises—she imbibed their odious principles, and her people awoke from their dream of fancied bliss, with the chains of the despot round their necks, and the dagger of the assassin at their bosoms. Amongst the number who abetted a change of Government in France, there were no doubt at first, many men of upright views, and of honourable principles;

but their impetuosity to accomplish the object which they had in view, led them to associate with men of very different principles and intentions—who without property and without principle, neither feared God nor regarded man. These men only sought for power to abuse it. These, as might easily have been foreseen, overthrew the more moderate party—destroyed without remorse, former associates, or open enemies; and on the ruins of all social order, endeavoured to raise their own barbarous fabric of folly and mischief. The source of this evil was not the work of a day, nor the business of a moment. Man does not become wholly depraved at once, “on step by step he goes.” Voltaire and his associates, laid the foundation of this hideous fabric. It was built upon, with the greatest assiduity, by his thoughtless countrymen, and other mischievous hands, without any measure being taken to check its increase. The general corruption of manners and of morals in France, before the Revolution, is well known. One class were sunk in the most grovelling superstition; and the other under the most abandoned contempt of every thing sacred. Amidst this scene of depravity and confusion, a set of metaphysicians and philosophers sprang up, who, abandoning all religion and revelation, who denying the existence of the Deity, endeavoured to raise a building without a foundation; and who, inculcating doctrines, but too agreeable to the evil dispositions of man, were eagerly listened to, implicitly followed, and terribly obeyed. In a soil but too well adapted to the culture of such baneful seeds, these grew with an alarming rapidity. They spread their noxious branches into every land; and in that wherein they had been at first planted, overthrew every thing, civil or sacred—good and virtuous—Morality and Religion—the altar and the throne. One hideous ruin, overwhelmed every thing which man had hitherto held sacred—which had either rendered him happy here, or that could prepare him for happiness hereafter. The dread of a Supreme Being, no longer restrained his wicked desires, and odious appetites—nothing remained to curb or controul them, for it was idle to think of human laws being any barrier to a man, who conceived it no wrong to violate them; and who only framed the laws of the country, where he lived, to suit his caprice—his pursuits, and his profligate prin-

object which they had very different principles and without principle. These men only might easily have been destroyed with enemies; and on the rise their own bar-source of this evil of a moment. Man on step by step the foundation of this greatest assiduity, mischievous hands, increase. The general France, before the sunk in the most the most abandoned scene of depravity and philosophers revelation, who ed to raise a building doctrines, but ere eagerly listened. In a soil but seeds, these grew noxious branches had been at first—good and virtuous and the throne, which man had rendered him happy hereafter. The ruined his wickedness to curb or man laws being strong to violate country, where he profligate principles.

ciples. Thus situated, and thus prepared, a scene of wickedness and misery burst upon mankind, beyond any thing of the kind that had ever happened—beyond any which human depravity had ever before conceived; nor could the ills which man has suffered by the hands of man, from Nimrod downwards, to the year 1791, if collected together, and thrown into the balance against the misery of the last twenty-four years, turn the dreadful scale. France, from that fatal period, became a dungeon—her cities a grave—her King she murdered—her God she denied—Religion she banished—Law she had none. Like the raving maniac, let loose from his fetters, while she mangled her own body, she tore her neighbours' to pieces, without pain or remorse. A dark and insatiable ambition, next usurped the place of this anarchy. It collected this frenzy into one focus, and fixed its fury upon one object. Military despotism, controuled and directed this terrible mass. Europe fell prostrate before it. With the force of a whirlwind, it tore up by the roots, all the ancient institutions of Continental Europe; and left in their stead slavery, violence, and desolation. Britain alone, remained in defiance of foreign foes, and domestic traitors, a barrier against this awful torrent. Notwithstanding the clamours of disaffection, she remained steady to her purpose. She boldly faced the rudest shocks of this tremendous adversary; and like as the rocks that surround her happy shore, stand firm against the fury of the Atlantic,

When from Columbia's shores, the surge is hurl'd,
Shakes the foundations of the Eastern world.

So she repelled the fury of her adversary, and overcame his strength. "*She saved herself by her firmness, and Europe by her example.*" Let her children reflect with pride and gratitude on this important truth, and never let them forget the dangers which they have escaped, or the miseries which have been ward off from them, by the firmness and the wisdom of their Government, and of those men in the superior ranks of life, whom the policy of their frantic demagogues, and infernal teachers taught them, to annihilate and destroy. The deception is now gone by. The real object, and fatal consequences of the frantic votaries of democracy, under the name of liberty,

are now clearly ascertained, and ought to be correctly appreciated. We too, had our national Convention—we too, our Jacobin clubs, and the honours of the sitting—we too, our friends of the people—we too, our Corresponding societies—our patriots, pikes, red caps, and levellers, whose bewildered and frantic ideas, had divided the properties, and parcelled out the riches of the wealthy, amongst us. And what would have been the consequences, had they succeeded? The same unquestionably, which has been in France. For years, we should have remained a prey to every bad passion—to anarchy, cruelty, and confusion. The best of sovereigns, who had ruled over us for 50 years, in mildness and in mercy, would have been brought to the scaffold. His widowed Queen butchered—his family dispersed, destitute, and forsaken, would have been kidnapped in a foreign land, to be shot by midnight assassins on their own. The guillotine would have been erected at the door of our Courts of Justice, in the halls of which the Judges would have been found seated on the bench, with a dagger in their belts, and a pair of loaded pistols, ready cocked, before each of them. Our national character lost—our morals corrupted and destroyed—our trade and commerce ruined—the slaves of a military despotism—unfit for social life, breakers of sacred treaties, and solemn oaths, a scourge to ourselves, and a terror to our neighbours; instead of dictating from the highest pinnacle of true glory and greatness, a peace to our inveterate enemies in Paris, we should have had a collected and indignant world, dictating to us the most abject submission in London.

In speaking of the French nation, with the asperity which I have done, let me not be misunderstood. By these, I have all along meant that dreadful and diabolical party, who brought round the Revolution, and who has trode her under foot, and directed her mighty energies to bring ruin on Europe, and destruction upon herself. I am aware, that in France, are many worthy men; but these are borne down by an opposite party, strong in numbers, and merciless in power. Their voice is not heard, or where raised, is treated with derision and scorn. It is not these, the peaceable and well disposed part of that nation which I allude to; but to those who murdered their King, and denied their God—to those worshipers of the Goddess of

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Reason, whom bitter experience and passing events have shewn are still too numerous and powerful in France, for her to expect peace, or Europe repose. It is them, their principles, and their disciples, which have made Europe a slaughter house, and which have deluged the New World with blood; in defiance of the peaceable, the wise, and the good, in both Hemispheres, trying to oppose them.—It is them only that I allude to, and condemn;—them whose atrocious conduct, no powers of human imagination can adequately pourtray, and over whose guilty heads, the anger of Omnipotence yet hangs.

It was the chief aim of this Revolution, to corrupt the intellectual powers of man, and to destroy the moral feelings of his heart. The votaries of the GODDESS OF REASON, amongst whom Fouche, Carnot, Cambaceres, Merlin of Thionville, Barrere, &c. were most conspicuous, publicly avowed this. In all their proceedings, they boldly and openly attempted to substitute darkness for light, injustice for justice, and wrong for right. A new code of National Law, issued from this polluted temple; and wherever they cast their eye, as the *natural limits* for their power, whether to the Alps, or the Straits of Gibraltar—the Rhine, or the “*Confines of Asia*,” or wherever treachery or baseness called upon them for assistance, those people, or those countries were without any further ceremony or reason given, incorporated with, and declared an integral and unalienable part of their Republic, or their Empire.* This flagrant and violent spirit of aggrandisement was one of the most characteristic features of this Revolutionary Hydra. In the language of that great Statesman Mr. Pitt, “IT WAS THE SOUL WHICH ANIMATED IT AT ITS BIRTH, AND WOULD CERTAINLY NEVER DESERT IT TILL ITS EXTINCTION. It had been invariably the same at every stage of the Revolution. It equally belonged to Brissot, Robespierre, Reubell, and Barras; but it belonged most of all to Bonaparte, IN

* In the Council of 500, Sept. 22d, 1799, Garreau proposed, that “Every negotiator, Ambassador, General, Director, or Representative of the People, who shall receive or consent to conditions of peace, tending to change the Constitution of the 3d year, and to diminish the territory of the Republic, are traitors to their country, and shall be punished with death.” Put it to the vote, was heard on all sides. The plan of Garreau was UNANIMOUSLY ADOPTED.

WHOM WERE CONCENTRATED ALL THEIR POWERS, AND ALL THEIR CRIMES. *Its ensign of power was the sword, and not the sceptre.*"* How far, and how fearfully these principles, and the plans of those who inculcated them succeeded, the melancholy history of the last twenty-five years, and every country in Europe bears the most ample testimony. Nothing was held binding, nothing was held sacred. "ALL THE TREATIES WHICH FRANCE HAS MADE SINCE THE REVOLUTION, HAVE BEEN ALL BROKEN."† As it suited their crooked policy, the sacred Name, and Attributes of Jehovah, were DENIED as at the beginning of the Revolution. As it suited their pursuits, these were BLASPHEMED as in the invasion of Egypt. As it furthered their dishonourable views, that Name, before whose frown, Creation trembles, was with exultation taken in vain, as it has lately been, in order not only to throw off their guard, and to disarm the nations of Europe, but to deceive and betray their Legitimate Sovereign. It is a melancholy prospect to Europe, to behold with what indifference such proceedings are adopted, and carried on by the French nation; and it is most lamentable, to reflect upon the manner in which their conduct is viewed, by many individuals in Europe, and more particularly in this country. The success, not the means engage the attention of the votaries of French politics, morality, and greatness; and because wickedness has been so often, and is again so far successful, therefore are its agents, admired and applauded—therefore, it is believed, not to be wickedness, and forgetting that it ever has been punished, they conceive that there is no danger that it will be so any more.

All these things in the sad example of another nation, stand on record as a beacon before us. Let us therefore be wise—let us learn wisdom from the past. The path before us is clear and straight. We cannot mistake it. Dear bought experience has taught it to us, and if we go astray we deserve no pity. Let us shun the paths which has conducted others, and which, if followed, will also conduct us to similar dreadful scenes of guilt and misery. Irreligion and immorality have overturned, and will always be the means of overturning, every

* Pitt's Speech, House of Commons, Feb. 3d, 1800.

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social institution amongst mankind. While we as Britons, contemplate with pride and satisfaction, the noble part which we have acted in the dreadful drama—while we reflect with exultation and astonishment, upon the wonderful events of the last three years, let us as Christians, do as our gallant Allies have done, give the praise unto HIM to whom all praise is due. Let infidelity herself acknowledge, that it is the doings of that Almighty Being, who has declared, that he will not give his glory to another, nor his praise to graven images—by whom Kings reign, and Princes decree judgment—against whom no power can contend with success, and from whose justice, none can escape with impunity.

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
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12. The deep dotted lines represent very nearly the positions of the Russian armies seen after the entrance of November 1918. (See page 10 and 81) viz. A Army under Kozlov, B 3^d under Zhilinskiy, C 1st under Zhilinskiy, D 4th under Kozlov, E 2nd under Zhilinskiy and F 5th under Zhilinskiy. The single dotted line which connects them may represent the boundaries from whence the tanks and light troops made incursions upon the Soviet positions in the reinforcements.

$2\frac{1}{2}$ longitude East from $3\frac{1}{2}$ Greenwich



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CAMPAIGN IN RUSSIA,

1812.




BEFORE entering into the subject of the campaign in Russia, it may not be uninteresting, to take a short view of the population and resources of that Empire; and at the same time to describe as shortly as possible, the nature of the country and the climate, with a topographical description of those provinces, which afterwards became the seat of that war, which recovered the liberty and independence of Europe.



POPULATION, &c. OF THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE, From a Census taken by order of the Empress Catharine, 1783.

EUROPEAN RUSSIA.

Government of St. Petersburg,	367,200
Archangel,	170,300
Olonetz,	206,100
Viborg,	186,500
Riga,	525,300
Revel,	200,000
Moscow,	883,400
Vladimir,	871,050
Raizan,	869,400
Tula,	876,000
Yaroslavl,	740,900



Government of Kaluga, *	810,000
Kostroma, ...	815,400
Novgorod, ...	577,500
Tver, ...	903,600
Vologda, ...	556,200
Nishnee Novgorod, ...	816,200
Voronetch, ...	801,600
Tamboff, ...	886,000
Koursk, ...	920,000
Orel, ...	968,200
Karkoff, ...	782,800
Keif, ...	795,800
Tchernigoff, ...	741,850
Novgorod Siverskoi, ...	742,000
Smolensk, ...	802,300
Pleskoff, ...	578,100
Polotsk, ...	620,600
Moghileff, ...	662,500
Ekatarinoslaff, ...	744,550
Taurida, ...	100,000
Viatka, ...	817,100
Cossacks of the Don, ...	220,000

ASIATIC RUSSIA.

Kazane, ...	763,300
Perme, ...	799,950
Penza, ...	640,700
Sinbirsk, ...	731,000
Saratof, ...	624,000
Ousa, ...	355,598
Kolhyvane, ...	170,000
Tobolsk, ...	514,700
Irkutsk, ...	375,150
Caucausus and Astrakan,	48,350
400 families,	3,200

* The numbers in this province have been omitted, but as it is divided into 12 circles, the same as Tula and Yaroslavl, and immediately adjoining both, the mean between them is taken as the number of its population.

..... 810,000
 815,400
 577,500
 903,600
 556,200
 816,200
 801,600
 886,000
 920,000
 963,200
 782,800
 795,800
 741,850
 742,000
 802,300
 578,100
 620,600
 662,500
 744,550
 100,000
 817,100
 220,000

..... 763,300
 799,950
 640,700
 731,000
 624,000
 355,598
 170,000
 514,700
 375,150
 in, 48,350
 s, 3,200

ut as it is divided into 12
 adjoining both, the mean

Kibitki, or tents, Kalmucs, }
 12,250, " say } 100,000

26,682,490
 Roving Hordes,..... 1,500,000
 Number, per note†..... 4,000,000

Total in 1783, 32,182,498

Acquired since:

From Turkey, 1791,..... 42,708
 Poland, 1793,..... 3,745,663
 Do. 1795,..... 1,467,402
 Subjection of Courland,..... 387,922
 Conquest, Finland, &c..... 1,000,000
 Cuban,.....uncertain
 Number, per note†..... 8,000,000
 Austria, in 1809,..... 400,000
 Kourieskie Isles, } unknown.
 Aleouskie do. }
 From Persia,..... 1,000,000
 Prussia, 1807,..... 500,000
 Turkey, 1812,..... 500,000

Grand total, 49,166,193

* Kibitki, or tents of Kalmucs, of which there are 12,250: the number here taken as contained in these is not accurate, but is certainly within the truth, as Astrakan, the capital of this part, contains according to the modern Geography 70,000 souls.

† This number includes, viz. all nobility, clergy, land as well as sea forces, different officers, court servants; all persons employed under government in any capacity: students of universities, academies, seminaries and other schools; hospitals of various descriptions: all irregular troops, foreigners and colonists, or settlers from various nations, and which were not enumerated in 1783, nor included in the sum of 26 millions. Tooke estimates these, including the Roving Hordes, at near 5½ millions, which is not likely to exceed the truth, consequently Russia contained in 1783, at least 32 millions of inhabitants.

‡ By certain data, from births and deaths, it is known, that, during peace, this great mass would increase at least 500,000 annually, but take one half as an allowance for the waste of war and other causes, and allowing her late acquisitions only to maintain their original numbers, there will remain 250,000 of an annual increase, which, in 30 years, since 1783, is nearly eight millions; without allowing any thing for the vast numbers who settled in Russia during the latter years of the reign of Catharine from all nations.

ASIATIC RUSSIA; a country much larger than all Europe, contains, according to the above enumeration, only five millions of inhabitants; and all these, with the exception of the three governments of Tobolsk, Irkutsk and Kolhyvane, (together larger than all Europe, but containing only 1,059,850 inhabitants) are all immediately adjoining the European provinces; from 600 to 900 miles from Petersburg, and from Moscow, the ancient capital, the most distant is only about 550 miles.

Russia, in 1763, contained 20 millions with the above mentioned exceptions, and, in 1783, about 26 millions, being an increase of six millions in 20 years, notwithstanding the bloody wars during that period; and her increase was in the same proportion for the 20 years preceding 1763.

European Russia, properly so called, contains 1,200,000 square miles, and from the preceding enumeration, about 36 millions of inhabitants, or 30 to a square mile—its breadth, from West to East, is 1000 English miles, and length from N. to South 1600; and, including Asiatic Russia, from Riga on the West to the confines of America on the East, it is 9200 miles, extending in these latitudes over half the circumference of this globe; and from the shores of the Caspian and Black Seas on the South to the Frozen Ocean on the North, the breadth of the Empire is 2400 miles. Its southern boundary extends along the following nations and seas, viz. Prussia, Austria, Turkey in Europe, the black Sea, and Sea of Azoff in Europe, and Turkey in Asia, Persia, the Caspian Sea, Tartary, and those extensive Countries North of Hindostan, and along the whole Chinese Empire, to the Sea of Japan, in Asia.

The Russian Army in 1794 consisted of

8 Divisions of 50,000 men each	-	400,000
Artillery	- - - -	30,000
4 Regts. Foot and one Regt. Horse Guards		10,000
Cossacks, Calmucs, &c. irregular troops	-	120,000
		560,000

To which may be added 200,000 Militia, all of which have been much augmented of late years.

The Russian Navy in 1794 consisted of

	<i>Line.</i>	<i>Frigates.</i>	<i>Gallies.</i>
In the Baltic	- 40	16	400
In the Euxine	- 8	12	200
In the Caspian	- 0	3	6 corvettes.

and many other smaller vessels.

The Cossacks, from their particular qualities, form a most effective part of the Russian army. The character of this gallant people has been most grossly misrepresented, and very much misunderstood. They have been represented as barbarians of the rudest kind; the reverse of this is the case. It is true they cannot boast great refinement in education, but the virtues of social life they possess in a great degree. In peace the Cossack is gentle, hospitable and humane; in war alone he is terrible to his enemy, and, in a protracted mode of it, particularly so. With a patience which no difficulties can deter, no dangers appal, he watches every motion, and traces every movement; is every where to be found, and met with when least expected; his attacks are irregular, incessant, and destructive. His horse, partaking of the character of his master, is a spirited and indefatigable animal, and perhaps no creature of its kind lives upon less or coarser food than it does. With the bridle of this faithful servant bound round his arm, the whole of whose food perhaps is the moss, or what scanty vegetation may be within its reach, the Cossack takes his repose, with the cold earth for his bed, and the canopy of heaven for his covering, both alike unfeeling of fatigue, and insensible of fear.

Russia has no National debt; and, in peace, the revenues considerably exceed her expenditure.

The revenue of Russia may be taken at 50,000,000 roubles, or £10,000,000 sterling; and her expenditure 38,000,000 roubles; of which 6,000,000 roubles is for the army, and 1,500,000 for the navy; all other ordinary expences 3,505,000. Her foreign commerce is very considerable with most nations of

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Europe, and a great part of Asia. In 1797, the imports into Petersburg alone was £4,000,000 sterling, and their exports by the Baltic exceeded their imports by one third.

The internal commerce of Russia is also of great extent and value. Siberia is said to afford in gold, silver, copper, iron, salt, gems, &c. to the amount of 12,000,000 roubles, or £2,400,000 sterling; that between the Southern and the Northern provinces is still more considerable. The coin current in the Empire is supposed to amount to about £30,000,000 sterling, and the paper money to about 20,000,000.

The Russian Empire, compared to its size, contains very few towns, and these separated at an amazing distance from each other. The 71 principal towns cannot contain above 2,500,000 inhabitants, if so much; and the other 488, which deserve the name of towns, about an equal number, so that not more than 1-10th of this great population dwell in towns. During the reign of Catharine, no fewer than 247 towns were erected in the different governments at her expense and by her orders.

Generally speaking, Russia is a level country, abounding in immense forests, and barren plains of vast extent, rivalling in that respect the vast deserts of Asia and Africa. In the south, are some extensive *steppes* or dry and elevated plains, such as that above the sea of Azoff, in length about 400 English miles. It contains also numerous lakes of great magnitude; such as, the Ladoga, Onega, &c. the former of which is 130 miles in length by 70 in breadth, and the latter 150 miles in length by 90 in breadth. Her rivers are numerous, large, and important. The chief is the Volga. This king of European streams, has the sources of its principal branches amongst the Valday mountains, about 270 miles east of Riga, and 140 south by east of St. Petersburg, whence it bends its majestic course in an easterly direction through the whole of European Russia; turning in a south west direction, it then forms the boundary between Europe and Asia for about 500 miles, and then, in a south east direction 250 miles more; it flows into the Caspian sea at Astrakan, in lat. 46° North, long. 48° East, after a course of 1,700 miles. This great river is navigable to Twer, near 1,400 miles from its mouth, and some idea may be formed of the placidity of its current,

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when it is known, that the mountains where it takes its rise are computed not to exceed 1,200 feet in height above the level of the sea, and thereby giving only about 3-4ths of an inch per mile for a descent. The next is the Dnieper, or ancient Borysthenes, which, after a course of 1600 miles through rich and fertile provinces, falls into the Euxine, or Black Sea. The Don, or ancient Tanais, after running a course of about 800 miles, falls into the Sea of Azoff, a branch of the Euxine. The Niester also falls into the Euxine after a course of about 600 miles. The Dwina in the North falls into the Frozen Ocean at Archangel, after a course of about 500 miles; and the Duna or Dwina, of equal length in the South, falls into the Baltic at Riga. There are, besides, many other streams of great magnitude, but inferior note.

In Asiatic Russia, there is still more important streams. The Ob, which falls into the Frozen Ocean, runs over a course of about 1900 miles; and the Yenissei and Lena, are rivers of not much inferior length, and perhaps equal magnitude, these rivers also fall into the Frozen Ocean.

It is along the banks of the rivers, in European Russia, that the most fertile and populous provinces of this great empire are situated; and placed as they are between 44° and 58° lat. they enjoy a good climate for every purpose of agriculture and commerce.

From the banks of the Niemen to Petersburg, a distance of nearly 650 miles, there is no towns of any note but Riga and Revel, upon the Baltic, at equal distances in the above space—the country is barren, marshy and full of lakes, and could easily be rendered a complete desert by a retreating army, with very little loss to its inhabitants.

From Kowno, where the centre of the French army crossed the Niemen to Wilna, is about 90 miles—from Wilna to Petersburg, in a direct line, 500 miles—from Wilna to Moscow, 590 miles—from Moscow to Petersburg, 490 miles—from Wilna to Riga, 170 miles—from Riga to Petersburg, 368 miles—and from Riga to Moscow, 710 miles—from Wilna to Polotski on the Dwina, near 170 miles—from Polotski to Riga down that river, about 200 miles—from Polotski to Petersburg, 320 miles, and to Moscow 360 miles.

From the latitude of 58° the climate of Russia is excessively severe. About Petersburg, the snow commences in the latter end of September and continues till May, during which time the frost is most intense. Only two months in the year are reckoned to be completely free from snow. At Ostiong, in the Government of Vologda, situate in 61° , the cold is so great, that on the 4th November, 1786, the quicksilver froze in the open air in a cold of $30\frac{1}{2}^{\circ}$ of Reaumer. On the 7th of December, it fell even to 60° , the quicksilver freezing to a solid mass, on which several strokes of a hammer were struck before any part fell off. On an average of 10 years, according to an accurate account kept by the Academy of Sciences at Petersburg, there are during the year, 97 bright days, 93 cloudy, 96 rainy, and 79 snowy. The ground is frozen during winter to the depth of 2 and 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ feet, and the ice upon the Neva is often 36 inches thick; the number of frosty days is reckoned from 150 to 190.

The middle regions of this vast Empire from the latitude of 58° to 50° , enjoy the mild climate of England and Germany; while Taurida and other southern parts from lat. 50° to 43° are blessed with all the warmth and luxuriance of the southern climate.

The grand population of Russia is Slavonic. The Slavons form an extensive original race of mankind, radically distinct from the Goths on the one hand, who, as possessing the countries more to the west, must have preceded the Slavons in their passage from Asia into Europe, and equally distinguishable in language, person, and manners from the Tartars, and other nations on the east. They are the Sarmatæ of the ancients, and were ever remarkable for their personal elegance and strength.

The soil is of course extremely diverse, from the chilling marshes which border the White and Frozen Seas, to the rich and fertile plains on the Volga. The most fertile is that between the Don and the Volga, from Voronetz to Sinbersk, consisting of a black mould strongly impregnated with saltpetre, that is, a soil formed from successive layers of vegetable remains. The great extent of arable land might be much ex-

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tended, if industry were more diffused. The produce of Li- vonia and Esthonia is from 8 to 10 fold, and the same is gene- rally the harvest on the rich plains by the Don, which are never manured, being apt to swell the corn into too much luxuriance. Pasturage is so abundant that the meadows are scarcely noticed, therefore artificial grasses hardly known. In some of the steppes, or plains, the grass attains the height of a man, and is seldom mown. The annual burning of this grass, as practised in ancient times, may have produced that rich black mould so abundant in some large regions of this empire.

European Russia has few mountains, though those parts which send out the large rivers Volga, Dnieper and Dwina, must be considerably elevated. This elevated range extending through part of the provinces of Smolensk, Polotsk, Pskov, Twer, and Novgorod, is called the Valday mountains, from the town and lake of Valday, situated on the ridge, but by the natives Phesokaya Plostchade, or *elevated ground*. In this quarter the ground is strewed with masses of granite, but the hills are chiefly marl, sand and clay; and, what are called the mountains of Valday, seem to be a high table land, interspersed with masses of red and grey granite, hornblende, short and steatites; near Valday is the highest of the range. The hills, lakes, and groves are beautiful, and there is an island with a noble mo- nastery. Some suppose the uplands of Valday to be an exten- sion of the mountains of Olonetz, passing between the lake Onega and Ladoga, and afterwards between those of Ilmen and Siliger, which is the chief ridge; yet the greatest height is sup- posed not to exceed 1200 feet above the level of the sea, there- by giving a striking idea of the gentleness of the current of the rivers issuing from them—the Volga running a course of 1700 miles, and, including its various turnings and windings, perhaps 3000.

From the Valday towards the South, scarce a mountain ap- pears; but, passing the steppe of the Dnieper, an arid plain, with salt lakes, which indicates the extent of the Euxine at re- mote periods, we arrive at the mountains of Taurida, which are rather romantic than remarkable for their height. South of this chain upon the shores of the Euxine, are beautiful vales,

producing the olive, fig, pomegranate and laurel, while the arbutus adorns the deepest cliffs with its red bark and foliage of perpetual green. In this natural orchard the vine also abounds, and the numerous flocks of sheep and goats (some of the Tartars have from 1000 to 50,000) bounding from rock to rock and feeding on the hills, joined to the simple manners and good humour of the Tartar inhabitants, render the scene most delightful.

In European Russia the forests are so numerous that it would be in vain to enumerate them. The elevated range of the Valday mountains may be looked upon as one continued one—that of Volkoskoi, on the road through them, from Petersburg to Moscow, is about 150 miles in length; it consists of oak, beech, mountain ash, poplar, pines and firs, mingled together in endless variety. There are others between Vlademir and Arzomas. Farther south, there seems to have been a forest of still greater extent, and probably, the Riphean forest of antiquity. The trees of most use and most abundant are the fir, the Scotch pine, the yew leaved fir and the larch, all of which growing together form these amazing forests, which supply the rest of Europe with masts, deals, pitch and tar; and it is from those forests, on the Valday chain towards the province of Smolensk, are brought the masts, &c. exported from Riga, and which are brought from the Dnieper to the Dwina, which approach each other very near between Smolensk and Polotski, and floated down the latter stream*.

The breed of horses in many parts of the Empire, are large, strong and beautiful. At Archangel are found small ponies like those of the North of Britain. The steeds of Lithuania are noted for strength, and those of Livonia for speed. The spirit and beauty of the Tartarian horse is well known, and these have been much improved by the introduction of the Turkish and Arabian breed.

Even the country about Archangel, in the lat. of 65°, is famous for excellent pasturage, and fine cattle; but the summer is very short, and the winter severe.

* For several observations in the two last pages, I am indebted to that valuable system of Geography, by Mr. Pinkerton.

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In the North, rye is generally cultivated; but in the middle and Southern provinces wheat; in the Government of Ekatarinoslaf, the Arnautan wheat is beautiful, and the return 15 fold; barley is a general produce, and as well as oats, is converted into meal; Moscow produces asparagus, and sugar melons abound near the Don and Volga; apples and pears are found as far North as 49°, and plumbs and cherries extend to 55°; what is called the kerfskoi apple often weighs four lbs. and will keep a long while.

Samogitia is the first province after passing the Niemen at Tilsit, and formed part of ancient Poland. It is about 150 miles in length by 90 in breadth. Bounded on the S. by the Niemen, on the W. by the Baltic, on the N. by Courland, and E. by Lithuania. The country is woody, and has many fertile spots: the meadows feed abundance of cattle, and the horses are particularly excellent; bees are abundant, and large quantities of wax and honey are collected; the woods abound with bears and elks. Chief towns Rossiena and Midniki.

Courland, including Semigallia, is a large province, bounded W. by the Baltic, N. and E. by the gulph of Riga and the Dwina, and S. by Samogitia. The chief towns are Goldingen, Windau, Libau, Groben, and Landaw; none of which are extensive. The country is level and fertile, bears good corn, and great quantities of excellent flax. The woods are numerous, and abound in bears, wolves and elks. Length 200 miles, and breadth from 30 to 10 miles.

Lithuania to the eastward, of which Wilna is the capital, is a large and important province, bounded N. by the Dwina, E. by a line drawn from Polotsk on that river, south to a branch of the Dnieper, west of the government of Mogilhev, and thence down that river to the confines of Volhynia. This country is level, and produces a good deal of corn and honey; it has numerous lakes and forests; the meadows are fertile, and feed numerous flocks and herds; the forests abound with bears, wolves, wild boars, buffaloes, deer, &c. But notwithstanding the land is so fertile, agriculture is much neglected, and the most fertile spots lie waste; the luxuriant pastures in the meadows lie neglected till the grass rot on the ground. This province lies

between 51° and 55° , N. lat. is about 320 miles in length, and 160 miles in breadth.

Keeping along the shores of the Baltic, and crossing the Dwina, or Duna, the first part of Russia Proper is Livonia, divided into the governments of Riga and Revel. The first is the government of Riga, which is a province of considerable extent, being about 160 miles in length and 120 in breadth. This province consists partly of woods and morasses, and partly of fertile soil, which yields the inhabitants plenty; the air is clear and salubrious, but the winter is long and severe, consequently the summer short; but, while it lasts, is favourable to vegetation which advances rapidly. In plentiful years the inhabitants export considerable quantities of rye and barley. Livonia is called the granary of the North. The horned cattle, horses, and goats of this country are numerous and much esteemed: vast quantities of flax, hemp, lintseed, leather and skins are exported from hence. There are few towns of any note or extent, except Riga, the capital, with a population of about 30,000. This province lies from 57° to 59° N. lat.

Revel is situated to the N. of the government of Riga, bounded by it on the S. by the Gulph of Finland on the W. and N. and by Pskov on the E. and is about a degree in breadth. The chief town is Revel, about 170 miles from Petersburg. It has a flourishing trade and a good harbour, and is a station for part of the fleet. Population about 25,000. Revel is distant from Petersburg, by the *great road*, 225 miles, from Moscow 710.

Returning to the S. on the N. bank of the Duna and E. of Riga, is the government of Polotski, in length 160, and breadth 60 miles, bounded N. W. by the government of Riga, N. E. by Pskov, S. E. by Smolenski, and S. W. by Lithuania. Polotsk is the capital, distant 200 miles from Riga, and 320 from Petersburg. Its soil, climate and produce are much the same as the government of Riga and the northern parts of Lithuania. Polotsk, is from Petersburg by the *great road*, 430 miles.

Next to Polotsk, is the government of Pskov, about 200 miles in length by 96 in breadth. Pskov is the capital, about 480 miles from Moscow and 230 from Petersburg. In this government is situated the large lake of Tchudskoj, or Pskowskie,

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in length about 74 miles, and breadth about 24. The river Viliki enters it from the E. The face of the country of this and the other provinces has already been enumerated in the general observations below. Dunaburgh is a town of considerable strength, situate upon the Dwina, with a population of about 5000 inhabitants, distance from Petersburg by the only roads, 420 miles, and from Moscow nearly the same.

Next in the road to Petersburg is the Government of Novgorod, in length about 320 miles and breadth 160. Novgorod is the capital, about 126 miles S. E. from Petersburg, and about 360 N. W. of Moscow. This is one of the most ancient cities in the Empire, and at one time, is said to have contained 400,000 inhabitants, but in 1783 there were supposed to be only about 12,000. In this government is situate the lake Ilmen, near the capital, and is in length about 48 miles, and breadth from 12 to 18.

Next to this is the government of St. Petersburg, bounded N. by the gulph of Finland, the government of Viborg, lake Ladoga, and the province of Olonetz, S. E. by Novgorod, S. by Pskov, and W. by the gulph of Finland, and is about 500 miles in circumference. It has several lakes, is very marshy, and has a cold bleak climate, and is an indifferent country. Petersburg is the capital of this government and of the empire, though the Russians call it the *residence*, and reckon Moscow the chief. Petersburg contains about 400,000 inhabitants, and is the surprising work of the last century—in the midst of frozen marshes, only a few huts of fishermen occupied the place where this capital now stands, in which is collected the luxuries of the four quarters of the globe.

Turning east from Wilna, after Lithuania, the first province of Russia Proper towards Moscow, is Mogilhev, which is bounded N. by Polotski, N. E. by Sinolensk, S. by Tchernigov and W. by Lithuania. It is 176 miles long and 120 broad in the middle, but only about 64 miles in the northern, and 24 in the southern extremity. Mogilhev is the capital, a handsome commercial town on the Dnieper, where a considerable trade is carried on. Mogilhev is, from Petersburg by the great road, 504 miles, from Moscow 360.

Beyond this is the government of Smolensk, 180 miles in length, by 160 in breadth, bounded N. E. by Moscow, S. E. by Kaluga, W. by Mogilhev and Polotski, and N. by Tver. Smolensk is the capital, distant from Moscow, 250 miles and Petersburg 428, with a population of about 8000 inhabitants. It is built on two hills, with a valley and the river Dnieper between. It is also surrounded with walls 30 feet high and 15 thick, the lower of stone, and the upper of brick, which follow the course of the hills, and enclose a considerable space. The houses are mostly built of wood, and the principal articles of trade are, flax, hemp, timber, masts, planks, honey, wax, hogs bristles, and Siberian furs.

East of part of Smolensk and S. E. of Moscow, is the government of Kaluga, bounded N. by Moscow, E. by Moscow and Tula, S. by Orill, and W. by Smolensk; in length about 140 miles, breadth from 30 to 90. Kaluga is the capital, situated on the river Occa, a tributary stream to the Wolga; the population is about 15,000. Kaluga is, from Petersburg, by the great road, 595 miles, from Moscow 105.

North east from it is the Government of Moscow, in length about 100 miles, and breadth 92, bounded N. and N. W. by Tver, W. by Smolensk, S. by Kaluga and Tula, and E. by Vladimir. Moscow is the capital of this province and of the whole Empire, and contains about 200,000 inhabitants. It derives its name from the river Moskva, a branch of the Occa, on which it is situate, and was founded about 1156. It is computed there are 1600 churches in this city; among which are 11 cathedrals and 271 parish churches. Moscow is remarkable for the number and size of its bells, particularly one presented by the Empress Anne, weighing 480,000 lbs.

Northward, on the road to Petersburg is the Government of Tver, bounded N. by Novgorod, E. by Yaroslavl and Vladimir, S. by Moscow and Smolensk, and W. by Pskov; in length about 180 miles, and breadth 100. Tver the capital, has a population of about 15,000, and is a place of very considerable commerce, from its situation at the conflux of the Tverza and the Volga, along which are conveyed all goods and merchandise sent by water from Siberia and the southern provinces from

Smolensk, 180 miles in N. E. by Moscow, S. E. by Tver. Moscow, 250 miles and about 8000 inhabitants. The river Dnieper walls 30 feet high and upper of brick, which use a considerable space. The principal articles are planks, honey, wax,

Moscow, is the government, E. by Moscow and in length about 140 is the capital, situated on the Wolga; the population, from Petersburg, by the

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Moscow. Tver is from Petersburg, by the great road, 380 miles, from Moscow 107.

Volhynia is a Palatinate of Poland, south of the river Pripez, and west of Kiev, about 180 miles in length, and from 80 to 120 in breadth. It is extremely fertile, producing its inhabitants a large surplus of grain. Rosemary, asparagus, &c. grow wild in the woods, equal to any in gardens. It is a level country.

Kiev is also a Palatinate of Poland, under the dominion of Russia, bounded N. and N. E. by Tchernigov, S. E. by Ekatarinoslaw, S. W. by Volhynia; in length about 148 miles, and breadth 64. Kiev is the capital, situated upon the Dnieper, here a very large river. It is formed of three towns, viz. the Castle of Petshersky, with its suburbs, the old town of Kiev, and the town of Pollos, which lies below the latter. Population about 16,000. Kiev is, from Petersburg by the great road, 1060 miles, from Moscow 576.

These parts of Poland and European Russia, are all intersected with numerous rivers, such as the Niemen, Pripez, Duna, Narowa, Neva, Tvertza, Volga, Occa and Dnieper, with their numerous tributary streams, and others of lesser note.

The roads in Russia are few and extremely bad. Indeed this is easily accounted for, as they are not much used; the principal and most expeditious mode of travelling, being on sledges upon the snow during three-fourths of the year; and in the more southern parts, newly acquired, little has been done to remove this inconvenience; hence the insuperable difficulties attending the carriage of artillery, and the heavy baggage of large armies in such a country, three-fourths of the year buried in snow, and, during the remainder, they sink in the mud and sand of these vast and extensive plains, or are entangled in almost impenetrable forests. From the banks of the Niemen, at Tilsit, one principal road goes by Riga to Petersburg, and one from Wilna to Minsk, Smolensk, and thence to Moscow; or, from the former place, to Polotsk on the Dwina to Smolensk, and thence to Moscow, but both bad, and only passable for artillery in very dry weather.

By these roads Bonaparte had to pass if he advanced either to Petersburg or Moscow, and over the bleak chain of the Valdai

mountains, covered with such forests, and intersected with innumerable branches of such vast rivers.

Supposing that the French army continued to extend itself in a line of equal length to that which it did when the contest began, (about 180 miles) and supposing it did, and that it was possible it could sweep along the shores of the Baltic in an equal breadth to Petersburg, it would then *only skirt* the edge of Russia in her least populous parts; and though she might be deprived of her ports in the Baltic, of great use to her, they would cease to be so to Bonaparte, from the hostility of the British navy; and, on the other hand, allowing he pushed forward with this imposing and extended line to Moscow, it was plain he must in doing so leave the shores of the Baltic near 300 miles on his one hand, and some of the most populous and mildest provinces of the Russian Empire, viz. Kio, Tchernigov, Novgorod, Siverskoi, Koursk, Charkof, Ekatarinoslaf, and Taurida, as much on the other hand, while those fertile and populous provinces, the strength of Russia, would lie still beyond him, eastward to the valley of the Volga; that there he would be removed nearly 600 miles further from his supplies; and, together with a formidable force in front, would have the Russian armies from the Danube and the southern provinces of the empire, and those from the shores of the Baltic, on his flanks and in his rear—which would necessarily render his scheme a desperate and uncertain undertaking; and, if Russia had determined, for the moment, to sacrifice much rather than render the whole dependent; and if French cunning and duplicity did not once more induce her to sheath her sword, it was obvious that she could scarcely fail to conquer, and arrest the career of that insatiable ambition which threatened the subjugation of the civilized world. Her country was well adapted for a protracted warfare, her population less contaminated with those baneful principles, which had taught the other nations of Europe that any other government and authority was better than their own, and which had done more than the power of France to lay Europe prostrate before them. Before Russia was equal in strength and civilization to what she at this time was, none ever attacked her with impunity, or came

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off with honour. Darius, notwithstanding his power and resources, failed with disgrace—Alexander prudently deferred it, or his boasted invincibility would have disappeared like a dream—and the Roman Empire, still more extensive and formidable than Bonaparte's, never attempted it with success. The plains of ancient Dacia, of which Moldavia and Wallachia formed a part, often saw *their* Eagles humbled in the dust; and the attempts in modern times are too well known to require their being mentioned here.

Such was the Empire against which the nations of the south of Europe were at this time marshalled in formidable array, under the banners of a man who had hitherto been the scourge of civilized Europe, yet conspicuously successful in his daring and destructive plans; and such the extent of a country inhabited by a numerous people, brave almost to desperation; in whose military vocabulary the term flight or even retreat is almost unknown, and who were now reduced to the necessity of contending for their existence, against the most unprincipled and ambitious of mankind.

Before proceeding to state the forces led against Russia, and the operations of the contending armies, it may not be uninteresting, to take a review of the causes, and principal occurrences which led to this memorable campaign.

The beginning of the year 1812, saw the Empire of the modern Charlemagne in its proudest glory and utmost strength. The arms of France were then extended to a pitch which the keenest ambition of Louis the XIV. had never contemplated, and which the utmost strength of her Revolutionary fury had attempted in vain. Europe was obedient to her nod, and trembled at her frown. From the Pillars of Hercules, to Cape North, she was obeyed; and from the mouths of the Elbe to the coast of Calabria, she found no resistance to her will. Russia, indeed, retained her independence; but then, she was engaged in schemes which equally assisted the objects which France had in view, as if she had been completely her vassal. Portugal alone, remained free and independent, but which independence British bravery and assistance had only recently accomplished, while formidable armies, breathing vengeance, still hung round

her frontiers and made her dread the future. Spain, it is true, bore the yoke with the deepest indignation; and, though overrun by numerous armies, it was easy to see that those trode upon a volcano, the slightest motion of which would bring ruin upon them. While continental Europe remained thus bound in French shackles, her principles extended across the Atlantic, and taking a deep root in North America, were about to call forth the energies of that people also in her unhallowed cause—the overthrow of Britain, and destruction of the liberties of mankind. The resources of France seemed to have no bounds—the wealth of Europe was in her power, and she used it when and as she pleased, without a voice of complaint being openly raised against her. Her population had long been inured to arms, and delighted only in war and mischief. Her military force was prodigious. In old France, and the conquests annexed thereto, it amounted, according to the accounts of her own government, to 1,200,000* men independent of all the Rhenish Confederation. Her navy, indeed, was humbled, and durst not venture on the ocean, but she was rapidly improving her naval means in every part of her Empire. Commerce, indeed, she had none. Her wealth for many years had solely been acquired by the plunder of other countries, which the fortune of war and their own cowardice had thrown into her power. Paris was adorned, France beautified, and her people made rich by the spoils of other nations; and hence her immense population were ever eager and ready to enlist under the banners of their profligate government, in any undertaking however atrocious and unjust, that had conquest and plunder in view. Her throne was filled, and sceptre wielded, by an usurper who had been bred on fields of blood; and whose proper elements were ruin and destruction. Hence France was the scourge of nations, and the terror of the civilized world. To oppose her will, was accounted the height of madness; to arraign her conduct, was to draw down vengeance and destruction upon the

* On the 10th March, 1812, the reserve of Conscripts from 1806 to 1812, of the 1st class, viz: from 20 to 26 years of age, and not called upon to join the active army, were 600,000.—Bassano's report, March 10th, 1812.

the future. Spain, it is indignation; and, though easy to see that those notions of which would mental Europe remain—principles extended root in North America, of that people also in Britain, and destruction of resources of France of Europe was in as she pleased, with-ly raised against her. to arms, and delight-ilitary force was pro-ests annexed thereto, it her own government, e Rhenish Confedera-and durst not ventureoving her naval meanserce, indeed, she hadolely been acquired byhe fortune of war andpower. Paris was a-ple made rich by thee immense populationr the banners of theiring however atrociousnder in view. Hery an usurper who hadproper elements wereas the scourge of na-world. To oppose her; to arraign her con-destruction upon the

ts from 1806 to 1812, of theed upon to join the active ar-2.

head of those who attempted it. The tocsin that was sounded at the Thuilleries alarmed the world, and the secret spring which was set in motion at St. Cloud, convulsed Europe with agony. With more boldness than other tyrants, he firmly believed that his power was invincible; and his subjects, that his wisdom was infallible. "The destiny of Napoleon is to reign and conquer—victory belongs to him, war to his age. Where still are the boundaries of possibilities? let England answer it. Let her meditate upon the past, and contemplate the future. France and Napoleon shall never change."* Proudly seated in Paris, and casting his eyes round the wide circle which obeyed him, he publicly proclaimed, It is my wisdom which has planned, and my arm alone which has organized and established all this. "Is not this great Babylon that I have built for the house of my kingdom, by the might of my power, and for the honour of my majesty?"† But not so saith He by whom kings reign. "It is I who have done it, and therefore have I brought it to pass, that thou shouldest be to lay waste defenced cities into ruinous heaps."‡ But "hitherto shalt thou come and no farther."§ "Hew down the tree and cut off his branches, shake off his leaves, and scatter his fruit: let the beasts get away from under it, and the fowls from his branches."||

France, intoxicated with success, considered Europe as her property, and her inhabitants as her slaves. Europe obeyed, but she obeyed with fear and reluctance. "Curses not loud, but deep," issued from her heart, and she eagerly watched the opportunity when she could with safety break her chains, and hurl them against the head of her oppressors. That opportunity was soon to be afforded her, and we shall see with what alacrity she seized it. The power of Great Britain yet remained unbroken, and her resources undiminished. She had preserved Portugal—she comforted Spain, and was ready to lend her powerful aid wherever it was demanded. Russia was sensible of this, and without violating the treaties she had concluded with her formidable adversary, she was resolved to assert her just rights, and no longer to submit to demands which those treaties did not warrant.

* Address of Senate.

† Isaiah, c. xxvii. 26.

‡ Daniel, c. iv. 14.

† Daniel, c. iv. 30.

§ Job, c. xxxviii. 11.

The fatal peace of Tilsit, which the generous mind of Alexander was drawn to consent unto, in a moment of irritation, against the wretched policy which the British Cabinet adopted towards him, early in 1807, had been productive of much distress throughout Russia. Day after day the Emperor perceived the sad effects of the mischievous councils to which he had listened, by the decay of his commerce, and the reduction of the resources of his Empire. The enemy also had violated every article of the treaty, in retaining in defiance thereof, the whole of the Prussian fortresses, and keeping a formidable military force in that kingdom, and in the newly erected duchy of Warsaw, which Russia soon perceived could be intended for no good purpose. Unwilling, however, to provoke the hostility of France at that moment, she carefully, on her part, observed the treaty of Tilsit; but while she continued to interdict all connection or communication with Britain, she was forced, by the necessities of her people, to allow of it under a neutral flag, which was one object of the treaty of Tilsit, that the flag* should cover the cargo, to whomsoever the property might belong. This Bonaparte resisted and remonstrated against, but the revolution in Spain having, in the meantime, taken place, and which occupied Bonaparte's attention, in a considerable degree, Russia was the less inclined to submit to have new and more galling conditions imposed upon her. The assistance which Britain lent to Spain and Portugal, provoked Bonaparte to madness, and made him enter into the wildest and most unjustifiable plans to counteract its effects; and, above all, to dry up the sources from whence that assistance flowed. Humbled also in the Peninsula, and smarting under the consequences of his own base conduct in that country, the example of which, he very justly dreaded, would spread into other countries; and, hoping to crush that in its bud, or if the Russians opposed him, to reap laurels in the North,

* Without deviating from the principles adopted by the Emperor of all the Russias for the commerce of his states, and for the admission of neutrals into the ports of his dominions—principles which his Majesty will never renounce, he binds himself, as a proof of his adherence to the alliance formed at Tilsit, not to adopt any change of the prohibitive measures against a direct trade with England."—Kurakin's Letter, April 30th, 1812.

nerous mind of Alexander, moment of irritation, British Cabinet adopted productive of much dismay the Emperor persuaded his councils to which commerce, and the re-

The enemy also retaining in defiance, and keeping a force in the newly erected perceived could he, however, to protect, she carefully, on while she continued on with Britain, she to allow of it under treaty of Tilsit, that over the property and remonstrated against, in the meantime, te's attention, in a declined to submit to ed upon her. The and Portugal, promise enter into the interact its effects; whence that assistance, and smarting conduct in that country, would spread that in its bud, or els in the North,

Emperor of all the Russians, neutrals into the ports, nounce, he binds himself, Tilsit, not to adopt any th England."—Kurz-

which might serve to cover his disgrace in the South, he no longer considered it necessary to keep on terms with Alexander. This coolness soon increased in the most unequivocal manner. Alexander remained firm; and, in 1811, it was evident, that he must either yield to the haughty demands of his enemy, or that war would be the consequence.

While Alexander wished to remain at peace upon condition of retaining his independence, he had too much reason to dread that he would not be allowed long to do so; and, therefore, preparing for the worst, he strained every nerve to bring round an accommodation with Turkey, with whom he was at that moment carrying on war, and into which he had been led by French policy, which now endeavoured to prolong that contest, and to throw every obstacle in the way of accommodation. Notwithstanding this, however, Alexander succeeded in his object, and concluded an honourable and an advantageous peace with the Turkish government.

The destruction of Britain, Bonaparte's favourite object, could only be accomplished, as he thought, by annihilating her trade. To accomplish this he was determined to sacrifice the happiness and prosperity of every nation in Europe. Amongst his other extraordinary demands upon Russia, he insisted, not only that Russia should abandon all connection and intercourse with that devoted country; but place her principal ports in the Baltic under his controul. "The ports of the continent shall not be opened either to denationalized flags, or British merchandize. But it must not be dissembled that to maintain in full vigour this grand system, it will be necessary that your majesty employ all the powerful means which belong to your Empire. It is necessary, that all the disposable French forces should march to whatever places the British, or denationalized flags should attempt to land."* To such extravagant demands it was impossible Russia could ever accede; and no wonder, when such degrading communications were made to her, and menaces held out against her, that "for eighteen months she had made it a constant rule to lay

* Bassano's report, Conservative Senate, March 10th, 1812.

her hand upon the sword, whenever propositions for an arrangement (upon the previous conditions, no doubt) have been made to her."* It was in vain that Russia urged she was at war with Britain, that she knew nothing of her, and all the intercourse she held with her, was through the medium of a neutral flag, to protect which was the principal object for which both parties were at war with Britain. In vain Russia urged the misery and ruin she would bring upon her people, by adopting such a course; and instanced even the ruler of France, as at that moment trading with Britain by means of licenses. Nothing would satisfy Bonaparte but implicit obedience unto his demands, the most extraordinary and degrading ever proposed to any independent nation. Yet torture language as we may, was not this the substance and plain meaning and design of Bonaparte's demands, viz. that Russia, should by one fell swoop with her own hands, annihilate all her foreign trade, lessened as it was by her impolitic war with Britain, and thereby reduce her whole population to misery and distress. Strip their official documents of that studied ambiguity and duplicity, which modern Frenchmen alone could have the impudence to endeavour to bewilder the human understanding with, and say if it is not so? Yet because Russia would not submit without a murmur to such unprincipled demands, reiterated with all the arrogance French power is capable of assuming; and further, of allowing Bonaparte to strip Russia of part of her dominions, to place under the sway of some of his creatures, thereby opening a door by which he could march to Petersburg or Moscow at his convenience; Russia was accused by him of provoking the war, and shrinking from a contest which she had courted.

That such policy, had it been adopted by Russia, would have been fatal to her, that the conduct she had adopted, if persevered in, would have withered her arm and paralyzed her power; and, that with all Bonaparte's inveterate animosity against Britain, he had sinister objects in view against Russia, could not admit of a doubt; and could not escape the knowledge of any thing but ignorance the most blind, and obstinacy the most irreclaim-

* Bassano's letter to Prince Kurakin, Paris, April 25th, 1812.

trample upon every principle of feeling and decorum; adding indignity to injustice, by insulting an honourable individual, obeying, and bound to obey the commands of his Sovereign. Yes, the mushroom Duke of Bassano treated in this manner Prince Kurakin, in every respect his superior. It is impossible not to admire the magnanimity and firmness of this respectable individual so situated. Corresponding with the accredited agent of a great government, upon things on which depended the happiness and repose of millions, he bestows upon him throughout the same honourable appellations, neither sinking to flattery, nor betraying fear. He retorts not the intentional *hanteur* of the other, and rises superior to his neglect. He demanded with firmness what was founded in justice, repelled with magnanimity the unprincipled demands and dishonourable imputations of France, and left not a shadow of complaint against his country for his personal conduct, to a set of arrogant upstarts, keenly on the watch to snatch any unfavourable circumstance in his behaviour, as an excuse for their unprincipled views.

Against the conduct of France as already detailed, let us contrast that of Russia. Although contrary to the faith of treaties, a near ally, and a near relation to her imperial throne, was driven from his territory, and sent a wanderer through the world, for no reason whatever, but because it suited the interest of French ambition to do so; or, for a more curious one still, because his territories were "*dovetailed*"* into territories France had previously unjustly seized. But so little inclined was Russia to involve the two countries in war, that she only protested that the act was wrong; was willing to put up with the indignity offered to her, and to accept any indemnity which might be offered to her friend.† Concession on her part, however, produced only boldness on the other. What! says the overbearing despot, through his deep toned organ Bassano? shall the Sovereign of Russia dare to complain of my conduct in annexing the paltry dominions of his relation to my territory? "The uniting of the duchy of Oldenburgh, *dovetailed* as it were into the countries recently brought under the same principles of government

* Bassano's letter to Count Romansow, Paris, April 25th, 1812.

† Prince Kurakin's letter, Paris, April 30th, 1812.

and decorum; adding honourable individuals to his Sovereign's commands treated in this manner by his superior. It is the strength and firmness of this policy, responding with the same force upon things on which he has no influence, he bestows upon appellations, neither of praise nor of reproof, he retorts not the inferiority to his neglect. He is just in justice, repelled by dishonourable and dishonourable of complaint against a set of arrogant and unfavourable circumstances, their unprincipled

already detailed, let us return to the faith of our imperial throne, and underer through the interest suited the interest of curious one still, to territories France inclined was Russia she only protested up with the indignity which might be part, however, proclaims the overbearing of shall the Sovereign in annexing the territory? "The uniting were into the councils of government

as France, was a necessary consequence of the uniting of the Hanseatic towns. An indemnity was offered. This object was easy to regulate with reciprocal advantage. But your cabinet made an affair of state of it; and, for the first time, was seen a manifesto of an ally against an ally*." With regard to the treaty of Tilsit, which Russia had, in an evil hour, and inconsiderate moment, entered into, she still had observed, and was willing most rigidly to observe it, providing that the French troops were only withdrawn from Prussia†, which that treaty had guaranteed as an independent power: and the more barefaced seizure of Swedish Pomerania in the midst of peace, was also relinquished, but neither of which could be considered the property of their rightful owners, while their towns swarmed with those myriads, who had so often destroyed thrones, when it suited their master's views. What, might not Russia very properly ask herself, can these be intended for in the North, while they are evidently wanted in Spain? According to the faith of treaties, says Russia, let there be an independent power between us, and we will then negotiate as independent nations. For it is impossible not to see, that if France will not give up Prussia, she violates the treaty between us, and can only have violated it to commit farther aggressions. I am willing to negotiate with you, willing to make reparation where you convince me I have done wrong, but I should humble my throne, barter away my own dignity, the safety and independence of my people, inseparably connected with mine, if I was to negotiate with a bayonet at my breast. Could any thing be more fair than these demands of Russia? but instead of the French troops being withdrawn, they were augmented, and under these circumstances all explanation being studiously and arrogantly refused, what could Russia do, but collect her forces, and prepare for war. This she did, in a manner which shewed she was aware of the contest she was entering into, and at the same time most prudently allowed her foe to be in every point, even in appearances, the aggressor.

Such were a few of the most ostensible causes which led to

* Bassano's letter to Romanzoff, April 25th, 1812.
† Prince Kurakin's letter, Paris, 30th April, 1812.

this dreadful struggle. "Approaching commotions and bloody wars were of course to be immediately apprehended*." But choice led the one party into it, and only imperious necessity the other. The one had justice on his side, the other had not a shadow of it. The one relied upon the goodness of his cause, and the fidelity of his people; the other upon the strength of his arm, and the innumerable hosts which the terror of his name had collected together. Blinded by ambition, and intoxicated with flattery and success, the French leader demanded that his will should be the law throughout Europe; that whatever he did must be right, and considered that whatever he undertook must be successful. "No person," says Bassano, "understands better than your Majesty, to expect from time, what time is to produce; and to maintain, with unchangeable constancy, a system and plan of conduct, from which you have calculated the results, which are infallible†." The world has certainly seen much better calculators.

The preparations made by Bonaparte being nearly completed, he commanded his venal press to proclaim throughout Europe, his accumulating forces in Poland. Amongst other documents, which Bonaparte now produced, were a treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, with the unfortunate king of Prussia, by which each party guaranteed the integrity of the territories of each other, and by which Prussia was obliged to furnish 20,000 men against Russia.—Also another treaty‡, of a similar nature, with Austria, by which that humbled power covenanted to furnish 30,000 men, always to be kept up to the war establishment, to assist France against Russia.—Ridiculous as these things were, to be contracted and issued into the world with such solemnity, where the one power had only to dictate, and the others to obey, still it shows he dreaded public opinion, and wished to throw the finest veil he could, over his arbitrary actions.

These things finished, on the 9th of May, secretly and suddenly, as usual, he left Paris, and on the 29th of the same month, he left Dresden, having there had conferences with some of his

* Bassano's letter to Romanzoff, April 25th, 1812.

† Bassano's Report to the Conservative Senate, March 10th, 1812.

‡ The one dated March 14th, 1812; the other, (Prussia,) February 24th, 1812.

emotions and bloody apprehended *." But by imperious necessity, the other had not goodness of his cause, on the strength of his terror of his name, and intoxicated her demanded that his; that whatever he whatever he under- Bassano, "under- ect from time, what a unchangeable con- which you have cal- The world has cer-

ing nearly complet- aim throughout Eu- Amongst other do- were a treaty of al- unfortunate king of he integrity of the ussia was obliged to another treaty†, of hat humbled power o be kept up to the ussia.—Ridiculous ssued into the world only to dictate, and public opinion, and is arbitrary actions. , secretly and sad- of the same month, es with some of his

0th, 1812.

) February 24th, 1812.

Rhenish puppets, and the humbled head of the house of Austria. In the meantime the French armies continued to press on towards the Russian frontiers. On the 16th Bonaparte arrived at Königsburgh, on the 17th at Insterburg, and on the 19th, he established his head quarters at Gumbinnen, a town on the Pissa, a branch of the Pregel, and not far from the Russian boundary. There he reviewed his troops, and like another Xerxes exulting in his strength, proclaimed himself invincible. Or, in the language of the tyrant of old, he thought, "I will sit also upon the mount of the congregation, in the sides of the north: I will ascend above the height of the clouds; I will be like the Most High *."

But let us consider what this force was. Although it is difficult to ascertain exactly the number of men led against Russia in the memorable campaign of 1812, yet the following statements will come near the truth, and shew us the vast amount.

The Journal de Paris of April 20, 1812, stated expressly, that France at that time had 500,000 effective men between the Elbe and Vistula, 50,000 in reserve, and 300,000 in Spain, besides the Austrian contingent of 30,000 men. About 50,000, the same paper informs us, were withdrawn from Spain, for the Russian contest, and replaced by the reserve or less veteran troops. The French Imperial Almanack for 1812, makes their regular army amount to 700,000 effective men, exclusive of national guards, the Rhenish confederation, and independent of the Austrian and Prussian contingents, and of all the Polish levies and troops. It is a fact well known, that France was completely stripped of regular troops, and that the duty in the interior was done by another species of force, similar to our regular or local militia. Another conscription of 137,000 men was, shortly after, called out in France, and an equal proportion in all her vassal states; and, upon the restoration of the Kingdom of Poland, when the French entered Wilna, a fresh levy of 40,000 men was called out. Independent, therefore, of reinforcements marching from all quarters

* Isaiah xiv. 13, 14.

to recruit his ranks, the force Bonaparte led against Russia, must have exceeded 500,000 effective men, besides the Polish deserters from the Russian ranks. Every one knows, that the dreadful engine, conscription, always kept the French corps and regiments complete; and there would be no deficiency in any one, at a moment when Bonaparte had been preparing, for two years preceding, for the blow he fondly imagined, would lay Europe prostrate before him. What an army, therefore, has he lost! What a fearful reverse has he sustained! The Russian accounts certainly do not exceed the truth.

By the Journal de Paris, the numbers in this mighty contest would have stood thus:—

Between the Elbe and the Vistula, April 1812,	500,000
Withdrawn from Spain for Russia,	50,000
Austrian Contingent,	30,000
New Polish Levy,	40,000
Polish Deserters, by 8th Bulletin,	20,000

Effective Men,	640,000
And followers of various descriptions,	50,000

Total, 690,000

The Prussian quota of 20,000 is here supposed to be included in the first number. The same paper, December 19, tells us only of the 2d, 9th, and 10th corps, with the Saxons and Austrians being upon the Niemen again. What became of all the rest?

The numbers may be stated in two other forms, viz. First, 11 Corps of the French Army, 20,000 infantry, and

5000 cavalry each,	275,000
Imperial Guards 30,000 infantry,	30,000
Italy, Switzerland, Bavaria, Holland, &c. &c. &c.	140,000
Austrian Contingent,	30,000
Prussian ditto,	20,000
Polish Levies and Deserters,	60,000

Effective men, 575,000

parte led against Russia, men, besides the Polish every one knows, that the kept the French corps could be no deficiency in had been preparing, for fondly imagined, would t an army, therefore, has sustained! The Russian uth.

s in this mighty contest

1812,	500,000
-	50,000
-	30,000
-	40,000
-	20,000

-	640,000
-	50,000

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r, December 19, tells
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r forms, viz. First,
antry, and

-	275,000
-	30,000
&c. &c.	140,000
-	30,000
-	20,000
-	60,000

575,000

Followers of various descriptions,

Brought forward, 575,000
50,000

Total, 625,000

Second—By the Act of the Rhenish Confederation, dated Paris, 12th July, 1806, the quotas to be furnished *under the command* of Napoleon (if any of the contracting Powers were attacked in the North) by the States which then acceded to it, were fixed thus, by the 38th article of that treaty, viz:

France,	-	-	-	-	200,000
Bavaria,	-	-	-	-	30,000
Wurtemberg,	-	-	-	-	12,000
Baden,	-	-	-	-	8,000
Berg,	-	-	-	-	5,000
Darmstadt,	-	-	-	-	*4,000
Nassau Hohenzolern,	-	-	-	-	4,000

263,000

Naples,
The rest of Italy,
Switzerland,
Tyrol,
Ilyrian Provinces,
Holland,
Westphalia,
Saxony,
Duchy of Warsaw,
Hansentic Towns,
Swedish Pomerania,

These countries contain by the latest and most accurate accounts, upwards of 26 millions of Inhabitants. Bavaria, which contains, in round numbers 2 millions of inhabitants, has her quota fixed at 30,000, and suppose the others are assessed in a similar manner, it would give 390,000 men; taking only one half as disposable, would make - -

† 195,000.

458,000

* This is stated at 40,000 in the copy I have, but it must be an error of the press.
† If taken in the same proportion as the quota of France is to her population, it would give 200,000 men, even allowing no extraordinary levy was called forth, nor strict demand made, but both of which was done in this Campaign. The Bavarians were in reality 37,000 strong, and the Wurtembergers 13,000.

		<i>Brought forward,</i>	458,000
Hessia,	-	-	20,000
Prussia,	-	-	20,000
Austria,	-	-	30,000
Spanish troops, say	-	-	5,000
Polish Levies and Deserters,	-	-	533,000
Followers of all descriptions,	-	-	60,000
			50,000

Total, 648,000

The following statement is, however, the most moderate, and is presumed to be the most accurate, as it is taken from the French official documents of that year, with this difference, that the troops of the vassal states are supposed to complete each corps to 30,000 effective men, infantry, besides cavalry. The French official details have again and again informed us that, the 9th and 11th corps acting as reserves under Bellano (Victor) and Castiglione (Augereau) were 30,000 strong each at the beginning of the campaign, though afterwards increased;—and we may fairly conclude that those which were to be engaged in immediate service, were at least equally complete, if not more so. The total force would therefore stand thus, and which the subsequent losses will shew us must be tolerably correct.

9 corps Infantry, 30,000 each,	-	-	270,000
9th corps Victor's Reserve,	-	-	45,000
11th Do. Augereau's Do.	-	-	60,000
5 Divisions Cavalry, under Murat,	-	-	50,000
Imperial Guards, Infantry,	-	-	30,000
Garrison of Dantzic,	-	-	* 20,000
Austrian Contingent,	-	-	† 30,000
Polish Troops, Deserters from Russia,	-	-	20,000
Polish Levies,	-	-	40,000

Effective Men, 565,000

* 1st Bulletin.—"The garrison of Dantzic was increased to 20,000 men."

† Treaty, France and Austria, Article 4th.—"30,000 men, viz. 24,000 infantry

	Brought forward,	270,000
Deduct one Corps equal to the Bavarians,		
sent with Oudinot as before,	-	30,000
		240,000
Effective men, besides the Polish levy,	-	525,000

Never had Europe seen such armies assembled. Her whole energies and resources were called forth for this tremendous conflict. Her whole military means formed by twenty years experience on the fields of war, were now collected under the command, and obedient to the nod of a hitherto successful adventurer; and while these fearful swarms overspread in formidable array the banks of the Vistula and the Pregel, Russia was proclaimed subjugated, and her throne overthrown. Russia, however, had weighed the danger she had to encounter, and fearless, braved this terrible tempest. Certain that in Great Britain she would find a firm support, and a steady friend, she nobly resolved to hazard every thing, and make any sacrifice, rather than compromise her honour and independence. On the 20th of June, Bonaparte's first bulletin, one of those fore-runner's of death and desolation, appeared at Gumbinnen; and on the 22d he published his second, with the address to his soldier's, which was also his declaration of war. Europe heard with fear and silence those masterpieces of arrogance, impiety, and vanity. "Russia is dragged along by a fatality! her destinies must be accomplished.—This second war of Poland will be as glorious to the French arms as the first; but the peace which we shall conquer will be its own guarantee, and will put an end to the proud and haughty influence which Russia has for 50 years exercised over Europe."* None but he who was infallible, should have spoke thus. The next day his troops entered the Russian territory. On the morning of the 24th he passed the Niemen at Kowno, and on the 28th he advanced to Wilna; the Russians agreeably to a preconcerted plan, every

* Address to the army, by Bonaparte, June 22d.

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where retiring in excellent order, destroying, or carrying off every thing that could be of the smallest use to the invader.

At Wilna he remained near three weeks, occupied in the theatrical farce of restoring the Kingdom of Poland, and trampling upon the feelings of that people, by confirming the dismemberment of their finest provinces. It could afford neither instruction nor amusement, to repeat all the inflammatory harangues of France and her adherents, upon this occasion. All their fine spun theories, and boasts of justice and humanity, were cut short by the infallible Napoleon, in his imperious answer to the deputation of the newly constituted diet, who waited upon him for his approbation of their conduct, in the restoration of the kingdom of Poland. "It is entirely upon the unanimity of the efforts of the population which covers countries so distant and extensive, that you must found your hopes of success. I must add here, that I have guaranteed to the Emperor of Austria, the integrity of his dominions; and that I cannot sanction any manœuvre, or any movement, that may tend to trouble the peaceable possession of what remains to him of the Polish provinces. Let Lithuania, Samogitia, Witepsk, Polotsk, Mohilow, the Ukraine, Podolia, be animated with the same spirit which I have seen in Great Poland, and Providence will crown with success your holy cause,"* &c. And was this the restoration of the kingdom of Poland, about which so much time was wasted in praising the deed. To Austria and Prussia their part was guaranteed, which left only that part belonging to Russia, or one third, to be restored to the situation of an independent state; a chimera more wild, absurd, and unjust, than any that ever entered into the mind of Napoleon, or the minds of those potentates who first dismembered this country. For what then was Napoleon praised, and where, with regard to this article, was his title to it?

His army having previously advanced, on the 17th he left Wilna; and on the 20th forced the passage of the Duna near Drissa; the Russians abandoned the entrenched camp they

* Seventh Bulletin, Wilna, July 16th.

had formed there, and after destroying every thing, retreated to the eastward. According to the accounts of the enemy, this entrenched camp was a work of great magnitude and expence, and had cost the Russians the labour of 6,000 men for three years, to complete it. It was very strong, and abundantly supplied with military magazines and stores, part of which were thrown into the river Dwina. The enemy, however, perhaps exaggerated the account of this place, in order to enhance the value of the acquisition, and to make it be believed, that the Russians, under any circumstances, were unable to cope with his formidable force. The reason, however, why the Russians abandoned this important place, in all probability was, because they had altered their whole plan of operations, of which this was intended to have formed a part. The general idea, at the commencement of the struggle was, that the enemy would advance in the direction of St. Petersburg, which the Russians would particularly endeavour to prevent. This was probably the idea of Russia, when she formed the camp; and this seems to have been the design of the enemy, when he ordered along with him besieging artillery, which, when he afterwards found the Russians had taken another route, he sent back. It was said that an aid de camp of Alexander's had disclosed the plan of the campaign to Bonaparte, for which he was sent into Siberia, and the whole plan, just about the commencement of hostilities, was therefore altered. This will also account for the fortifications and entrenchments at Mojaïsk, being in an unfinished state at the time of the engagement, having only then been newly and hastily thrown up, a work which would not likely have been left to the last moment, had the falling back of the Russian army in that direction, formed part of the original plan. Previous to the abandonment of this place, however, a sharp action took place near it. Bonaparte gives rather a curious account of this affair, as he generally does, when he has the worst of it. "The enemy, says he, to the amount of from 100 to 120,000 men, being concentrated in the entrenched camp at Drissa, upon the 15th, finding that our light cavalry did not keep a strict watch, threw a bridge over the river,

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and sent across 5000 infantry, and 5000 cavalry, which attack-
ed general Sebastiani unexpectedly, and drove him back one
league, and caused him a loss of 100 killed and wounded,
amongst the latter of whom, was general Genier, mortally*." The Russians, however, gave a very different, and more ac-
curate account of this transaction. The enemy having been
previously repulsed in two attacks upon the place, was, in this
action, in which the Russians had sent general Kulnew, with the
regiment of Grodno hussars, and some squadrons of Cossacks,
across the river, entirely defeated, and the two regiments of
cavalry, of which his force consisted, "were completely cut up,
and their commander, brigadier general Genier, with several
officers, and 200 privates, were made prisoners†." In these
repeated attacks, the enemy lost a great number of men.
Hitherto, however, no action of any moment had taken
place. The Russians continued to retreat, agreeable to their
plan, and the enemy to follow them. These rapid marches,
however, fatigued and jaded their troops, who were thus
sometimes exposed to the ever watchful Cossacks, and al-
though it was now the middle of summer, Bonaparte com-
plained that he had lost several thousand horses, by reason of
the cold.

The collected forces of the enemy, like an overwhelming tor-
rent, rolled along to Polotsk, which the Russians yielded up, and
back upon Ostrovno and Witepsz. At Drissa, a corps of
the enemy were repulsed with great loss, and obliged to recross
the Duna. The plan of the Russians was now beginning to
develop itself. Two admirable proclamations from the Empe-
rator Alexander, the one directing the inhabitants of the provin-
ces through which the enemy should march, to destroy every-
thing which they had not immediate use for, and assuring them
that they would be paid the full value out of the Imperial trea-
sury. This order was cheerfully obeyed. The other was for the

* 8th French Bulletin, Gloubekoe, July 22d.

† Russian Bulletin, July 16th.

purpose of informing the nation of the plans to be acted upon, and for quieting the minds of the soldiers, who were very unwilling to retreat, but eager for battle. "The enemy," says the Emperor to the army, "accuses you of timidity, because of mistakes, or affects to mistake the policy of your system. Desperate counsels are alone compatible with the enterprise he has undertaken, and the dangers of his situation; but shall we therefore, be imprudent, and forego the advantages of our own? He would March to Moscow—let him. But can he by the temporary occupation of that city, conquer the empire of Russia, or subjugate a population of 50 millions? Soldiers! in pursuance of the policy of our military councils, the army will, for the present, quit their positions, and retire farther into the interior, in order more readily to unite. The enemy may possibly avail himself of this opportunity to advance. He is *desperate*, and would therefore put every thing upon the issue of a battle. The honour of our crown, the interests of our subjects, prescribe, however, a different policy: it is necessary that he should be *made sensible* of the madness of the attempt," &c. It is impossible that plainer or stronger language could be used to shew that the Russians were acting upon a wise and cautious plan. But nothing could convince the friends of Napoleon of this. All the measures which the Russians took, were looked upon as acts of direful necessity, forced upon them by the superior skill and force of the enemy. Napoleon encouraged the idea with all his usual cunning and address, though he must have been sensible it was far otherwise.

In the meantime, the enemy, by the rapidity of his movements, endeavoured to interpose with the main body of his army, between the centre and left wing of the Russian army; the former commanded by Barclay de Tolly, and the latter by Prince Bagration. Thinking he would thus be able to attack them separately, and to cut them off in detail. To accomplish this, the enemy exerted his utmost military strength and skill. The pursuit of this object brought on the severe engagements of Witepsk, Ostrovno, Wileff, and Polotsk, which merit our attention. The Russian army, which broke up from Drissa, under the command of Barclay de Tolly, and the army of Prince Bagration, who followed him, were both defeated. The Russian army, which broke up from Drissa, under the command of Barclay de Tolly, and the army of Prince Bagration, who followed him, were both defeated.

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de Tolli, consisted, according to the accounts of the enemy, in his 10th bulletin, of five corps de armee, each of two divisions, and four divisions of cavalry. These would amount to 150,000 men, as the Russian corp de armee consists, when complete, of 25,000. One division of these, with a proportion of cavalry, was left with Witgenstein at Polotsk, consequently about 110,000 must have marched upon Witepsk. The other part of the army under the command of Bagrathion, consisted, according to the 8th bulletin of the enemy, of four divisions of infantry, from 22 to 24,000 men each, from 4 to 5,000 cavalry, and Platoff's Cossacks about 6,000; which, altogether, would make a force of 107,000 men. Consequently, the whole force of the Russians at the beginning of the campaign, on this side of their Empire, must have been about 240,000 men, besides the garrison of Riga, 18,000, and the Cossacks, estimated at 50,000, a force only about one half of that of the enemy.

On the 25th July, that part which was marching upon Witepsk, was attacked by the French army, under the command of Murat and the Viceroy, not far from Ostrovno. The action was long and obstinate. The enemy claimed the victory; but it was evident he gained nothing, as he renewed the engagement next day on the same place. On this day also the engagement was severe, and with little advantage to the enemy; and it was not till the 27th that he was able to advance, after another hard contest, when the Russians drew off their forces in excellent order towards Witepsk, having received intelligence that Bagrathion, with the first army, was advancing to join them. The Russians insist that they maintained their position on each day, and did not retire till they deemed it prudent to do so. The loss on both sides was very considerable. The enemy stated the Russian loss at 20 pieces of cannon, 1500 prisoners, and 6000 killed and wounded. His own only 400 killed, 900 wounded, and 50 prisoners. On the other hand, the Russians state the enemy's loss at 5000 men, and allow that their own was considerable. Their accounts in these matters are certainly most to be depended upon. Amongst the remarkable stories with which the enemy now and then chose to embellish his bulletins, the one in the bulletin of this action

is not the least so. Two hundred of his voltigeurs were surrounded by 10,000 Russian cavalry—they remained an hour in this state, and then cut their way through the enemy without any loss on their part, after having destroyed 300 Russians. The Emperor inquired to which corps these troops who performed this feat belonged.—*To the 9th, and three-fourths of the lads of Paris.** “Tell them, says the Emperor, they are brave fellows, they all deserve the cross.” This story was only fitted for the ears of the “*lads of Paris*,” for no other human beings could credit it for a moment.

By the rapid and desperate push which the enemy made upon Wilna, he succeeded, for the moment, in separating the Russian army, and in a great measure cut it in two. To prevent the fatal consequences which might have ensued from this movement, the Russian armies strained every nerve to retrieve this misfortune; and the enemy to prevent their object, and to render it fatal to them. Hence his operations against the second army, under Barclay de Tolly, which have been already noticed. While he continued to follow it with unremitting ardour, but with no real advantage except the occupation of an extent of country, which the succeeding events might render it impossible for him to retain. Davoust, Jerome, and others, continued to press after the gallant Bagrathion, without allowing him a moment's repose. Often, however, as they came in contact with him, they suffered for their temerity, though their superior numbers enabled them to manœuvre so as to oblige him to retreat. On the 28th June at Mir, the enemy's advanced guard, under Jerome, attacked Platoff, and was defeated with great loss, six regiments†, Huhlands, under General Rosneckje, being cut to pieces. For this unfortunate affair, and some others, Jerome got liberty to retire for the recovery of his health. Davoust, however, having gained upon Bagrathion, continued to move with his army to the northward in such a manner, that while he was in communication with Bonaparte, Bagrathion was cut off from communication with the other part of the Russian army, except by circuitous routes. The enemy endeavoured to compel him

* 10th Bulletin.

† Petersburg Gazette, 21st July

of his voltigeurs were surprised—they remained an hour in the enemy without being destroyed 300 Russians destroyed these troops who perished, and three-fourths of the army. The Emperor, they are said, "This story was only a lie," for no other human

which the enemy made at that moment, in separating the two measures cut it in two, which might have ensued. The armies strained every nerve to prevent the enemy from reaching them. Hence his operations under Barclay de Tolly. While he continued to follow with no real advantage in the country, which the success was possible for him to retain. He tried to press after the general at a moment's repose. In contact with him, they suffered. Their numbers enabled them to retreat. On the 28th June, under Jerome, attacked with loss, six regiments† were being cut to pieces. For this, Jerome got liberty. Davoust, however, hesitated to move with his army. That while he was in flight, Bagration was cut off from the Russian army, except he endeavoured to compel him

to march in the direction of the Pripez river, thereby separating him to a greater distance; but Bagration shaping his course more and more to the northward of east, endeavoured to approach nearer and nearer the army, from which he had been separated. This again brought him in contact with the enemy; who, after an engagement more sanguinary than any that had yet taken place, were severely defeated. Nine regiments were almost cut to pieces. From 5 to 6000 were left dead on the field, and 1000 taken prisoners.* Although by this the obstacles to a junction were lessened, still the barrier was not altogether removed; but it was now evident, that Bagration would soon be enabled to accomplish this desirable object. Having passed the Berezina at Bobrunsk, he marched in the direction of Novi Bhykow. But the enemy had already got to Mogilheff, and were before him. On the morning of the 23d, according to the enemy's account, he attacked their advanced guard; of whom, says the 10th bulletin, 100 were taken prisoners, but the *generale* was beat; the action now became warm, and was continued with the utmost obstinacy, from nine in the morning until five in the afternoon; when, according to the accounts of the enemy, the Russians were defeated with the loss of 3000 killed and wounded, and 1600 prisoners; his own loss, only 700 killed and wounded; but it was evident that the fruits of the battle remained with the Russians, for he acknowledges that Bagration succeeded in passing the Dnieper, or Borysthenes, at Bhykow, and marched upon Smolensk, which it had been his grand object to prevent.† The Russian accounts, however, which are more to be relied on, differ very considerably. At nine in the morning Bagration's advanced guard was attacked by a superior force, consisting of five divisions, under Davoust and Mortier. The contest was obstinate. The enemy were twice repulsed. Again he came forward with fresh columns—but in vain—the Russians maintained their ground. The road to Smolensk was opened, and at six in the evening the action ceased. The loss of the enemy exceeded 5000 killed and wounded; that of the Russians amounted to 600.‡ Hav-

* Official dispatches, July 25th.

† Petersburg Gazette, August 4th.

‡ 10th Bulletin.

ing passed the Dnieper, as has been already mentioned, Bagrathion marched by Matislavl, upon Smolensk, where his communication was quite free with the main army. This retreat does Bagrathion, and the Russian army, the highest honour, and was accomplished in the midst of great difficulties and dangers. The enemy boasted of his successes at this time, and proclaimed himself the victor in all of these actions; but it was obvious to the meanest understanding, that he was foiled in his main object, which was to separate Bagrathion's divisions from the main army, and annihilate each in detail. He tried every manœuvre, which he had put in practice in the opening of other campaigns, in order to strike a blow which might derange the ulterior plans of his adversaries, and make them fall an easy prey—but he failed; and hence, as he advanced, his want of success irritated his mind, which he poured forth in low abuse and sarcastic observations, against the Russian government—the Russian people and their army.

The second army, in order to effect a junction with Bagrathion, retreated from Witepsk in open day, and in the face of the enemy, who had it not in his power to take the smallest advantage of them, or disturb them in their operations. Witepsk was immediately occupied as the head quarters of the French army. In it the enemy found a magazine of salt, worth 15,000,000 francs; and he found out that it had 20 convents and 30 steeples. Here the French army took up its abode for 12 days; a sufficient proof of the arduous and destructive operations through which they had advanced so far. Here also perceiving that his task was not to be so soon accomplished as he imagined, Bonaparte gave orders for the corps of reserve left west of the Niemen to approach the Russian frontiers, and to act afterwards as might be found necessary.

While these things were going on between the main armies, important operations had also taken place between the detached armies in other quarters; amongst these was the attack made by Tormasoff, upon the Saxon army, under General Klengel, at Kobryn. This engagement took place on the 27th July, and was extremely obstinate and bloody. The battle lasted nine hours. The bravery of the Russian troops, however,

already mentioned, Bagration's army, where his command was the highest honour, and difficulties and dangers. At this time, and proclamations; but it was obvious that he was foiled in his main divisions from the detail. He tried every means in the opening of operations which might derange the enemy's plans, but he failed to make them fall an easy task. He advanced, his want of resources was made manifest in low abuse of the Russian government—

action with Bagration, in the face of the enemy, and the smallest advantage was taken. Witepsk was taken, the French army, worth 15,000,000 rubles, 150 convents and 30 steeples, it abode for 12 days; destructive operations were carried on. Here also perceptions were accomplished as he moved the corps of reserve left the frontiers, and to the rear.

Between the main armies, between the detachments, these were the attack operations, under General Kutuzov, took place on the 27th and 28th. The battle last night, the troops, however,

overcame every obstacle. The Saxons were completely defeated, above 1000 men were left dead on the field, besides the wounded; 8 cannon, and 2,360 prisoners were taken, including Gen. Klengel. The Russian loss was small, but not mentioned. This engagement endangered the enemy's rear, and obliged him to detach the 7th corps, under Regnier, to the assistance of the auxiliary army under Schwartzemberg, which for the moment checked Tormasoff's career. But, in the meantime, he also had been re-enforced with two divisions of Bagration's army, detached by the latter in his retreat; and with these, his force amounting to perhaps 45,000 men, Tormasoff was enabled to maintain his positions, or at least, not to lose much ground, against all the efforts of his adversaries, until the arrival of the army from Turkey, enabled him again to act upon the offensive.

While these things were going on, Wittgenstein was fully employed on the Dwina. Having been re-enforced by several battalions of the reserve,* he felt himself strong enough to oppose the enemy's projects in that quarter, and to protect the Pskov road. From Polotzk, Oudinot with the 2d corps, and all the Bavarians, (30 to 37,000), amounting to at least 60,000 men, marched in the direction of Sebesch; while Macdonald, from Jacobstad, threatened to advance from that quarter, to join Oudinot, whose united forces would then have been far superior to those under Wittgenstein. This brave General saw that not a moment was to be lost, and he therefore determined to attack Oudinot without delay. In addition to the battalions of reserve already mentioned, Bonaparte informs us, in his 10th bulletin, that Prince Repnin's corps had also joined him. His force might therefore amount to 50,000 men. Oudinot had crossed the Drissa, and was advancing upon Sebesch. Wittgenstein met him at Jacobobovo, on the 30th, when a series of the most obstinate and sanguinary engagements took place, and which were continued for three successive days. The enemy slurs over the actions of the 30th and 31st, by merely stating that an engagement took place at Jacobobovo, on the 30th, where the 26th regiment of light infantry obtained much glory; and that of the 31st, simply by saying, that the enemy endeavoured to

* Petersburg Gazette, July 26th.

attack the Duke of Reggio on his flank as he marched, who took up a position with the Drissa in his front; but as he had been previously beyond the Drissa, he had therefore been compelled to recross it; certainly not the object for which he set out. How he came to do so, Bonaparte very prudently refrained from mentioning, but turned his attention to the third engagement, which took place on the first of August, where, in his usual style of bombast and gasconade, he asserted, that after a masked battery had been opened upon the Russians who had crossed the Drissa, which battery of 40 pieces of cannon, for one hour, poured forth grape shot amongst the Russian ranks, 15,000 of their troops were driven into the river, 3,500 were killed and wounded, 3,000 taken prisoners, and all their artillery and military chests.* Such were the accounts of the enemy, a sweeping, but a suspicious way of getting rid of the matter. But why Oudinot had been compelled to fall back upwards of 40 miles, or how he had not continued to advance after such brilliant victories, the emperor did not condescend to inform us. Wittgenstein, however, did this for him, in very plain, but very strong and convincing language. Oudinot, with all his forces, were most dreadfully beaten. The engagements, says Wittgenstein, were most obstinate and sanguinary. For three days the battle continued, each day, from early in the morning, till late at night. The enemy was totally routed, fled in all directions, and only escaped by the woody nature of the country. The Russian troops performed incredible actions of valour. Batteries, and columns of whatever strength, which were opposed to them were, at the point of the bayonet, overthrown and annihilated. "All the villages through which we pass," says he, "are covered with dead bodies;" the enemy lost 3000 prisoners, 2 pieces of cannon, many powder waggons, and all the crown and private baggage. The killed and wounded exceeded 5000 men. "The loss of the Russians," says the gallant general, "is not small." "So soon," says he, "as I shall have driven them across the Dwina, I am determined, as I attack them on each side, to turn myself against the corps of Mac-

* 11th Bulletin, Wittezh, August 10th.

he marched, who took but as he had been before been compelled which he set out. How y refrained from men- rd engagement, which in his usual style of after a masked battery ad crossed the Drissa, or one hour, poured nks, 15,000 of their 00 were killed and heir artillery and mi- the enemy, a sweep- of the matter. But back upwards of 40 nce after such bril- escend to inform us. very plain, but very e, with all his forces, gements, says Wit- ry. For three days in the morning, till ed, fled in all direc- ure of the country. actions of valour. th, which were op- ayonet, overthrown h which we pass," he enemy lost 3000 r waggons, and all l and wounded ex- ans," says the gal- says he, "as I shall ermined, as I attack he corps of Mac-

donald, to attack it;" and continued he, "by the blessing of God, and the spirit of our troops, invigorated by these successes, I hope likewise to perform something. I shall endeavour to clear the lines of demarkation allotted to me, of the enemy*." He kept his word, as the sequel will shew us.

On the 1st of August, says Bonaparte, the Duke of Tarentum, took possession of Dunaburgh, which had cost the Russians many millions to fortify, for the space of five years, during which time the work was carried on, and a labour of 20,000 men expended upon it. Here, however, he only found 2 pieces of cannon, the Russians had carried away all the rest. In the absence of Macdonald, general Grawert commanded the corps before Riga, consisting principally of Prussian troops. No important operations had yet been undertaken against that place. As a measure of precaution, the Russian general Essen had caused the suburbs next the enemy, to be burnt down. A division of British men of war, under admiral Martin, rendered great service, and cleared the mouths of the river, keeping the enemy at a respectful distance. Throughout the Russian Empire, the utmost unanimity prevailed upon the subject of the war. The patriotism of all ranks was kindled, and the whole Russian population was determined to submit to any privation, rather than yield to the invader. High and low, rich and poor, came voluntarily forward, to offer their fortunes and their services. Armies were raised, equipped and paid by the different towns, and divisions by single individuals, yet with this prospect before him, the enemy continued to persevere. It was fortunate for mankind he did so.

The dexterous conduct of the Russian generals having succeeded in again uniting their armies, and after having inflicted severe chastisement upon the invader at Ostrovno, Witepsk, and Mogilheff, their united forces were concentrated at Smolensk, the main army having had a very brilliant affair at Innoovo, in its march thither, in which the baggage of general Sebastiani was taken, and about 500 prisoners.—The affair of Drissa, those of Ostrovna and Mogilheff, (says the enemy in his

* Official Report, August 2d.

† 12th Bulletin.

10th bulletin), might have been, in other wars, called three battles." But the events which were approaching in this war, shewed, that comparatively speaking, these were unworthy of that rank in history.

In front of the venerable city of Smolensk, the Russian army amounting to 130 or 140,000, was now drawn up, and though determined to defend the place, still they were not inclined to risk a general battle.

Smolensk, the capital of the province of that name, is an ancient and venerable city, which formerly belonged to Poland. The principal part of it is situated upon the side of the Dnieper where it runs betwixt two hills. The town is surrounded by walls of great extent and thickness, enclosing a much larger space than the city at present occupies. It is a place of considerable commercial note, but, from being a frontier town, had suffered much in the wars between the Russians and Poles, before it was confirmed to the former power. The buildings are principally wood, and the number of inhabitants, in 1783, was only estimated at 8000, but since that period they must have increased considerably. It was always accounted the key of Moscow and a kind of belief was prevalent, that the power who held Smolensk, was master of the capital. The Russians intended to defend the town to the last extremity, and the enemy was resolved to have it at all hazards. The combat, therefore, was likely to be serious and sanguinary, which was to decide the fate. The whole French army, under Bonaparte in person, approached to the attack, and crossing the Dnieper low down, advanced to the city from the southward. The accounts which the enemy gives of these affairs, are so full of exaggeration and falsehood, that it is extremely difficult to separate them from the truth, or to obtain a clear and connected view of their operations. On the 14th, a severe engagement took place at Krasnoy, where the Russians had a body of 7,000 men posted. These were attacked by the king of Naples and general Ney, and were defeated with the loss of 1500 prisoners, 8 pieces of cannon, 1000 horses, and 1000 killed and wounded. The enemy does not state his own loss, and, no doubt, exaggerates the usual, that of the Russians. The army continued to press

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now drawn up, and though
they were not inclined to

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ward to Smolensk. On the 16th, the heights of Smolensk,
were commanded, and the French army were placed in the
following position, viz. Ney had the left, leaning upon the Bo-
rysthenes or Dnieper; the prince of Ekmuhl the centre, who
had advanced from Dombrowa; prince Poniatowski the right;
the guard was placed in reserve in the centre; the Viceroy in
reserve on the right, and the cavalry under the king of Naples,
at the extremity of the right; the Duke of Abrantes, with the
4th corps, "lost their way, and made a false movement*."

Such were the positions of the French army, consisting of at
least 220,000 men. The enemy moved forward his main force.
to the attack. He says the 16th, and half of the 17th, were
passed in observation, but the Russian accounts are very differ-
ent. Early on the morning of the first day, the Emperor Na-
poleon, at the head of 100,000 men, made his appearance before
Smolensk. This force was intended solely for the attack upon
the city, the remainder of the army had to observe the Russian
army, lest it should disturb their operations. About six versts
from the city, he was received by the corps of general Rayewski.
At six in the morning the engagement began, at noon it be-
came most bloody; but the Russians remained firm, and the
enemy were overthrown. The corps of general Doctorow was
ordered to replace that of Rayewski. These attacked the ene-
my, on the morning of the 17th. The engagement lasted till
the evening. The Russian troops fought with desperation
"imploping the assistance of the Almighty." The enemy
were again every where repulsed; but again he returned to the
charge, with fresh troops, and accumulated fury; and it is at
this time only, as usual, that his account begins, when he had
made the appearance of success. Thirty thousand Russians
held the town, and the remainder of their army was upon the
north bank of the river, with which three bridges communicated.
Perceiving in the afternoon of the 17th, that the French were
determined to carry the place, since the Russians declined a ge-
neral engagement, which was the wish of Bonaparte to bring on,
they re-enforced that part of the army in the city with two divisions

* 14th Bulletin.

of infantry, and two regiments of the infantry of the guards. The attack began, says the enemy, at three in the afternoon of the 17th. But the various repulses he experienced, on the 17th and on the preceding day, were not proper subjects of mirth for "the lads of Paris." At half past four, the fire of musquetry became general. The attack was furious, the defence obstinate. The Russians fought under cover of ramparts; the enemy advanced, in closs and determined masses, in the very teeth of the Russian artillery. The divisions of Morand and Guden, at length succeeded in taking the entrenched suburbs, and penetrated to the covered way, and the Duke of Elchingen carried the position which the Russians held without the town, and pursued them to the glacis. At five o'clock, says the enemy, the communication between the town and the right bank, could only be accomplished by insulated men, and yet we find, at midnight, the whole Russian force that was in Smolensk, abandoned it, and passed without molestation, to the right bank of the river; consequently the enemy must have been worsted at this point. The engagement continued with indescribable fury. The Russians stood firm as their ramparts, and fearless as the guns, and it was only when the one tumbled from beneath them, and the other became useless, that they abandoned the posts. Batteries upon batteries were opened upon them; the howitzers threw shells innumerable into the town. Smolensk, built of wood, was quickly in flames, and exhibited to the eyes of the French army, said its callous Chief, "in the middle of a fine night in August, a spectacle similar to that which an irritation of Vesuvius, presents to the inhabitants of Naples*." The breaching batteries played upon the town, and companies of miners were undermining the ramparts. Thousands of fresh troops were advancing to the assault, when the place being now either one sheet of flame, or spread with smoking ruins, the Russians, at one o'clock in the morning, on the 18th, abandoned what once was Smolensk; broke down the bridges, and joined the army on the north bank, without further molestation. "At two in the morning," says the enemy, "the troops

* 14th Bulletin.

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advance, no longer found opposition;" a pretty clear proof they did not, and durst not closely pursue the Russians. The enemy says he found 200 pieces of cannon in the place. If so, many of these must have been of little use, and that was all he obtained in his dearly earned prize. The Russians, he said, lost 12,700 men killed and wounded, and 2000 prisoners, while the loss of the French was only 3,900, killed and wounded; a prodigious admission, however, on his part, and nearly equal to what he said the battle of Asperne cost him. Such accounts, however, deserve no attention; the meanest capacity must perceive their falsehood, and know that the loss of the assailants must have been more than double that of the assailed, under such circumstances; but not content with this misrepresentation, he colours it a little higher, by saying, that "the field of battle has offered to the view of 200,000 persons, who can attest it, the sight of one French corpse lying upon the dead bodies of seven or eight Russians." As the inhabitants had all left the town, and none of the Russian army remained, consequently these 200,000 spectators, must have been the individuals composing the French army alone.

During the 18th, the enemy repaired the bridges over the Dnieper; and at break of day, on the 19th, Ney crossed over to the right bank. At one league only from the town, he encountered the last column of the Russian rear guard, consisting of 6,000 men; these were, according to his accounts, quickly overthrown. On the heights of Valentina, a stronger force was stationed, and which being attacked by the enemy, the Russians sent several divisions to their support, and which, together, amounted to 40,000 men. The position was excellent, and it was of the utmost importance to the Russians to maintain it against all hazards, in order to secure the retreat of their army, their baggage, and their wounded. This brought on the bloody battle of Valentina. The enemy were repulsed, but he returned with fresh troops to the charge. General Gudén, the commanding officer, was killed in this last attempt; and it is evident, from the accounts of the enemy himself, that the Russians accomplished their object, and retired unmolested. Junot, who had formerly lost his way, seemed here to have committed a still greater fault. He was detached to throw him-

self between the retreating Russian army and Moscow. He failed in his object, because in reality he durst not attempt it. From this period, he was sent back in bad health, fortunate that he escaped the remainder of the Russian campaign. The engagement of Valentina continued throughout the day, and was certainly most obstinate and bloody. The enemy stated his loss at 3,200 men, killed and wounded; and estimated that of the Russians at treble the number. Four days elapsed before we thought proper to notice it at all, a practice usual when he suffered a defeat.* The Russian accounts, however, which are proven to be nearly correct, stated their total loss at Smolensk at 9,000 men, and that of the French at 20,000; and it was afterwards ascertained, by the documents found at Moscow, that the loss of the latter was nearly 23,000 men.

It may easily be conceived what an awful picture Smolensk afforded, after such a carnage. In flames, and covered with dead and dying; without refuge, without help, without hope. The enemy coloured the consequences, with all his art. The whole Russian army was described as wholly dispersed and broken. Of the 12 divisions, says the enemy, of which it was composed, 2 were broken and defeated at Ostrowo, 2 at Mohileff, 6 at Smolensk, and the remaining 2, consisting of the guards, at Valentina. The Poles were described as deserting in numbers. "You have abandoned us without fighting," say they, "and what right can you have to exact from us to remain under your colours." These, and many other sneering expressions, amused the people of France, and gave satisfaction to the disaffected throughout Europe.

The enemy taunted and ridiculed the Russian general for not making a proper use of the advantageous position which he held, by giving battle in it. The enemy's general, "wanted resolution" and the Emperor Alexander (said he), had reiterated his commands, to defend Smolensk till the last extremity. There, so, (continued he), the Russians gave out that they would make a stand, and meet us in battle; but no—we appeared, and they made no effort to protect the place; Smolensk was taken, and

* The expeditionaire (postmaster,) forgot to send the bulletins for some days!!
Paris, September 3d.

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the Russian army ran *full drive* upon Moscow. "*Smolensk the sacred! Smolensk the strong!* whoever has Smolensk has Moscow," exclaimed the enemy. That the occupation of Smolensk, occasioned the fall of Moscow, cannot admit of a doubt. "Your Majesty may rest assured, that this event is the necessary consequence of the loss of Smolensk†," says Kutusoff, but not in anger—he does not attempt to say that his predecessor could have acted better than what he did‡; although the occupation of Smolensk occasioned the loss of Moscow, that does not necessarily imply that blame was attached to the Russian general for his conduct. The rest of the campaign shewed that Barclay de Tolli acted wisely in not risking a battle to preserve it. The sole object of Bonaparte in attacking the place, was to provoke a general engagement; but when he found the Russian general would not leave the advantageous position which he had chosen, to engage an enemy immensely superior in numbers, Bonaparte could not with propriety relinquish the attack; least, if he had done so, it might have been construed into inability on his part, to accomplish the object. Success was his sole aim, any thing else, even in appearance, was injurious to his cause, and might be dangerous. The object of the Russian general seems to have been a wise one, namely, to defend every strong position which the country afforded, against a superior enemy, while he could inflict upon that enemy, a loss more than double to that which he suffered, and at the same time not endanger the fate of his army, upon which, at that moment, the existence of the Empire in a great measure depended. But had he acted otherwise—had he at Smolensk given battle to the enemy, what would have been the consequences. The enemy was then superior in numbers by one half—still proportionately more so in cavalry—unacquainted with disaster, and buoyed up with the utmost confidence in victory and complete success. Had he engaged such an enemy in a general battle, the fortune of war was doubtful; and the battle lost might have sealed the doom of the Russian Empire, by inti-

* 13th, 14th, and 15th Bulletins.

† Kutusoff's Dispatch, September 16th.

‡ Kutusoff himself, after he took the command, did not wish to engage, until he was joined by the re-enforcements from Moscow and Kaluga.

modulating the population, before their national feeling and utmost strength was called forth. On the other hand, if he fought and gained such a battle as was afterwards gained at Borodino, and which, against such an enemy, was the utmost he could rationally expect, the foe still superior in numbers, upon the frontiers of a country rising to support him—at no great distance from his supplies and resources, would have preserved such a firm front, as would have rendered it impracticable for the Russian general to have followed up his success, until his loss was repaired by re-enforcements from the interior, by which time, the force of the enemy also augmented, would have rendered other sanguinary battles necessary, to secure his defeat. If, also, the enemy had been defeated at Smolensk, as he was at Borodino, it would have sooner awakened him to a sense of his real danger. He would have called up his reserves and other resources, while these could have joined him with safety and facility. He would not then have advanced as he did in false security, into the very heart of the Russian Empire; to such a distance from all his supplies, that none could join him in time to render victory decisive, or preserve defeat from being attended with utter destruction. The end of the Russian campaign could never, under these circumstances, have been so signally disastrous to the enemy, as it was. Although the Russian general, very probably, neither contemplated nor calculated upon such complete success, in the future stages of this campaign; yet considering every circumstance, he acted wisely in declining a general engagement in order to preserve Smolensk. The occupation of a part of the country for the moment, was of no importance, when compared to preserving the Russian army entire, until circumstances and the season, enabled it to assume the offensive, and render the discomfiture of the enemy more complete and fatal. Such, no doubt, were the calculations of the Russian General; and in the end, the enemy found that his plans excited very different feelings from sarcasm and reproach. Indeed, when Bonaparte accused his antagonists of error, in not giving him battle, it was in nine instances out of ten, the surest proof of their wisdom. For many a day, he and the Moniteur, had made the defensive sys-

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of Lord Wellington, in Portugal, the object of their public
 ridicule. The same plan was now adopted with regard to the
 Russians. "If this be a plan previously arranged, (said the
Journal de l'Empire, September 7th,) we must allow that the
 Russians have singular combinations." Singular, indeed, they
 found them, and far beyond the calculating powers of that
Boutique of injustice and iniquity established at Paris.

After the battle of Valentina, the Russian army continued
 its retreat towards Moscow. Every thing in their way, that
 could be of the smallest use to the enemy, was burnt or destroy-
 ed. The commercial suburb of Smolensk, on the north bank of
 the Dnieper, was consumed; and at Doroghobus, Viasma, and
 Ghint, everything was also laid waste. The enemy advanced after
 the retreating Russians, but marched over deserted dwellings,
 and scenes of general desolation. "Never was a war conducted
 with so much inhumanity: the Russians treat their own country
 as they would that of an enemy."* Yet with this dismal prospect
 before him, the enemy (detaching a force to oppose the Russians
 assembling on the lower Dnieper,) advanced in a solid and
 compact mass. He turned neither to the right hand nor to
 the left, but marched straight forward. "The Viceroy man-
 oeuvres on the left, at *two leagues* from the great road; the
 Prince of Ekmuhl on the great road, and the Prince Poniat-
 owski on the left bank of the Osma."† Nothing of any im-
 portance occurred in this retreat, except a very brilliant affair
 on the 27th, with the advanced guard of the enemy and the
 rear guard of the Russian army, in which the former were very
 roughly handled, and forced to desist from attacking the Rus-
 sians in their march.

While these things were going on between the grand ar-
 my, equal activity was displayed by the detached corps. Wit-
 genstein, after his repeated victories over Oudinot, pursued
 him to within 40 miles of Polotsk, where leaving a strong ad-
 vanced guard to observe his motions, he made a rapid move-
 ment to the right, towards Druya, in order to attack Macdon-
 ald and compel him to pass the Duna. But while on his
 march for this purpose, he received information that Oudinot

* 15th Bulletin, Slakovo, August 27th.

† Ditto, ditto.

having been re-enforced* by 11,000 men, was again on the advance, he immediately returned to oppose him. On the 10th of August he fell in with the enemy's advanced guard, which he defeated, with considerable loss in killed and wounded, and 600 prisoners.† Of this action no French bulletin ever took any notice. Wittgenstein continued to follow the enemy, and on the 16th found him posted before his intrenchments, in the neighbourhood of Polotsk. The Russian General immediately resolved to give him battle. On the morning of the 17th the engagement began, and was continued hand to hand for 14 hours, with the utmost fury. After six desperate attacks in the face of the most formidable batteries, the Russians succeeded in driving the enemy into their intrenchments with great slaughter. Marshall Oudinot was wounded on the shoulder by a cannon ball, and carried to Wilna. General Govion St. Cyr, assumed the command in his stead. The loss of the Russians during this day was 2000 killed and wounded;‡ that of the enemy was much greater. The enemy, on this day, acknowledges a loss of 1000 men,§ but it has been estimated as high as 4000 killed and wounded alone. During the night the French army received fresh re-enforcement of Bavarian troops, under General Deroo, these replaced the corps of General Wrede, "which had been much exhausted by the battle of the former day."|| Wittgenstein who was determined to renew the attack, had, during the night collected all his troops, and brought forward his artillery, amounting to 180 pieces by the French, and 100 by the Bavarian account. Govion St. Cyr saw his object, and determined to anticipate him. At four o'clock in the afternoon an action commenced, more obstinate and bloody than any that had yet taken place. The contest was of the most murderous description. The fire of the artillery was terrible. The desperate valor, however, of the Russian troops, overcame every effort of the enemy. Repeatedly the French and Bavarian troops threw themselves in columns upon the Russian batteries, and as often

* Wittgenstein's dispatch.

† Admiral Martin's Dispatch, Riga, August 17th, Gazette, September 5th.

‡ Wittgenstein's dispatch. § Fourteenth bulletin. || Bavarian official account.

en, was again on the advance to pose him. On the 10th advanced guard, which he led and wounded, and 600 bulletin ever took any notice of the enemy, and on the 16th, in the neighbourhood immediately resolved of the 17th the engagement hand for 14 hours, with attacks in the face of the Russians succeeded in driving them to great slaughter. Mar-oulder by a cannon ball on St. Cyr, assumed the command of the Russians during the day; that of the enemy was acknowledged a loss of as high as 4000 killed and French army received, under General Deroy, a severe, "which had been the last day."|| Wittgenstein, had, during the night, ordered his artillery, amounting to 100 by the Bavarian army, and determined to attack in the afternoon an action commenced in any that had yet taken a murderous description. The desperate valor came every effort of the Bavarian troops through batteries, and as often

they left the greater number dead before them. The Bavarian General, Deroy, was wounded in the belly by a musquet ball, and carried off the field. General St. Cyr was also wounded. Several other Generals were wounded on both sides. The enemy were driven into the town. The Russians fought even in the streets. The darkness of the night parted the combatants, and the Russian General at last was forced to withdraw his men from the city. The enemy, as usual, claimed decided victories in all these affairs; but it was evident, from St. Cyr's account, that in the battle of the 17th, their troops had been compelled to collect behind Polotsk, and on the other side of the Dwina, and their inactivity after the action of the 18th shewed clearly that the Russians had the advantage in these bloody days. As usual, the accounts of the loss of men were various and contradictory. The enemy in his 14th bulletin acknowledged a loss of 1000 men, but stated the Russian loss to be treble theirs in killed and wounded, besides 500 prisoners. Wittgenstein on the first day states his own loss in killed and wounded at 2000; that of the enemy much greater, besides 2000 prisoners. On the 18th he states the loss as very great on both sides, but that of the enemy was treble that of the Russians in killed and wounded, besides 500 prisoners; and in a subsequent dispatch, he stated the loss on each side to be 355 Russians killed and wounded, and on the part of the enemy 10,800 killed and wounded, and 3,200 prisoners. General St. Cyr says, that on the 18th he took 20 pieces of cannon and 1000 prisoners, and that the Russian killed and wounded was *immense*, while "*on our side we also lost some-thing*," closes his account of the loss on that dreadful day. The official account, however, published by the Bavarian government, stated the loss of their army alone in these days at 144 killed, 1136 wounded, and 715 prisoners; being itself double what the enemy states the total loss to have been. At this time the different governments published the accounts from their armies in Russia, but these were found to be so different from the bulletins of Bonaparte, that it was hinted their publication was altogether unnecessary; and, accordingly, with the exception of Austria, the curtain dropped upon their operations.

In the meantime, Tormasoff had numerous and severe engagements with the united forces of Schwartzenberg and Regnier, certainly exceeding 60,000 men. Regnier had the 7th corps of the French army, at least 30,000 strong, and Schwartzenberg had the Austrian auxiliary army, 30,000, besides the Saxon troops. Thus situated, Tormasoff, whose forces did not exceed 40,000 men, was compelled to act on the defensive. He concentrated his troops behind the defile of Horodetska; and on the 12th of August, there awaited the attack of the enemy. The 7th corps advanced to the attack of the Russian position, under an incessant and dreadful fire from the artillery, which Tormasoff had posted in an advantageous manner. The enemy endeavoured in vain to turn the Russian right. Tormasoff for a moment, according to the enemy's accounts, became the assailant; and "all their efforts were reduced to repulse his reiterated attacks and drive the Russians back upon their centre."* The battle became general. It was contested with great slaughter. Tormasoff redoubled his efforts to drive the enemy into a wood near his position, but he could not succeed. The enemy now endeavoured to pass a large force over a morass, which Tormasoff considered secured his flank. They succeeded; and which unexpected attack turned the fortune of the day. Nevertheless, Tormasoff yet made another attempt, by a mass of cavalry from his left, to attack the enemy's right; but which attack having been foreseen, was rendered ineffectual, though for a moment the enemy gave way, but afterwards recovered the ground. Night now put an end to the engagement; and, under cover of it, Tormasoff withdrew his artillery from this well contested field, and retired upon Kobryn, and afterwards in the direction of Volhynia. Next day the enemy followed his retreat, but without being able to effect any thing of material injury against it. Schwartzenberg estimates the Russian loss at 3000 killed and wounded, and his own at 1000; but as these accounts came through the Parisian manufactory, no reliance is to be placed upon them in this point, which they always distort; and considering the excellent position which the Rus-

* Schwartzenberg's bulletin, from the French papers, from which this account is compiled.

assiduously served his country. With danger he was familiar to him she had no terrors. At Ismael he had lost an eye. In the bloody trenches, at the foot of its walls, he had been let as dead; but found afterwards, he recovered to save his country. Experience had taught him wisdom. Cautious in his policy but firm and decided in his actions. Near fourscore years he passed over his head, grown grey in the service of his country. The army looked upon him as a father—as a companion in their toils, and therefore adored him. The nation looked to him with confidence. He raised their hopes. He promised them deliverance, and he lived to realize their expectations. At Mojaïsk, the first town of any note in the government of Moscow, and near the river Moskwa, he took up an excellent position, in order to cover the capital. At Moscow the greatest anxiety and alarm prevailed. The enemy was now advanced to within 70 miles of the place, and no appearance of progress being arrested. The population of the district through which he had advanced, crowded to Moscow, and increased, by their contradictory statements, the general alarm. A million and a half of people were collected within its walls, uncertain whether to remain or fly, and not knowing where to direct their footsteps. All eyes were directed to Kutusoff, and turned towards Mojaïsk, as it was understood the army would make a stand, in the intrenchments which had been raised there; but which, according to the accounts of the enemy, were not quite finished. It was evident to the most inattentive that a terrible crisis was approaching. Moscow could not surrender without a struggle. The lines at Mojaïsk, it was known, had been fortified—no other favourable position remained betwixt that and the capital. All eyes were therefore directed to this spot. Europe was interested in the contest. Every breath and every whisper from that quarter awakened the feelings of nations, and commanded the attention of millions. The Russian army called loudly to be led to battle. Kutusoff had chosen his ground, and was determined to gain it. Napoleon advanced, eager to meet it. The preparations were formidable, the stake immense. Liberty or death was the watch-word of the Russians; Victory and Moscow, that

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the opposing host. Here the fate of Alexander; and the for-
 tune of Bonaparte were to be determined, and both parties
 prepared for the gigantic combat. The Russian army was
 about 130,000 strong; that of the enemy 180,000.—Every mo-
 tive that could impel the human soul to action, here animated
 the breasts of the different combatants. It is not my inten-
 tion, as it is above my powers, to describe minutely the events
 of this terrible day; it is a subject which claims a bolder pen,
 and will occupy the talents of some future Robertson to record
 them.

The enemy's account of this memorable battle is so full of false-
 hood and misrepresentation, that scarcely any attention is due to
 the relation, except as to the length and obstinacy of the action.
 On the 4th the enemy reconnoitred the Russian position, in
 front of Borodino, but was driven back with loss. On the 5th a
 more serious affair took place, against a redoubt, upon a rising
 ground, about one mile and a quarter in front of the Russian
 position, and occupied by 10,000 men. The enemy caused the
 King of Naples and the divisions of Compans, to pass the Kolog-
 ha, and attack this place, while Poniatowski endeavoured to
 hold the position. After a desperate attack, the enemy states
 that he accomplished his object, and that the Russians were
 driven from it, with the loss of one-third of their number.
 The Russian accounts, however, which are more correct, insist
 that the enemy was repulsed with great loss of men, and seven
 or eight pieces of cannon;* and, that the place was taken and
 retaken four times, and not abandoned by them till night.† The
 day was spent by both armies in observing the motions of each
 other. The armies on this day occupied the following positions.
 The Russian left was backed by a large wood, supported by a
 height, crowned by a redoubt planted with 25 pieces of
 cannon. Their centre behind a village (which had been de-
 stroyed) occupied two fine heights, with redoubts at the dis-
 tance of 100 paces from each other, and covered with artillery
 and infantry. Their right extended behind the Kologha, in

* Cathcart's Dispatch, September 13th.

† Official Bulletin, Foreign Office, October 2d, from Russian accounts.

the rear of the village of Borodino, and was supported by two fine heights, crowned with redoubts, and fortified with batteries.* The enemy was in front of these positions with an army superior in numbers, a numerous cavalry, and a formidable artillery. The brave and venerable Kutusoff, with his principal officers, upon the evening of the 6th, rode along the whole line of the Russian army, haranguing his men. He pointed out to them how British valour, under Wellington, in a cause, not immediately their own, had scaled the walls of Badajos, and swept the plains of Salamanca. He conjured them by all that was sacred, and by every motive which could arouse the feelings of the human soul, to protect their country, their altars, their homes, and the tombs of their forefathers, from violence and insult. To patriotism, the solemn voice of Religion lent her aid; the *sacred image* from Moscow was carried along the line with the General, the troops beheld it with reverence and enthusiasm,—they heard and felt the appeal of their General. Tears started from every eye, and every Russian resolved to conquer or perish. It was a noble, a solemn, and an affecting scene. Nor was Napoleon idle. He knew that on the issue of this day depended his future fame and fortune. Victory, decisive and complete, could alone save him from destruction—defeat was utter ruin. On the morning of the 7th the sun rose, says he without clouds. “Soldiers! he exclaimed, this is the sun of Austerlitz. Behave yourselves as you did at Austerlitz, Friedland, Witepsk, and Smolensk. Before you is Moscow.—Victory will give us plenty, good quarters for the winter, and a speedy return to your country. The field of battle is before you—henceforth victory depends upon you.”† The first part of this was another of those theatrical fictions with which the enemy chose to embellish his bulletins. The latter part of his address was, in all likelihood, correct; but the allusion to the sun of Austerlitz, from the sun rising without clouds, we know was false, “for it was under cover of a thick fog,” says Kutusoff,‡ “that the enemy attacked my left in the

* Eighteenth Bulletin,

† Eighteenth Bulletin, Mojaisk, September 1807.

‡ Kutusoff's Dispatch.

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dawn of the morning." It was easy (says the enemy in his 18th bulletin) to manœuvre and oblige the Russians to evacuate their position, but that would have been renouncing our object—yes, certainly it would have been so—for that object was a victory like Austerlitz, and the total destruction of the Russian army, a task not easy to accomplish. But after all, it was by manœuvring, as we shall presently see, that the enemy was enabled to carry his object of compelling the Russians to abandon their position.

On the morning of the 7th, by break of day, the battle commenced with a tremendous cannonade, and furious attack upon the whole line, but chiefly directed against the Russian left, where the gallant Prince Bagrathion commanded; and who here received a wound which cost him his life. This part of the Russian army suffered much. They had to sustain the fierce onset of half the French army. The enemy's cavalry advanced to the very muzzles of the Russian artillery, whose well directed and incessant fire swept away whole columns. Before Bagrathion's line arose a high and fearful wall of dead and dying enemies. After three hours dreadful carnage, the French troops were compelled to give way. But Bonaparte aware that the fate of his army depended upon this wing maintaining their post, re-enforced this part of his army with a strong force under Caulincourt and Murat, with 50 pieces of cannon. The enemy rallied, and rushing over the dead bodies of their countrymen, overpowered Bagrathion, who, for the moment, was compelled to fall back upon his second line. This was the enemy's grand object from this furious attack. The left of the Russian centre was exposed, and their army, if defeated, would have been turned and cut off from Moscow. Kutusoff was aware of this, and re-enforced his left with a strong force of cuirassiers and grenadiers. Bagrathion, though wounded severely, refused to leave the field. He returned to the charge with his gallant comrades, and in the teeth of a dreadful fire from the enemy, recovered all they had lost. The combat now became close and sanguinary, they fought man to man, resolved to conquer or perish; while the Moscow militia and light troops, under Touch-

koff rushed from their ambush armed with pikes and hatchets, and made a dreadful carnage amongst the enemy's ranks, who were again compelled to fly. On the centre the attack was tremendous: the batteries were alternately taken and retaken, with dreadful loss. At seven o'clock, Ney, under the protection of 30 pieces of cannon, attacked the centre of the Russian army—at eight o'clock, says the enemy, "his positions were taken, and our artillery crowned his heights. In this extremity he attempted to restore the combat,"* and did restore it, in spite of all the efforts of the enemy, though it did not suit his purpose to tell this part of the story. 'Three hundred pieces of French cannon thundered upon the Russian masses, (French masses, he should have said) and their soldiers died at the foot of those parapets they had raised for their protection.' But notwithstanding all this, the Russians succeeded in regaining their batteries, and defending them. On the right, the attacks were equally dreadful and sanguinary. General Morant, says the enemy, carried the Russian redoubt in that quarter; "but at nine o'clock in the morning, attacked on all sides, he could not maintain himself there."† Now was the critical moment, in which the Russians regained all they had lost. They attacked the enemy's centre, which formed the pivot to their right. "For a moment it was feared he might carry the village."‡ The Russians did carry it. The redoubt in their centre, which commanded their position, was retaken, and the enemy driven to a distance. Again he came forward with fresh troops, and accumulated fury—again he succeeded. General Bonami fairly lodged himself in this important fort with a considerable force. In an instant it was retaken by the Russian General Gormouloff, at the point of the bayonet, and every Frenchman in it cut to pieces.§ General Bonami fell, fairly pierced with 20 wounds, and was made prisoner. What! only General Bonami, a name never before heard of? Yes, Gene-

* Eighteenth bulletin.

† Eighteenth bulletin.

‡ Eighteenth bulletin.

§ These particulars are taken from an account of the battle, published in the St. Petersburg Gazette, by one who was in the engagement, but whose name was not published. It was said, Sir Robert Wilson.

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ral Bonami fell, and was taken in the last recapture of the key of
 their position by the Russians—and his capture was an incontro-
 vertible proof that at this important moment his master was com-
 pelled to fight for retreat and not for victory: and, therefore, with
 that characteristic meanness and vanity peculiar to Bonaparte,
 the name of this brave man and his actions were omitted. The
 combat at this moment, and particularly at this place, was
 terrible and sanguinary. "The earth shook to afar (says
 the Petersburg Gazette) at the anger of men;" how close and
 dreadful it was appears even from the accounts of the enemy.
 His general officers and first commanders fell fast. At half
 past six, A. M. General Compans was wounded; at seven Da-
 voust was wounded, and had a horse killed under him. Soon
 after, General Montbrun was killed; and in one hour after-
 wards, Caulincourt the younger, who was sent to supply his
 place, was shot dead. But 80 pieces of cannon annihilated the
 Russian columns, who stood for two hours, in close column,
 exposed to their fire, "unable to advance, and unwilling to re-
 tire, and renouncing the hopes of victory," till the King of Naples,
 with his cavalry, charging *through the chasms* which the can-
 non had made in their columns, compelled them to disperse.*
 Even if this account were true, it only shewed the invincible
 bravery of the Russian troops, and the hopelessness of conquer-
 ing an Empire peopled with such men. The obstinacy of the
 combat, we know, to be true; but the success of the enemy is
 known to be false. "The batteries passed from the possession
 of the one party to that of the other; and the result was, that
 the enemy, with his superior force, has in no one part gained
 an inch of ground. I remained at night master of the field of
 battle."† The Russians on this field certainly baffled every
 effort of their adversaries, and at length, after a whole day spent
 in slaughter, unequalled in the annals of modern warfare, they
 succeeded in maintaining their positions, and driving the ene-
 my from that bloody field. Such was the battle of Borodino,
 where 1000 pieces of cannon on each side spread death and

‡ Eighteenth bulletin.
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* Eighteenth bulletin.

† Kutusoff's Dispatch, 8th September, from Borodino.

darkness over the face of the earth, and where the flashes of the musquetry, under the meridian ray, only served to discover the combatants to each other. The loss on both sides was very great. That of the Russians, by their own accounts, about 40,000, and that of the French, 60,000 men. When we reflect that scarcely any prisoners were taken, and that the whole of that loss, covered, in killed and wounded, the field of battle, we may form some idea of the awful prospect which the plains of Borodino afforded to the survivors. One hundred thousand brave men, and upwards of 20,000 horses, lay scattered, dead and dying, in these bloody fields. Modern history can furnish no example of a carnage like this in one day and at one place. "Never was there seen such a field of battle,"* said he, who had spent half his life amidst blood and destruction. Several thousand men were employed some days in burying the dead, and in removing the wounded. The Russians had 18 generals killed and wounded, though the enemy magnified these to 50; more likely, indeed, his own loss. Amongst the former was the gallant Prince Bagrathion, who had previously signalized himself so much in the retreat of the army. In the prime of life he fell in the field of glory and honour. The cause in which he met his fate interested the world.

—He sunk to rest,
By every generous feeling blest.

His grateful country will cherish his memory to latest times, and the name of Bagrathion will be found by the side of those of Borodino and Moscow, in the brightest page, not only of the history of Russia, but of Europe. The enemy confessed a loss of 10,000 men, four generals killed and eight wounded; and estimated the Russian loss at 50,000 men. The reason he gives for their loss being so much greater than his own is remarkable. "Had the enemy, says he, when driven from their intrenchments, not endeavoured to retake them, our loss would have been greater than his; but he destroyed his army, by keeping it from eight o'clock till two, under the fire of our batteries.

* Eighteenth bulletin.


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and in obstinately attempting to regain that which was lost: "Now this account ought just to be reversed, for it was the enemy who kept his army under the Russian batteries, endeavouring to regain what he had once taken, but again lost. But if the Russian accounts were not clear and decisive on this important point, even to their remaining next day on the field of battle, and the pursuit by Platoff for 15 versts that morning; still we have the most undeniable evidence of the truth of it by the accounts of the enemy himself. If, as he says, he drove the Russians from all their intrenchments—if he gained such an important victory with so little loss, what became of him for three days, when he did not even advance to the field of battle? It was the 10th before his bulletin was wrote from Mojaisk, three days after the battle; and then, when he found, that in consequence of his manœuvres, the Russians had retired, he boldly claimed the victory. It would be a waste of words to argue against the enemy's statements. There can be no question, but that the Russians gained the battle of Borodino, though circumstances, unfortunate as they then appeared, but ultimately most fortunate for Europe, and ruinous for the enemy himself, arising from his obstinacy and rashness, prevented them, for the moment, from reaping the benefits of it. The Russians claimed 5000 prisoners; and the enemy, to make appear that he was the victor, laid claim, as he usually did, to an equal number, and 60 pieces of cannon. But, if he took any prisoners, it must have been such of the wounded as the Russians could not remove; and the cannon were no doubt, those which were not worth carrying away; for it is not likely that Kutusoff, who remained two days undisturbed on the field of battle, would leave any artillery that was worth carrying off.

The battle of Borodino, says Lord Cathcart, will form an "important feature" of the war. It did so. It taught the invader what he had to expect from 50 millions of people, composed of the same materials which there opposed him. But the enemy although defeated was still powerful, and had gone












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too far to recede. He wanted winter quarters, supplies, and provisions for his troops, and Moscow, as he thought, would abundantly supply him with all these desirable objects. His superiority in numbers, notwithstanding his recent severe losses, was still such as would enable him to accomplish his object. He detached two strong columns on the Borousk road, after the battle, to interpose between the Russian army and the capital. Not a moment was to be lost, and Kutusoff thus felt himself obliged to abandon the hard-earned field of Borodino. Circumstanced as he was, no alternative remained, but to abandon Moscow for the moment, or by another dreadful engagement, under every disadvantage, to risk the fate of the Empire. He prudently chose the former, and having stripped the capital of every thing which could be of service to the enemy, he, with a heavy heart, abandoned it to its fate. "I must confess, (says the gallant veteran) that the abandonment of the capital is very hard;"* but any other movement, than the one which he made, "would have prevented me (says he) from keeping up my communications with the neighbouring governments, and would also have separated me from the armies of Tchichagoff and Tormasoff."† This Bonaparte knew well, and strained every nerve to accomplish. This was the cause of his desperate attempts upon the left wing of the Russian army at Borodino; which, as he expected to vanquish, so he also wished to render the victory most decisive and destructive, by turning their army, and cutting it off from Moscow, and the resources of the southern provinces; thereby compelling it to retreat to the less productive provinces in the N. W. while he remained in the midst of plenty, derived from those of the south. To prevent this, no sacrifice was too great; and the destruction of Moscow and Petersburg, had both been in the way, would have purchased the failure of this plan of the enemy at a cheap rate. Under the circumstances in which he found himself placed, the Russian general could not act better. His expected re-enforcements not having joined him, to have risked another battle with an enemy, still

* Kutusoff's Dispatch from Chilna, September 10th.

† Ditto, ditto.

superior in numbers, "would (says Kutusoff) not only have been destructive of the army, but would have reduced Moscow to ashes."* "In this lamentable situation, (continues he) after holding a council of war, I was compelled to allow the enemy to enter Moscow, out of which all the valuables, the stores in the arsenals, and almost all other property, imperial or private, were previously conveyed, and scarcely an inhabitant (of respectability he means) remained in the town."† Severe, indeed, must have been the feelings of the Russian army, and its gallant leader, at this dreadful alternative. His own simple expression, "I must confess that the abandonment of the capital is very hard," when we consider the time, the place, and the cause why it escaped his lips, conveys a stronger idea than can otherwise be expressed. It was wrung from the acutest feelings of a gallant heart. But Moscow though abandoned was not forgotten. Moscow shall yet be free, was the language of every Russian. From the measures taken, says her excellent general, "I hope to be enabled to cut off all reinforcements marching to join the enemy, from his rear; and by occupying his attention, I hope to compel him to abandon Moscow, and to change his whole line of operations. I am at no great distance from the capital, and as soon as I have collected my troops, I can with confidence await the approach of the enemy;" and repeating his emphatic observation, "as long as the army of your Imperial Majesty is entire, and animated with its known courage and zeal, the loss of Moscow is not the loss of the Empire."‡ Under these circumstances and these feelings, the Russian general abandoned Moscow. His conduct was looked upon as pusillanimity—his feeling expressions treated with scorn, and his confident expectations ridiculed by the evil-minded and mischievous of all countries—but not so by the arch enemy himself, who preserved a sullen silence upon these important, and to him, fatal operations. The march of the Russian army from their capital, said the French bulletin writer, was

* Kutusoff's Dispatch, 16th September.

† Ditto, ditto.

‡ Ditto, ditto.

"sombre and religious."* It was so, but it was the consequence of indignant sorrow, not of unmanly fear. To the southward and westward of the city, and in the very teeth of the enemy, the Russian General took up an excellent position, from whence he not only secured his own communication and supplies, but prevented the invader from deriving any support from the finest provinces in Russia; and, at the same time, endangering the whole line of his communications from his rear; hereby demonstrating the truth of what he so feelingly expressed, that the "loss of Moscow was not the loss of the Empire." In the meantime, the enemy advanced without further resistance, to what he conceived the end of all his dangers, and summit of all his hopes, the possession of Moscow, which he imagined would intimidate the Russian government, and induce them to sue for peace. On the 14th of September he entered that ill-fated capital. There he hoped for plunder sufficient to satisfy the rapacity of his troops: and there he expected, as in other European capitals, to find the seeds of discord and disaffection. But he was miserably disappointed. Deserted dwellings, or an exasperated population, met every footstep he advanced; and hardly had he entered the Kremlin, when an "ocean of flame"† consigned the whole to destruction. Fortunately for Russia and for Europe, Moscow then had a governor who had a head to plan, and a heart to execute designs suited to this dreadful emergency; and fortunately too, he directed a population who were eager to obey whatever he advised to be done. They instantly consigned their habitation to the flames, rather than these should afford comfort or shelter to the ruthless invader.

The destruction of Moscow will form such a memorable epoch in the annals of the world, that the following account of this ill-fated city, which is taken from the latest and best authorities, (principally Tooke's) cannot fail to be interesting:—

Moscow, or Moskwa, formerly the capital of the Russian empire, is a very ancient city, founded about 1156. It is si-

* "This march, according to the Russian officers, was sombre and religious: consternation was in all hearts. We are assured that officers and privates were so penetrated that the profoundest silence reigned throughout the army, as at the time of prayers.—26th Bulletin."

† "It was an ocean of flame." Twenty-first Bulletin,

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tituted in $55^{\circ} 45'$ N. lat. and $37^{\circ} 24'$ E. long. from Greenwich, in a level country, upon the river Moskwa, which runs through it, and whence it takes its name.

Its extent and population has been very much exaggerated. Before the seat of the Empire was removed to Petersburg, these were very considerable; but, since that event, it has been rapidly on the decline; not only for that reason, but also, the frequent and destructive fires which have happened in it, the principal of which, in 1752, reduced the best half of it to ashes. In 1771, it was visited by a destructive pestilence. Independent of the numbers which abandoned the city, in the short space of a few months, that dreadful scourge carried off at least 60,000 inhabitants, at that time supposed to be one-fourth of the whole population. "The dead lay for three or four days in the streets, where they had fallen, or where they had been thrown out from the houses, as the police had neither carts nor people enough to carry them away." Prior to this fatal period, the houses in Moscow were computed at 12,538, and the population fully 200,000. Coxe, from good authority, estimates its population at 250,000, and Mr. Tooke, who resided 20 years in Russia, and knew more about that Empire than any Briton, having had access to the official records, says, that, during the winter, when the nobility and their numerous attendants reside in it, the population may amount to 300,000; but, during the summer, when they take up their abodes in the country, it is not more than 200,000. From the continual drain of its wealthiest inhabitants to Petersburg, 200,000* is perhaps at this moment the extent of its population, if so much.

* After this calculation was made, the following interesting statistical account of this city and population, at the time of its destruction, was received, and which deserves both our attention and imitation:

State of Moscow, from 1st January to 1st June 1812, according to the accounts of Major General Swaschkin, the Minister of Police.

BIRTHS.			OFFICERS OF POLICE.		
Males,	-	1,213	Engines,	-	290
Females,	-	1,417	Horses,	-	900
DEATHS.					
Children, {	Males,	1,015	Superior,	-	595
	Females,	739	Subaltern,	-	3,777
Youths, {	Males,	795			
	Females,	888			4,170

EXTENT OF MOSCOW.

16,100,300 Square sagues, or 18,111 English acres,

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-	118
ors, -	208
-	17
-	192
-	145
-	215
-	568
-	316
ops -	162
-	1,198
-	41
-	17
-	21
-	360
-	7,291

Feet.

paved by the	49,973
paved by the	156,682
paved by the	4,006,023
ng, -	4,192,678

OF BOTH SEXES.	
-	5,104
-	9,381
-	3,175
-	19,124
-	18,139
-	47,584
esses, -	96,409

Total, 198,915

HICH,	
-	96,282
-	102,532

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wersts in length, and 482 collateral streets and lanes intersected this prodigious mass of houses, consisting of more than 17,000 buildings; amongst which were 1600 churches, and 1000 palaces. Twelve *sastavas*, or gates, lead into it, and two rivers, the Moskwa and the Yausa, with the rivulet Neglinnaiya, runs through it. The Moskwa falls into the Okka near Kolomma, and abounds with fish. In the spring it bears considerable barks that come from the Okka, laden with corn; the Yausa, is a small stream; the Moskwa divides Moscow into two unequal parts, of which the Citerior is the largest, the most populous, and, in regard to the number of fine structures, the principal. Seventeen bridges of stone, and twenty-one of wood, keep up the communication between the several parts of the town, the chief of which are the Central stone bridge over the Moskwa, and the Court bridge across the Yausa.

The streets of Moscow are broad, the squares are spacious, and, in various parts, are extensive gardens; the houses are mostly of only one story, and not contiguous, but separated by interstices from each other, so that the air and sun diffuse their influence in every part of them, which prevents noxious vapours from stagnating; advantages in which other large cities are two often deficient. Hence arises the amazing extent of Moscow in proportion to its population, occupying more ground than either Paris or London.

Moscow was formerly divided into five main districts, viz. Kreml, Kitaigorod, Bielgorod, Zemlenoigorod, and the Slobodes.

The *Kreml*, a word of Tartarian origin, signifying the fortress, is separated from the Kitaigorod, by a rampart and a fosse running in a semicircle round it. This place is situated on a considerable eminence on the bank of the river Moskwa, and in the very centre of the city; the prospect hence is not to be paralleled. Far beneath flows the Moskwa, the beautiful windings of which may be pursued by the eye to a great distance. To the right is the Central stone bridge, and to the left the Court bridge, of timber, on which the rattling of carts and carriages of all sorts is incessant. Beyond this latter bridge the stream is covered with barks, and from it may be surveyed a great part of the city. Here rise lofty palaces, worthy of

adorning either Florence or Rome: there stand miserable huts, that would be a disgrace to any German village—a contrast which distinguishes Moscow from all other great cities in Europe, and, except in this quarter, the number of mean houses are by far the most numerous. On both sides of the river, Gothic monasteries, with their gilded turrets, decorate charming elevations.

Equally interesting, but of a different kind, are the objects which meet the view on the other hand. There stands the ancient palace of the Czars, in which the brave Ivan, the wise Alexey Mikhailovitch, and the great Peter formerly resided. It is built in the pure Gothic stile, but has nothing imposing or majestic in its appearance, as, by reason of its numerous angles and corners, only a small part of it can be seen at once. At present all is here silent and void. This palace was falling fast to decay, when the Emperor Paul gave orders to fit up this venerable seat of the Russian Monarchs, as a dwelling place for himself and family. Some of the apartments serve as a treasury, in which the silver and gold vessels, and other valuables of former times, are preserved. Others are made into armories. The ascent to this palace is by the grand flight of steps, eminently called *the red, or beautiful stairs*. The present view of the Kreml is serene and solemn, to which the multitude of churches and monasteries undoubtedly contribute.

In this quarter stands the cathedral, dedicated to the ascension of Mary, containing the monuments of the Patriarchs, the great silver chandelier, and the portrait of the holy Virgin, by the hand of the artist and evangelist Luke. This portrait bears every appearance of high antiquity; it hangs at the entrance of the sacristy, in a silver shrine, and is ornamented with a profusion of precious stones. The chandelier, a present from the Venetians to Boris Gudonof, weighs 2,800 lbs. and is, in fact, a wonderful piece of workmanship.

This church is one of the richest in the empire, in gold and silver decorations; and the sacerdotal vestments that are here preserved, are of surprising magnificence. In this cathedral, the Russian sovereigns are crowned. Several other grand religious ceremonies are here performed, as the feet washing on Holy Thursday, when the Metropolitan washes the feet of 12 priests

stand miserable huts, village—a contrast great cities in Europe, of mean houses are by the river, Gothic most charming elevations. kind, are the objects. There stands the brave Ivan, the wise er formerly resided. as nothing imposing son of its numerous can be seen at once. is palace was falling e orders to fit up this as a dwelling place artments serve as a sels, and other valu- hers are made into y the grand flight of stairs. The present to which the multi- dly contribute. dicated to the ascen- of the Patriarchs, the the holy Virgin, by This portrait bears ags at the entrance ornamented with a tier, a present from ,800 lbs. and is, in empire, in gold and nents that are here n this cathedral, the ther grand religious washing on Holy ne feet of 12 priests

of the inferior order. The whole number of churches in the Kreml is 32.

The Synodal house, adjacent to the cathedral, in which the patriarchs dwelt formerly, contains the synodal library, remarkable for having the Greek manuscripts brought from Mount Athos. All these churches and monasteries have a considerable number of steeples standing near them, with gilt or silver cupolas or crosses. Amongst these the belfrey, called the great Ivan, Ivan Viliki, accounted the highest turret in Moscow, is most conspicuous; it has 22 bells of various sizes, and in a pit lies the largest bell in the world, presented by the Empress Ann, and weighing 480,000 lbs. having a large piece broke out of the rim, occasioned by fire in 1737.

Two other large and handsome buildings adorn the Kreml; one the senate house, built by Catharine II. a grand imperial work in a noble modern style. Here the senate and the sacred college hold their sittings and keep their archives. The other grand building is the arsenal, standing opposite the former—a solid and compact edifice; but since it was damaged by the fire it remains in an imperfect state.

The Kreml palace was originally built of timber, by Prince Daniela Alexandrovitch, in 1300; the grand Prince Dmitri Ivanovitch Douski, constructed it of stone, in 1367, and Ivan Vassillivitch, in 1488, gave it the form in which it now appears.

From the banks of the Moskwa to the Neglinnaiya, the second division of Moscow, called Kitaigorod, runs, in a semicircular form, towards the Kreml. The origin of this appellation is uncertain, but probably proceeds from Kitai, a Russian word, signifying China, as in this quarter a great commerce with that country was formerly carried on. In 1538, the Tzar Ivan Vassillivitch caused the buildings between the Neglinnaiya and the Moskwa to be surrounded with a rampart and a mud wall. It has four gates. This quarter is also in an eminent sense styled *gorod—the city*. It is almost entirely filled with shops and warehouses, and the whole has the appearance of a perpetual fair. The outside of this mart is surrounded with arcades, within which the principal tradesmen have their shops.

Each class of goods has its peculiar row.—The whole number of shops in Kitaigorod is 4021 of brick, and 54 of wood.—The number of all the shops and warehouses amount to upwards of 6000.

The other remarkable buildings in the Kitaigorod, are the Government buildings, the police office at the Voskresenskoï gate, in which the several courts of judicature are held, and the Zaikonospaskoi monastery, in which is the academy for the Slavonian, the Greek, and Latin languages. The Exchange is an elegant modern structure, and perfectly corresponds with the magnitude of Moscow and the opulence of its inhabitants.

Bielgorod lies also on this side the river Moskwa, and is built principally of brick; some of them are elegant buildings. This quarter embraces the Kitaigorod in a semicircular form, from the influx of the Yausa into the Moskwa to the bank of that river again. It probably received the name of Bielgorod, or *White Town*, from the white wall and rampart built round it by Tzar Feoder Ivanovitch in 1586, and at length pulled down on account of its ruinous condition. The vacant space is now furnished with an alley of trees and a canal, much more useful and valuable to the inhabitants of the city. In this quarter are four monasteries, five nunneries, 92 churches, and an Armenian church built in 1781. The other structures are the university, founded by the Empress Elizabeth in 1755, and to the enlargement of the buildings of which, the late Empress Catharine devoted 125,000 roubles, the foundling house, the grammar school, the post-office, the salt magazines, the archives, the assignation bank, the artillery court, and the printing office of the senate, &c.

In this quarter are 378 shops, six stone bridges, and one of timber.

Zemlinoigorod and Slobodes encircle the three quarters before mentioned, as well on this side as on that of the river Moskwa. It was bordered by an earthen wall, whence it took its name, but only ruins of this wall are remaining. Here, by the side of massy and elegant buildings, are seen wooden houses, and among them wretched hovels. In the year 1591 and 1592, during the reign of the Tzar Feoder Ivanovitch it was surround-

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ed by a wall, which was entered by 34 gates of timber and two of stone; of all these only the two last are now remaining, the others being either burnt or decayed.

The Slobodes, or suburbs, are surrounded by the Kammer-college wall, through which the *zastanes* or outer gates are the passages. This wall encloses a number of waste and empty places, which has been done probably with a view to the future enlargement of Moscow. The principal and most remarkable suburb is undoubtedly the German Slobode, and it is therefore, by way of eminence, generally called the *Slobode*. It lies on the eastern side of the city, and forms the suburb as one comes hither from Vladimir. It is entered by three of the finest streets, the Pokroska, the new Bosmannaiya, and the old Bosmannaiya. The suburb is inhabited principally by Germans.

The public edifices most deserving of notice in the suburbs, are the three infirmaries; the Paviskoi, the Katarininskoi, and the great hospital. The latter is devoted to sick and infirm soldiers, the two former to other patients of whatever class, nation, or religious profession. The plan of conduct in all of them is exemplary.

The hospital of invalids, an elegant building, with a garden properly attended, in a pleasant situation, may be matched against any beneficent institution of its nature.

The botanic or apothecary garden, belonging to the Imperial Apotheke, is kept in an excellent state. This apotheke is appointed to supply all the inferior apothekes of the lazarets of the empire, with drugs and medicines. In the garden are reared almost all the officinal herbs in great abundance.

The foundling house forms an elegant counterpart to the university. The whole number of foundlings is about 5,000, who are not only maintained, but brought up to become useful members of society. Numbers of indigent persons, who cannot well provide for their children, commit them to this charitable institution; no questions are asked nor objections made, but all who are brought are admitted. Since the first institution of this hospital, a period of 50 years, not one instance of child murder has been detected in the whole circuit of Moscow. What other

nation in Europe can say the same? And yet we are told, the nation where this is done are barbarians, because their laws, institutions, and government are different from ours.

The climate of Moscow is certainly to be reckoned amongst the most salubrious. The situation is high, and the soil on which it stands dry, a few morassy parts about the Yausa and Neglinnaiya excepted. Add to this that the atmosphere is generally clear and bright, and the weather regular and wholesome. The winter is particularly remarkable for settled and bright weather. The longest day is about 17½ hours, and the shortest 6½ hours. Moscow, like the whole of Northern Russia, has properly speaking, only two seasons, the summer and the winter; since the spring and autumn are of such short duration, as to form no more than the imperceptible transition of the two chief seasons. The summer is upon the whole not agreeable, as the heats of the long days in June and July are oppressive, and the nights chill; the foot walker is either smothered in a cloud of dust, or must wade through mud and dirt. The winter usually sets in about the middle of November, often earlier, and lasts till the end of March, old style, with great severity. January and February are the finest part of the winter, as then the principal falls of snow are past, and the heavens are generally clear and serene, while the days lengthen very quickly, and the cold is more uniform, being about 9° Fahrenheit. The frost is always intense, and nearly uniform, and throws firm and solid bridges over rivers and morasses. Although near 5° more to the southward than Petersburg, the cold is equally severe; but, inured to the climate, and wrapped in his warm furs, it is life and health to the Russian. In this country, we can form no idea of the severity of a Russian winter. It destroyed the greater part of the veteran army of Charles XII. of Sweden, in 1709, during his desperate expedition into that country; so dreadfully severe did the hardy sons of Sweden feel it, though considerably more to the southward than Moscow is, that 2000 of them actually dropped down dead on a march, from the effects of the cold alone.

The environs of Moscow, particularly along the banks of the

serpentine Moskwa, is covered with delightful seats, the summer retreat of the Russian nobility.

Hospitality and beneficence are the characteristic of the people of Moscow. Under their roof the stranger is made free—welcome to food and drink, without respect to person or condition. No pauper is sent empty away from their doors, on the contrary, they hasten to offer their mite to the indigent.

Public topics are discussed with a liberality and frankness not common elsewhere. Every one speaks his sentiments without fear or reserve, which shews the good understanding and mutual confidence between the Government and the nation; and is certainly the best evidence for the goodness of the administration and contentedness of the people. Though rigid adherents of the Greek church, yet toleration is one of the finest features of the Russian character, and shines with a peculiar lustre at Moscow. Difference, in matters of religion, is never any detriment to a man. In civil affairs, in social intercourse, in friendship, or in love, religion is no obstacle to success. The Muscovite never inquires, whether you be of Cephas, or of Paul. Honour and probity are the grounds of his confidence, and amiableness of any kind the source of his attachment—yet there are men among us, who tell us the Russians are demi-savages.

Such was Moscow; interesting in her prosperity, but more interesting in her fall. From her ashes sprang up the glorious fabric of European independence. She set an example which preserved the liberties of the present age, and which will animate succeeding generations to resist oppression and ambition. Her name will be pronounced by every nation with admiration and regard. The example of Moscow will prove the watchword of patriotism, and a warning to violence, through every succeeding age.

The destruction of this venerable city, forms one of the most extraordinary events which has ever occurred in the history of the world, whether we consider the causes which led to it, or the consequences which resulted from it. The enemy, in his bulletins, detailed at length ridiculous stories, about a balloon which was

formed at Moscow, in order to destroy the French army. The preparations which are there enumerated, however, were certainly intended for a different purpose, and were, no doubt, meant for the destruction of the city, if necessity should demand it, but which purpose it might be necessary to conceal till the moment of execution. The Russian government had certainly determined to sacrifice the place, if the enemy advanced to it. The public buildings, and every thing valuable which could not be carried away, were burnt by the command of Rostopchin, who durst not have attempted it unless he had been directed, or at least been given to understand that it would give no offence to his government. Many of the wealthy inhabitants adopted this plan of their own accord, with regard to their own properties. All followed the example, or obeyed the command, without a murmur. All this too was done in Moscow with cheerfulness by its people, where Bonaparte and his admirers firmly believed that the greatest discontent and disaffection prevailed against the government. He found himself egregiously mistaken. He had indeed to lament the fate of one friend, of the name of Wirtigen, who, as early as June, had been *prophesying* that Napoleon would be in Moscow in September; but Rostopchin, very properly, extinguished such wishes by putting him to death. Much also of the city was destroyed in the desperate conflict which took place in it. Evacuated by the regular troops, still Moscow did not fall without a dreadful struggle. The inhabitants of the lower orders which remained, flew to arms, and endeavoured to defend the Kremlin. But their efforts were vain, opposed to regular troops. The Kremlin was forced by artillery, and the city subdued, but not without a dreadful carnage. The fighting continued for three days, amongst the flaming houses, and it was during this bitter contest that the fire was communicated to many dwellings, which, being built of wood, spread the flames with an astonishing rapidity, and which in the general confusion no measures could be taken to check. With the exception of the Kremlin, the French in revenge destroyed all the rest of the city. The scenes which took place in Moscow, during this direful period, are beyond the power of language to describe. The fury of

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the French soldiers knew no bounds. They had been taught to expect in Moscow, every luxury in abundance; and that there they were to live through the winter in the midst of every gratification. The dreadful disappointment rendered them furious and ungovernable. Plunder, robberies, and murders, followed in a fearful train. Females were violated in sight of their distracted friends; and many, to preserve their honour from the fury of this Gallic swarm of violence, threw themselves into the flames and perished. No age nor sex was spared. The beggar was dragged from his humble dwelling—the helpless female from her most secure hiding place, and the blood of the Priest was shed round the altars of the Almighty. Children were butchered before the eyes of their parents, and parents in the presence of their children. Destruction and crime occupied the time of the French soldier. Many of these wretches perished amongst the burning houses; and others escaping from them, or issuing from the cellars where they had been in search of plunder, had more the appearance of furies than human beings. Moscow exhibited one indelible scene of horror and misery. For some days the great cause of all this remained without its walls, not daring to enter it. From thence issued no voice of supplication, imploring his clemency or panegyrising his power. No deputation, as at Berlin or Vienna, came to place their necks below his feet and acknowledge him as their conqueror—No! every tongue proclaimed hostility—every arm was raised up in defiance. The enemy stated that 30,000 wounded Russians perished in the flames; but this must be one of his falsehoods, advanced merely to blacken the Russian character, for whether they carried off their property or sacrificed their wealth, it is not likely that they would be so careless of those who had suffered for their country. But in the combats which took place in the city, perhaps an equal number may have perished. The loss of property, with more appearance of truth, was estimated in the 20th bulletin at *many millions*, but take it only at three millions, that makes £126,000,000 sterling. The enemy, for some time after he entered the place, continued to boast of the supplies it afforded, and of the great number of furs and pelises

which the soldiers discovered, and the vast quantity of wine and brandy which were found in the cellars; but it was evident that all this was done for the sole purpose of deceiving the people of France, with regard to his real situation, for the army was soon after reduced to great distress.

The enemy eagerly snatched the opportunity that his occupying Moscow afforded, to proclaim himself the undoubted conqueror at Borodino. Loud was the exultation throughout France at this unexpected calamity. "Is it not fortunate for France and Europe, that their destinies are confided to the greatest captain of the age; to the hero whose prudence equals his activity, who abandons nothing to chance, overcomes all obstacles, and seems by his genius to enchain fortune and command events."* "While Russia (continued they) is thus struck to the core, we cannot doubt that the shock will be felt in London. The Englishman will suffer in what is dearest to him—his mercantile speculations and his gold.† England, as well as Russia, was conquered under the walls of Moscow."‡ Yes, England—dreaded, and, dreadful England, your name was always uppermost in a Frenchman's thought. It was your destruction was chiefly sought amidst the blood of Marengo—under the beams of the sun of Austerlitz—upon the gory plains of Jena and Asperne—amidst the carnage of Borodino, and the ruins of Moscow. Thy power did not appear so limited, thy resources so delapidated, nor thy hopes and prospects so gloomy to thy enemies, as they were described to be by pretended friends. Hence the unbounded joy of France at an occurrence which appeared fatal to the best interests of Great Britain. Little did they imagine that this important event would so soon turn their joy into mourning. Every species of bitter invective, sarcastic observation and abuse, was thrown out against the Russian Government, the Russian nation, and the gallant Rostopchin, which, strange to say, was echoed loud and long in this country. In the remains of Moscow, and in the finest provinces of the Russian

* Official Article, Paris, October 13th, *Moniteur*.

† Ditto, ditto, ditto, 18th.

‡ Ditto, ditto, ditto, 4th.

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Empire,* they fondly conceived they would supply and recruit
their armies, and, at the approach of spring, said the haughty
Moniteur, we "*will finish the contest on the confines of Asia.*"†

Great was the joy at the result of the battle of Borodino,
and proportionate the despondency and grief, which overspread
Britain, upon learning the fate of Moscow. Our opposition
and democratic prints, those prophets of plagues and mischief,
eagerly caught this afflicting event, to proclaim the condition of
Russia as desperate. Her government, people, and cause, were
loaded with every species of contempt and reproach, while the
enemy was extolled, and his crimes extenuated. All was given
over as lost; and Bonaparte proclaimed the conqueror. Follow-
ing the language of the Moniteur, and believing it alone, they
upbraided the Russians, even after such proofs of their firmness
as had been exhibited at Borodino: "How can we give credit
to the story of their devotion to their country, when they see it
overrun? How can they make pretensions to patriotism, when
we hear of the French penetrating 90 miles in five days, un-
checked—nay, unobserved? (does the 26th bulletin say so?)
The superstitious ignorant Russians believed that Moscow was
impregnable. From them no exertions in the cause of their
country can be expected—they have no object to fight for.
For what condition can be worse than that to which the Rus-
sian is condemned? The feeble and unfortunate Alexander will

* "Suppose Paris burnt, could the army which occupied the Beauce, the Orlenois,
and Picardy, in short, the provinces from which it derives subsistence—could
this army want provisions? Certainly not. Very well, our position in Russia is ex-
actly similar to the case we have now put. Far from being ourselves exposed to dan-
ger, for want of provisions, we are even likely to furnish St. Petersburg this win-
ter."—Paris, Moniteur, October 18th.

† In Moscow "our army, master of all its movements, is deriving new strength to
finish on the confines of Asia, the reduction of those barbarians whom it has march-
ed to combat from the utmost extremities of Europe. One great man of the 18th
century blamed another for employing his pen in writing the history of Russia.
The same reproach will not apply to him who shall continue it to that period,
when it becomes a chapter in our annals. It must always be with the most lively
curiosity that the philosopher will inquire what the Muscovites were, what they
wished to be, and what they are become!!"—Paris, Moniteur, October 18th,
official. Unquestionably it will be with the most lively curiosity that both the
historian and the philosopher will inquire, the one with enthusiasm, and the other
with admiration, what the Muscovites were—what they wished to be—and what they
are become.—Nor will any reproach attach to him who employs his pen in relating
that chapter, when Russia is connected with French history, but this chapter few
Frenchmen will be fond to record, and even their thoughtless heads and callous
bosoms will long contemplate it with fear and sorrow.

sue for peace, and will obtain it. It is from the indignation we feel at the imposition daily practised on the public credulity, that we are anxious to prove, that the war which has been commenced by the Russians with torpor, and proceeded in with pusillanimity, must infallibly end in ruin. The French Emperor has gained the point at which he aimed.—The winter quarters that he promised his army he has obtained for them; and, possessed as he is of the heart of the Russian Empire, it is hopeless to expect that the public counsels of St. Petersburg, can retrieve the fortune of Alexander.”* These and a thousand similar taunts and sneers were thrown out in England; nay, every epithet of reproach was heaped upon the British Government, for daring to publish the official accounts of the battle of Borodino, in which the Russians were victorious. Some of these things will descend to posterity, and they, at least, will infer, that such sentiments could not have been uttered, but in a country where men had liberty to speak and write what they *thought*, and not what they were *commanded*. Far different were the feelings in Russia. Regret, sorrow, and indignation filled every bosom, but without any symptom of despondency, submission, or fear. “He has not entered a country where every step he takes inspires all with terror, and bends both the troops and the inhabitants to his feet. Russia is unaccustomed to subjection, and will not suffer her laws, religion, freedom, and property to be trampled upon: she will defend them to the last drop of her blood.”† “It being once for all fixed and determined (and in which, no doubt, every Russian will voluntarily coincide) that whatever may be the progress of the enemy, *rather to drain the last drop of the cup of misery, than by a scandalous peace to subject Russia to a foreign yoke.*”‡ Confiding in the honour of Britain, the fleet from Cronstadt was dispatched to an English port. Petersburg was stripped of what was valuable, and prepared, if necessary, to share the fate of Moscow. Redoubled energy was used to re-enforce the ar-

* Morning Chronicle, September 26th and 28th, and October 9th, 1812; and other dates. See also other papers in the same interest.

† Alexander's Proclamation upon the fall of Moscow.

‡ Petersburg Gazette, October 2d, official.

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mies. The fall of Moscow was made known to the Russian Empire; and it is impossible not to admire the solemn and affecting manner in which Alexander disclosed that sad event to his subjects, particularly in the concluding and solemn appeal to the Almighty.* The heart must be cold, and mind dead to every generous feeling, who is not penetrated by it. It was the language of a Prince who suffered for the miseries of his people;—It was the language of the heart in a just cause, and could not fail to be acceptable to the Almighty;—yet to the shame of my country, these strongest criterions of true bravery and courage, were treated with mockery and derision, by pretending patriots amongst us. Imploring His aid and assistance, with whom "the race is not to the swift, nor the battle to the strong," Alexander called upon his subjects, and his subjects obeyed his call. From every part of that vast Empire the arm of resistance was stretched forth, and from every mouth issued the cry of vengeance.

Every hope disappointed, every prospect blasted, with famine, disgrace, and ruin before his face, the unprincipled invader, irritated to madness, dared before a mock tribunal, to arraign, condemn, and execute the subjects of another power, whose crime was fidelity to their country. There have been tyrants, who, in the heat of passion, and in defiance of all law, have destroyed those who opposed them; but it belonged to French audacity, in the nineteenth century, coolly, and deliberately to proclaim as just, and act upon as right, principles so diabolical. By what right did he assume this power over the inhabitants of Moscow.—Did they capitulate—did they yield up their properties to his laws? or did they in their persons swear allegiance to him, and then rebel against him?—No such thing—no compact or agreement subsisted betwixt them—they were enemies, sworn, open, and determined enemies—when resisting he might kill them, when yielding themselves prisoners he was bound to treat them as such; but when they fell in-

* "Almighty God! turn thy merciful eye to thy supplicating Russian Church. Vouchsafe courage and patience to thy people struggling in a just cause, so that they thereby may overcome the enemy; and in saving themselves, may also defend the freedom of kings and nations."—*Alexander's Address.*

to his power, to make them amenable to his laws and authority, in a judicial manner, was an insult to human understanding, an outrage upon human nature, of so flagrant a kind, that unless the enemy had himself recorded it, however it might have been circulated, no person would have believed it; and, like the murder at Jaffa, the atrocity of the deed would have been deemed a testimony against the fact.—What though these men were criminals, they were only so to the laws of their country, no other power on earth had a right to punish them by their's, for crimes committed as Russian subjects against Russian laws, even supposing they had done so. Europe stood astonished at the unequalled atrocity of the deed, while she saw in it the very climax of human temerity, injustice and oppression. Nevertheless, there were not wanting amongst the degenerate sons of Britain, men, who, having hitherto advocated the tyrant's cause and endeavoured to extenuate his crimes, now stepped boldly forward, to justify, with devilish sophistry, this unprecedented deed. But while these live amidst the unqualified contempt of the present, we shall leave them to the severe reprobation of succeeding generations. Their reasoning could no longer make darkness light, nor their good wishes support the cause of their idol. His power was weighed by him who weighs "the mountains in scales, and the hills in the balance." He was found wanting. Those eternal laws of justice, morality, and truth, immutable as their Author, and omnipotent as their Judge, were marshalling their accusations against him, before that tribunal which takes cognizance of the affairs of the universe—where human might sinks into nothing—from whose mandates there is no escape, and from whose decision there is no appeal. The cruel woes and miseries that France and this man had so long inflicted upon their fellow creatures, were about to be visited on their guilty heads, and that Providence which both had so long derided and defied, was preparing the cup of wrath and indignation for his lips, and those of his followers. With steady, but silent steps, the day of just retribution was advancing upon them "as the thief at the midnight hour;" and at last, punishment came upon them "as a destruction from the Almighty."

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• "His
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The conduct of Bonaparte in remaining so long inactive at Moscow, has appeared extraordinary and inexplicable to many. Curiosity and conjecture have been stretched to the utmost in order to ascertain the cause of it. But it does not appear that these inquiries have yet attained their object. If, however, we attend unto this man's character and pursuits, the reason will appear natural and simple. He had not destroyed nor intimidated the Russian army. Moscow he had obtained, and found it a shadow. He could afford to fight no more battles like that at Borodino. Another such, and it was immaterial whether the climate he was in had been under the pole or the line, his ruin was equally certain. When he advanced to Moscow, he wanted to strike a blow which would astonish the world.* His vanity led him to believe that the capture of this capital would intimidate Alexander, and induce him to conclude a peace, without appealing to his people or inquiring into the situation or spirit of his army. Alexander, however, acted a different part, and one which, had it been earlier adopted, would have saved Europe much misery, and prevented the sun of Austerlitz from shedding his beams beyond the confines of Moravia. Bonaparte, thus situated, began to perceive that his enterprise was of a more desperate nature than he had imagined. But how could he extricate himself? He was too far from his reserves to risk another battle with an enemy, unbroken in courage, and increasing in numbers. To have retreated from Moscow, so soon after he had told the people of France that he had still six weeks of excellent weather to continue the campaign, would have been such a confession of his defeat at Borodino, and his inability to overthrow Russia, as no French sophistry could disguise or confute. And what would have been the effects of this upon Europe? Would not her enslaved people have said, if our oppressor is beaten in Spain, and discomfited in Russia, why may he not be so on the plains of Germany? Bonaparte was well aware, that upon the belief of his invincibility, depended the whole fabric of his tyrannic

* "His hopes of astonishing the world by the capture of Moscow, were vain."—*Alexander's Address.*

dominion. To preserve this charm, he calculated that the approach of winter would give him a plausible excuse for retreat, and to which he could attribute any loss he might sustain. That this resolution of prolonging his stay, until the approach of winter afforded him a handle to begin his retreat, would be attended with the most ruinous consequences to the army he had with him, he could scarcely fail to know. But what regard had he for them? It was not their safety but the security of his own power and ambition, that he regarded or sought. For that he had sacrificed other armies, and why should he be more careful of this? That he could contemplate the scene which followed, and with his satellites plan it, no man can doubt who reflects upon the little value which he set upon human life. "I can afford to lose 25,000 men per month," said he, to the Russian Ambassador, why then should your master go to war with me?" What could this man care for the consequences of a Russian winter, with regard to his army, providing he and his principal officers escaped to collect another? That the more thinking part of mankind would blame him, as a General, for leading such an army into a situation where he could not bring them back, and impute the whole to his want of talents, he was well aware; but then the mass of mankind, over which he ruled, he conceived, would not, and that was sufficient for his present purpose. Let Europe believe (thought he) that it was the Russian winter, not the Russians, who defeated me, and I am safe, and will soon obtain another army. Similar to these were his calculations, and we know what effect such opinions had upon Europe; nay, even to this day there are men who believe that it was the winter, not the Russians, which occasioned all his disasters.

There seems, therefore, no necessity whatever to wander into the fields of conjecture about the cause of Bonaparte's remaining so long inactive at Moscow. Like other rash mortals, whose ambition and vanity overpower their reason, he had led himself into a situation, where to advance was ruin, and to retreat was destruction. To extricate himself he affected moderation. He solicited an armistice, which Kutusoff rejected with

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indignation. The General received his messenger, Lauriston, openly in his army, showed him that the Russians were prepared for the contest, and sent him back with this message to his master: "Hitherto it has been your turn to act upon the offensive, but it is now mine;"—foiled here, he endeavoured to negotiate—Alexander refused to listen to him, either *directly* or *indirectly*.—He very wisely left the matter to his generals, and the issue to the sword.—"Moscow is not Russia," said the resolute Alexander; "and, if I lose Petersburg, I will retire to Archangel.—Whatever may be the consequences I will never be your slave." The conduct of Alexander, and of Kutusoff, has been attempted to be loaded with duplicity and insincerity, in endeavouring to delude Bonaparte, with the prospect of negotiating with him, while he remained at Moscow.—This is not just, neither is it true. Their characters were above such deception. "We have been compelled, (says Alexander) though with a sorrowful and wounded heart, in invoking the aid of God to draw the sword; and to promise to our Empire not to return it to the scabbard so long as a single enemy remained in arms in our territory. We fixed firmly in our hearts this determination."* Those terrible words from the lips of the judge, "Thou shalt be taken to the place of execution, and there hanged 'by the neck till you are dead," never had such an effect on the trembling criminal at the bar, as these resolutions had upon the mind of Bonaparte. They chilled his soul with terror; and even he whose nerves nature had steeled against all chances of fate and fortune, appeared *shook, and lost his gaiety*.† A portentous gloom collected round his communications. His bulletins began to freeze. The remainder of Moscow to crumble into ruins—from being a place like Brussels, it became an uninhabitable sink, where its starving inhabitants wandered about upon the ashes of their former dwellings, picking up some scraps and garden stuffs, and whatever wretched morsels could be found to live upon. In his vast plan of combinations, it was now neither of military nor political importance, but only an

* Alexander's Proclamation, Wilna, January 6th, 1812.

† Twenty-ninth Bulletin.

advanced post in the army. The soldiers got orders to bake biscuits for 20 days march, because "in 20 days we must be in winter quarters." "It is necessary to make a *lateral* movement from Moscow into Poland, in order that our army may approach nearer Petersburg;—" to say that the Emperor has left Moscow, is only to say, that this father of soldiers marches wherever great operations demand his presence. His presence ensures victory."* Strange arguments! but, such as they were, they succeeded in deceiving the understandings of this man's admirers, to whom they were addressed, and that was the object which he had in view when he made them.

We are now arrived at that point where the destructive power which rose from the consequences of the French Revolution, "bestrode the world like a Colossus;" when the arms of France shone in the zenith of their glory, and when the friends and admirers of the *greatest captain of the age* conceived that he had attained the utmost height of human grandeur, greatness and security. Hitherto it has been our painful task to record the acts of injustice, attended with success, and to contemplate the career of this destroyer as altogether irresistible. From Moscow he contemplated both Europe and Asia as being within his grasp, and obedient to his nod. Every thing was considered as lost, and all further resistance as impossible. "The whole world (to use the noble language of Alexander) has fixed its attention on our suffering country, and inwardly moved, thought, in the reflection of the flames of Moscow, they beheld the last day of the existence of our freedom and independence.†" So certainly thought the enemy. Dreadful deception. It was the dream of the night, which vanisheth with the morning—the meteor of the night which darts through the wintry sky, and disappeareth in darkness for ever. "Great and mighty is the God of justice! the triumph of the enemy was of short duration;"‡ and we have henceforward to contemplate a different scene, and to record

* Twenty-fourth, twenty-fifth, and twenty-sixth Bulletins, and an official article in the *Journal de Le Empire*, of November 12th.

† Alexander's Proclamation, 15th November.

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events which the mind of the most sanguine could hardly have anticipated. But how shall I attempt to express, within the bounds of a work like this, these unexpected and amazing occurrences. The labour of years disappeared in a day; the wealth of nations was lost in a moment. He, before whose power Europe trembled, was now about to tremble in his turn. His fame—his fate—his throne, and, perhaps, his life, now depended upon the will of Alexander. The poisoned chalice of woe and misery, which he had filled for the lips of the Russian Sovereign, was now returned into his own hands, in wrath and indignation. With the bitter dregs of his iniquity it was filled to the brim. The order was irresistible which commanded him to drain it.

But to proceed. The burning of Moscow was a thunder-bolt to the tyrant. It struck him with consternation and terror. Long accustomed to the treachery of the degenerate sons of Southern Europe, his narrow soul never imagined that there were any men who would dare so much for their country. But the ruin of Moscow was yet the least of the evils which he had to contend with. It was the spirit which kindled its flames which appalled him. It was the devotion of 50,000,000 of people to their Sovereign and their country, that like the bolt of heaven, struck his senses with torpor and confusion. It was that, which though Moscow had stood in all her glory, and had summer until this day displaced the horrors of winter, would have sent him back to the Vistula, stripped of his army, and shorn of his glory and his power. In the mean time the danger increased around him. The scanty supplies which the smoking ruins of the Russian capital afforded, were completely exhausted. Not a Russian could be found who was base enough for any consideration to supply him with a morsel of bread or a mouthful of water. None would listen to him—none would obey him—A Peasant on whose arm some French soldiers had impressed the letter N, having inquired what it meant, was informed, that it was the mark which designated him henceforward as a Soldier of Napoleon's. The indignant Russian deliberately snatched a hatchet, and with his other hand chopped off that which had been marked, exclaiming, that it should never wield arms

against his country! Similar was the spirit throughout Russia. Besides, his communication with Poland was almost entirely cut off. Every where the Russians presented a firm front, and no where could a single party go out to forage and return in safety. His army continued to decrease rapidly by the constant exertions of the Cossacks. Cunning, promises, or menaces were alike disregarded by the indignant Russian. "The campaign only began when you came to Moscow—we asked you not to come here, and you must get back the best way you can," said the inflexible Kutusoff.

Before proceeding in the narrative of the subsequent events of this campaign, let us consider the position which the contending armies at this moment occupied. Bonaparte was at Moscow with an army of 120,000 men. Kutusoff with a force nearly equal, and soon after much superior, occupied a position about 20 miles to the Southward and Westward of that city, collecting his own supplies and re-enforcements with security and facility; and at the same time intercepting and cutting off all the supplies and communications of his enemy. On the N. and N. W. side, Winzengerode occupied the Petersburg road, with a force of 40,000 men, and that force daily augmenting in numbers. These never allowed the enemy to move any distance from the ruins of the capital. From Moscow to Smolensk, a distance of 250 miles, the French had no force whatever; and at the latter place only a feeble garrison. Lower down the Dnieper, and near its conflux with the Berezina, Dombrowski with 20,000 men, endeavoured to besiege Bobrunk. He was watched and opposed by the Russian General D' Oertell, with nearly an equal force. Further to the westward, on the confines of Lithuania and Volhynia, Schwartzenberg with the Austrian contingent, the Saxon troops, and the 7th corps of the French army under Regnier were stationed. These had for their object, not only the protection of Wilna and the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, but the conquest of Volhynia, Podolia, and the Ukraine. But they were opposed by Tormasoff now joined by Tchichagoff with the army from Moldavia, which made their united forces 100,000 strong. Northward at Polotsk, was placed Marshal St. Cyr with one corps of the

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French army, and all the Bavarian troops. Wittgenstein opposed all his efforts on that side with success. Before Riga, Marshal Macdonald with the Prussian and other troops, about 30,000 strong, were posted in order to attack the place, which was defended by General Essen with 18 or 20,000 men. Victor with the reserve of 45 or 50,000 was advancing from the Niemen by forced marches to Smolensk, but from the distance he had to march, (300 miles,) it was evident that it would be the middle of October before he could reach that place. The other reserves also under Augereau, stationed between the Oder and the Vistula, amounting to 60,000 men, were ordered forward; but the great distance which they had to march, rendered it impossible for them to reach Wilna, in any considerable body, before the middle of November. Other re-enforcements from more distant parts, were also put in motion to the same point.

Whoever casts his eye over the map, will quickly perceive the desperate situation into which the rashness and vanity of Bonaparte had now drawn him:—With armies equal to his own, and animated with a different spirit, he was assailed in front—winter was rapidly approaching, for which he was wholly unprepared—18,000 Russian troops, embarked from Finland, had landed and augmented the already dangerous force under Wittgenstein. The whole population of the Russian Empire, vowing vengeance, was collecting around him. From the gulph of Archangel to the shores of the Caspian, they cheerfully marched to the combat. Issuing from the banks of the Oby, and descending from the Uralean mountains, strong as the gale which agitates its bosom, and terrible as the tempests which sweep their summits, the hardy sons of Russia rushed onward to Moscow. Austria was cold in the cause, and stuck only to the letter of her agreement, without energy, and without activity—Prussia was even less to be depended upon—France, Italy, and the Rhenish states were 1700 miles from him—The detached armies in his rear, were nearly all composed of mercenary troops—His power in Spain was shaken to its centre, and Rebellion raised her head in France. Yet so situated, he lingered at Moscow. Surely He who made him, could alone harden his heart and

darken his understanding to that degree, which could make him disregard the danger of a situation like this.

"Moscow is not Russia, but Moscow must be avenged," was the watchword for commencing offensive operations against him. Every day, every hour, saw not only his supplies, but his army rapidly diminishing. The numerous petty combats round Moscow were most ruinous and destructive; but it would be too tedious to enumerate these, while more important operations present themselves in abundance. Suffice it to say, that the occupation of Moscow, cost him 33,000 men, without striking a blow; the greater part of whom were taken prisoners by the indefatigable Cossacks, who hung around him in more threatening clouds than ever darkened a Russian winter. It is inconceivable what these indefatigable people performed. Neither by night nor by day did they allow the enemy one moment's repose. Men, horses, and cannon—every thing that came out from the French army, in any thing less than overwhelming numbers, disappeared in a moment. While the French Soldiers were busy in dividing the provisions for their scanty meals, the Cossacks appeared in the middle of them, and carried off the astonished Frenchman and his food.* Cannon, baggage waggons, Caissons, vanished as quickly as Tam O' Shanter's vision at

"Alloway's auld haunted Kirk."

Here began that terrible *Hourra*, which never ceased till it had frightened the Fox to Elba. In a week after Bonaparte entered Moscow, they had possession of Roussa and all the environs of Mojaisk; and from the army of Winzengerode, were in constant communication with their comrades under Kutusoff to the Southward of Moscow. Amongst the severest actions which were fought betwixt these parties, and the French foragers, was that early in October with Murat, upon the Kolomna

* "On the 18th, at 7 A. M. 4000 Cossacks came out of a wood—they made a *Puzza* on the light Cavalry, whilst they were on foot during the distribution of the *Zow*—12 Cannon, &c. &c. were carried off. *Twenty-sixth Bulletin, Bourrousk, Dec. 25d.*

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Road, where it is stated by demiofficial accounts, that Murat lost several thousand men, and daily they sent into the different armies some hundreds of prisoners.

Perceiving that no prospect remained of bending the Russian government to his will, Bonaparte at length, with humbled hopes, began to think of measuring back his steps into Poland. Victor was directed to use all speed, to keep the communication open at Smolensk. Murat was detached with a strong force to open a secure road for retreat. The Kremlin was mined preparatory to its evacuation and destruction; and he who had shot some hundreds of the people of Moscow for destroying their own property, upon the principle, that their government could no longer protect them; now thought it no iniquity to destroy that property which he could no longer keep, and which he had no right to. Kutusoff now saw, that the moment was arrived when he should act on the offensive; and drawing his army more to the westward, he detached Beningsen with a strong force to attack the French rear guard but now by their intended movement become their advanced guard, under the command of Murat. On the 18th of October, this attack took place, near the river Nara. The enemy's force amounted unto 50,000 men. The contest was obstinate and severe, But the valour of the Russians prevailed. The attack completely succeeded. Two thousand five hundred French were left dead on the field. Thirty-eight pieces of cannon and 1600 prisoners were taken, together with a standard of honour, of the 1st regiment of cuirassiers. Murat had a narrow escape, and was compelled to fall back upon the main body of the army. The Russians lost 300 men, and Gen. Baggawit killed.*

This victory quickly decided the conduct of Bonaparte: Moscow was no longer tenable, and his escape from it barely possible. The colours taken by the Russians from the Turks, in the different wars, for 100 years, and several curious things found in the Kremlin, together with a Madona set with diamonds, had previously been sent to Paris.† On the 15th, 16th,

* Kutusoff's dispatch, Oct. 19th.

† 23d Bulletin, Moscow, Oct. 2th.

17th, and 18th, Oct. all the sick who were in the hospitals of Moscow were sent to Mojausk and Smolensk; those who had been wounded early in the campaign, had already left Smolensk, Mohileff and Minsk, for Wilna, to give room for the others. The artillery caissons, the ammunition taken, and a great quantity of curious things, and two trophies were packed up and sent off on the 15th. The army was commanded to take biscuit for 20 days, and every thing indicated, that it was time to think of winter quarters.* On the 19th of October, therefore, Bonaparte left Moscow, with very different feelings and prospects from those with which he entered it, and scarcely knowing where to direct his steps. Mortier was left in the Kremlin with a garrison, in order to prevent the advance of Winzengerode, until the army was united; when he had orders to destroy and abandon it. His army being collected was found to amount only to 85,000 men.† With these, his intention seems to have been to penetrate through the fertile provinces of Toola and Kaluga, and thus through the Polish Ukraine, gain the confines of Austrian Galicia, if he could not effect his passage higher up the Dnieper. But uncertain if he should be able to accomplish this object, and not willing to have it supposed, that he was compelled to adopt another course, he thought proper to issue that curious bulletin, (the 25th,) Where he said, "Some think the Emperor will march upon Toola and Kaluga, to pass the winter in these provinces, and occupy Moscow with a garrison in the Kremlin. Others suppose, that the Emperor will blow up the Kremlin, and burn the public establishments which remain; and that he will approach within 100 leagues of Poland, to establish his winter quarters in a friendly country, and near to receive every thing which exists in the magazines of Dantzic, Kowno, Wilna, and Minsk, and recover from the fatigues of war. The latter observe, that Moscow is distant from Petersburg 180 leagues, of bad road, whilst Witepsk is only 130 from Petersburg; that from Moscow to Kiow is 218 leagues, whilst from Smo-

* Twenty-fourth and twenty-fifth Bulletins, Moscow, 14th and 20th, Oct.

† Lord Catlicart's dispatch, London Gazette.

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lensk to Kiow is but 112 leagues; from whence they conclude that Moscow is not a military position, or that Moscow possesses no longer military importance, since that town is burned and ruined for 100 years."* The Devils in Pandæmonium, when disputing about free will and fate, never could advance such extraordinary reasoning as this, nor were they ever more completely—

"In wandering mazes lost."

That the Emperor knew very well what road he intended to take, no person can doubt; but that he could be able to retreat by that one which he wished, or that he should winter in Toola or Kaluga, was another question; and one depending not upon his pleasure, but that of the Russians. A few days afterwards however, when the Emperor became a little more settled in his mind, he determined to march "To gain the Dwina, and take up a position which will be 80 leagues from Wilna and Petersburg, a double advantage, that is to say, nearer by 20 marches, his means and his end."† The Emperor had forgot, that Moscow once was his object—but now, that town was become neither of military nor political importance.‡ True, it was not; nor was the road he was taking, that which led to "the Confines of Asia."

The Russian General was not to be deceived by the enemy's movements. He penetrated into his real intentions, and threw himself with his whole force into the Kaluga road. On this point, Bonaparte marched, after taking great praise to himself, for not burning 2000 villages and as many country houses round Moscow, to which he was advised by his bloody followers.§ The Russian army was posted in the neighbourhood of Maloyaroslavitz, commanding the road to Kaluga. Dire-ct necessity, compelled Bonaparte to endeavour to force his

* Twenty-fifth Bulletin, Noilscoe, Oct. 20th.

† Twenty-sixth Bulletin, Bowrowsk, Oct. 23d.

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way into that fertile province. On the 23d, the French army marched upon Maloyaroslavitz, and the Russian army endeavoured to prevent it. On the night between the 23d and 24th, two divisions of the Russian army arrived in the town, and occupied a favourable position upon heights, on the right bank of the river; the enemy occupying the left bank, and having re-established the bridge. On the morning of the 24th, an engagement began, which was maintained with great obstinacy. The fury of the combatants was so great, and the fire of the artillery so terrible, that the town was almost totally destroyed. The streets were covered with dead and dying. The wounded of the French army who were unable to move, and whom no person regarded, were crushed to death under the heavy artillery passing and repassing over them. Mutilated limbs, human heads, &c. half consumed skeletons amidst the burning ruins, met the eye in every direction. The piteous lamentations and groans of the wounded, alone disturbed the deep silence which reigned in Maloyaroslavitz during the night after the battle. The town was taken and re-taken eleven times;* but the enemy was finally foiled in all his attempts, and compelled to march off in the direction of Vereja, with the loss of near 6000 men. By his accounts, he succeeded in defeating the Russians, who lost from 6 to 7000 men; while his own loss was stated at 1500. "We found on the field," says he, "1700 Russians, 1200 of which were recruits, clothed in grey waistcoats,† having been scarcely two months in the service"—Yet these men beat his best troops, and compelled them to fly from Russia!! The enemy in publishing such ridiculous accounts as these, and launching out in praise of the fine weather, (which in reality, at this time, was become very bad,) wished only to conceal his dangerous situation, as much as he possibly could, from the people of France. On the 24th, Bonaparte removed his head-quarters to Ghorodnia, where his constant attendants, the Cossacks, soon paid him a visit. Six thousand of them "*glided into the woods*"‡ in the rear of the position, made a dash at the artillery,

* Cathcart's dispatch, Nov. 11th.

† Twenty-seventh Bulletin, Vereja, Oct. 27th,

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and carried off six pieces of cannon.—But they were quickly, if we can believe him, attacked, cut to pieces, and the cannon retaken. The Cossacks, said he, who knew the French Guards, called them "*Muscadins de Paris*," of which it appeared, they were always anxious to collect as many as possible. Compelled to retire from Maloyaroslavitz, he made a feint of effecting his purpose more to the westward, at Medyn, where a body of Cossacks were posted. From thence, however, he was obliged to retire, with the loss of 1000 prisoners. Kutusoff advanced in that direction; and the enemy now finding, that it was impossible for him to accomplish his retreat by Kaluga, was compelled to make up his mind to return by the road he came, and which had been rendered a desert.

In the meantime, Moscow had been retaken by the forces under the command of Winzengerode. On the 22d, he attacked the place, made himself master of the town, and in his anxiety to save the effusion of blood, rushed before his troops with a flag of truce in his hands, in order to induce the French garrison in the Kremlin, to desist from firing, as all resistance was now useless—by them, however, contrary to all the laws of war, he was taken prisoner. Bonaparte had even the audacity to threaten his life; and was with difficulty dissuaded from the attempt. He was sent off, under an escort, to France; and at two, A. M. on the 23d, Mortier blew up the Kremlin, and abandoned the place. "The arsenal, barracks, magazines, all were destroyed. This ancient Citadel, which dates from the foundation of the monarchy, this first palace of the Czars *has been!*"* Having accomplished his object, Mortier marched in the direction of Vereja and joined his master; while General Howaiska, who assumed the command of the Russian army lately under Winzengerode, next day occupied the place; here he found the enemy's sick and hospitals, and a great quantity of military stores;† and afterwards joined his comrades in the pursuit of the flying enemy.

The Prussian troops before Riga having been directed to

* Twenty-sixth Bulletin, Bowrousk, Oct. 23d.

† Howaiska's report, Oct. 22d.

join Macdonald, who was in the vicinity of Dunaburgh with the intention of marching against Wittgenstein, previous to the battles at Polotzk in August, their places were to be filled up by other troops from Germany. General Essen resolved, if possible, to prevent this assistance from reaching Macdonald. He attacked the Prussian troops on the 22d of August, and succeeded in arresting their attention, and in injuring them considerably. The enemy held an advantageous position, strongly intrenched, and covered with artillery. It was, nevertheless, taken by storm. The action was long and obstinate; and, had a division of the Russians from Riga, which were embarked to take the enemy's column near Shlock in the rear, been able to land, which from contrary winds they were not, there can hardly be a doubt, but that a considerable part of the Prussian force would have been destroyed. As it was, they lost 1500 men, 664 of whom were prisoners. The Russian loss was 600 men.* This diversion paralyzed the efforts of Macdonald, and prevented him from rendering any assistance to Oudinot, till Wittgenstein had beat him severely, and destroyed nearly one fourth of his army. After this no event of importance occurred in the neighbourhood of Riga, until the 27th of September, when the garrison being re-enforced by the forces under Steinheil, consisting of 18,000 men from Finland, an attempt was made to seize the besieging artillery of the enemy, and destroy the Prussian forces, in some measure isolated from each other. This brought on a series of bloody engagements, which continued till the 2d of October. The Russians advanced at first with success, but the enemy penetrating their design, allowed them to advance to the right bank of the Aa, where, on the 29th, a bloody engagement took place, in which the Russians suffered considerable loss, and were obliged to recross the Aa. Finding that their object was discovered, and that the numbers of the enemy were too great for them to have any hopes of success, they began to retreat to Riga, harassed and attacked daily by the enemy. On the 1st of October, the enemy, with all his forces, attacked, and endeav-

* Essen's dispatch, Riga, August 25d.

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* London Gazette, Oct. 27th, Stewart's dispatches.

† Essen's dispatch, Riga, Oct. 4th.

Prussian troops principally engaged in these affairs, the last which they fought in this unjust war, and to which no doubt they were compelled. From this period the opposing forces remained inactive before Riga, while grand and decisive operations were carrying on in other quarters, and to which it is now time to return.

We have already seen that Tormasoff, pressed by a superior force, and after a most obstinate resistance, had been obliged to fall back into Volhynia, and take refuge behind the Styr. But the enemy had suffered so severely,* in these destructive combats, as to be unable to give him much trouble for some time. They were, however, re-enforced by 10,000 men of the Confederation of the Rhine,† and were expected again to advance. The waters of the Pruth, and other rivers, having been swelled by heavy rains, impeded the march of the Moldavian army, and prevented its forming a junction with Tormasoff as early as was expected. That indefatigable leader, however, continued to annoy the enemy in every direction. The Cossack, the terrible Cossack, surrounded their camps, and every detachment that made its appearance, in moderate strength, returned to their standards no more. The advance of the Moldavian army being now ascertained, Tormasoff began to prepare for a warfare more agreeable to his inclination. On the 9th September, he began to throw bridges over the Styr, and to make preparations for crossing that river. On the 17th, the Moldavian army under Tchichagoff joined him, and augmented his force to 100,000 men. On the 23d, these active Generals crossed the Styr, which movement obliged Schwartzberg to fall back upon Bresck. The retreat of the enemy was conducted with the greatest precipitation, leaving stores and prisoners behind him. By the 15th October, Volhynia was entirely clear of the invaders, and Prince Schwartzberg continued his retreat to Bresc Litowski. The Russian Cavalry came up with his rearguard, on which occasion a severe action ensued, with great loss to the enemy, who left 2000 dead

* In the action of the 12th August, they lost more than 5000 men, 280 of which were prisoners; the Russians lost 1500. Tormasoff's dispatch, 19th August.

† Tormasoff's dispatch, Sept. 3d.

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on the field, and had 500 taken prisoners.* Schwartz-
berg's army then crossed the Bug, followed by the Russians,
whose approach carried terror to the gates of Warsaw; whilst
other parts of the army marched to the Northward in the di-
rection of Wolkowisk, and threatened Wilna, and the enemy's
lines on the Niemen. Tchichagoff, who now had the chief com-
mand, left a strong force under General Sacken, to watch the
Confederates in the Duchy of Warsaw, and pushed on himself
in the direction of Minsk. On the 21st October, his ad-
vanced guard entered Slonym and took several prisoners, while
another division of his army marched in the same direction
from Volhynia by Pinsk, and another from Mozer by Leitsk.
—The flight of the French from Moscow was now known in
the more distant Russian armies, and each was more eager
than the other to assist in their capture and destruction.

Dombrowski, who had been detached from that part of the
French army under Junot, from Smolensk, to besiege the for-
tress of Bobrunsk, on the Berezina, was busily employed in
collecting supplies of all kinds, and strengthening his army by
numerous recruits from Poland, in order to accomplish his
object. Bobrunsk was blockaded in a strict manner, and the
siege expected soon to commence. General D'Oertell, who re-
mained at Mozyr in order to watch Dombrowski, having assem-
bled a considerable force, and understanding that the prepara-
tions of the enemy were nearly complete, resolved to attack,
and prevent his object from being carried into effect. For
this purpose he left Mozyr, and by rapid and painful marches,
in which the troops were 48 hours without water, and almost
without any thing to eat;† he came up with the enemy near
Gorbatschew, on the 15th September, and after a severe en-
gagement of eight hours under the most discouraging and dis-
advantageous circumstances, succeeded in defeating him com-
pletely. The enemy's division consisting of 5000 men were to-
tally destroyed or dispersed. One thousand were left dead on
the field, and a great number of prisoners were taken. The

* Kutusoff's dispatch, from 13th to 15th, Oct.

† D'Oertell's report, Mozyr, end of September.

Russian loss was only 180 killed and wounded. In this action, the Grand Major Guersan, Adjutant to General Junot was second in command. The consequence of this affair was, that all the enemy's magazines were destroyed, and Bobrunsk entirely freed from blockade or danger.

While the important events which have already been related were taking place in Moscow and its neighbourhood, operations, equally important and decisive of the war, were going on in other quarters. After the bloody affair of the 18th September, at Polotzk, the French army found itself unfit to attempt any thing against Wittgenstein. But that brave General, being re-enforced by the troops from Finland; and according to St. Cyr's account, with "17,000 more from the Capital, including 6 or 8000 men, which had been *scraped together* in St. Petersburg and its environs;"* he with these found himself in a situation to follow up his offensive operations. Previous to this, his troops continually harassed the enemy's position. On the 20th September, a body of Cossacks, under the command of Colonel Rodionow, succeeded in destroying large magazines which the enemy had formed, in the circles of Gorodezk and Polotzk. They also occasioned him a loss of more than 600 men. Similar operations continued to be performed with success, to the constant annoyance and great loss of the enemy. But more important operations than these were about to take place. The re-enforcements from Finland and other places having joined, and being relieved from all dread of any trouble from Macdonald, Wittgenstein was determined at all hazards, to drive the enemy from Polotzk. For this purpose, General Steinheil was directed to move along the left bank of the river Dwina, in order to distract the attention of the enemy, and drive him from that side of the river—Wittgenstein himself was to attack in front. These combinations brought on the third battle at Polotzk; more sanguinary than any which had yet taken place in that quarter. On the morning of the 18th, Lieut. Gen. Price Jaschevil commenced the attack. The enemy received them in the village of Guravitchne, from whence he was driv-

* St. Cyr's dispatch, Oct. 20th, dated from no place.

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In this action, General Junot was slain. The affair was, that the Russian General Bobrunsk en-

... had been relatively poor, operations, were going on. The 18th was unfit to attack. The brave General, and according to the Russian Capital, included in St. Petersburg. He put himself in a position. On the 18th, the command of the large magazines at Gorodezk and more than 600 were armed with success. The enemy, about to take other places having no trouble at all hazards, purpose, General of the river, and drive himself was to attack the third battle had yet taken the 18th, Lieut. the enemy received he was driv-

en into the town. The battle was most bloody. It commenced at six o'clock in the morning, and lasted till seven at night. The Russians drove the enemy before them in all directions, and compelled them to seek refuge within their intrenchments. The loss on both sides was very great. St. Cyr describes the battle as truly dreadful, and the fury of the Russians as terrible; he asserts, he repulsed them with a dreadful loss, but to account for the loss of his redoubts in front of his intrenchments, and his seeking refuge in the latter, he uses the following remarkable words; "I wished to have allowed all that *fine ardour* of the Russians, who had debouched furiously and in a crowd, by the Seibit and Riga roads, upon the left flank of the town, to be spent on two redoubts, constructed and occupied by the Bavarian Artillery and troops;" and continued he, "by this, we at least brought the Russians who made this attack, under the walls of the town, where the carnage we caused them, lasted from morning till night. But notwithstanding the success obtained on this day, I was *uneasy in the evening*, respecting the success my cavalry might have met with on the other side of the Dwina."* We shall soon see that he had good reason for his fears. During the greater part of the next day, the enemy were occupied in removing their wounded from Polotzk to the other side of the Dwina. On the early part of that day, Wittgenstein desisted from his attack, until he had obtained information of the movements of Steinheil on the opposite bank. That General had been successful. In the afternoon, Wittgenstein received information, that he had driven the enemy from the village of Bolonia, and was pursuing him to Polotzk. The enemy then made every preparation to abandon the place; but the Russian General was too near, and too well acquainted with his situation, not to perceive his intentions. It was now near dark, but Wittgenstein immediately determined to attack Polotzk. "He rectified his position," says St. Cyr, "and formed a half circle round ours."† A dreadful circle indeed it was! At five o'clock the engagement commenced, and was contested

* St. Cyr's dispatch, Oct. 20th, dated from no place.

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with indescribable fury. The enemy was driven from his strong intrenchments at the point of the bayonet. He threw himself into the town. It was surrounded with a double pallisade.—The houses were filled with troops, from behind which, an incessant and galling fire of musquetry was kept up. The Russian artillery commenced a dreadful discharge of round and grape shot. “He began” says St. Cyr, “to fire from all his batteries, and threw into the town a quantity of shells and other *incendiary projectiles*, to set it on fire, in which he in part succeeded, hoping by this to prevent our artillery movements, and blow up our Caissons. This cannonade and bombardment were supported by a general attack.”* Wittgenstein immediately commanded the advanced guard in two divisions, the one under Generals Platoff and Diebitch, and the other under the command of Colonel Reidiger, to storm the place. These brave men threw themselves into the town. The battle raged in the streets. The scene now became awful and appalling. The Russians thought only on victory. They rushed over scenes of death and desolation, altogether indistinguishable. Well might the enemy exclaim, “Never was a war conducted like this war!”† Polotzk bore ample testimony to this truth. Though now the middle of a gloomy night in October, “*We saw each other*” says St. Cyr, “*as in full day light, by the light of the burning town*, and this attack was continued until the moment when the *last man* had passed to the left bank of the Dwina.”‡ The slaughter was prodigious. The Russian troops bore down all opposition, and by three o’clock in the morning of the 20th, Polotzk was their own. “Thanks to the Almighty,” said Wittgenstein in his dispatch to the Emperor, “Marshal Govion St. Cyr is on the other side of the Dwina, and I am in Polotzk.”§ No French logic could answer this. The enemy fled across the river in consternation; and great as his loss was, it would have been much

* St. Cyr’s dispatch, Oct. 20th, *datel from no place*.

† Fifteenth bulletin.

‡ St. Cyr’s dispatch, as above.

§ This laconic sentence must bring to the reader’s recollection, similar dispatches from Suwarrow to the Empress Catharine, particularly the following “Glory to God—Praises to Catharine—the proud Ismael is below your feet—Suwarrow is in it.”

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greater, had General Steinheil arrived in time at his destination. But the darkness of the night, and the opposition that he met with, being more formidable than he expected, he did not arrive until the enemy had crossed the river with a considerable part of his forces. The result of these brilliant days, was a loss to the enemy of 100 staff officers, and 6000 privates taken prisoners; 9 pieces of cannon, 90 powder wagons, all the baggage belonging to the Bavarian regiments, and a great number of gun carriages; the guns belonging to which, had been thrown into the river. The loss in killed was not accurately ascertained; but it must have been immense; as not only the field of battle, but even the whole road through the line of their disastrous retreat, was covered with dead, "so that this corps, says Wittgenstein, is entirely destroyed."* General St. Cyr was wounded, and obliged to leave the command. The Russian loss was also considerable; but a greater proportion wounded than killed. The Russians troops behaved with the greatest gallantry; particularly, the militia of Petersburg, under the Senator Bibikoff. "It was impossible," says Wittgenstein, "to restrain them, or to keep them back in close column, from their eagerness to throw themselves into the enemy's batteries and lines."

This last battle that was fought at Polotzk, was not the least decisive in this memorable war. It not only ruined the army which the enemy had left at Polotzk, but the Bavarian troops were separated from the wretched remains of St. Cyr's army, now commanded by Le Grand, and they were never again able to rejoin it; but were pursued by Steinheil to Gloubokoe, and towards Wilna, while the right flank of Macdonald's army was thereby completely uncovered. But these were its least important results. It recalled Victor from Smolensk with the greater part of his reserve, at a most critical moment, when he had received the most pressing orders to march to the assistance of his master; and accordingly, bereft the troops composing the grand army, of the supply and assistance which they expected to meet on

* Wittgenstein's report, Oct. 31st.

the road to Smolensk, and which if they had received, would have been of the most essential service to them.

Wittgenstein continued to follow up his success, without allowing his antagonist a moment's rest. He continued the pursuit to Ouchatki, and was preparing to march to Lepel. He detached a part of his army to observe Macdonald. He detached also Major General Garp to Witepzk, which that General took by storm on the 7th of November; the enemy, besides a great number killed and wounded, had 317 men taken prisoners, and also magazines stored with large supplies of provisions, forage, and gun powder. Steinheil, having been dispatched after the Bavarians who had been separated from St. Cyr's army, completely effected his purpose. Their remaining force was totally dispersed; and after performing this essential service, he rejoined Wittgenstein. In the meantime, the remains of St. Cyr's army, having been joined by Victor and 15,000 of his reserve, with other detachments, had marched from Lepel to the village of Tcheschniki, in order if possible, to compel Wittgenstein to recross the Dwina. This however, was no easy task, and one they were by no means adequate to perform. Wittgenstein attacked them on the 1st of November, and after an obstinate and destructive engagement, decided principally by the artillery, which lasted from seven in the morning till five in the evening; he succeeded in driving the enemy from their positions—occupied the village of Tcheschniki—established his vanguard in front of the Ula, and sent detachments in the directions of Borrisow and Minsk, to learn the position of the Moldavian army under Tchichagoff. This he ascertained, however, in a few days afterward, by the arrival of General Chernicheff; who, with a party of Cossacks, had been detached by Tchichagoff to inform Wittgenstein of his situation. This gallant officer, after a most extraordinary march through the middle of enemy's columns, swimming four rivers, and destroying many baggage waggons, intercepting couriers belonging to the enemy; and lastly, of having had the good luck to relieve General Winzengerode and his companions, so treacherously taken prisoners at Moscow, arrived in safety at the head-quarters of Wittgenstein, with scarcely any loss. By

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him he was dispatched to Petersburg; which journey he performed with incredible rapidity, swimming rivers, and crossing forests with the speed of the eagle. The loss of the enemy at Tcheshniki was severe. For some time, he was unable to face Wittgenstein in the field, but fell back towards Smolensk, to secure his communications with the grand army.*

Such was the situation of affairs in all quarters, when the Grand Army was compelled to leave the object of all its desires, fatigues, and battles—Moscow! Misfortunes and dangers now assailed them, out of which no device of their leader could extricate them. “Gladly would he compound for safety; but policy and justice alike demand the terrible infliction. The history of his daring must not be told, without the terrible catastrophe by which it was attended.”† We have already noticed the operations that accompanied the abandonment of that city, and the ineffectual attempts of Bonaparte, to force his way by the fertile provinces of Toola and Kaluga. We left him at Vereja, on the 27th, in full retreat to gain Smolensk. To enter into every particular occurrence of that retreat, the most disastrous in military annals, would exceed the limits of this work; and, from its uniformity, appear tedious to the reader. The leading particulars shall therefore only be mentioned. The situation of the French army, before leaving Moscow, was sufficiently wretched. Horse flesh had been their principal food.‡ Their cavalry was worn down and decayed, for want of forage and proper food. The men disappointed, and the officers dispirited, had lost that confidence which is a great support in arduous undertakings. But all this which they endured amidst the gloom and ruins of Moscow, was luxury and happiness compared with what they were about to suffer. From Vereja, Bonaparte, and the army which then remained, took the road to Poland. Their march was of the most rapid kind. No time was to be lost. The advance of Tchichagoff from the south-west—the advance of Wittgenstein from the north-

* See Wittgenstein's dispatches, Sept. 25th, Oct. 14th, 20th, 26th, 31st, and Nov. 1st, 3d, 6th, and 9th; and Steinheil's, Oct. 26th; and Chernicheff's, Nov. 17th.

† Alexander's Proclamation beginning, Retreat of the French army.

‡ Kutusoff's Dispatch, October 12th.

west, towards Smolensk, after having destroyed every thing opposed to him, might, if united upon the Dnieper, form a barrier, which the dispirited army of the French Emperor would endeavour in vain to break through. On the 30th of October the head quarters of the enemy were at Coloki, a monastery 8 miles from Borodino—Borodino yet reeking with the torrents of blood shed around it, and the grave of nearly as many brave men, which once belonged to his army, as now remained under his command.—What must have been his feelings, when he cast his eyes towards those fatal fields?—what must have been the feelings of the army, when they passed over and left forever the remains of their dearest comrades and companions, buried in a foreign land? Around them no ray of comfort brightened their prospects—no sun of Austerlitz dispelled the gloom. The deplorable situation of the French army in its retreat, through a country maddened against it, cannot be illustrated in a more striking manner than by attending to the proclamation issued by the Emperor Alexander, on the 15th November, at a time when it was only known that the enemy had but the Russians to contend with. To this important document I must, for a moment, direct the readers attention. It is a production which Sovereigns should study, and which subjects should learn. It shews what the Sovereign may do that has his people's affection, and what a people will do for the Sovereign they love. It does more—it exhibits the character of the enemy in the true colours of Gallic wickedness; and further, exalts the character of the Russian Sovereign and his people, who, with as much sincerity as with justice, always acknowledged the Almighty as their preserver, their leader, and their guide.

The enemy, says Alexander, "with peaceful promises on his tongue, never ceased to think of war;" and having collected a numerous army from 20 different nations, "with vast quantities of artillery, he penetrated into the interior of Russia. "*Murder, fire, and destruction, were his attendants on the march.* The plundered property, the towns and villages set on fire, the smoking ruins of Moscow, the Kremlin blown up into the air, the temples and altars of the Lord destroyed; in a word, all

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kinds of cruelty and barbarity, hitherto unheard of, at length prove by his own actions that they have long been lying concealed in the depth of his mind." The possession of the world could not satisfy him, so long as Russia was happy. He therefore planned her destruction. "He likewise thought by *cunning and flattery, to shake the fidelity of our subjects; by the defilement of the sanctuaries and of God's temples, to make religion unsteady, and to strike the national sight, with follies and extravagancies.* On these hopes he built his destructive plans, and with them he forced himself, like a pestilential and murderous tempest into the heart of Russia."

I do not recollect of any production where Gallic villany is more correctly, justly, and forcibly delineated, than it is here, in such a short compass. Every word speaks volumes of woe and misery, which Europe, through all her borders, can testify as true. The first object of the French Government, ever since the revolution, was to shake the fidelity of the people of every country to their Sovereign, by poisoning their minds with every thing that is evil, in order to make them a more easy prey. Bonaparte attempted to rebut the charge of having done this, in Russia, by saying, that he could easily have effected this purpose, of raising the people against their superiors, but that his humanity would not allow him, as it would have been productive of such horrid scenes of butchery and bloodshed. "I should have been able to arm the greater part of her population against her, by proclaiming liberty to the slaves; a great number of villages demanded it of me; but, when I perceived the *brutality* of that numerous class of the Russian people, I refused to accede to a measure which would have devoted many families to death, and the most horrible punishments."* The Emperor's memory (which was never very good, when it was necessary to recal any scheme of wickedness which he had planned, but could not accomplish) had suffered very much in the Russian campaign. Unless his recollection had been frozen, he could not have forgot the triumphant answer which he caused a French grenadier make to the Russian proclama-

* Bonaparte's Answer to Senate, December 20th, 1812.

tion, which invited them to abandon his service. "At all events, (says this *eloquent* production) the hour is not far off when we will give freedom to your brethren—*when we will extinguish slavery in the Russian Empire*—we are actually fighting for your rights, and for your families.*" The Emperor had all his army too obedient to his will, and too much under discipline, for any grenadier in it to dare to attempt or promulgate what was not the will and the intentions of his master. His humanity! who could doubt for a moment that he tried this scheme, and would have accomplished it too if he could. But when he found that the people treated his insinuations with scorn, he then turned like the fox from the grapes which were beyond his power, and went off, saying, "hang it, they are not worth my while."

But the ruin of their political principles were the least of the evils attending upon Gallic invasion. It was the total destruction of the moral and religious principles of nations which they aimed at, and which they used their first and most strenuous efforts to accomplish. This they knew, from experience, had brought round a revolution in their own country, and would never fail to bring round one in any country. For this purpose, the first object of the Gallic leaders and Government, under whatever form it was constituted, and under whatever orders they fought, was to endeavour, "by defilement of the sanctuaries, and of God's temples, to make religion unsteady; and to strike the national sight with follies and extravagancies." (A most appropriate expression.) Their disregard of, and contempt for every thing sacred, has been a prominent feature in the character of the French people, and their armies, from the abolition of the Sabbath in Paris, till the disastrous retreats from Moscow and Leipzig, where they turned the churches into stables for their horses, burnt their furniture, and compelled the ministers of religion to drive cattle after their army; and then stripping them naked, turned them back helpless and forlorn, to their plundered homes and starving families. Such wanton contempt of every thing sacred, and such crimes, could not always escape with impunity. Such conduct as this, was, above all others, the surest way to call

* Moniteur, Wilna, July 20th, 1812.

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forth the undivided hatred of the Russian nation. The defile-
ment of their temples, above all other actions, struck their souls
with horror, and aroused their passions to madness. The enemy
felt its effects. They rushed against him, under whatever cir-
cumstances they met him. "All joined (says Alexander) un-
animously in the work. The new levies have, with the same
force and intrepidity, penetrated the enemy's regiments with
the same implements with which they only a few weeks before
turned up their fields. Many villages have secreted their wives
and tender infants, in the woods; and the inhabitants with
armed hands, and inconceivable courage, under engagements
upon the Holy Gospel, not to leave each other in danger, de-
fended themselves; and, whenever the enemy shewed himself,
fell upon him, so that many thousands of them have been
cut to pieces and dispersed by the peasants, and even by their
women; and numbers taken prisoners, who were indebted for
their lives to the humanity of those very people, whom they
came to burn and plunder."*

Dreadful, indeed, must have been the situation of an enemy
in a country like this. Bonaparte soon perceived that his teme-
rity had carried him too far; and while misery, unpitied, assailed
him on every side, he fled from the appalling scene. "He
flies from Moscow (says Alexander) with as much fear and de-
pression, as he advanced against it with pride and insolence;—
he flies, leaving his cannon behind him, throwing away his
baggage, and sacrificing every thing that can retard the swift-
ness of his flight. Thousands of the fugitives daily fall to the
earth, and perish. In such manner does the just vengeance of
God punish those who insult his temples: whilst we with pa-
ternal tenderness and joyful heart, observe the great and praise-
worthy actions of our faithful subjects, we carry our most warm
and lively gratitude to the first cause of all good, the Almighty
God—and jointly with the true Church, and the holy Synod
and Clergy, supplicate his assistance; that if our inveterate
enemy, and the mocker of God's temples and holiness, should
not be entirely and totally destroyed in Russia; yet that his
deep wounds, and the blood it has cost him, will bring him to

* Alexander's Proclamation, Petersburg, December 15th, 1812.

acknowledge his might and his power." This was noble language; and while it exalted the man, it shed an unfading lustre round the person of the Sovereign.

But to return to our Narrative—Kutusoff, who had fallen back from Maloyaroslavitz to Gorki, within 40 wersts of Kaluga, in order that he might render it impossible for the enemy to retreat by the road he wished, being now certain, from the movements which his manœuvres had compelled the enemy to make; that he had renounced his intention of marching in that direction, and had pitched upon the road by which he advanced; took immediate measures to annoy him as much as possible, and also to intercept him altogether, in the neighbourhood of Smolensk. For this purpose he detached General Milaradovitch's corps, consisting of 18,000 men, of the light troops, and Platoff with all his Cossacks, directing them to march upon the enemy's left, towards Viasma; while the Marshal himself took the more direct road towards Smolensk. Whoever casts his eye upon the map, will perceive that the road from Moscow to Smolensk describes part of a circle, and that by this movement of Kutusoff upon Kaluga, he compelled the enemy to march over a considerable space before he arrived upon that road, in a direction due north from himself; thus rendering the distance which the enemy had to march from Vereja to Smolensk, above 30 miles farther than he had to perform from Gorki to Smolensk—which afforded the fairest prospect to Kutusoff of his being able to reach the latter place, or Krasnoi, before the French army could.

Hitherto the weather, comparatively speaking, had been favourable. The enemy, therefore, continued his retreat, or rather flight, with the utmost expedition. "He burned all his heavy baggage, and powder magazines; and, during the night, he even marched his artillery by the light of lanterns."* The Cossacks had received the most positive orders to anticipate the enemy in his march, and to break down all the bridges, and cut up the roads, and to give him all possible annoyance; which orders they punctually obeyed. On the 31st of Octo-

* Kutusoff's Dispatch, November 1st.

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ber, Platoff, with these *clouds* which continued to follow where-
ever the enemy turned, came up with them at Kolotzk, and
commenced that system of warfare in which they are so terri-
ble, and so useful; and, from that day forward, they never allow-
ed the enemy to take one meal in peace, or one moment's repose
in safety. The French army on this day lost a considerable
number of men, as the Cossacks took but few prisoners. On
the 1st of November, the French rear-guard passed Gredneve;
on the same day the main body reached Ghjat, closely followed
by Platoff and Milaradovitch. On the 3d of November they
reached Viasma. Here they were attacked by General Milar-
adovitch. The battle was obstinate and sanguinary. The
enemy were driven from the town at the point of the bayonet.
The Russian troops entered the place with colours flying,
and music playing, the regiment of Pernow having made a
road for their comrades over the dead bodies of their enemies.
The French loss was severe, 6000 were killed and wounded,
and 2500 taken prisoners. Beauharnois, Davoust, and Ney's
corps, were in the battle. Previous to this, Count Orloff Den-
isoff had captured Courusett, the Duke of Bassano's secretary,
with all his papers, several other officers of distinction, and 130
soldiers. In the affair of Viasma the Russian loss is stated at
only 500 men. Platoff continued to pursue the beaten ene-
my from Viasma; and between it and Eremnar took 1000 pri-
soners, one pair of colours, and their sick and wounded.

But this was only the beginning of their sorrows. All they
had yet suffered was but as a drop in the bucket, or a grain in
the balance, compared to what they were now about to endure.
"I shall follow the enemy (said Kutusoff) and make him suffer
dreadfully."* He kept his word, even beyond the letter of
it: scarcely had he finished relating one victory, when he had
to communicate another. "God is great, most gracious So-
vereign!—I fall at the feet of your Imperial Majesty, and con-
gratulate you on a new victory."† Platoff, who had followed
the enemy's army, on the right of the Smolensk road, to anti-

* Dispatch, November 1st.

† Kutusoff's Dispatch, November 9th.

cipate, as he said, their head columns, and prevent them from foraging and burning the villages, overtook the corps of the Viceroy on the 7th, between Doroghobuz, and Dunkovitchina. He immediately fell upon it, separated it into two columns, one of which took the road to Dunkovitchina, and the other that to Doroghobuz. Platoff followed the latter; and notwithstanding the dreadful state of the weather, on the 8th he came up with, and completely defeated it. Three thousand prisoners, and 69 pieces of cannon, fell into the hands of the victors, and the killed and wounded were immense. The remainder fled to Dunkovitschina, followed by the Cossacks. On the 7th, Milaradovitch entered Doroghobuz, after a considerable resistance. The loss of the enemy on this and the preceding day, at this place was very great; the killed and wounded in these two days, and in the victory obtained by Platoff, on the 8th, were estimated at 12,000 men. Every moment prisoners were made. The indefatigable Cossacks not only hovered round the enemy in *clouds*; and, "like the Arabs, flew about to annoy," but they cut up columns of infantry, and even attacked the artillery, with the greatest bravery. "They perform miracles," said Kutusoff.

Dangers, of no common kind, now surrounded the French army, and pressed upon them from every quarter. Every hour—every moment brought upon them overwhelming evils, which they could neither perceive nor prevent. Misery assailed them in her most hideous forms, and ruin overtook them in his wildest terrors. The weather of Fontainebleau, and the sun of Paris had vanished. Winter had set in with unprecedented rigour. The ground was covered with snow. The thermometer, in three days, had sunk to 16 and 18 degrees below the freezing point, 9° below Zero, in Fahrenheit). Their clothes were worn to rags. Their provisions were expended. The road before them a desert.—Their artillery immoveable, by reason of the ice upon the roads, or from the want of horses to draw it. These perished by thousands—or were killed by the troops for food. Faint, forlorn, and naked, the soldier's spirit was broken. Without food—without comfort—with only the frozen earth for his bed, and the cheerless canopy of heaven for his covering, the arm that con-

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quered at Jena and Freidland, and that marched through rivers
of blood at Borodino, refused obedience, and no longer grasp-
ed the sword. "These three last days (says Beauharnois) have
cost us two thirds of the artillery of this corps of the army.
Yesterday about 400 horses died; and to day, perhaps, double
that number—whole trains of horses perish in the harness at
once, and I must not conceal from your highness, that these
three days of suffering have so dispirited the soldier, that I be-
lieve him at this moment very little capable of making any ef-
fort. Numbers of men are dead of hunger or cold; and others,
in despair, have suffered themselves to be taken by the ene-
my."* The scenes, therefore, of destruction exhibited in the
line of the enemy's retreat, were unprecedented. Along it was
strewed the remains of dead and dying men, and carcasses of
horses; many of which had been cut up for food. Peasants
houses every where on fire, ammunition waggons blown up,
and quantities of wreck of every description. Yet this picture,
horrible as it is, is trifling to what followed!

Previous to this, Bonaparte had forsaken his army. Arriv-
ed at Viasma, and aware of the imminent danger which threat-
ened him, from the movements of the Russian armies, in all
quarters, he abandoned the army which his ambition and ob-
stinacy had led to destruction; and with 6000 cavalry pushed
on to Smolensk. He arrived there on the 8th, in a miserable
plight indeed. But, alas! even there he was destined to find
no rest for the soles of his feet. It afforded him no supplies; no
cheering prospects nor hopes. Wittgenstein had nearly anni-
hilated the army which had been opposed to him, and was ad-
vancing to Orscha. Augereau, Charpentier, and Barrege
D'Hillier, with 3000 men each, who left Smolensk with a part
of the army of reserve, in order to march upon Kaluga, where
they supposed they would find their master, had scarcely left
Smolensk, when, instead of the French army, they fell in with
the Russians; Charpentier's whole division were cut to pieces,
while Augereau's were either killed or taken prisoners. D'Oer-
tell had advanced from the lower Dnieper—Tchichagoff was

* Viceroy's Letter to Berthier, at crossing the Vop, November 7th, 1812.

moving upon Borisow, where Dombrowski was unable to oppose him—Platoff and Milaradovitch carried destruction in his rear; and, lastly, General Kutusoff, with the Russian grand army, had on the 9th reached Elnya, within a short distance of Smolensk; and from whence, when he found that Bonaparte had reached that place, he pushed on without the smallest delay to Krasnoi, on the Dnieper, which he reached before the main body of the French army.

What the object of Bonaparte was, in leaving his army at Viasma, is not exactly ascertained. Perhaps it was with a view to organize any force which he might find in the neighbourhood of Smolensk, in order to assist in extricating his army from its perilous situation, and also to learn in what state the affairs of Poland stood; or determine by what road it was safest and most practicable to continue his further retreat. But it is much more probable that, though this was his professed object, yet that his intention really was to try to effect his escape, as he dreaded being taken prisoner; which, if he was, he knew would be the end of his authority and dominion over France and Germany; whereas, if he could only escape himself, to collect fresh resources, he conceived he might still maintain his throne and dominion. It seems certain that, immediately after his arrival at Smolensk, he did attempt to escape in the direction of Wittgenstein; but finding that road completely shut against him, by the victories of Wittgenstein, he was compelled to return to Smolensk, and collect the scattered remains of his army, in order to endeavour to reach the Berezina, on the Minsk road, before the arrival of Tchichagoff, or at least before that General had effected his junction with Wittgenstein. In the interim which this delay occasioned, Kutusoff reached Krasnoi, and thus a double circle was formed around him and the forces at Smolensk, still amounting to a considerable army, as re-enforcements had joined them at that place and its vicinity, amounting to 35,000 men, of Victor's army. Besides these, the greater part of the levies which were raised in Poland, amounting to upwards of 40,000 men, and 20,000 Polish deserters from the Russian ranks, must have joined the different divisions of the army, and been on their way to Moscow; though but a small number, if any, of

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these could have reached that city before the French army began to retreat. The army was, therefore, still formidable, notwithstanding its recent losses; and, excepting that part of it which had been opposed to Wittgenstein, in a great measure uninjured from the effects of the climate and season. These things when duly attended to, account for the severe battles which Bonaparte fought, after leaving Smolensk, and the prodigious losses which he therein sustained, without raising any suspicion of exaggeration in the Russian accounts.

Perilous as was the situation of Bonaparte, at Moscow, it was much worse upon his arrival at Smolensk. The barrier which was drawn around him became more formidable, and his means of breaking through it less effective. It has been already mentioned, that Bonaparte attempted to escape from Smolensk, by the Witepsk or Polotzk roads; but that he failed in his object, and was obliged to return and take another route. This attempt was, in all likelihood, tried in the desperate attack which Victor made upon Wittgenstein's positions, on the 14th November. On the 13th, the 29th bulletin informed us that Bonaparte left Smolensk; and that on the 16th he slept at Krasnoi; but where he was in the interim, or what he was about, it does not inform us. An article, however, inserted in the *Journal de Paris* of December 14th, a few days before that memorable bulletin appeared, and when an article was inserted by order of the French Government, to quiet the minds of the people, alarmed and agitated by the most gloomy reports from the North—This article informed us that his Majesty, with the troops which were with him, together with the 2d and 9th corps, was in front, and upon the flank of Wittgenstein's army, on these days. It is therefore extremely probable that Bonaparte either was in this battle, or that he was moving in that direction, while Victor was endeavouring to clear the way for him. But be this as it may, on the 14th November, Marshal Victor, "having collected all his troops from different places, and having been re-enforced by a division which had remained behind, attacked with great fury the advanced guard* of Witt-

* Wittgenstein's Dispatch, November 17th.

genstein's army, under the command of Lieutenant General Price Jaschevil; which, agreeable to orders, immediately fell back upon the main body, in the position of Smolena." The enemy's force then advanced against the Russian centre; and at the same time threatened, with an "*overwhelming force of troops*," which marched in columns, both flanks of the Russian army. The Russians suffered the enemy to advance, without any opposition, till they were in immediate contact with their position; when a most tremendous fire was opened upon them by the artillery, which did terrible execution, and covered the ground with dead. Nevertheless, the French continued vigorously to press the Russian centre, the main columns of which were on a height in front of the village of Smolena. This place was taken by the enemy six times, and as often retaken by the Russians, and finally remained with them. The battle continued the whole day; and notwithstanding the reiterated and desperate attacks of the enemy, he was beat back at all points, and with great loss compelled to retreat along the river Ula, in order to effect his junction with the grand army. The Russian loss was 1018 killed and wounded; and that of the enemy 2500 killed and wounded, and about 1000 prisoners. The Russian troops fought with great bravery, particularly the militia, who could not be restrained; and who, during the retrograde movement before the battle, continued it with reluctance, exclaiming, "The Emperor sent us here not to retreat, but to advance and beat the enemy, which we are willing to do."* The troops here engaged on the part of the enemy, were the remains of St. Cyr's corps. Those of the Viceroy's from Dunkovitschina, and part of Victor's reserves, with some of the Polish re-enforcements. After this attempt the enemy abandoned all hopes of penetrating to Wilna, by that quarter, and therefore turned his attention entirely to the road to Warsaw, by Borisow and Minsk.

In the meantime, the scattered remains of the French army had reunited at Smolensk, in a very different situation to that in which they left it; and in a very different state to what the

* See Wittgenstein and Dornberg's Dispatches, Nov. 17th, for this battle.

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people of France had, for some time, been dreaming about. Considering the former campaign as closed at Moscow, the occurrences of this "*new campaign*" puzzled them exceedingly. But Frenchmen are not easily disheartened while deception remains. "We expect to see the whole army cantoned between Smolensk, Witepsz, and Minsk, in the first fortnight of November. This fertile and healthy country, offers abundant and tranquil winter quarters; the cavalry will find forage.— The ulterior plans and object of the *new campaign* cannot, and ought not to be divined; but already we perceive that the march of the army from Moscow, by Smolensk and Witepsz, is much less a retrograde than a *lateral* movement, by which the head quarters is nearer Petersburg by almost 40 leagues. If the eyes of the Russians be not opened by the burning and destruction of the first capital; if the war faction, resolved upon risking every thing, cannot be lowered but by the burning and destruction of the second capital of the Empire; if, in one word, peace can only be signed at Petersburg, it is evident that the concentration of the grand army, in the environs of Smolensk and Witepsz, was the preliminary condition of that operation, directed towards that end."* We have heard of

" Moody madness laughing wild
 Amidst severest woe."

And surely this was the climax of human madness, as it was of human misery. The head quarters of the grand army were now removed 40 leagues nearer Petersburg. The army had got into the country intended for its cantonments. It had, indeed, during the first fortnight of November, got into tranquil winter quarters, round Smolensk, Witepsz, and Minsk; but what cantonments! What winter quarters? Cantonments, indeed; in that country, from whose silent "bourne no traveller returns." Winter quarters, tranquil indeed; "where the wicked cease from troubling, and where the weary are at rest," and from which the last trumpet will only call them forth. Never did any nation sport with human wretchedness as that nest of

* Moniteur, November 23d.

villany, established at Paris, has done. "We have lost a great battle! proclaimed the undaunted Roman: arise! let us wipe away the stains." Not so, France—though we have lost every thing, let us proclaim all is right—"the Emperor enjoys the best health, he was never better."*

Bonaparte, however, did not find the plentiful country and tranquil winter quarters, at Smolensk, which he so fondly anticipated, and the Paris papers so charmingly described. It afforded to him a very different picture indeed; a picture of wretchedness, disgrace, and misery, which was never equalled, and never can be surpassed. At the expence of the greater part of his horses, and an useless sacrifice of men, Bonaparte had hitherto dragged on the greater part of his artillery, which, had he abandoned sooner, his army might have escaped with less loss. But it could be carried no further;—and, daily, great numbers of pieces were abandoned, destroyed, or taken. On the 14th, the French army left Smolensk, consisting of Ney's and Davoust's corps, and the Imperial guards that were remaining. The guards at that time consisted of more than 15,000 men,†—Ney's corps, according to Kutusoff's dispatches, which were left to fall a sacrifice at Smolensk, amounted to 30,000; and Davoust's, from the losses which it afterwards sustained, must have amounted to more than half that number: what part of Beauharnois' force was there assembled, or what force of cavalry then remained, there is no data to determine; but it is obvious, that the force which left Smolensk must have been, at least, 60 or 70,000; and, it must be observed, that the number of troops mentioned in the different corps, were not all of those who had left Moscow, but the remains of these, incorporated with the remnants of other corps, but more particularly of re-enforcements. This force, under Bonaparte in person, Ney, and Davoust, for no other names are given, by the enemy, as commanding any division, took the direction of Krasnoi, which place their advanced guard reached on the 14th. But the Russian General is more particular, and mentions expressly

* The only intelligence the French nation received from the army, during three weeks of horror and misery.

† Kutusoff's Journal, from 15th to 19th November.

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part of the guards, and the remainder of the Viceroy's corps.* Kutusoff, whose head quarters had reached Lobcovo on the 13th, was advancing with all speed to Krasnoi, by the shortest roads. On the 14th, the advanced guard of the Russian army, under Count Orgeroff, attacked the enemy's forces, which were in possession of Krasnoi; and, notwithstanding a terrible fire of grape shot, succeeded in driving the enemy from the town, at the point of the bayonet. Several strong columns of the enemy, however, advancing from Smolensk, the Russians were obliged to relinquish the town, and fall back about three versts, to the farm of Kulhoff.—On the 16th, the army, under Kutusoff, arrived in the neighbourhood, and the advanced guard, attacking the enemy, drove him from Krasnoi with considerable loss, in killed, wounded, and prisoners. Scarcely was this effected, when the corps of Davoust, with which Bonaparte was, made its appearance. Their surprise may be conceived at finding Krasnoi in the hands of the Russians, who now pressed upon them on all sides. As the enemy could neither advance nor retreat, without fighting, he endeavoured to cut his way through the Russian army. "Napoleon could not ward off the blow," says Kutusoff. A bloody engagement was the consequence. The battle lasted during the day. The enemy defended himself obstinately; but, in the end, was completely overthrown. "The Russian infantry rushed upon him with levelled bayonets." The artillery made a terrible carnage in the ranks of their adversaries, who were most signally defeated and dispersed in the neighbouring wood. Bonaparte, who was an eye witness of the engagement, seeing all was lost, fled with his whole suite to the village of Liadam, abandoning his unfortunate soldiers. Davoust followed his example. The loss of the French in killed and wounded was immense. Two Generals, 58 officers of different ranks, and 9,170 privates, were taken prisoners. Seventy pieces of cannon, three standards, and the *baton* of Marshal Davoust, which he had thrown away in his flight, fell into the hands of the victors.†

* Kutusoff's Journal, from 15th to 19th November.

† Kutusoff's Dispatch, November 18th, and Journal from 15th to 19th November.

Scarcely had the Russians completed the destruction of Davoust's corps, when the advance of Marshal Ney, with the rear guard of the French army, gave them an opportunity of earning fresh laurels. Ney had it in command from his master, upon leaving Smolensk, to blow up the ramparts and the venerable cathedral; the last, however, was saved, as the match was extinguished before it reached the mine. Ignorant of the fate of Davoust, Ney continued to advance, till, on the 17th of November, at three P. M. he found himself in the presence of the Russian army. His advance having been previously ascertained, by the light troops and Cossacks, Kutusoff had reinforced General Milaradovitch with the 8th corps, giving him orders to prevent the Marshal's advance, and to take up a position at the villages of Syroherenice and Tcherniska. A dense fog darkened the atmosphere, and rendered it impossible to ascertain the numbers of the enemy; and he, on his part, could not perceive the Russian batteries until he felt their effects. Ney's force at leaving Smolensk, including the garrison of that place, consisted of 30,000 men, and 100 pieces of cannon; which force says Kutusoff, in a strain of the bitterest irony, "was *forgotten* and left to fall a sacrifice.*" The French army had advanced to within short range of cannon shot from the Russian batteries, before any individual in it was aware of their situation. They stood astonished. But recovering quickly from their panic, and perceiving their situation, they threw themselves with all the fury of despair, upon the batteries, and endeavoured to take them. When at the distance of 250 paces, they were, in a moment, received with a general discharge of musquetry, and a dreadful cartridge fire, from 40 pieces of cannon. This did frightful execution. "The moment was terrible and decisive." The enemy were repulsed with great loss. "But, far from being dismayed, says Kutusoff, at the sight of inevitable destruction, they only grew the more enraged; and, with the utmost fury, rushed upon our batteries, which continuing to be well served, carried death and destruction into the enemy's ranks,

* Kutusoff's Dispatch, November 20th,

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and rendered all his attempts fruitless."* Another column came to their assistance, and shared the same fate. General Pakovitch charged them sword in hand, and destroyed whatever he met. They were driven back in confusion, and endeavouring to gain the Dnieper, many of them were cut to pieces by the Russian cavalry, which Kutusoff had ordered round their left flank; numbers were driven into the river and drowned, and the remainder pursued, were taken prisoners or dispersed in the woods. Even at this time, the "field of battle was covered with dead bodies." About five o'clock, however, fresh columns advanced to the attack, resolved to force their way—"with the full determination to conquer or die."† They were received by the fire of 24 pieces of artillery, which occasioned dreadful havoc amongst them. While they failed, after the most desperate attempts to advance, the Russian cavalry threw themselves in their rear, turned them, and prevented all possibility of escape. Thus situated, at midnight, the remainder of the enemy's army sent a flag of truce, and agreed to surrender at discretion—100 officers, and 12,000 men, laid down their arms and were made prisoners. Twenty-seven pieces of cannon, two pair of colours, and two standards, were taken from them; and 117 pieces of cannon had been left by them in their flight, within 17 versts of Smolensk, and were picked up by Platoff. Ney was wounded, and fled across the Dnieper, pursued by the Cossacks. The loss of the enemy was enormous. Four Generals of division were wounded. As this corps consisted of 30,000 men, and as Ney, according to the accounts of the enemy in the 29th bulletin, extricated himself with 3000 men, the rest must have been killed, wounded, taken prisoners, or dispersed in this battle; besides Kutusoff concludes his dispatch of the 20th, by saying, that the number of prisoners were far more considerable than the numbers at first stated. It is scarcely possible to conceive more complete destruction. Besides these, upwards of 5000 prisoners were taken around Smolensk, and a very great number killed and wounded; the principal part of which were taken in a severe action between General Os-

* Kutusoff's Dispatch, November 20th.

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charoffsky and 7000 of the enemy, under the command of General Rouguet, who was ordered out by the express command of Bonaparte himself, who had arrived at Krasnoi on the night of the 15th. Also a still greater proportion in an attack made by General Milaradovitch, upon the Viceroy's corps, on the 15th, when 1500 prisoners were taken, and a very considerable number killed and wounded in both affairs. Europe greeted these repeated victories with unfeigned joy, and repeated with exultation the sincere congratulation of Platoff, to his venerable commander, *Hourra! your most Serene Highness!*

The miserable fugitives of the French army, dispersed and wandering in all directions, were incessantly pursued and collected by the light troops and Cossacks. Platoff was at their heels wherever they turned. He had entered Smolensk, after a very sharp rencounter with the French rear-guard, who had been left to destroy what remained of it, but who had but time to execute part of their commission. The enemy fled; and Platoff followed, sending out detachments in all directions, and bringing in a great number of prisoners. Near Winnisalouki, General Baron Mittersakomelsky forced 2,500 to lay down their arms. The enemy was driven from Mogilheff, where the Russians found 34,000 koules of provisions and forage, a quantity sufficient to serve the whole army for 10 days. On the 19th, many prisoners were made between Kossan and Dombrowna, by General Count Oscharoffsky. The head-quarters were at Romanoff. On the following day, (the 20th) near Dumbrowna, the Cossacks, under Oscharoffsky, cut off a detachment of the French army, killed more than 1000, took four pieces of cannon, a considerable number of carts, caissons laden with grape, and 600 prisoners. On the 16th, General Borosdin, near Orscha, took 400 prisoners. On the 19th, Platoff, who was proceeding from Smolensk to Dombrowna, along the right bank of the Dnieper, fell in with a body of 3000 men, who had escaped from Krasnoi, and having collected, were endeavouring to find out the main army: the whole were taken prisoners, including de Piubusque, the late chief Commissary-General at Smolensk. Continuing his course to Dombrowna,

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Platoff got before the remains of Ney's corps, who were flying from Krasnoi. He planted masked batteries on the road, from which he opened a dreadful fire of grape shot upon the fugitives as they advanced. They threw themselves in consternation, into a wood near the Dnieper, covering their rear with some chasseurs, and continued to march close along the banks of that stream till night was far advanced. Platoff took a different direction; and about six o'clock next morning, in advance of Dombrowna, he again posted himself upon the road where the enemy had to pass. They advanced from a thick wood, and were again saluted with a discharge of grape shot. They were thrown into disorder; and the Cossacks, profiting by the confusion, attacked them with their lances, killed a great many, and took 800 prisoners, amongst which were a Commissary General and 10 officers. Ney, who was here present, again took himself to flight, and threw himself into the forests; where collecting the troops which had been dispersed, he occupied the village of Jarouboff, and there defended himself, till night put an end to the combat. The enemy fled to Orscha; and next day, in advancing to that place, Platoff took 400 prisoners. The French burnt the town. At Kopyss, the Partisan Davidoff, on the 18th, took 285 prisoners, and killed a considerable number. On the 21st, Platoff occupied the remains of Orscha, where he found 20 pieces of cannon, and an hospital in which were 50 sick officers. On the 20th, near Gorki, Major Rachevsky, took 250 prisoners, and many equipages. The journal of Prince Kutusoff, for this period, contains a most extraordinary instance of the courage and zeal of a Russian private soldier, which is worth recording, not only for the real merit of the action, but because it shews the spirit which animated every Russian at this time. A tirailleur of the first grenadier company of the regiment of infantry of Moscow, named Stepan Jeremenko, had been left in the government of Smolensk, to be cured of the wounds which he had received at the attack upon that place. After his cure had been completed, and during the retreat of the French, a detachment of the enemy, consisting of 47 men, passed by the villages of Mlethino and Polsino, where he was. He immediately assembled the

peasants; and, encouraging them by his example, he killed seven, and bound the other forty with cords, and sent them as prisoners to the nearest outposts of the Cossack detachments. For this act of bravery, Kutusoff advanced him to the rank of a subaltern officer. Many other Russians, no doubt, signalized themselves in a similar manner.

Continuing the pursuit of the wretched and dispersed French fugitives, Mogilheff was saved from the flames, by the timely arrival of General Oscharoffsky. The enemy had threatened to burn it, in order to retard the progress of their pursuers, and to destroy the magazines which they could not carry away. The sudden appearance of Oscharoffsky, with the Cossacks, compelled them to abandon the place with precipitation; in advance of which, 100 men were taken prisoners. On the 24th, a detachment of the enemy, amounting to 800 men, which had separated from Ney's corps, surrendered near Lou-bawitnitz, to the Cossacks, under Platoff. At Zolotschina, Major General Karpow, on the 25th, had collected 600 prisoners, and taken a considerable quantity of provisions. On the same day, General Martinott, acting under Platoff, upon the high road, where the enemy were flying, attacked them, killed 500 and took 400 prisoners, amongst whom was General Dseworoffsky. But, says Kutusoff, the enemy's loss in prisoners was so great, that Platoff considered it *unnecessary* to make any particular report upon the subject, but merely to state that he seldom took less than 1000 every day.* That indefatigable officer considered it as his first duty to take them, but for numbering them exactly, he was not very mindful, but left it to any person who had more time to attend to it. Such were the results of the dreadful battles of Krasnoi, where the mighty French force was scattered like chaff before the whirlwind; and where all prudence and presence of mind seemed to have forsaken the French Emperor and his officers. Ney, alone, amidst all these difficulties and dangers, succeeded in preserving, amongst his diminished and daily diminishing corps, any thing like the appearance of a regular body. It is also worthy of re-

* Kutusoff's Journal from 7th to 19th November, O. S.

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mark, that amongst the prisoners now taken, a greater number of Polish names appeared among the officers; a clear proof that it was about Smolensk that a principal part of the new levies had joined. It is also obvious, from the Russian accounts, that the enemy had large stores of provisions collected in different places, but that the rapid advance of the Russian armies, whom he durst not or could not face, prevented him from deriving any benefit from them.

The bloody battles of Krasnoi, and their consequences, annihilated the remains of the grand army, which had formerly crossed the Dnieper and advanced into Russia. It was done also with comparatively trifling loss on the part of the Russians. In the last engagement, their loss in the van, under Milaradovitch, was only estimated at 500. The loss in other parts is not stated. The comparative small loss of the Russians, in these battles, is explained by the enemy himself, in his 29th bulletin, where he states, that his army was "without cavalry, without artillery, and without ammunition;" consequently, those unfortunate men had nothing but their bayonets to oppose against the Russian cavalry, artillery, and musquetry, plentifully supplied with ammunition, and these they wanted their former strength to wield. Nothing shews the cautious and prudent schemes of Kutusoff, in a clearer point of view, than the results of the actions which have just been mentioned. Had he attacked Bonaparte, and fought a general battle at Moscow, or immediately after leaving it, there can be little doubt but he would have gained the victory. But at what an expence of lives must it have been purchased—more than 10 times what it at last cost him; but, by the judicious manner he acted, he accomplished his purpose in the most complete manner, with scarcely any loss on his part. He was sensible what he had in his power, and what the Russian army could do; but he was also aware of the situation of the enemy, and what the winter could do; and he very wisely took the full benefit of its assistance.—The event justified his calculations, and equalled his expectations. The situation of the French army, from its arrival in the neighbourhood of Smolensk, about the 10th November, till the fatal battles of Krasnoi, almost exterminated the remainder, was dreadful beyond all de-

scription. The cold had increased to an intolerable degree. In three days, viz. on the 14th, 15th, and 16th, it was 18 degrees* below the freezing point of Reaumur. Davoust even asserts, in his account of the battle of Krasnoi, that it was as low as 25 degrees.† The consequences of which were most fatal indeed. In the three days of this cold, (from the 6th to the 10th,) the 28th bulletin informed us that they lost 3000 carriage horses, and "many men," by the severity of the cold. But the 29th deepens this tragic scene in a tenfold degree. "In a few days, more than 30,000 horses perished." What number of men shared the same fate, we are not told. Over that sad part of the drama, Bonaparte draws a veil—it was a scene too terrible to disclose, even to Parisian levity. In a book published at Dresden in February following, by a French officer of the Imperial guards, who was then with the army, he admits, (writing under the sway of Bonaparte) that the loss of men by the cold alone, was 30,000 between Smolensk and Wilna, besides what were lost previous to the flight from Smolensk. This number, there is the strongest reason to believe, is much below the truth. But even as it stands, what a scene of misery does it disclose. It is scarcely possible, however, for language to draw a more dreadful picture of the situation of the enemy, than he has himself done in his 29th bulletin. "The cavalry, artillery, and baggage-horses perished every night, not only by hundreds, but by thousands—Our cavalry were on foot, our artillery and our baggage were without conveyance. It was necessary to destroy and abandon a good part of our cannon, ammunition, and provisions. The army so fine on the 6th, was very different on the 14th; almost without cavalry, without artillery, without transports: without cavalry we could not reconnoitre a quarter of a league's distance; without artillery we could not risk a battle, and firmly await it: it was requisite to march not to be constrained to a battle, which the want of ammunition prevented us from doing: it was requisite to occupy a certain space not to be turned, and that too

* Twenty-ninth Bulletin.

† That is 56 degrees below the freezing point at Fahrenheit.

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* "But the calamity upon us was great loss of men, and future prospects were dark."
Feb. 14th, 1812.

without cavalry, which led and connected the columns. This difficulty, which joined to a cold which suddenly came on, rendered our situation miserable. These men whom nature had not sufficiently steeled to be above all the chances of fate and fortune, appeared shook, and lost their gaiety, and their good humour; and dreamed but of misfortunes and catastrophes; those whom she had created superior to every thing, preserved their gaiety and their ordinary manners, and saw fresh glory in the different difficulties to be surmounted." This picture requires no comment nor elucidation. The more it is considered, the more it serves to disclose "new sights of woe." The situation of the enemy was indeed miserable—no division of the army, when separated from another, knew what that part was about, or on what point it was moving; and thus Ney was ignorant of Davoust's defeat and destruction, till he found himself in a similar situation. The sword of the Russians, and the Polar blast, were equally destructive to him. The life's blood of his bravest troops, was frozen in their veins—they fell amidst woes unutterable, before his eyes, who, as he was the cause, so he was *steeled** against them all. Since the expulsion of the fallen angels from heaven, there is no scene to be found, which can parallel this; and under such circumstances, even Satan himself, and all the hosts of Pandemonium, would have lost "*their gaiety and their good humour, and dreamed only of misfortunes and catastrophes.*"

From the bloody fields of Krasnoi, Bonaparte and his army, if the wretched remains of what once terrified Europe could be called so, fled in consternation beyond the Dnieper: On the 19th, according to his relation, he crossed that stream; but in a very different plight, indeed, to that in which he had advanced across it, exactly that day three months, upon the conquest of Smolensk. He took the direction of Orscha, in

* "But the excessive and premature rigour of the winter, brought down a heavy calamity upon my army. In a few nights I saw every thing change—I experienced great losses—they would have broken my heart, if under such circumstances, I could have been accessible to any other sentiments than that of the interest, the glory, and future prosperity of my people."—Bonaparte's speech to the Legislative Body, Feb. 14th, 1813.

which direction, Victor and Oudinot, after their unsuccessful attack against Wittgenstein, were retreating. On the 20th he left Orscha, with the miserable remnants of his once mighty army; for it must be remembered, that the army which fought at the Berezina, were collected on the west side of the Dnieper; as few, very few indeed, recrossed that stream from the eastward. Collecting his scattered forces, and all the re-enforcements which had been advancing through Poland, Bonaparte proceeded with the utmost expedition, on the road to Borisow, in order to pass the Berezina at that point, and to gain the Warsaw road before the arrival of Tchichagoff to obstruct him. Dombrowski, who had been employed against Bobrunk and D'Oertell, was now recalled to accomplish a more difficult object. He was commanded to take possession of, and guard the important *tete du pont* upon the Berezina at Borisow. But General Lambert, with the advance of Tchichagoff's army, was before him. On the 21st, Dombrowski, after a severe engagement, was defeated with great loss, and compelled to abandon his object, and retreat in the direction of Orscha. Three thousand prisoners, six pieces of cannon, and two stands of colours remained in the hands of the conquerors; 2000 were left dead on the field, besides wounded, so that Dombrowski lost half his army. On the 22d, Tchichagoff reached Borisow with all his forces, having in his advance, during the preceding eight days, taken 11,000 prisoners, and 24 pieces of cannon, including those taken from Dombrowski. Victor and Oudinot, who were retiring before Wittgenstein, had received peremptory orders to march on to the Berezina, where it was imagined Dombrowski was in possession of the bridge, and there to oppose with their united forces, the designs of Tchichagoff. On the 24th, General Lambert having crossed the Berezina, and advanced as far as Bobr, was met by the corps of Oudinot, and compelled to recross the river, after a very considerable loss; but the strength of the position on the right Bank prevented any further success. In the mean time Wittgenstein followed Victor. In the space of two days he made 2000 prisoners, and on the 27th he came up with him, cut off his rear-guard from the main body, attacked it with great vi-

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gour, and after an action of 4 hours, completely defeated it. Thirty officers and 1000 prisoners were taken, and a great number killed and wounded. At the same time, he sent a flag of truce to summon the remainder to surrender, as further resistance was useless; in consequence of which, Partineaux's division, which Bonaparte said lost its way, and had marched to "the right instead of proceeding to the left," amounting to 8000 men, laid down their arms, and surrendered themselves prisoners of war, part at midnight, and the rest on the following morning. These unfortunate men were in a miserable condition—without food or covering, they spent the night under the canopy of heaven, benumbed with cold and almost frozen to death. "During the night, and benumbed with cold, it rallied," says the 29th Bulletin, "at seeing the enemy's fires, which it mistook for those of the French army." Dreadful deception! like the benighted travellers amid the barren waste, who through the pitiless storm, thinks he sees a friendly light at a distance. He rallies his drooping spirits—he marches—it flies—it vanishes—faint and forlorn, he ceases to make any exertions, and yields himself to his wretched fate. In the mean time, Bonaparte had arrived upon the Berezina, but found the Warsaw road closed against him. Platoff in advance of the main army, (which had passed the Dnieper on the 25th and 26th at Kopyss,) was at his heels—Tchichagoff in his front, and Wittgenstein on his right flank, each pressing upon him with a formidable force. His situation was most critical and dangerous. Still his force was formidable. With the remains of Dombrowski's, Victor's and Oudinot's corps, with those he had brought from the Dnieper, and what detachments had been marching to join him, his force, after the loss of Partineaux's division, amounted to 70,000 men, and comparatively speaking, well equipped troops, with a considerable force of cavalry; for all of them had hitherto been stationed in a plentiful country, and near their magazines and supplies; and though defeated, still they had experienced none of those marches, miseries, and privations, which had destroyed their more unfortunate comrades, who had advanced to Moscow, and whose unburied bodies now strewed in thousands the dis-

mal road from that city. The advance of the main body of the Russian army under Kutusoff, Bonaparte saw would give his enemies, already too numerous and powerful, a decided superiority over him; and as his supplies and resources were now wholly exhausted, he was determined to make a desperate push to effect his escape, before he allowed the formidable circle to be fully completed around him. He had only two ways to choose. The one seemed utterly impracticable, from the strong position which Tchichagoff held at Borrisow—the other which led to Wilna, seemed barely possible, and which was also increasing the length of his march very considerably, and of course his subsequent danger, providing he escaped that which at present threatened him. To escape by this road, could only be effected by deceiving the vigilance of Tchichagoff, and crossing the Berezina considerably above his present position. This too was to be effected, before the advance of the victorious Wittgenstein from the N.E. should either prevent his marching up the river, or if set out in that direction, throw him back into the position which he now held, and hem him in with the Berezina and Tchichagoff in his front, and Platoff and the main army in his rear. Not a minute was to be lost—every moment increased his danger—Wittgenstein was close at hand, and the Cossacks at no great distance.

The Berezina at this place, is fully 250 feet broad. Its banks are covered with morasses, which rendered the approach to it difficult. At this time it was covered with large masses of floating ice, which rendered the construction of a bridge a difficult undertaking. On the 25th, Bonaparte endeavoured, by different manœuvres, to call off the attention of Tchichagoff from his real object—and in a great measure succeeded. During the night of the 25th*, he marched with all expedition about 10 miles above Tchichagoff's position, and found a place at the village of Studsianca, where the river was so narrow, that the infantry could cross it on horseback. He resolved to attempt his passage at this place. It was at this very spot, where Charles XII. of Sweden, passed this stream a century ago, in his advance to Moscow. Under the protection of

* Twenty-ninth Bulletin.

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a battery of 30 pieces of cannon, erected upon some fine heights, and protected by morasses, the enemy constructed a bridge, and began to move his army and baggage over the river. During the 26th and 27th, says the enemy, the army passed, and some divisions of the Russian army who endeavoured to oppose it, were beat back by the Duke of Reggio, who led them fighting two hours. Tchichagoff, however, soon discovered the object of the enemy, but singly he was unable to prevent it. A cannonade, however, on the 27th, on the right and left of the enemy's new position, advised him of the approach of friends and assistance. Wittgenstein and Platoff approached, and communications were quickly established betwixt them. It was immediately resolved to attack the enemy without delay. This resolution brought on the memorable battle of the Berezina.

The whole army of Tchichagoff which had broke up from Borisow, advanced to the attack of that part of the French army which had passed the Berezina, and which were those under the command of Oudinot, who, recovered of his wounds which he had received at Polotzk, had again advanced from Wilna with re-enforcements to rescue his master. The battle began with the break of day—and was most obstinate and bloody. How severe it must have been, is obvious from the enemy's accounts, who states, that half an hour after the Duke of Reggio (Oudinot), had caused the Emperor to be informed, that he was attacked, (or in other words, that he was unable, without re-enforcements, to maintain his positions, on which the fate of the whole army depended,) Victor's force, which was flying before Wittgenstein, appeared on the left bank. But notwithstanding the pressing dangers which assailed Victor, and that part of the army which remained on the left bank, still the danger was greater on the other side, and re-enforcements most urgently demanded. In consequence of this, early in the day, Marshal Ney passed to the assistance of Oudinot, but this re-enforcement being still insufficient, Mortier immediately proceeded to the assistance of both. "The battle then became warm," * says the enemy. The Russians endeavoured

* Twenty-ninth Bulletin.

to turn the right of the French army, that is, drive them back upon the bridges and the river. A charge of cavalry, however, seems to have prevented the success of this measure, which would otherwise have been ruinous to the enemy. The battle lasted from morning till night, and was attended with a great loss to both parties. The enemy were strongly posted in a wood, and the nature of the ground, which was so favourable to them, prevented the Russians from using any part of their army, but their tirailleurs. The Russian loss was estimated at 4000 men, and the enemy attempts to claim 6000 prisoners, and 6 pieces of cannon, which was very improbable; for although the Russians could make no serious impression upon the enemy's position, still they had forced them to yield so far, as to compel them to fall back several versts. General Le Grand was said to have been killed; and Marshal Oudinot, General Merle, and another General, were amongst the number of the wounded, on the side of the enemy. The Russians lost no officer of distinction.

While Tchichagoff attacked that part of the French army which had passed the river, (for only part under Oudinot had passed it,) Wittgenstein attacked the other part on the east bank. Upon his approach the enemy halted, and with a very strong force endeavoured to defend the passage, in order to save their baggage and heavy waggons. The attack was spirited—the defence obstinate—the object for which each contended, most important. The engagement lasted during the greatest part of the day; but, towards evening, Wittgenstein succeeded in turning the French force opposed unto him, under Victor, and obtained possession of the heights, which commanded both the large bridge and a foot bridge, over which the army and its attendants were passing at the time. The engagement had been very severe, and the slaughter great; but it was not now to the field of battle covered with slain, that the eye looked to find objects of horror. A more dreadful field was to be seen, where at the time, there was neither Cossacks nor Russians. Before the advance of the army under Wittgenstein, and before, and during the time which he contended for the possession of the heights which commanded the

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bridges, the scene there was most horrible and distressing. The crowd pressing to gain the bridges, became so great, that it was impossible to move. The soldiers, delirious from their sufferings, threw themselves upon the banks of the river, uttering dismal yells of agony. The officers, though hardly able to move, from fatigue, continued to run about, in order to keep themselves in heat, and escape destruction. Some of the soldiers endeavoured to light fires. They were seen frozen to death, with the branches in their hands, which they had broken. They tore the tattered rags from each other. They even refused their dying comrades, the mouthful of water which they had been fortunate enough to obtain. Whenever they had got a fire lighted, crowds flocked around it. There numbers were frozen to death, and the living were seen coolly sitting down upon the bodies of their dead comrades. Bonaparte, by the assistance of his guards, made his way through this scene of confusion and death. He crossed the bridge—most of the army still remained behind. The shades of night closed upon this dreadful scene. A piercing wind covered their faces with snow which froze into ice as it fell upon them. The morning dawned with deeper horrors. One dreary waste of snow met the eye, except where the black waters of the half frozen and destructive Berezina, were seen winding along, amidst the sheets of floating ice, which were borne down by his stream. Towards eight o'clock in the morning, the bridge, over which the baggage and artillery were passing, was broken. They tried to gain the other bridge. But in vain. Here the infantry and the cavalry commenced a dreadful struggle, and in endeavouring to get forward, slaughtered each other. A dreadful barrier of the carcasses of dead men and horses now arose around the bridge; and to cross it, it became necessary to climb over mountains of dead. The artillery and waggons crushed the half frozen wretches as they moved. The half dead endeavoured to raise themselves, and struggled with those who were trampling upon them. Some were brought down, and shared the same fate. The stronger, however, trampled them to death. But no words can give an adequate idea of this tragic scene. The approaching roar of the Russian can-

non, increased the alarm and consternation. The command of the heights by them, formed not only the climax of this scene of misery, but I may say formed the climax of human suffering. Man never witnessed, nor did man ever endure such woes, as were felt at the Berezina. A considerable part of the baggage had already been carried over. The rear was composed of a crowd of persons of all descriptions, the least useful to the army. These Bonaparte would not endeavour to save at the risk of any number of his best troops. Accordingly, no sooner had the Russian artillery been planted on the heights, and commenced a well directed fire upon the French bridges, and the French army crowding to and passing them, than he commanded them to be set on fire. A scene of horror now ensued which beggars all description. Carriages, guns, cavalry, infantry, men, women, and children, all rushed forward to the flaming piles. Their piteous lamentations were disregarded—their efforts to escape were vain. What the flames did not consume quick enough, their countrymen broke down. The Russian artillery with fatal aim, poured destruction amongst the fugitives. Though in flames, the crowd still pressed forward upon the bridges. The sick and wounded perished beneath the feet of their comrades, or under the artillery. The strongest pushed the weakest into the water. Battalions in the rear endeavouring to escape, pushed forward those before them—

“The wave behind, impelled the wave before.”

They were seen in multitudes, sinking amongst the flames, or tumbling headlong into the water. The Berezina was choked with bodies—his waves were discoloured with blood—thousands sunk to rise no more, while the bitter lamentations of the dying, drowning, and abandoned wretches, scattered on fields of snow, or crushed amongst piles of floating ice, were wafted to a great distance, and filled the mind of the survivors with agony and horror. What remained alive from this scene of carnage were taken prisoners by the Russians—their fate indeed was happiness to that of their companions. Bonaparte fled from

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this scene of horror as quickly as he could; but till he flies from himself, the horrors of the Berezina must meet his eyes and appal his mind—the yells of despair must vibrate in his ears, and fill him with fear and trembling.

In this engagement, Bonaparte had fully 70,000 veteran troops, with a considerable force of cavalry. None of this army had, comparatively speaking, suffered much hardship, or were in a bad state, because they were all, or nearly all, collected on this side the Dnieper, and had not been destitute of supplies of any description. This army, however, was his last resource; for if it was destroyed, he had not the means of assembling another, east of the Vistula; because although a great number of troops, and numerous re-enforcements were to be found in that space, yet these were so scattered, that the rapidity of the Russian advance rendered it impossible for them to unite in a body. All hopes therefore of resistance vanished, after the disasters of the Berezina. Famine, fear, and flight, from this moment, accompanied with double horrors, the sad remnants of the French army.

Wittgenstein having obtained pontoons, quickly re-established the bridges which the enemy had destroyed. He crossed the river, while the main army, under Kutusoff, closely followed his footsteps. The vanguard under Milaradovitch had arrived at Bobr on the 27th. The enemy, therefore, sought his safety in a precipitate flight. Abandoning every thing he had, he took the road by Zembín for Molodetschino, Smorgonie, and Wilna. Baggage, the few remaining cannon they had, waggons belonging to government and individuals, carriages of all descriptions, the plunder of Moscow and of various churches, which had been long ago forwarded, but now overtaken on the road, were all abandoned on the fatal banks of the Berezina. So thick were the spoils left, that a space of half a verst square was so crowded with them, that it was impossible to penetrate through them either on horseback or on foot; and three companies of the new raised Russian militia, were employed to open up the road, in order to give room for the army to pass. The loss of the Russians in the battles of the Berezina was about 6 or 7000 men killed and wounded,

viz. 4000 with Tchichagoff and 3000 with Wittgenstein. That of the enemy exceeded 20,000, of which 13,000 were prisoners. Cannon, flags, and waggons innumerable, after this, daily fell into the hands of the victors.

General Sacken, who had been left with 17,000 infantry, and 7000 cavalry, to observe the armies of Schwartzberg and Regnier in the Duchy of Warsaw, was obliged to yield to the superior numbers of his antagonists, who had been re-enforced by a division under General Durette;* he fell back upon Słonim, followed by the enemy. Schwartzberg having divided his army into two,† sent one division under General Frimont, which advanced as far as Nieswicz after the army of Tchichagoff. The other part, under his own command, manœvered against Sacken, who was also opposed in front by Regnier. The Russian General, however, baffled all their efforts; and having found a convenient opportunity, he, on the 18th, attacked Regnier and beat him severely. One thousand prisoners and one pair of colours fell into the hands of the Russians. The enemy were afterwards obliged to retreat, and Sacken, re-enforced by Oscharoffsky's and other corps, quickly resumed the ground he had lost. The enemy eagerly proclaimed, upon the retreat of Sacken, a complete victory over him; but it was curious to observe the different statements of the same affair, given through different channels. The Paris papers proclaimed his corps annihilated, and 8000 prisoners taken—French accounts from Wilna, dated November 26th, rated his loss at 4000 killed and wounded, and 3000 prisoners; while from the account of the Vienna Gazette, December 8th, received through the medium of the *Moniteur*, even that dreadful *Boutique* of misrepresentation and transformation, was only able to state in vague terms, that his loss was immense, while the Father of falsehood himself, could not find one ray from that quarter, to lessen the gloom of his last Bulletin. The truth was, that as Tchichagoff and Sacken's armies were on the road to Warsaw, by which route it was believed in Paris, that the Grand Army in-

* Tchichagoff's dispatch to Kutusoff.

† Vienna Gazette, Dec. 8th, 1812.

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tended to pass; it was therefore, necessary to lessen the fears of the public for its safety as much as possible, by making the people believe, that the only obstacle to its retreat was removed by the destruction of Sacken's corps; which would render the united armies of Schwartzenberg and Regnier much superior to Tchichagoff; who would thus, for his own safety, be compelled to leave the road open for the grand army to pass to Warsaw.

All the divisions of the Russian army, now in close communication with each other, marched after the flying enemy. General Kutusoff, who commanded the troops formerly under General Winzengerode, had advanced from Babinovitchi, and following the enemy's army, hung on his flank and his vanguard, from Orscha to Borrisow. In repeated attacks, he caused the enemy a severe loss. In that space, he took 73 staff and other officers, 5,937 privates prisoners, and killed "of course, (says he,) as many."* The greater part of this force, he also expressly mentions was composed of the fugitives who had fled from the disasters of Krasnoi, and were ignorant on what road they should direct their footsteps, in order to escape death or captivity. Near Borrisow he joined General Wittgenstein, and with him assisted in the pursuit, taking the right of the Berezina, and endeavouring to get before the enemy. From thence, he was directed to march after the remains of the Bavarian army, under General Wrede, who having been re-enforced from Wilna, after the disasters at Polotzk, had again advanced towards the Dwina, in order to assist his late colleagues; but, learning, in his advance, the disastrous situation of affairs, he turned and was now marching by Welieke and Dolginoff, to join the main army at Smorgonie. In pursuit of them, Kutusoff detached that indefatigable leader Tettgenborn, who came up with them on the 2d of December at Dolginoff, attacked and defeated their rear guard, with the loss of 36 officers, and 1000 privates prisoners—occupied Dolginoff, and cut off their communication with the army at Smorgonie.† Immense re-enforcements at this time were pressing forward to join

* Kutusoff's (General) dispatch, Berezina, Dec. 2d, 1812.

† Wittgenstein's dispatch, Kamen, Dec. 4th.

the Russian army. From the southern provinces, General Goudavitch was advanced to Mogilheff, with 70,000 militia, viz. 50,000 infantry, and 20,000 cavalry.

General Wittgenstein marched on the right of the French army, Count Tormasoff with the advance of the main army in his rear, Admiral Tchichagoff on his left, and Platoff with his Cossacks, and light troops and light artillery, under General Ekmuloff, was in his front continually annoying him.* The Russians advanced with incredible rapidity, particularly Tchichagoff, who felt sore at having allowed himself to have been deceived by Bonaparte at Borrisow. For this, he was blamed by many, but without much cause. The force which Bonaparte there had, was more considerable than was supposed, and, in reality, was a lequate to force the passage, at any unprotected point, in defiance of every effort of Tchichagoff alone. The wits at Petersburg said, the Admiral was waiting a wind, when his antagonists got the start of him; but be this as it may, he made ample amends in the pursuit for his former negligence. He never lost sight of the French army, by night nor by day, for one moment. He frequently entered the same house which Bonaparte had left only an hour or two before. His army alone, in the course of a few days, from the Berezina to the Wilia, caused the enemy a loss of 30,000 men.† To mention in detail, the operations of the Russian army in the advance from the Berezina to Wilna, and from Wilna to the Niemen, would only be to repeat the daily list of thousands of prisoners, numbers of cannon and standards taken. The enemy were incapable of any resistance. Worn down by want and fatigue, the soldier became careless of his fate—he no longer heard the voice of his officer, and his feeble hand refused any longer to wield his arms. Without consolation or assistance, they perished by hundreds and by thousands, amidst the ruins which their necessity and revenge induced them to make. Their rage for mischief never forsook them. They continued it till the last

* Cathcart's dispatch, Dec. 12th, and Russian do.

† Tchichagoff's dispatch, Dec. 11th.

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moment they were capable of it. Those who marched foremost, left only ruins to meet the eyes of their comrades; and if on their march, during the day, they saw the steeple of a church at a distance, or heard it strike the hours during the darkness of the night, fondly hoping they were near some relief, they quickened their march, but coming to it, they found only silence and desolation—all around was but ashes and carcasses. If they attempted to repose for a moment, shivering, naked, and without shelter as they were, they were immediately aroused from their miserable relaxation, by the dreadful hourra of the Cossack, and the reiterated attacks of the Russians. Nights the most cheerless and gloomy, were rendered tenfold more hideous and dismal, by the incessant roar of the Russian artillery, through these awful solitudes, formed by the ruin and devastation which they had left behind them. The advance of the Russians was inconceivably rapid. In the midst of a winter like this, and carrying along with them provisions, stores, and artillery, over a desolated country, where every obstacle was thrown in the way of their march, still they not only never lost sight of, but were constantly upon the “*shoulders*” of an enemy who had abandoned every thing—who now fought not for victory, but retreat—not for retreat, but for flight.

On the 2d, Bonaparte reached Molodetschino, from whence he dated the 29th and last Bulletin. Here he met his first convoys and supplies, which had been dispatched from Wilna for his relief. On the 5th, he reached Smorgonie, having fled at that cruel season, a distance of 120 miles in 6 days. During this period he had several narrow escapes. The Cossacks frequently seized upon the food, which in miserable hovels, was set out for his scanty meals. At Syzomsk near Oschniasny, he was almost taken prisoner, and had the Cossacks known, that the prize which would have gained Miss Platoff was there, he had certainly not escaped. They burst into a cottage by the door, while the Emperor threw himself out at a window on the opposite side. From thence he fled alone, and on foot, to the corps of General Bourcier, who had been dispatched by Bas-sano from Wilna for his relief. These soon carried him out of the reach of immediate danger. By this time he had lost the

greater part of his guards. These had been spared and supplied while the rest of the army suffered, in order that they might protect his person; but from the Berezina they equally suffered, and amongst the dead on the roads, were distinguished numbers of them.* At Smorgonie, Bonaparte assembled his principal officers, all of whom had yet escaped, though "meagre, pale, and wan." There he conferred the command of the army upon his brother-in-law, Murat; and, under the title of the Duke of Vicenza, he set off with that personage in a miserable sledge, travelling night and day, by Dresden and Mentz, till he reached Paris, at midnight, on the 19th, in a more pitiable plight, and humiliating situation, than the Asian monarch, who fled from Greece in a cock-boat—he still left an army behind him—Bonaparte none.

The following authentic documents concerning the Guards, while it shews us the miseries and losses which they endured, who were the last and always the least exposed of the army, may also enable us to form a more correct idea of the sufferings and losses of the rest of it:

Imperial Guards, 4th Regiment of Voltigeurs.

Under arms, at leaving Smolensk, 16th November, 32 officers and 427 privates.

Killed, 3 officers and 26 privates; wounded, 2 officers and 69 privates, and who were also left and taken.

Dead of cold and misery, 103 privates.

Remained behind, frozen, or from sickness and fatigue, supposed to be taken prisoners, 1 officer and 204 privates.

Total loss, 6 officers and 398 privates.

Remained under arms, upon arriving at Wilna, 26 officers and 29 privates.

Certified authentic, Lieut. Col. Commandant,

(Signed)

CHAVALIER FALTE.

* Russian Journal, from the 8th to the 13th.

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Imperial Guards, 6th Regiment of Tirailleurs.

Under arms at leaving Smolensk, 31 officers and 300 privates.

Killed in battle, 11 officers and 13 privates.

Wounded and taken, 4 officers and 52 privates.

Dead of cold and misery, 11 officers and 24 privates.

Remained behind, frozen, or from sickness and fatigue, supposed to be taken prisoners, 13 officers and 179 privates,

Total loss, 17 officers and 290 privates.

Remained under arms, at Wilna, 14 officers and 10 privates.

Certified authentic,

(Signed)

CARRE, Col. Major Commandant.*

The above accounts are sufficient of themselves to shew the truth of the Russian returns, and the miseries and losses of the French army.

If the French army, which left Moscow, suffered the bitterest distress before that it reached Smolensk—if the remnants of it, and those that were collected near that place, suffered the extremes of wretchedness before passing the Dnieper, still those of the fresh armies which survived the disasters of the Berezina, suffered tenfold misery and distress. Terror, fear, and flight, marched after them with giant strides.

————— "Confusion worse confounded,
"Route on route,"

overtook them at every step. Bereft of every thing—even of Hope, the last consolation of the afflicted—their fate was miserable beyond all example, and their hardships unequalled in the annals of man. It was during the dark hour of midnight, under a cold of from 13° to 24° degrees below Zero, that they alone could attempt to fly. During the day, they were obliged to halt, and to form themselves into hollow squares,† in order to defend themselves against the incessant attacks of the Cossacks.

* London Gazette, Feb. 27th. Cathcart's Dispatch, Petersburg, Jan. 16th. 1813.

† Lord Cathcart's Dispatch, December 14th. 1812.

Even the superior officers, for seven weeks* had never changed their clothes, nor slept in any place but the open fields. At every resting place hundreds were left dead and dying. The roads by which they passed were covered with thousands upon thousands of killed, wounded, famished, sick, dead and dying wretches. Here the soldiers were stabbing a horse, and sucking his blood to quench their thirst—cutting his body to pieces, which they eat raw for their wretched repast; and there others, horrible to relate, were gnawing pieces out of the flesh of their wounded comrades, in order to satisfy their hunger.† Around the fires which they had kindled with the materials of the dwellings which came in their way, they collected in circles, with their feet towards the fire, and in that situation were found frozen to death. In the flames which mischief, or necessity, induced them to kindle, many were burnt alive. Amongst the warm ashes of the dwellings, which his comrades in advance had burnt, the shivering soldier eagerly rolled himself, as a momentary relief from the bitter cold. In the houses, the doors and windows of which they had broken, the polar blast arrested the vital current in their veins.‡ “The road by which the enemy retreated was covered with the dead bodies of men and horses.”§ “The whole distance from Smorgonie to Oschniasny is so strewn with dead bodies, and dead horses, and covered with artillery waggons, tumbrils, and carriages, that it is rendered almost impassable.”|| “In one instance, when the enemy was quitting a town, the road for about a verst, was so choked with dead, that it was nearly impossible to step without putting a foot on one of them.”¶

* Twenty-ninth Bulletin.—“50 days.”

† Petersburg Gazette, December 11th, and Konigsberg, December 17th.

‡ Tchichagoff's Dispatch, December 11th.

§ Russian Journal, 3d, to 8th December.

|| Russian Journal, 8th to 13th December.—This, though it may seem to invalidate the Russian account of the loss of the French baggage at the Berezina, by no means does so, because what was here lost was derived from fresh supplies. This loss was between the 5th and 11th, whereas, the enemy, in his 29th bulletin, dated the 3d, tells us that it was at Molodetschina, on that day, “where the army received the first convoys from Wilna,” and from whence supplies of all kinds had constantly been sending towards the eastward.

¶ Lord Tyrconnel's Letter, Wilna, December 11th, 1812.

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Round Wilna, alone, 16,000 dead bodies were collected;* and a still greater number in other places, as we shall by and by see. By this time “the dissatisfaction of Napoleon’s troops had increased to such a pitch, that they, with one voice, charged him as the author of all their misery.”† “Condemned to perish far from their own countries, they cursed, in different languages, ambition, as the cause of their destruction.”‡

Under such circumstances, could they preserve their gaiety? So situated, could they do any other thing, “but dream of misfortunes and catastrophes?” Cold unfeeling despot, who could upbraid them for losing both—degraded and thoughtless nation, who could for a moment hear such expressions, and yet continue to support, praise, and obey the author of them. When the armies of Cambyses were buried under the burning sands of Africa, they were overwhelmed in an instant, and fell without pain or sorrow. When the hosts of Sennacherib, who derided the name of the living God, were blasted by the breath of the Almighty, these perished beneath the awful stroke, without feeling their end approaching. Not so the more unfortunate French soldier. Destruction, equally irresistible, swept around him; but, hovering over his head, deepening and deepening the gloom, it delayed to strike, while its terrors tore his soul with agony. For some days after the frost began, the sky was clear and serene; but, it suddenly became overcast, and from a calm, the wind began to blow with violence. Increasing to a tempest, it swept the gloomy forests; and, from their dark recesses, sent forth the most hideous noises, which appalled the ears of the fainting fugitives. Drifts of snow darkened the air, and blinded the soldiers on their march. The earth was covered with it, and presented to the eye of the French soldier one uniform surface, where no trace of a road, or path, was distinguishable. The extremes of misery met his eye in every direction. He saw others perishing under wretchedness, which he also was beginning to feel—which he too must endure to the uttermost. Death met his eye in every shape, and

* Cathcart’s dispatch, Petersburg, January 16th, 1813.

† Russian Journal, from 8th to 13th Dec. 1812.

‡ Petersburg Gazette, 11th Dec. 1812.

armed with every terror. The soldier marched—he fought—he fled—but in vain—still no escape—no end to his miseries—“foundations fled the wretched,” and while heaven and earth conspired for his destruction—he bent beneath the stroke—he yielded to the devouring blast—he rallied his departing spirits, to curse the author of his misery. He perished far from his native land—his body was left to be food for the “*dogs and the crows*.”* The unburied bones of multitudes covered the fields of Russia, white as were the fatal plains of Helam, where, in ancient times, the Almighty also scattered kings in his anger.† The rapid destruction of the armies which invaded Russia, is an “Event so remarkable, that no time will efface it from the annals of the world.” Let it not be lost upon the world. May nations and individuals ever remember, that “Great and mighty is the God of Justice,” who has in a similar manner, in every age, and in every country, punished every one who was presumptuous enough to usurp his attributes, deride his name, and defile his temples.

It belongs to man to touch with a trembling hand, the ways of his Creator in His moral government of this world. But there are instances, where the interference of his power is so plain and so conspicuous, that they can neither be mistaken nor misapplied, and which ought not to be lost upon mankind. The sad catastrophe which befel the French army in Russia, was most assuredly one of these instances. “In the East of Europe the Lord of hosts has held a dreadful court of justice, and the Angel of Death has cut off 300,000 of those strangers, by the sword, famine, and cold, from the earth, which they, in the insolence of their prosperity, would have brought under the yoke.”‡ Let us consider for a moment, who these strangers were, that were thus summoned by the Angel of Death, to the bar of the Almighty. Who was it that composed the mighty army, which threatened to bring the earth under the yoke? Was it not men who denied the name of God, derided his power, and trampled upon his authority. We cannot have forgot-

* Alexander's proclamation, Wilna, Jan. 6th, 1813.

† “It was white as snow in Salmon.” Psalm lxxviii. 14.

‡ Alexander's proclamation, Wilna, Jan. 6th, 1813.

§ Blücher's address to the Saxons, Buntzlau, March 26th, 1813.

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ten—the world never should, and never can forget, that alarming moment, when the distracted French nation rose in arms against Heaven and earth—when they trampled upon man, and challenged Omnipotence to the combat. The mind cannot reflect without shuddering, at those gloomy days, when man dared declare it death to his fellow creature, to acknowledge the power, or worship the name of his Creator. On *Sunday, August, 1793*, a deputation of children presented themselves at the bar of the Convention, and demanded that instruction should be made compulsory; and “one of the children who accompanied the deputation, requested, that *instead of preaching* to them in the name of the *self-styled God*, they might be instructed in the principles of equality, and the rights of man, and of the constitution.” These children had parents—these parents must have taught them these principles. These principles durst not have openly and publicly shewn themselves, unless they had been, as they really were, general throughout France. These children, when they thus appeared with this horrid demand, may have been eight or nine years old; (their fathers being then in the prime of life,) and it is not, therefore, supposing too much, or asserting too harshly, that the French army which invaded Russia, was chiefly composed of the youths of that generation, commanded too, perhaps, by those who begat and misled them. Nay, even of those very “*lads of Paris*,” who, in 1793, thus publicly derided and defied their Maker. I say, when we consider this as the case, and behold these men writhing under the agonies of the Berezina—suffering beyond what mortals ever endured—feeling the omnipotence of that power which they had so wantonly and openly defied—their spirit withered, and their strength blasted by the breath of the Almighty*—that it affords a picture which no man can contemplate without terror, and which must make the most profligate fear, and the most abandoned tremble.

It was at the close of this bitter period of misery, this indelible scene of horror and carnage, that the official organ of the French government, along with the 29th bulletin, outraged

* “By the breath of God frost is given,” Job xxxvii. 10.

every feeling of honour, truth, and humanity, in glorying over, and making merry at its disastrous contents. "The details contained in it, (said the *Moniteur*), cannot but add to the glory with which the French army has covered itself, in this last campaign; to the admiration of the heroic firmness, and puissant genius, which his Majesty the Emperor inspires. After having *vanquished* the Russians in twenty battles, and driven them from their ancient capital, reduced to ashes, our brave troops have had to bear up against the rigour of an excessive cold, and the severity of an inhospitable climate. There are few pages in ancient or modern history, that with respect to nobleness, elevation, and interest, can be compared to this memorable bulletin. *It is an historical piece of the first rank.*" In the disastrous situation to which the French army was reduced, "the genius of the Sovereign animates all, *foresees every thing*, and prepares unexpected resources. The enemies, who had the elements for their auxiliaries, were *beaten* wherever they appeared. The march of the French army, which had never been delayed by any difficulty, *is a series of triumphs*, and the operations concluded with a brilliant victory, which dissipates every fear.* We have seen the *sacred squadron*, composed of brave men, selected from among the valiant, preserving in the midst of dangers, that constancy and *gaiety*, in which men, although by nature sufficiently formed for hardihood, are *deficient*; and we may rest assured, that with *such* an army, and such a General, the eventual success of the war cannot be uncertain." "The skilful foresight of the Emperor, which dives into futurity, has provided at Wilna, every thing necessary for the relief of the sick and wounded, and useful for the necessities of the whole army. Within these three months, the magazines have been filled, and easy communication exists between the lines and the magazines of the army. People recently arrived from Poland, confirm this intelligence, and add, that there are larger supplies of ammunition, and provisions of all kinds, in the different magazines, than are necessary to support the army through the whole winter."† Magazines with

* "Trembling and talking loud went fear."

† *Moniteur*, Dec. 20th, 1812

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every thing, there, no doubt, was; but where was the army? Surely, if the 29th bulletin is, as it really is, a historical document of the first importance, this extraordinary narrative which accompanies it, also from official authority, ought to be equally so; and, if it descends to posterity, it must strike them with wonder and astonishment, at the debased and degraded state of a nation, the very existence of whose Government depended upon falsehood, and a total want of any one feeling which distinguishes man from the brutes that perish. The history of no nation can produce an instance of such a desperate perversion of truth, and such a total contempt of the opinion of mankind, as is here exhibited by Gallic sophistry, and Parisian levity. He who is extolled here as foreseeing every thing, foresaw nothing. He abandoned the miserable remains of that army, which had remained faithful and obedient unto him, through dangers which no human power can describe. Who can tell the pangs of grief, shame, and despair, which burst from the indignant bosoms of the wretched few whom his policy deserted at Smorgonie? and who, it was fortunate for him, never returned to France, as he never wished they should. Oh! could the expiring thousands of Krasnoi, or the ghastly figures of the Berezina, have been transported to the banks of the Seine, what a tale of woe could they have told—what a spectacle of wretchedness would they have exhibited. It must have called forth the indignation of France; and a fate, very different from Elba, might then have been their Emperor's doom.

The Russian armies continued to advance in an overwhelming mass, sweeping every thing before them. On the 12th December, they entered Wilna upon the *shoulders* of their enemies, who were forced to abandon all their magazines of provisions, clothing, and military stores, collected at an immense expense, and to a great amount. Fourteen thousand Tschetwert of barley, 5000 do. of biscuit and flour,* and an immense number of uniforms, musquets, pouches, and saddles, great coats, and other articles of equipment, were found at Wilna, besides a great deal in the neighbourhood. Seven

* 4,032,000 lbs. barley, and 1,440,600 lbs. bread and flour.

Generals, 18 staff officers, 224 superior officers, 9517 soldiers, and 5139 sick, were taken prisoners in the town. And from the 8th to the 13th, 168 pieces of cannon fell into the hands of the victors. A vast number were also killed and wounded, in different affairs, the exact account of which it is impossible to ascertain. General Kutusoff and Tettenborn, on the 8th, took prisoners the wretched remains of the Bavarians, consisting of 126 officers, and 2024 men. General Platoff destroyed two whole columns, of which he took 1000 prisoners, and the rest were killed and wounded. Every day, every hour increased the number, till there were no more to take, or for the sword to destroy. The miserable remnants of the French army,

"Refuse of swords, and gleanings of the fight,"

continued to fly to the frontiers, pursued by the Russians, constantly in advance of whose army, was the indefatigable Platoff and his Cossacks. At Kowno, he came up with them once more; and, passing the Niemen on the ice, he, on the 24th, killed, wounded, and took prisoners, including those taken in the pursuit, 10,000 men, most of whom were raw recruits;* so that, perhaps, not a man, with the exception of superior officers, escaped of all that tremendous force which passed the Niemen, upon the morning of that day six months preceding; besides many of those who had perished, were re-enforcements which had lately advanced, and were not included in the original force, and their number certainly exceeded whatever part of the original strength effected its escape. From Kowno, part of the fugitives took the road for Tilsit, followed by Wittgenstein, and part for Wilkowitzsch, followed by Platoff.

On the other hand, the advanced divisions of the Russian main army took the direction of Grodno, from the neighbourhood of which, an Austrian force, there stationed, fled as fast as possible. Tchichagoff took the direction of the upper Niemen, and quickly cleared both banks of that river. Schwartzenberg and Regnier now felt themselves in a perilous situation. Tchichagoff's and

* "Conscripts and convalescents." Cathcart's dispatch, Dec. 31st, 1812.

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other forces were advancing on their left flank, and even threatened their rear. Sacken re-enforced, was now advancing upon them in front; and at no distance from him, were still further re-enforcements, under Touchkoff, who had reached Minsk on the 10th December. They, therefore, fled with the utmost precipitation, and gained, after considerable losses, the grand duchy of Warsaw and Austrian Galicia: the Austrians glad, no doubt, to be relieved from the dangers of a campaign, in which they never were, nor was it possible they could be, very cordial.

Till the date of the 25th December, from the head-quarters at Wilna, and from some corps not so late, by several days, the Russians had taken 41 Generals, 1,298 officers, 167,510 non-commissioned officers and soldiers, prisoners; and 1131 pieces of cannon; and upon comparing this account from the Petersburg Gazette, with the tables I have annexed to this work, as kept from the official dispatches, it will be seen, that there is scarcely any difference.

On the 20th of December, Lord Tyrconnel, attached to the British embassy at St. Petersburg, a young nobleman of great talents and exalted virtues, died at Wilna. His Lordship served as a volunteer in the army under Tchichagoff—he had followed, with an ardour beyond his strength, this glorious advance of the Russian armies, and miserable and ruinous retreat of the French. He had witnessed the horrors of the Berezina, and all the subsequent scenes of misery which fell on the heads of the invaders: but the rigours of the climate, and the fatigue, overcame his constitution; and he died of a pulmonic complaint, sincerely regretted and generally lamented. Marshal Kutusoff caused military honours to be paid to his remains, and a monument to be erected to his memory in the reformed church at Wilna. Peace to his ashes—his memory will never be forgotten, but will be remembered with those of the other heroes who have fought and died in the most glorious cause in which ever man was embarked. Along with the Russian army, through all this eventful period, was that brave officer, Sir Robert Wilson, from whose able pen the world may, at no distant date, expect an accurate and minute account of all these momentous

operations. He was at the head of the Commissariat, in the Russian army, and in which situation he rendered the most essential services. The Russian forces had never before been supplied in such a regular manner. By his advice and directions, through all this tremendous struggle, they wanted nothing. Bonaparte keenly felt his services; and hence, in venting his spleen against the gallant Rostopchin, he could not allow him to escape, without an observation of contemptuous anger. After Rostopchin had completed the destruction of Moscow, "he has," said Bonaparte, "been able to console himself in the society of the English Commissary, Wilson." The world would consider them as very fit companions.

Amongst the other remarkable events of this year which it is now time to notice, is the conduct of Sweden. The arrogant domineering power of France, out of her own borders, had at last separated that kingdom, though ruled by a Frenchman, from the interest and views of France. The consequence of which was, the conclusion of a peace with Great Britain and Russia, which gave general satisfaction in Sweden. If Bernadotte at that moment did not join the cause of Russia, it was merely from his inability to do so, that he refrained. Sweden was greatly weakened and impoverished, from the late war with Russia; but above all, from the loss of her trade, the consequence of hostilities with Great Britain. Shortly after the conclusion of the treaty, by the latter, with Sweden, a meeting took place at Abo, between the Emperor Alexander and Bernadotte, the Crown Prince of Sweden; in consequence of which, the ties of friendship between these personages were drawn closer, and Alexander felt himself at full liberty to withdraw the Russian troops from Finland, and to transport them across the Gulph of Finland to the Dwina; where, as we have seen, they rendered such important services; and, by their timely assistance, rendered the issue of the Russian campaign more signally disastrous to the enemy, than it would otherwise have been. But this was, after all, the smallest part of the good it did. With Bernadotte his enemy, Bonaparte was under the

• Twenty-third bulletin, Moscow, Oct. 2d, 1812.

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necessity of keeping an immense force in his rear, all over the king-
 dom of Prussia, from the Oder to the Niemen, where Augereau
 and Victor with 105,000 men, were both stationed, for a con-
 siderable time, till necessity obliged Bonaparte to call them
 to his assistance; but still he durst not do so, with regard to the
 forces of the former, till the season was so far advanced, that any
 attempt from Sweden was rendered almost impossible, when as
 we have already seen, this force under Augereau, came too late
 to render him any effectual assistance. Bonaparte was well
 aware of the discontent, which reigned amongst the people all
 along the southern shores of the Baltic; and that the presence
 of a Swedish army, near the mouth of the Oder, might have
 kindled a flame, which would have formed a circle of fire in
 his rear, through which nothing could penetrate to his sup-
 port. The conduct of the Crown Prince at this moment, and
 the measures he took, were such, as were alone sufficient to
 screen him from those surmises afterwards thrown out against
 him, for lukewarmness and insincerity in the cause in which he
 had embarked. This was the moment, when above all others,
 he could have rendered Bonaparte the most effectual assistance,
 by attacking the Russians in Finland, and threatening Peters-
 burgh from the west; while Bonaparte advanced to it, as he cer-
 tainly at the outset meant to do, from the Southwest and South.
 Bonaparte was aware of the importance of his assistance, and of-
 fered him every bribe, that he conceived would influence him; but
 the Crown Prince rejected them all: the giver and the gifts,
 were alike objects of his contempt, suspicion, and disregard.
 He knew that the promises of Bonaparte, were dark as Erebus,
 and therefore were not to be trusted. The conduct of Sweden,
 though she did not actually embark in the war, was of the
 greatest service to Alexander. Not that the junction of Swe-
 den with Bonaparte, would have insured the subjugation of
 the Russian empire—No! the spirit which animated Russia,
 would have overcome all attempts of her enemies; but the neu-
 trality of Sweden saved her from greater distress than she had
 to endure. Sweden also knew, that peace between Great Bri-
 tain and Russia would ensue, upon the commencement of hosti-
 lities between the latter power and France; and by the exertions

and aid of the British navy, any attempt upon Finland would be rendered extremely dangerous and precarious. Still, however, even the prospect of such an attempt would have been hurtful and discouraging to Alexander; and it was of the utmost consequence to him, to be freed from danger on that side. Hence the conferences at Abo; and this object, with visiting different places of his empire—animating his people, and encouraging them to resistance, and with his servants devising plans for continued and determined resistance to the proud invader, occupied the time of Alexander; during which period Sir Francis Burdett had the hardihood to charge him with shutting himself up in his palace, safe from the din of war, and far from the miseries of his people!*

In the meantime, the sufferings and privations of the people in Russia, brought upon them by their firmness and patriotism, called forth, in a lively manner, the sympathies of the people of Great Britain. On the 17th December, a message was brought down from the Prince Regent, to both houses of Parliament, requesting them to take into their consideration, the propriety of granting a sum of money for the relief of the Russian people, who had lost their all by the French invasion. This message was eagerly taken into consideration, and the sum of £200,000 granted, without any serious opposition. It was indeed, opposed by Mr. Whitbread, with this sneering observation, that we ought first to relieve our starving manufacturers; and by Sir Francis Burdett, in his usual style, on the grounds, that such a demand was an *insult* to the people of Great Britain. By the people of Great Britain, who were insulted by this message, Sir Francis, no doubt, meant those people, who like himself, beheld no magnanimity in the character of Alexander, who shut himself up in his palace, safe from the perils of war,

* "And are we further to be called upon to admire the magnanimity of the Emperor Alexander, because *safe* himself from the perils of war, and *untouched* by the hand of famine; *retired in his palace*, he bore with unequalled fortitude the misfortunes of his subjects. The appeal, Sir, will find many hearts in this House which will not vibrate to it."—Sir Francis Burdett's Speech, House of Commons, Dec. 5d, 1812. The greater shame that there should have been any bosoms, either in that House or out of it, that did not vibrate to such an appeal. A bivouaque at the Berezina, or a retirement to Elba, was the proper station for such bosoms. These would have taught them to vibrate in the quæse of truth, honour, and justice.

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and untouched by the hand of famine; and those people who, with him, beheld nothing but barbarity and atrocity in the character of the Russian people, and the sacrifices they made. "I gladly," says he, "turn my eyes from a scene where I find nothing to admire, and every thing to shrink from; where a barbarous people, dead to one of the most sacred feelings which animate the bosom of man, brandish the torch, and desolate that unhappy land, which they ought to protect or perish in the attempt."* Sir Francis Burdett's ideas must be different from those of other men, if he could see nothing to admire in the character of the Russian people, or noble in the sacrifices and exertions which they made. No senator of Bonaparte, or child of revolutionary France, ever said more—ever said so much; Sir Francis mistook the place where this speech was delivered—it should have been in Paris, not in London. How such a demand was an insult to this country, was an assertion which Sir Francis Burdett might make; but which was beyond the power of his crooked logic to explain. The very reverse of such aspersions is the fact. In considering the admirable proclamations and dispatches of the Russian Sovereign and his Generals, these come home to every honourable and noble feeling in the human bosom. In reviewing their patriotism, their courage, and their perseverance, and last, their humble dependence upon, and grateful acknowledgments for Divine aid and assistance, the mind which is not bound in ignorance, and warped by prejudice, beyond the common lot of man—which is not dead to every feeling, which mankind have hitherto accounted honourable, must, in the conduct of the whole Russian Empire, see every thing to admire, and nothing to shrink from. With regard to Mr. Whitbread, it seemed to be his business to refuse to see, that what the Russians had done, was the most certain way for our manufacturers to obtain relief; that Russian patriotism, and courage had broken that gigantic arm, which had long been the only cause of their sufferings. Every battle which was fought in Russia, was also the battle of Great Britain; for it was principally to

* Sir Francis Burdett's Speech, House of Commons, December 3d, 1812.










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secure her destruction that every one of these battles were fought. If Alexander had yielded to the demands of Bonaparte, manufacturers and labourers would not have been the only sufferers which would have been found in Great Britain. The people, however, of Great Britain, were of a very different opinion from these gentlemen. They not only applauded the conduct of their representatives, for bestowing that sum out of the public purse, but they cheerfully opened their private purses, for the relief of so much misery, and such invincible patriotism. Large sums were raised throughout the country, and remitted to Russia, where these were received with the deepest gratitude, by the Russian Sovereign and his subjects. On their minds, and his in a particular manner, it made a deep and a lasting impression. "The sympathy and cordiality manifested on this occasion, by the subjects of Great Britain, to his people has made a deep and satisfactory impression on the mind of Alexander, which *never can be effaced*."* He eagerly solicited the British minister to communicate this to his Sovereign and to his country. And was all this nothing? Independent of the charity in a worthy cause, one expression of gratitude from the lips of Alexander was worth it all. The remembrance of it can never be effaced. No! Political quarrels may arise—Alexander may be our foe. But him, nor his people, can never seek to overthrow our independence, or pursue us with that rancorous and destructive hostility, which France and her rulers, have done. No! our conduct, on this occasion, exalted the British character in the eyes of the Russian nation. It relieved the pressing want of thousands, whose sufferings and whose losses rendered our prosperity and safety doubly secure; and it afforded, at this moment, such a contrast between our conduct and character, when compared to that of France, as can never be forgotten in Russia—in a few words, "*which can never be effaced*."

Of the miseries and hardships, which millions of the population of Russia endured, we can hardly form an adequate idea. Every thing that a large proportion of them had, was either destroyed by their own hands, or wasted by the enemy: so com-

* Cathcart's dispatch, Kalisch, March 6th, 1813.

battles were fought. Bonaparte, manufacturing sufferers which the people, however, on from these generations of their representative purse, but they the relief of so much the sums were raised Russia, where these the Russian Sovereign his in a particular oppression. "The occasion, by the made a deep and under, which *never* British minister to his country. And variety in a worthy lips of Alexander never be effaced. or may be our foe. overthrow our iniquitous and destructive done. No! our character in the pressing want of resources rendered our afforded, at this act and character, never be forgotten in the effaced."

ions of the population an adequate idea. and, was either defeated by the enemy: so com-

plete was the destruction, that, from an account lately published at Paris, by an officer who belonged to the Imperial guard, nothing was left, either for food or shelter, to the rear of the enemy's army. When, during the day, they saw, at a distance, the steeple of the village church—when, during those weary nights of misery and horror, they heard its clock strike the hours, they were cheered with the hope, if not of food, at least of shelter from the bitter blast—vain expectation—they came to the spot, and found the steeple standing amidst smoking ashes. Such were the scenes, occasioned by the enemy himself, even to the gates of Vienna. When it is said that the country, from Moscow to the Niemen, was rendered a desert, it is but few who consider the extent of the mischief. It is, no doubt, conceived to be something of great magnitude; but the distance from us drowns, in some degree, the voice of the sorrow which there covers the country with mourning; and prevents us from appreciating clearly the terrific nature of the picture exhibited to our view. When, however, the people of Great Britain are informed that the distance from the Niemen, at Kowno, to Moscow, is 700 miles, or equal to the distance from the Pentland Firth to the Straits of Dover; and when it is considered, that throughout all this distance, for many miles in breadth, (in some places 100,) the country was rendered a desert, and a population, perhaps double the number of all the inhabitants of Scotland, or equal to that of Ireland, were stripped of their clothes, of their food, of their houses, and, in a word, of their all, at the commencement of a northern winter, then may any inhabitant of this happy land, appreciate the mischief in its true extent—then may even Sir Francis Burdett, and his callous followers, allow that the case demanded not only our pity, but our assistance. Let us attend to the account of the arch destroyer himself. He seldom errs far in his account of destruction. There he is in his element—there he is at home. "Four thousand villages, says he, and 50 towns, in the finest parts of the Russian Empire, were reduced to ashes."* All the detached houses, of

* Bonaparte's Speech to the Senate, February 14th, 1813.

every description, upon the line of his retreat, we are informed by both Russian and French authority, were completely consumed. In several of these towns the population amounted to 10, and even to 15,000. Amongst these were Maloyaroslavitz, Viasma, Smolensk, Orscha, Polotzk, and many others. In Moscow alone, there were 200,000; who, according to the enemy's 26th bulletin, wandered in the adjacent woods, dying with hunger, and came upon the ruins to look for some scraps and garden stuffs, to live upon. Around the environs of Moscow, and within the distance of 20 leagues, the 26th bulletin informs us, there were no fewer than 2000 villages, and as many country houses. Though most of these escaped destruction, yet every thing in them, or around them, fit for the use of man, was destroyed. "The fire of Moscow, says the enemy, consumed the labour and cares of four generations." The picture, which he here exhibits, is drawn by the hand of a master. It is, no doubt, correct; and what a sum of human suffering does the most cursory glance impress upon the mind of the observer. Yet, were these loyal and patient sufferers described as *barbarians*, who possessed not one quality to admire; and their Sovereign stigmatized as having shut himself up snug in his palace, thoughtless of their griefs and insensible of their wrongs. Posterity will load with reproach the memory of the Briton, who at this moment, with contrary evidence of the strongest kind before his eyes, could utter such sentiments as these.

But, to return again to our narrative; on the side of Riga, the enemy, who held the town of Frederickstadt, from whence he made inroads into both Livonia and Pskov, was dislodged from the same, on the 16th November, by 3000 men under the command of Lieutenant General Lewes, and Major Jalistratow, &c. After an obstinate resistance, in which the enemy lost a considerable number of men, killed and wounded, and an ineffectual attempt, by Macdonald to relieve it, the place was captured with the garrison, consisting of 800 Bavarians, and all that part of the country cleared of the enemy. The river Dwina being now frozen, and it, with the morasses

* Bonaparte's Speech to the Senate, February 14th, 1813.

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in front of the Russian positions, by that means rendered pas-
 sable for cavalry; Macdonald took advantage of this circum-
 stance, to pass over a force, in order to secure his right flank,
 hem the Russians close into Riga, and also harass the rear of
 the troops before it, now commanded by the Marquis of Paluce-
 ei. After severe actions on the 15th and 16th, in the latter of
 which the enemy lost 400 killed and wounded, he was foiled in
 his intentions. The Russian loss in these affairs was nearly
 400 men killed and wounded. These were the last efforts of
 the enemy at this place. Macdonald, who lingered some-
 time longer before Riga, in the same state of stupor in which
 his master had lain at Moscow, learning, at length, the
 sorrowful and alarming tidings of the miserable fate of the
 grand army, and of every thing that was advancing to its
 assistance, conceived it full time to consult his safety. He
 fled from Riga in all haste, and took the direction of Til-
 sit upon the Niemen. As eager as his master, to secure
 his personal safety, he left the Prussian troops, in his rear, ex-
 posed to the attack of any Russian force which might be follow-
 ing them. On the 26th, he arrived in the neighbourhood of
 Tilsit, and found it in the possession of the Russians. Their
 advanced parties, however, under General Kutusoff, consisting
 principally of light cavalry and Cossacks, were unable to oppose
 his march, and they, in consequence, fell back upon Wittgen-
 stein's force, which was rapidly advancing to their assistance.
 In the meantime, however, the road being left open, Macdon-
 al took advantage of it, and fled in all haste towards Konings-
 berg, with only 5000 men.* The advance of Wittgenstein in-
 tercepted the retreat of the Prussian troops, under General
 D'York, who very readily entered into a convention with the
 Russians, to desist from all hostilities, and remain in safety
 till "subsequent events, the consequence of negotiations which
 are to take place between the Belligerent powers, will decide
 their future fate."†

The friends and admirers of Napoleon affected not to under-

* Kutusoff's Journal from 4th to 10th January, 1813.

† D'York's Letter to Macdonald, Tauroggen, December 30th, 1812.

stand the meaning and intentions of this convention; but Bonaparte knew it well; it filled him with rage and anguish. The issue of the Russian campaign was beginning to make its appearance in consequences that could not be mistaken, and which staggered the resolution of the keenest votaries of French invincibility. The treachery of General D'York filled the mouths of the French orators with fine subjects of threats and declamations, in order to call forth the passions of the French people. England was stated to be the agent which had occasioned this mischief. A conscription of 350,000 men was demanded to punish this treachery, and to guard against any other.* It was the effect of this example which alarmed him most. He knew that he was no longer the same object of terror that he was six months before at Gumbinnen; and though Regnaud de St. Jean de Angley laboured with all his servility, and oratorical flattery, to convince Europe that he was so, a very large portion began to question the truth of D'Angle's assertions. "By that genius, says D'Angle, which has accustomed France to conquer, the enemy, forced from all his posts, repulsed in every combat, vanquished in every battle, has been forced to abandon his capital to the victor; but he gave it to the flames, which have almost reduced it to ashes. From thence the necessity of this *glorious retreat*; a retreat wherein we have not been detained, nor disheartened by the asperity of the climate, the early severity of the season, and its unusual rigour. When the 29th bulletin of the grand army shall at once astonish and reassure France, the information of its losses unveiled to the nation, with so much energetic simplicity—with such a manly confidence—will awaken in all Frenchmen a feeling of the necessity of repairing them," &c. Branding D'York with every thing that was infamous, the orator continued. "but our forces, our means, and our military resources are immense. *Exteriorly* Austria, and our other allies, shew themselves affectionate and faithful." But yet, they may do as D'York has done. Therefore, "it is necessary to re-unite proportionate resources, even superior to the dangers which prudence discovers. That which was yesterday sufficient for

* Conservative Senate—Bassano's Report, January 9th, 1813.

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the security of government, is to-day found to be deficient in foresight. New events have created new wants; unforeseen conjunctures require unexpected sacrifices. The manœuvres and intrigues of England have, over the Continent, fortified and raised up "numerous societies, under the names of *truth of nature*, &c. &c. or under other titles less ridiculous, preaching hatred, insurrection, and disobedience against every Sovereign, the friend of France, of Peace, of the Continent."* Yes, England, under the name of truth and the language of nature, continued, without fear, to speak her sentiments to the world. "She had saved herself by her firmness," and both D'Anglely and his master *interiorly* knew, that she would "save Europe by her example."

Meanwhile the Emperor Alexander had left Petersburg, and arrived at Wilna. His presence there, he conceived necessary, to quiet the fears of the inhabitants, and to preserve them from any harsh measures which might otherwise have been taken against them. But, even before his arrival, Poland was freed from alarm. "Fear not, says Kutusoff, even though false conceptions and a momentary delusion have seduced some among you, their future conduct may yet erase their faults; for the compassion of his Imperial Majesty, my most gracious Lord, is boundless; and as for me, who am for ever bound by happy ties to the province I have formerly governed, to me it gives new life, to be by Providence appointed the organ of so much good."† No Davoust's or Vandamme's, no Soult's nor Suchet's, were to be found in the Russian army, to cover Wilna with scaffolds, or her people with mourning. Oblivion and forgiveness were the words of Alexander. In his presence Poland shook off her fears, and raised her hands to bless him. The presence of the Russian Sovereign and his brave Generals, diffused joy and gladness where fear and consternation reigned before. Wilna became a scene of rejoicing and festivity. The Russian Generals, and their troops, received the well merited and sincere thanks of a grateful Sovereign. Re-

* D'Anglely's Address, Senate, January 14th, 1813.

† Kutusoff's Proclamation, Molodetschina, December 8th.

wards and honours were heaped upon them all. Kutusoff was raised to the rank of a Prince of the Russian Empire, by the title of Prince Kutusoff Smolensko. He was also decorated with the military order of St. George, by the hand of his august Sovereign. But that was not all. The Emperor, to shew still more his gratitude, and to commemorate to latest posterity the deliverance of his country, which this gallant General had achieved, took from his Imperial diadem the brightest gem it contained, and in its place substituted a small gold plate, on which was engraved the word *Kutusoff*. A greater tribute or higher honour the one could not pay, nor the other receive. Wittgenstein—the gallant Wittgenstein, was not only promoted to a higher rank in the army, but was raised to the rank of a Count. Wittgenstein had no fortune. Alexander knew it. Before he left Petersburgh, he gave a grand entertainment, in one of the Imperial palaces in the neighbourhood, to which the lady of this brave officer was invited. There, in the presence of the whole company, the Emperor declared that she was henceforward mistress of the palace, and every thing belonging to it, as a mark of gratitude from the Sovereign of that Empire, the Capital of which, the bravery of her husband had saved. Every one was rewarded in his station, for all had done their duty. By command of the Emperor a silver medal was struck, on which was engraven the ever memorable year 1812, and distributed to every Russian who was engaged in this campaign. “This year of glory, said the Emperor, is fled; but your heroic deeds will remain for ever. Suspended from a blue ribband, this honourable badge will ornament the manly breast, that impene-trable shield of our native land. The enemy must tremble when he beholds it. He will feel that under this silver shield, glows unconquerable valour, not leading to avarice or impiety; but which rests its firmest grounds in holy religion, and in the unmixed love of our country.”*

Though now the depth of the severest winter which had been known for many years, the Russian army continued to advance. The greatest part of the army crossed the Niemen, part march-

* Alexander's Proclamation, February 17th, 1813.

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ing upon Warsaw, and part upon Insterburgh and Konigs-
 berg. The French army, if such it could be called, including
 the reinforcements which had at different times joined, or ra-
 ther were joining it, fled before them. At Koningsberg, and its
 neighbourhood, near 9000 men were made prisoners. On the
 6th January, this city, the capital of East Prussia, fell into the
 hands of the Russians. Soon after Marienwerder, Elbing, &c.
 shared the same fate, glad to be relieved from their oppressors.
 Wherever the Russians came they were welcomed with un-
 feigned joy, and received as deliverers. Along the whole line
 of their advance, they continued to make many prisoners.
 From the 25th December to the date of passing the Vistula, up-
 on the 13th Jan. upwards of 40,000 men had been taken. The
 Austrian force had abandoned, or were abandoning in all haste
 the Duchy of Warsaw, and taking up their quarters in Galli-
 cia. Regnier, with the Saxons and Poles, and what Frenchmen
 remained of his corps, also fled from that Duchy, and took the
 direction of Posen. Leaving a force before the fortified towns,
 the Russian army advanced across the Vistula, without any
 thing to oppose them. Arrived at Posen, Murat resigned the
 command of the French army into the hands of the Viceroy,
 "who possessed the entire confidence of the Emperor, and who
 was more accustomed to a grand administration."* A grand
 administration it was, with a vengeance, where there was nought
 to administer. A king "of shreds and patches." The 29th
 bulletin had informed us, that before the arrival of the French
 fugitives at Wilna, and five weeks previous to this period, it
 was with the greatest difficulty, that they could muster 600
 horses in the whole army, to form a *sacred squadron* of four
 troops of 150 men each, to guard the person of the Emperor.
 Kutusoff's Journal of the 6th January, also informs us, that at
 that date, only about 1500 men remained of the Imperial
 Guards, who had suffered less than any other part of the ar-
 my. It was obvious, therefore, that the administration of the
 affairs of the French army would not be a difficult task. The
 truth was, that Murat marched home with all speed, lest, in the

* Moniteur, Paris, January 26th.

meantime, the Russian *cold* should have reached to Naples; and lest England, whose spirit was felt wherever the billows flowed, should have also scattered societies, "under the names of *truth and nature*," &c. on the coasts of Naples, as she had done on those of Germany. The French Marshals, one by one, made their appearance in Paris; and some of them, viz. Davoust, Ney, and the Viceroy, having nothing else to do, took up the pen to contradict, point blank, the Petersburg Gazette, and the pithy dispatches of Kutusoff and Platoff, which recorded the defeat and surrender of their different divisions. Nothing now remained to oppose the advance of the Russian armies through the kingdom of Prussia. Leaving them for a short time employed in this manner, and organizing plans of the greatest importance, let us turn our attention, for a moment, to collect into a short compass and connected form, the leading features, the mighty consequences, and the terrible losses occasioned by the campaign now closed.

In the commencement of the account of this campaign, I endeavoured to state the strength of the French army led against Russia, and it will be seen, from the subsequent tables, that it has not been exaggerated. I shall here only alter Victor's reserve from 45 to 50,000 men, as it more probably amounted to the latter than the former. This will give for the whole force led against Russia, 620,000 men. From a paper found at Moscow, in the house of Messrs. Thomson, Rowan, and Co. British bankers, which was occupied as the *Chancellerie de l'Etat Major* of the French army, at the head of which was Berthier, it appears that the total strength of the French army was 616,500 men. This number is 1,500 more than the number stated in the beginning of this work, and 3,500 less than I now state it. The authenticity of the paper was not doubted. Indeed it is proven to be correct, from the accounts of the losses which it states the French army sustained, which correspond with the Russian accounts to a great degree of accuracy, as will be seen in the references accompanying the tables. It also agrees with the tables I have made out, in the leading particulars, viz. in the total strength—in the number of Poles, viz. 60,000; and in the number engaged at Borodino, viz. 180,000, with other

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passages; but as the tables I have annexed were made out and published near 12 months before that paper appeared, I have adhered to my own mode of arrangement. The difference of the strength of the respective corps, as stated in it, from what I have made them, may easily be accounted for, as during the operations of the campaign these would be augmented or lessened as circumstances and situations demanded; nor do I wish to build the accounts of the strength of the French army upon that document, but merely to point it out as confirming and coinciding with every other document. It may also be remarked, as a further proof of the accuracy of the tables from which I have founded my reckoning, that while these state the force at 615, or say 620,000 men, that the paper referred to makes it 616,500, while the calculation from the number of troops to be furnished by treaty for the Northern war, as far as these were known, and where wanting from the number, in proportion to the population of the respective countries, gives, in one case, about 600,000; and in another computation, from the corps employed with auxilliary troops, 625,000; and deducting the number under the head followers, as we should do, the Journal de Paris makes the number 640,000. The total number of troops, therefore, and other persons necessary to supply and attend to their wants, may fairly be taken at 620,000.

As it is of the utmost importance to ascertain, as exactly as possible, the amount of this army, the largest ever led to destruction, I have endeavoured to pay every attention thereto, and to advance nothing lightly concerning it. It may be necessary here to observe, that by the number 50,000, which I include under the head of followers, I mean every one that belongs to an army, except infantry and cavalry, viz. artillerymen, pioneers, commissariat, drivers, medical staff, attendants of all descriptions, &c. &c. Besides these, the force with which Bonaparte passed the Niemen, at first was 100,000 men. A proclamation from Prince Schwartzenberg, who must have known exactly the number, expressly states this as the effective force. Victor and Augereau's reserves, amounting to 110,000, followed, which made 510,000 effective men, infantry and cavalry, which entered Russia. In this statement I am borne out

by the following proclamation of the Emperor Alexander, dated Wilna, January 6th, 1812: "From 20 different nations, flushed with success, *half a million of soldiers, infantry and cavalry*, accompanied by 1500 cannon, entered *our territory*." In that territory the enemy was reinforced by, at least 60,000 Poles, according to his own official statements, and it is probable that the number was much greater, as the ministers of the grand Duchy of Warsaw, in an address to the king of Saxony, dated Warsaw, December 1st, 1812, expressly declare, that during that year, to that date, they had raised in that Duchy *alone*, 78,800 men for the grand army; of these, 25,000 were only called out on the 14th November. I have stated the number of *effective* French troops carried into Russia at 305,000 men, and in this I am also borne out by the very first authority. The Crown Prince, in a proclamation dated Oranienburgh, August 15th, 1813, says, "Misfortunes against which he (Bonaparte), did not deign to provide, fell upon their heads, and 300,000 *Frenchmen perished* upon the territory of a Great Empire, &c."

Where the number of killed is mentioned in the Russian dispatches, without stating the wounded, I have estimated the latter in the proportion of three to one. In this I have followed the authority of the enemy himself, who expressly states, his loss at Borodino to have been 10,000, of which *two thirds were wounded*; and although he underrated that loss, in the proportion of six to one, yet he was perfectly correct in the proportion between the killed and wounded; for the paper referred to, as found at Moscow, which makes the loss about 60,000, expressly states two thirds as the proportion between the killed and wounded; and the Russian accounts, which state his loss at 60,000, estimate by the same proportion, both in the loss of the enemy and in their own. At Smolensk, Bonaparte estimates the proportion at four to one, I have chosen three to one as the fairest average throughout the campaign; and in which I include only those who were severely wounded, and thereby obliged to leave the service for some time; and not the numbers, who, though they were wounded, yet were so in such a slight degree, as not to deprive the army

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at least 60,000 and it is probable that the ministers of the king of Saxony, declare, that during the Duchy alone, 5,000 were only added to the number at 305,000 men, the first authority.

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At Smolensk, one, I have cho- throughout the cam- were severely service for some y were wounded, deprive the army

of their services. In the Russian campaign, the number wounded were fewer in proportion than in any other, because the actions were of the most murderous description, and the combatants fought hand to hand, and not with distant cannonading, or long range of musquetry. In the Russian returns also, are not included the numbers either of the sick or wounded which were taken prisoners; in almost every dispatch, the former is expressly excepted: these must have been great, and we know from many dispatches were great, and from the situation of this army, and the sufferings it underwent, 30,000 is certainly not too much to allow for this number, as being either taken by the Russians, or that perished from this cause. Indeed, but very few of those taken could survive the diseases brought upon them, by the extreme hardships and miseries which they had undergone. The number of troops who were not upon the sick list, but who were cut off by the excessive rigours of the season, cold and hunger alone, was very great, and cannot be estimated at less than 45,000. It has already been shewn, that from accounts published by an officer of the enemy's army who was present, that he, even at the time he wrote, under the iron sway of Bonaparte, admitted a loss in this way of 30,000, between Smolensk and Wilna alone. With these observations, I shall now proceed to shew in a short compass, the enormous losses sustained by the enemy, and also the authority from which I have taken it. The Russian accounts are borne out by the most unquestionable and irresistible evidence, and it is only astonishing, considering every circumstance, that they have been able to be so accurate:—

Abstract of French loss from Russian accounts.

Main army under Bonaparte,.....	240,000
Lost till battles at Smolensk,.....	18,200
Do. at battles of Smolensk, ...	20,000*
	38,200
Carry over	201,800

* By French documents found at Moscow, the loss was, viz.: In the attack upon Smolensk; 10 Generals killed or wounded; 3 superior officers of the staff; 11

Brought over, ...	201,800
Left at do. and on the Dneiper, under Dombrowski	20,000*
	20,000
Left Smolensk, ...	181,800
Lost from Valentina to Borodino, ...	1,300
	180,500†
Lost at Borodino, (Kutusoff's dispatch, 11th Sept.)	60,000‡
	120,500§
Effective force carried to Moscow, ...	

Colonels: 23 Lieut. Colonels; 2 Majors; 402 officers and subalterns; 13,592 serjeants and privates—Total 14,042.

Battle of Valentina—1 General of Division killed; 4 Generals of Brigade killed or wounded; 8 officers of the General Staff; 316 officers; 8422 serjeants and privates—Total 8,751. Grand total at both places 22,794.

The French force round Smolensk, was 222,000. The 13th bulletin, as has already been noticed, inadvertently admits this, and the following article confirms it. Paris. Sept. 2d, "More than 200,000 men have passed the Dwina between Polotzk and Witepsk. The Emperor is with this army. Another considerable corps under the Prince of Ekmuhl has passed the Dneiper at Mogilheff."

* *Journal de l'Empire*, Oct. 17th, "There is in Lithuania, a Polish corps of 15,000 infantry, and 4000 cavalry, opposing the Russian General D'Oertill, about Bobrinsk, &c.

† By French documents found at Moscow, there were engaged at Borodino viz.

Infantry, ...	145,000
Cavalry, ...	53,000
Horse Cannoniers,	2,000
Foot do.	2,500

180,500

‡ Lost in the Battles of Borodino, according to documents found at Moscow. Battle of the 5th—1 General of Brigade; 2 Colonels; 6 officers of the General Staff; 45 officers; 4341 serjeants and privates—Total 4395.

Battle of the 7th—17 Generals of Division; 23 Generals of Brigade, 57 Colonels; 14 Majors; 105 Chiefs of battalion and squadron; 17 officers of the General Staff; 1367 subaltern officers; 50,876 privates—Total 52,475. Grand total, 56,870. The grand total at Borodino and Smolensk, by these accounts, is 79,664. The Russian accounts make it 80,000, being only 336 above the other!!

§ The papers of the French Commissary General, who was taken prisoner, stated the number provisioned at Moscow, to have been 120,000, efficient men. Lord Cathcart's dispatch, Petersburg, November 11th.

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Brought forward, ...	120,000
Lost till abandoning of Moscow, ...	33,000*
Carried from Moscow, ...	87,500†
Reinforced by part of Victor's Reserves, ...	35,000
Do. by polish levies, ...	40,000‡
Remain to dispose of from Moscow to Krasnoi, ...	162,000
Lost from Moscow till Ney's defeat, ...	105,000
	57,000
Wounded recovered and rejoined till Krasnoi, ...	20,000§
	77,000
Lost by sickness, fatigue, and cold, till same date,	35,000
Remained after battles of Krasnoi, ...	42,000
Reinforced by remains of Dombrowski's corps, ...	16,000
Do. do. Oudinot's and Victor's, ...	35,000
Carry over, ...	93,000

* Petersburg Gazette, Oct 23d. The occupation of Moscow had, to the date of the latest accounts from it, cost Bonaparte 30,000 men. At Petersburg, at that time, they had not heard of the battle of the Nara, nor of many skirmishes before the evacuation of the capital.—The Russian Gazette, stated his loss at 1000 men per day, upon an average, for the period he held Moscow.

† Lord Cathcart's dispatch, Nov. 11th, states, the force at this time, to have been 85,000 *effective* men.

‡ The Polish levies from the time raised, could scarcely have reached Moscow, but they must have joined, and were marching to join (see Russian Journal from 3d till the 13th October,) the different parts of the army around Smolensk, and beyond it; and consequently these, or an equal number of Victor and Dombrowski's corps must have remained to join the Grand army in its retreat.

§ The 24th bulletin says, "all our wounded had left Smolensk, Minak, and Mogilheff. A great number are restored and have rejoined their corps." Before that the wounded must have exceeded 100,000. Those wounded in the retreat must have perished or been taken.

|| The number lost by sickness, fatigue, and the severity of the cold, previous to the battle of Krasnoi, could not have been less. A great number of the sick were taken in Moscow, private accounts say 15,000. In the hospitals at Mojaisk, 150 died daily, and the Russian dispatches gave no enumeration of these.

Brought forward,.....	93,000
Followers of all descriptions added to the ranks, &c.	50,000*
Collected from Krasnoi to the Berezina, ...	143,000
Lost from Krasnoi to the Berezina	57,000
	86,000
Suppose from Krasnoi to the Berezina, by cold, famine, sickness, and fatigue, ...	10,000†
Remain to meet Tchichagoff, ...	76,000‡
Lost at the Berezina in killed, wounded, and pri- soners alone, ...	20,000
	56,000
Reinforced by the Reserve under Augereau, ...	60,000
Force to dispose of from Berezina to the Vistula,	116,000
Lost from the Berezina to Wilna, ...	45,100
Sick in Wilna, ...	5,000
By cold, famine, and fatigue, ...	20,000§
	70,100
	45,900
Lost from Wilna to the Niemen, ...	10,000
	35,900
Carry over,.....	35,900

* These would be placed in the ranks, as their services in their different departments ceased; many of them, however, were artillerymen, &c. &c.

† I estimate this loss merely upon conjecture, but in proportion to the time and condition of the army, it could hardly be less.

‡ Tchichagoff's dispatch, Nov. 29th, says about 70,000 men, composed of troops who had not suffered much, and provided both with artillery and cavalry; with these there must have been sick, and followers of various descriptions.

§ Tchichagoff's dispatch, Dec. 11th, says, his army caused Bonaparte a loss of 30,000 men, from the Berezina to Wilna, *several thousands* of which only were prisoners. The Russian Journal from 8th to the 13th Dec. states the number of prisoners taken by him, at 8,000. A great part of the remainder must have been killed and wounded—the rest dead from the cold.

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Brought forward.....	93,900
Reinforced by remains of Macdonald's corps,.....	24,600
	60,500
Lost from the Niemen to the Vistula,.....	41,000*
Allow for cold, famine, and fatigue, do. do.	5,000†
	46,000
	14,500†
Remains of Schwartzenberg and Regnier's corps,	31,000§
Total remaining force, ...	45,500
Off these, deduct Austrians separated from the enemy, ...	21,000
Total remaining for the field, ...	24,500

Detached Corps.

Oudinot, &c. opposing Wittgenstein, ...	60,000
Add cavalry, ...	10,000
	70,000
Lost by French till 24th November, ...	50,000
Carry over, ...	20,000

* In this number is included 18,000 Prussians who capitulated. Macdonald's corps at that time, was stated in the French papers at 30,000. Russian Journal from 4th to 10th January, 1813, says, only 5,000 men of all descriptions remained with him at Tilsit; he was afterwards reinforced by Hennelet's division, 6,000 strong from Dantzic.

† For this I have no official data, but it must have been considerable.

‡ The number of fugitives which passed Koningsberg, westward, were 255 Generals; 669 Colonels; 4,440 Captains and Lieutenants; and 26,950 privates; about 6,000 of whom were wounded and sick—Total 32,314: but 11,000 were taken in Koningsberg, and between that town and the Vistula, and some of the remainder were of the latest reinforcements received from Germany.

§ Russian Journal from 20th to 30th Jan. 1813, states Regnier's corps, after being separated from the Austrians, at 6,000 Poles; 2,500 Saxons; and 1,500 French—Total 10,000.

Brought forward,.....	20,000
Reinforced by part of Victor's reserve, ...	15,000*
Remain to join main army, ...	35,000

Schwartzenberg and Regnier's corps in Volhynia,.....	60,000
Lost by Russian accounts, till 18th November, ...	29,000
Remain at time of separation,.....	31,000

Macdonald's corps before Riga, ...	30,000
Lost till Prussian defection,.....	5,400
Remain to join Grand army, ...	24,600

Dombrowski's corps on the Dnieper, &c.	20,000
Lost by Russian account till 1st November, ...	4,000
	16,000

General abstract of French forces led against Russia.

Total, ...	560,000
Poles deserters, ...	20,000
Do. Levies, ...	40,000†
Carry over,.....	620,000

* Wittgenstein's dispatch, Nov. 1st. after this period, all Victor's operations were directed in unison with the grand army.

† "Six regiments of infantry and four regiments of cavalry are just ordered to be raised in Lithuania," *6th Bulletin*. These Regiments, as afterwards mentioned, made a force of 18,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry. The Diet of Poland also on 26th Oct. decreed a new levy of 40,000. Further, *Leipsic, Nov. 14th*, 25,000 conscripts have just been ordered out in the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, 18,000 of whom will be ready to join the Grand army." *Paris papers*. In an address to the King

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Brought forward,.....	620,000
One fifth wounded rejoined, ...	20,000
Grand total, ...	640,000

General abstract of losses.

Killed and wounded,.....	278,500
Prisoners including Prussians,.....	221,000
Dead by cold, ...	40,000
Sick, taken, or dead, during the campaign,	35,000
Total loss,.....	574,500*

Remain.

Garrison of Dantzic, ...	20,000
Remains of united armies, ...	14,500
Do. of Regnier's corps,.....	10,000
Do. of Austrians, ...	21,000†
	640,000

Thus it appears, that out of the prodigious force of 620,000† effective men, with which the enemy had set out for the express purpose of conquering Russia, there only remained at the end of six months 65,000 men; of these 20,000 abandoned his

of Saxony, dated Warsaw, Dec. 1st. the ministers of that Duchy declared, that they had raised during that year, 78,000 men for the Grand army. So that the Polish levies are certainly here much underrated, as are the reinforcements also, which joined Bonaparte throughout Russian Poland, in this most disastrous campaign; and great as the losses were, there can hardly be a doubt but that these exceed the present estimate.

* Deducting 18,000 Prussians which capitulated, and the wounded which recovered and rejoined, the actual loss by the sword and the climate, is 554,000 men, in the short space of 6 months!!—

† The Austrians were probably more, as they received repeated reinforcements; but then, these if noticed at all, ought also to be enumerated in the total numbers led against Russia. According to the Vienna Gazette, Oct. 7th, four regiments of infantry and one of cavalry, by order of the Aulic Council, were ordered to march from Hungary, and join Schwartzberg; these must have been at least 10,000 men. Other reinforcements were also sent. The Prussians were also reinforced to their full complement. So that the loss of the troops under Macdonald, must have been greater than the Russian dispatches referred to, have stated it.

† "He has lost an army of half a million of experienced warriors,"—Wittgenstein's Proclamations, Berlin, March 16th, 1813.

cause, 20,000 were cooped up in Dantzic, and reinforced by 10,000 more, where they could be of little use, and only about 15,000 remained in the field to oppose the justly enraged armies of the Russian Empire; and even these remaining were disorganized, without clothing, food, ammunition, horses, or artillery, and worn down with fatigue, famine, and defeat, in the middle of a northern winter.

Suspicion has been attempted to be thrown upon the Russian returns of the losses sustained by the enemy. I cannot see wherein this is well founded, and would just ask which of the parties is most to be credited; whether is it the power which, in one instance in particular, acknowledges a loss of 40,000 men, as Russia did at Borodino, while at the same time she stated the loss of her antagonist at 60,000; or the other power, which, through the whole of this dreadful campaign, states his own loss at only 28,000, and rates that of his victorious antagonists at 217,000? It must be obvious to every person which of the parties is most to be depended upon, independent of the exact manner in which the different Russian accounts correspond with each other, and the whole united, with the force which was led against that Empire. Had the Russians intentionally begun a system of exaggeration in their returns, and carried it on as the enemy did, they would soon have far exceeded the number of the French led against them, whereas their accounts still come short of it. If from the commencement this system had been continued, and after all their returns had agreed, as we see they do, with the number which all accounts agree were led against them, and which remained at the end of the campaign, then, in the language of the *Journal de Paris*, "we must acknowledge that the Russians have strange combinations!" Very different were the accounts of the enemy, formed as those were, for the purpose of deception. By looking into his bulletins, it will be seen that, by the time he got to Moscow, he had destroyed the whole army which he allowed the Russians to have at the commencement of the campaign, while he had not lost a sixth part of his. He finished the army of his opponents at the time he concluded the campaign was closed; and, had the sun of Austerlitz not set at Borodino, his accounts

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would have been accounted perfectly correct. Of the numbers which perished, 300,000 were Frenchmen, and the remainder chiefly from Poland, Italy, and the states which formed the Confederation of the Rhine.

That the Russian accounts of the loss sustained by their enemies is as correctly stated as possible, the following is a convincing proof. But, first, it must be observed that all, or nearly all the dead in the various bloody battles, down to the date of the evacuation of Moscow, in October, were buried before the winter set in; and, therefore, cannot belong to the numbers in the following table. A commission was appointed, by the Russian government, in the different provinces where the enemy had passed in his retreat, to have the dead bodies collected and burnt, before the spring, to prevent pestilential diseases being engendered by their putrid remains. The Petersburg Gazette of the 20th April, 1813, contains the following official report, from the Governors of the different provinces, who were appointed for this purpose. The destruction of the dead bodies of men and horses, belonging to the enemy, which fell in battle, or perished with cold, and had not been committed to the earth, were at the respective dates and places, viz.

<i>Governments of</i>	<i>Date.</i>	<i>Men.</i>	<i>Horses.</i>
Moscow,.....	to 15th Feb.	49,754	27,849 burnt.
Kaluga, ...	to 11th March, ...	1,017	4,384 do.
Smolensk, ...	to 2d March, ...	71,735	51,430 do.
Minsk, ...	to 15th Jan.	18,797	2,746 do.
Do. remained, do.	do.	30,108	27,316 to be do.
Wilna, ...	to 5th March, ...	72,202	9,407 buried.
Total, ...		243,613	123,132

"Exclusive," continues the Gazette, "of many others, either burned or buried, of which no account was taken. The strictest measures were also taken for destroying, before the approach of spring, the dead bodies that were afterwards found in the rivers or woods." No doubt many more were afterwards found, when the snows were dissolved, and the rivers free from ice.

Those found in the government of Minsk, were, principally, round the fatal banks of the Berezina—what havoc and ruin! In turning our attention, for a moment to the above document, we find it confirmed in a striking manner, by the accounts of the enemy himself. For instance, the number of horses found dead in the government of Smolensk, was 51,000. The 28th bulletin says, in a few days, at the beginning of the cold, they lost 3000 horses from its severity; and the 29th, that in a few days more the loss was 80,000 more, all in the government of Smolensk. The dead bodies found in the province of Moscow, were all those who fell in the destructive combats round that city, at the river Nara and Maloyaroslavitz, &c. Those in the government of Smolensk were those which perished from the first effects of the cold, and all the destructive battles, from that of Viasma to those of Krasnoi. Those in the government of Minsk, from the loss after the assembling of all the reserves, which formed a new and better equipped army, and which fell at the Berezina, and in the advance to it; and those in the government of Wilna, were the numbers cut off during the awful retreat through that government, which has been already described.

We are, however, told by those who decry every effort that has been made against tyranny and oppression, that the Russian accounts are falsehoods, because these say that they have destroyed more than was in the whole French army, and still a strong force remained. But that is said only by those who set down the force of the enemy at 300,000 men, when, in fact, it was double; and which, if those men would attend unto the statements of the enemy himself, was more than double, and which, before Russia entered into the contest, was fully believed and loudly echoed. "What madness and folly to resist a power which has one million of men in arms," say these people; but once resist him, and beat them, and then what a trifle; they immediately find out he had scarcely 250,000 men!

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ed 80,000 more than they do state to have been destroyed, or that the climate, sickness, and fatigue had done so for them, still their accounts are correct; and allowing that these equalled all the effective force which entered their territories at first, and that after all a considerable force remained; still that does not invalidate their statements, because 40 or 50,000 men must have followed this immense army, for various purposes, and who, as their services became unnecessary in their different departments, would be compelled to fall into the ranks, and make up for the numbers of the regular forces which were lost. Besides all this, the annexed notes will shew that, independent of the vast force at first marched into Russia, the enemy must have received very considerable re-enforcements.*

* *Florence, May 8th*.—"11,027 infantry and 1,517 cavalry, Neapolitan troops, passed this place for the grand army."—*French Papers*.

Leipsic, July 16.—"Numerous forces are traversing at this moment the country between the Oder and Vistula, for the armies."—*Moniteur*.

Paris, Aug. 11.—"We are informed a re-enforcement of 20,000 Austrian troops have arrived at Tomassow in Poland."—*French Papers*.

"Within these eight days the 9th regiment French infantry, 14th hussars, 3000 Piedmontaise, and 5000 other men have passed through Strasburgh; 20,000 more are expected, who are to embark upon the Rhine, and afterwards march for the grand army."—*Abeille du Nord, Aug. 4*.

Berg, Aug. 20.—"Within these last eight days, 10,500 men have passed this town as re-enforcements to the grand army."—*Journal de l'Empire, Sept. 8*.

Berlin, Aug. 25.—"We daily see arrive and depart from hence French and Allied troops."—*Moniteur*.

Dresden, Aug. 26.—"The passage of French and Allied troops through the Saxon territory for the grand army, has lately been very considerable. During some weeks more than 16,000 have passed, among whom were Swiss and Neapolitans. Some Saxon regiments, which were in different garrisons in our kingdom, have likewise set out."—*French Papers*.

Wilna, Sept. 20.—"Troops to complete the different corps pass through this place daily. We have seen within these ten days, 19,000 pass."—*Journal de l'Empire, October 17*.

Vienna, Oct. 7.—"By order of the Aulic Council, four regiments infantry and one of cavalry, are ordered to march to re-enforce our armies in Poland."—*Vienna Gazette*.

Warsaw, Oct. 12.—"We every day see re-enforcements proceeding to the army of Prince Schwartzberg. Marshal the duke of Castiglione's corps has marched for Wilna, where it will not be long in arriving."—*Moniteur, 28th and 29th Oct*.

Nor has the brute creation escaped this awful scourge of human ambition; at least 190,000 horses for cavalry and other purposes, must have accompanied this vast army, almost all, if not all, of which must have perished. M. Montesquieu, in his *Exposé* of the state of France for 1814, states, that the campaigns of 1812 and 1813, in the North of Europe, cost France alone 230,000 horses. What must it have cost the other na-

Warsaw, Oct. 17.—"Yesterday 5000 men passed for the grand army—every day some pass."—*French Papers.*

Posen, Oct. 18th.—"On the 14th and 15th we have again seen 3414 men, and also several regiments pass for the army."—*Paris Papers.*

Warsaw, Oct. 21.—"Troops from Castiglione's army are daily arriving."—*They continue their march without stopping*" to re-enforce Prince Schwartzberg, who will soon be superior to the enemy.—*French Papers.*

Warsaw, Nov. 2.—"On the 4th we shall have 20,000 men, 12,000 of whom will be French. General Loison is to join his reserve to the Duke of Tarentum."—*French Papers.*

"8000 Bavarians are on their march to join the grand army. They pass through Saxony and Silesia."—*Journal de Paris, Nov. 14.*

Leipsic, Nov. 14.—"10,000 Bavarian troops have passed through Saxony, to join General Wrede (on the Dwina.) *Exclusive of the first contingent of the Saxon army, 20,080 men, and Prince Maximilian's regiment of infantry, all under the Duke of Castiglione, there has been sent two regiments of infantry, one regiment of cavalry, and four hundred artillerymen. Several thousand recruits, raised in Saxony, are always ready to march and supply deficiencies; the last transport of 10,000 marched on the 7th October, to join the 7th corps.*"—*French Papers and various others, too tedious to mention.*

Thus according to the statements of the enemy himself, as already enumerated, 100,000 men must have joined him at different periods, independent of the vast armies he set out with.

The *Journal de Paris*, December 17, says, "They write from Wilna, Warsaw, &c. that the divisions of Durette, Lagrange, &c. &c. united, form 120,000 men of reinforcements, upon the Niemen; and which, joined to the 2d, 9th, and 10th corps, together with the Saxons and Austrians, presents a mass of imposing strength, and renders the grand army much superior in number to what it was at the commencement of the campaign."

I shall not dispute the amount of those re-enforcements, very probably correct, but beg to call the reader's attention to the words in *Italics*, as shewing the true state of that once mighty French army; only the remnant of three corps, with the remains of the Saxons and Austrians, were then to be found of it. Not a word is said of any of the others. What a different army this, to that which the same paper boasted, stood nearly on the same ground in April preceding!

tions under her controul? perhaps as many, and the greater proportion of these were lost in Russia.

To have bestowed upon the vast number of men above-mentioned, the usual quantity of animal food allowed to an army, from the 22d June, the date of the 2d bulletin, till the 2d September, a week after they entered Moscow, (in all 13 weeks,) and which we may fairly presume, they did get until that period pretty regularly, would require 14,000 bullocks, and 220,000 sheep; add to this the numbers wantonly destroyed that perished for want, and what the opposing army must have consumed, and see what a sum of devastation!

The quantity of provisions and expences for the same time, without counting any thing for the periods before or after, must have been enormous. For these 13 weeks alone it would require 70,000,000 lbs. of bread, 25,000,000 lbs. of corn, and 44,000,000 lbs. wine and groceries, for the troops: 133,000,000 lbs. corn, and 205,000,000 lbs. hay, for the horses and cattle. To this add artillery, carriages, powder, musket and cannon balls, (60,000 of the latter were spent in one day, by one army, at Borodino alone,) all of which were brought by the invader from the rear, as the Russians destroyed every thing they could not carry away, and the whole expence of this campaign, on the part of the enemy, will form a sum altogether incredible, and perhaps exceeding £50,000,000 sterling.

In the short space of six (we may almost say four) months, we have seen the finest, best appointed, and most numerous army the world ever saw, swept from the face of the earth; for, with the exception of a few of the principal officers, not a vestige of the original army remained. Even of those taken prisoners very few could survive, except to drag on a short period of wretchedness and misery; and thus, from the banks of the Niemen to the mournful spot where Moscow stood, above 600,000 human beings have bit the dust in a few months; and half that number of the most valuable part of the brute creation cover those fatal fields. When the mind reflects for a moment upon the miseries and sorrows which accelerated their fall, and which terminated their existence, it discloses a scene so terrible

that it must appear the firmest nerves, and fill the most unfeeling heart with sorrow.*

Since the days of Xerxes no civilized nation ever brought such a formidable army into the field, and since his days, or even before these, none was ever so completely ruined and destroyed in such a short space of time. Nor is it to the numbers alone we must look, but the effective strength of this well appointed and disciplined army, the flower and pride of the youth of Europe, which perished in a few months; and those veteran legions which carried blood, destruction, and subjugation over the fairest part of the civilized world—who seated the usurper upon his resplendent throne, disappeared like a fog before the Northern gale,† and left not a vestige behind.

But say his friends, it was not the Russians, but the elements which vanquished him at this time. But who compelled him to expose himself to these? Was it not the Russians? if not

* The conduct of Bonaparte and the fate of his army, was so like that of Cambyzes in his expedition against the Ethiopians, that I cannot help transcribing it as recorded by Rollin, vol. 2d, page 360.

“In the meantime Cambyzes marched forward, like a madman, towards the Ethiopians, notwithstanding his being destitute of all sorts of provisions; which quickly caused a terrible famine in his army. He had still time, says Herodotus, to remedy this evil; but Cambyzes would have thought it a dishonour to have desisted from his undertakings, and therefore he proceeded in his expedition. At first his army was obliged to live upon herbs, roots, and leaves of trees; but coming afterwards into a country entirely barren, they were reduced to the necessity of eating their beasts of burden. At last they were brought to such a cruel extremity, as to be obliged to eat one another; every tenth man, upon whom the lot fell, being doomed to serve as meat for his companions; a meat, says Seneca, more cruel and terrible than famine itself; * *Decimum quemque fortiti, alimentum habuerant fame sœvius*. Notwithstanding all this the King still persisted in his design, or rather in his madness, nor did the miserable desolation of his army make him sensible of his error. But at length beginning to get afraid of his own person, he ordered them to return. During all this dreadful famine (who would believe it?) there was no abatement of delicacies at his table, and camels were still reserved to carry his kitchen furniture, and the instruments of his luxury; † *Servabantur illi interim generosa, aves, et instrumenta epularem camelis rohebantur, cum fortirentur milites ejus quis quale periret, quis prius viveret*.

† “Fair weather cometh out of the North.” Job xxxvii. 22.

* *De Sen. b. 3. c. 20.*

† *Iditto, ditto.*

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so, what though Moscow was become an "uninhabitable sink;" was not the finest provinces of the Russian Empire, "lands equal to the finest parts of France and Germany," open to him. If the provisions and supplies were there, why did he not take them? If the Russian army opposed him, why not fight and beat it? If snug in a good lodging, why, without being forced, did he expose himself to the tempest? Could an army round Paris want provisions? No! unless the inhabitants destroyed these, or rose in arms to prevent it. For what purpose did Bonaparte invade Russia? Was it not to beat her down beneath his feet—"to put an end to that proud influence which Russia, for 50 years had exercised over Europe?"† Did he accomplish this? No, certainly! the unanimity of her people, and the invincible bravery of her sons, compelled him at that "cruel season"‡ to choose, what he must at that time have conceived to be the least of the two evils which surrounded him,

* Twenty-sixth Bulletin.

† Second Bulletin.

‡ Twenty-ninth Bulletin.

I shall here add, in a connected form, Tables of the Official Returns of both parties.

FRENCH OFFICIAL RETURNS.

Battle or Bulletin.	French Loss.			Russian Loss.		
	Killed and Wound	Pris.		Killed and Wound	Pris.	
4th Bulletin, ~~~~~~	50					
5th Do. ~~~~~~	30			100	1,000	
6th Do. deducting former two being included, (a) ~~~~~~	50			179	60	
7th and 8th Do. ~~~~~~	700	10		sabred some	245	
9th Do. ~~~~~~	no returns			(b) 1,500	1,370	
10th Do. Ostrovno, (d) ~~~~~~	1,100	50		(c) 2,000	12	
Mogilheff, ~~~~~~	900			5,500	1,500	
Carried over,	2,830	60		5,000	1,100	
				12,279	5,267	

~~~~~ Bulletin they make the total prisoners 2,000.

(b) This number includes 500 the Bulletin says were "cut down."

(c) This number, says the Bulletin, the garrison of Mogilheff "were sabred."

(d) By Murat's report their loss was from 5 to 6,000 killed and wounded, and from 700 to 800 prisoners;—and in a second action 2,500 or 3,000 killed, and an immense number wounded, while he says, "Your Majesty scarce lost any body."

namely, to run the hazard of perishing, by the cold of the Russian winter, rather than to encounter the spear of the indefatigable Cossack, or the arm of the indignant Russian. There was no calculation about, or dread of Russian frosts, when he thundered forth, and his admirers echoed after him his impious declamations at Gumbinnen. "Fate drags them on, let their destinies be fulfilled; the peace which we shall conquer will be its own guarantee." Such was the language of this self-sufficient Parisian tyrant, in the ears of an astonished world. Why should Xerxes be laughed at, by posterity, for upbraiding the Hellespont, and Napoleon escape scorn for more notoriously endeavouring to exercise the attributes of Omnipotence? But he has not escaped the punishment. The one fled from Greece to Asia, across the Hellespont, in a wretched cockboat, and the other over the Niemen, in a miserable sledge, from Wilna to Paris, each, in his person, the solitary survivors of the innumerable hosts which obeyed them. Striking examples of the instability of all human grandeur and power that is not founded upon justice to man, and humility before God.

## FRENCH OFFICIAL RETURNS.

| Battle or Bulletin.                   | French Loss.     |       | Russian Loss.    |        |
|---------------------------------------|------------------|-------|------------------|--------|
|                                       | Killed and Wound | Pris. | Killed and Wound | Pris.  |
| <i>Brought forward,</i>               | 2,880            | 60    | 12,279           | 5,267  |
| 11th Do. Drissa, &c. (a) ~~~~~        | none             |       | 3,000            | 3,940  |
| Ekaw, ~~~~~                           | 100              |       | 100              | 200    |
| 12th Do. relates to the former, ~~~~~ |                  |       |                  |        |
| 13th and 14th Do. Krasnoi, ~~~~~      | none             |       | 1,000            | 1,500  |
| Do. Smolensk, ~~~~~                   | 3,900            |       | 12,200           | 2,000  |
| Do. Valentina, ~~~~~                  | 3,200            |       | (b) 8,600        | 1,000  |
| Do. Polotzk, (c) ~~~~~                | 1,000            |       | 3,000            | 1,000  |
| <i>Carried forward,</i>               | 11,080           | 60    | 40,179           | 15,477 |

(a) Oudinot's or Reggio's report is 4,000 Russians killed and wounded, and 4,000 prisoners—his loss from 3 to 400 wounded.

(b) Bulletin says, the Russian loss "was treble ours."

(c) This bulletin makes the Russian loss near 30,000 men at Valentina and Smolensk, about 7,000 more than at first.

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It is a fact worth remembering, that on the 19th of June Bonaparte arrived at Gumbinnen, all his formidable preparations being then complete. On the morning of the 24th he passed the Niemen, at Kowno; and, on the 24th December, Flatoff destroyed the last sad remains of his army, upon the icy bosom of that stream, at the same place. On the 19th June, he assumed the command of a mighty army—he lost it all; and, on the 19th December following, in disguise, and a weary fugitive, he returned to Paris to demand another. The longest day saw him in all his greatness, believing that he

——“ Could put a girdle round about the earth  
“ in forty minutes.”

The shortest day of the same year saw his army annihilated, and himself a fugitive, left to skulk into his boutique of iniquity, in the palace of the Thuilleries, at the midnight hour; a warning to mortality through succeeding ages.

The wars of Julius Cæsar, the bloodiest and most destruc-

S.

|           | Russian Loss.          |        |  |
|-----------|------------------------|--------|--|
|           | Killed<br>and<br>Wound | Pris.  |  |
| 0         | 12,279                 | 5,287  |  |
|           | 3,000                  | 3,940  |  |
|           | 100                    | 200    |  |
|           | 1,000                  | 1,500  |  |
|           | 12,200                 | 2,000  |  |
| (b) 8,600 | 1,000                  |        |  |
|           | 3,000                  | 1,400  |  |
| 0         | 40,179                 | 15,427 |  |

#### FRENCH OFFICIAL RETURNS.

| Battle or Bulletin.                 | French Loss.           |       | Russian Loss.          |        |        |
|-------------------------------------|------------------------|-------|------------------------|--------|--------|
|                                     | Killed<br>and<br>Wound | Pris. | Killed<br>and<br>Wound | Pris.  |        |
| <i>Brought forward,</i>             | 11,080                 | 60    | 40,179                 | 15,427 |        |
| 15th and 14th Do. Kobryn, (a) ~~~~~ | 1,000                  |       | 5,000 and Pris.        |        |        |
| Do. Inknovo, ~~~~~                  | 200                    |       | 200                    |        |        |
| Hospital taken by Cossacks, ~~~~~   |                        | 200   |                        |        |        |
| 15th Bulletin, (b) ~~~~~            |                        |       |                        |        |        |
| 16th and 17th Do. ~~~~~             |                        |       |                        |        |        |
| 8th Bulletin, Deserters, ~~~~~      |                        |       |                        |        | 100    |
|                                     |                        |       |                        |        | 20,000 |
| <i>Carried over,</i>                | 12,280                 | 260   | 43,379                 | 35,527 |        |

(a) Austrian and Saxon returns not given, at least supposed so. Schwartzberg's report makes his loss 1,300, the Russian 3,500.

(b) Bavarian official returns swell the Russian loss at Polotzk from 17,000 to 18,000 men (supposed an error in the press for 7,000 and 8,000) and mark the loss of the Bavarians alone, at 144 killed, 1,136 wounded, and 715 missing.

ed and wounded, and

at Valentina and Sme-

tive the ancient world ever saw, are supposed to have cost Europe, Asia, and Africa, 2,000,000 men in the space of 14 years; but what were these to those in our own times? Six months, in 1812, cost Europe alone about 850,000 men put *hors de combat*, besides several millions which were driven from their ruined homes, to wander through the merciless rigours of a polar winter; and millions more, by the loss of their relations, their friends, and their support, rendered miserable, and plunged into irretrievable want and distress during their remaining life.

Napoleon the Great being defeated, and his mighty army exterminated, his slaves and supporters, in order to lessen his mis-

## FRENCH OFFICIAL RETURNS.

| Battle or Bulletin.                          | French Loss.     |         |  | Russian Loss.    |            |  |
|----------------------------------------------|------------------|---------|--|------------------|------------|--|
|                                              | Killed and Wound | Pris.   |  | Killed and Wound | Pris.      |  |
| <i>Brought forward,</i>                      | 12,280           | 260     |  | 43,379           | 35,507     |  |
| Difference, Bulletins and Reports, (a) ~~~~~ | 1,645            |         |  | 16,459 and Pris  |            |  |
| 18th Bulletin, (Moskwa) ~~~~~                | 10,000           |         |  | 45,000           | 5,000      |  |
| 19th Do. burnt in Moscow, ~~~~~              |                  |         |  | 30,000           |            |  |
| Riga, from 27th Sept. to 2d Oct. ~~~~~       |                  |         |  | 3,500            | 2,500      |  |
| 20th Bulletin, incendiaries, ~~~~~           |                  |         |  | 100              |            |  |
| 21st Do. do. ~~~~~                           |                  |         |  | 300              |            |  |
| 22d Do. do. ~~~~~                            |                  |         |  |                  |            |  |
| 23d Do. do. ~~~~~                            |                  | 20      |  | 300 sabred       |            |  |
| 24th Do. Riga Affair (above) ~~~~~           |                  |         |  |                  |            |  |
| Military commission, ~~~~~                   |                  | 10      |  |                  |            |  |
| St. Cyr, October 20th, from Steinheil, ~~~~~ |                  |         |  |                  | 1,500      |  |
| 25th Bulletin, ~~~~~                         |                  | 100 (b) |  |                  |            |  |
| 26th Do. Moscow, ~~~~~                       |                  |         |  |                  | (c) 10,000 |  |
| Battle 18th Oct. ~~~~~                       | 800 (d)          |         |  |                  | 1,600      |  |
| <i>Carried forward,</i>                      | 24,725           | 390     |  | 139,038          | 56,147     |  |

(a) Without including about 1,000 difference between Eckmühl's report, and Bulletin of Mogilheff, and Murat's last action, where the wounded was "immense," or the difference in Bavarian official report of the battle of Polotzk, from the Bulletin, which is no less than 13,000 more, or taking the smaller number, at least 3,000 additional.

(b) 4 Battalions Russian infantry "cut to pieces" by Murat.

(c) All these were old soldiers taken plundering in Moscow.

(d) This is the same as note (b) his loss was then only 100, it is now 800, the Russian loss of course double.

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to have cost Europe of 14 years; Six months, in *hors de combat*, from their ruined of a polar winter; sons, their friends, plunged into ir- ining life. mighty army ex- to lessen his mis-

fortunes, and to maintain his power and his fame, were reduced to the necessity of branding the Russian accounts of his losses, either as impudent falsehoods, or gross exaggerations; and, strange to say, this was asserted most strenuously by those who, at the commencement of the contest, were the first to state and believe, that his army considerably exceeded what I have stated it to be; nor can they, nor do they attempt to deny, but that the whole number which composed it were destroyed. Another, and perhaps a more numerous, party, among which was Bonaparte himself, ascribed the principal part of his disasters, to the *premature* rigours of the season. Be it so. This detracts

## FRENCH OFFICIAL RETURNS.

| Battle or Bulletin.                   | French Loss.     |       | Russian Loss.    |        |
|---------------------------------------|------------------|-------|------------------|--------|
|                                       | Killed and Wound | Pris. | Killed and Wound | Pris.  |
| <i>Brought forward,</i>               | 24,725           | 390   | 159,658          | 56,145 |
| 27th Bulletin, Maloyaroslavitz, ..... | 1,300            |       | 7,000            |        |
| Ghorodnia with Cossacks, .....        | 55               |       |                  | 600    |
| 28th Bulletin, .....                  |                  | (a)   |                  | 3,000  |
| 29th Do. (b) .....                    |                  | 2,800 |                  | 8,550  |
| Macdonald, Tilsit, Dec. 28th. ....    |                  |       | (c)              | 2,000  |
| Total, .....                          | 26,258           | 3,180 | 146,658          | 70,295 |

## RUSSIAN OFFICIAL RETURNS.

|                             | Russian Loss. |  | French Loss. |     |
|-----------------------------|---------------|--|--------------|-----|
|                             |               |  |              |     |
| Actions to 30th June, ..... | 47            |  | 50           | 50  |
| Romanoff, Mir, &c. ....     | no returns    |  | (c) 1,600    | 520 |
| <i>Carry over, .....</i>    | 47            |  | 1,650        | 530 |

(a) At Polotzk, 18th Oct. ("and covered the field of battle with his dead") lost many men and 3,000 horses, in a few days by cold.

(b) No returns of killed and wounded on either side. The French lost 30,000 horses in a few days by cold.

(c) "Two regiments Russian infantry laid down their arms."

(d) This includes the total numbers, according to the additional numbers as given in the official returns of the officers of the different nations to their Sovereigns.

(e) Two regiments cavalry completely destroyed—by the Imperial French Almanack; it appears these regiments consist of 4 squadrons of 200 men each—demiofficial accounts say 7 regiments were destroyed.

not from Russian valour and patriotism. These are the weapons of an invincible ally; they are the arms of Omnipotence. "Hast thou, (says the Almighty to Job) entered into the treasures of the snow; or hast thou seen the treasures of the hail, which I have reserved against the time of trouble, against the day of battle and war?"\* His interference in this instance was indeed most conspicuous—infidelity must own it. Even St. Jean de Angley, (Legislative Body, Dec. 21st, 1813,) while he misapplies, confesses this great truth. "We have been twice betrayed by fortune," says he, "the first in one of

\* Job xxxviii. 22, 23.

#### RUSSIAN OFFICIAL RETURNS.

| Battle or Bulletin.                                        | Russian Loss.    |       | French Loss.     |       |
|------------------------------------------------------------|------------------|-------|------------------|-------|
|                                                            | Killed and Wound | Pris. | Killed and Wound | Pris. |
| <i>Brought over,</i>                                       | 47               |       | 1,650            | 350   |
| Kobryn, 27th July, ~~~~~                                   | no returns       |       | (a) 4,000        | 2,360 |
| Various actions before 12th July, with Wittgenstein, ~~~~~ | do.              |       | (b) 3,200        | 1,708 |
| Bagrathion, before 19th July, ~~~~~                        | 600              |       | (c) 7,200        | 1,000 |
| Mogilheff, 23d July, ~~~~~                                 | 600              |       | (d) 5,000        |       |
| Ostrovno, ~~~~~                                            | no returns       |       | 6,000            |       |
| Retreat from Witepszk, ~~~~~                               | do.              |       | (e) 1,200        |       |
| Jacobovo, Drissa, &c. ~~~~~                                | do.              |       | 7,000            | 3,000 |
| Inkovo, ~~~~~                                              | do.              |       | consid.          | 500   |
| By Wittgenstein, 12th August, ~~~~~                        | 600              | (f)   | great.           | 250   |
| Riga, 5th August, ~~~~~                                    | 52               |       |                  | 55    |
| <i>Carry forward,</i>                                      | 1,899            |       | 35,250           | 9,243 |

(a) 1000 were left dead on the field—the wounded is estimated at 3 to 1—demiofficial accounts represent the total loss of the enemy at 10,000, which it very likely was.

(b) 4 Cavalry regiments estimated as before.

(c) 9 Do. do.

(d) Battle near Mogilheff with Davoust, according to a paper found at Moscow—2 Majors; 3 chiefs of squadrons; 7 chiefs of battalions; 141 officers; 3982 privates—Total, 4,134.

(e) 6 Squadrons, completely destroyed, estimated as before.

(f) Of this action, no French bulletin has ever taken any notice, Admiral Martin says the prisoners were 600—Wittgenstein 250, and that the action was severely contested for 8 hours.

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5,117 Bavar  
the Bavarians  
(b) Official  
Valentina 900  
(c) If the  
given previous  
scale, as in th  
4,200 addition  
(d) 5000 w  
(e) Add 10  
siderable, our



these are the weapons of Omnipotence, turned into the treasures of the hail, terrible, against the enemy in this instance to own it. Even in 21st, 1813,) h. "We have the first in one of

those winters which afflict nature but once in a century." Granted. But he who sends summer and winter, seed time and harvest, certainly commissioned this. Russia was deeply sensible of it. Trusting to the aid of his God, Alexander unsheathed his sword. In humble dependence upon his assistance, he built his hopes. Russia, with a grateful heart, acknowledged her Deliverer and her deliverance. "There is not," to use the energetic language of Alexander, "a single enemy on the face of our territory; or rather, there they all remain. But in what state? Dead, wounded, and prisoners! Even their proud Chief himself, has, with the utmost difficulty,

### RUSSIAN OFFICIAL RETURNS.

| French Loss.                                       |       |  | Russian Loss.    |       |  | French Loss.     |        |  |
|----------------------------------------------------|-------|--|------------------|-------|--|------------------|--------|--|
| Killed and Wound                                   | Pris. |  | Killed and Wound | Pris. |  | Killed and Wound | Pris.  |  |
| 1,650                                              | 350   |  |                  |       |  |                  |        |  |
| (a) 4,000                                          | 2,560 |  |                  |       |  |                  |        |  |
| (b) 3,200                                          | 1,708 |  |                  |       |  |                  |        |  |
| (c) 7,200                                          | 1,000 |  |                  |       |  |                  |        |  |
| (d) 5,000                                          |       |  |                  |       |  |                  |        |  |
| 6,000                                              |       |  |                  |       |  |                  |        |  |
| (e) 1,200                                          |       |  |                  |       |  |                  |        |  |
| 7,000                                              | 3,000 |  |                  |       |  |                  |        |  |
| consid.                                            | 500   |  |                  |       |  |                  |        |  |
| great.                                             | 250   |  |                  |       |  |                  |        |  |
|                                                    | 55    |  |                  |       |  |                  |        |  |
| 35,250                                             | 9,243 |  |                  |       |  |                  |        |  |
| Brought forward,                                   |       |  | 1,899            |       |  | 35,250           | 9,243  |  |
| Polotsk, 17th and 18th August, (a) ~~~~            |       |  | 4,353            |       |  | 10,784           | 3,216  |  |
| Wittgenstein, 23d August, ~~~~~~                   |       |  |                  |       |  | 150              | 914    |  |
| Smolensk and Valentina, (b) ~~~~~~                 |       |  | 9,000            |       |  | 20,000           |        |  |
| Kobryn, 12th August, ~~~~~~                        |       |  | 1,500            |       |  | 5,000            | 234    |  |
| Krasnoi, included in Smolensk, &c. ~~~~            |       |  |                  |       |  |                  |        |  |
| Riga, 21st August, ~~~~~~                          |       |  | 600              |       |  | 850              | 650    |  |
| Numbers per notes to date, (c) ~~~~~~              |       |  | 4,200            |       |  | 6,000            |        |  |
| Retreat from Smolensk, ~~~~~~                      |       |  |                  |       |  |                  | 1,300  |  |
| Battle of Borodino, Kutusoff's dispatch, ~~~~~~    |       |  |                  |       |  |                  |        |  |
| 11th September, ~~~~~~                             |       |  | 40,000           |       |  | (d) 58,000       | 2,000  |  |
| Winzengerode's, Sept. 28th, besides killed, ~~~~~~ |       |  |                  |       |  |                  |        |  |
|                                                    |       |  |                  | (e)   |  | 271              |        |  |
| Carry over, ~~~~                                   |       |  | 61,554           |       |  | 156,505          | 17,557 |  |

(a) The official accounts received were 4,555 Russians killed and wounded, 5,117 Bavarians killed and wounded, the French divisions considerably more than the Bavarians in killed and wounded, and 3,216 prisoners, in all near 14,000 men.

(b) Official accounts make the Russian loss on both battles of Smolensk and Valentina 9000—French 20,000.

(c) If the French and Russian losses in the affairs where the returns are not given previous to the battles on the 18th August, are estimated by the same scale, as in those affairs where the returns are given by the Russians, it would make 4,200 additional to the Russians, and 6 or 7,000 to the French.

(d) 5000 were made prisoners, but above two-thirds of these were wounded.

(e) Add 100 men, "besides the enemy's loss in killed must have been very considerable, ours trifling."

ated at 3 to 1—demi-  
0, which it very likely

per found at Moscow  
41 officers; 3982 pri-

notice, Admiral Mar-  
the action was severely

escaped, with his principal officers. The scene of the destruction of his armies surpasses all belief. One almost imagines that our eyes deceive us. Who has been able to effect this? *Without* derogating from the merited glory of the Commander in Chief of our armies, this distinguished General, who has rendered to his country services for ever memorable; and without detracting from the merits of other valiant and able commanders who have distinguished themselves, by their zeal and ardour; nor from the general bravery of the troops; we must confess, that what they have accomplished, *surpasses human power*. Acknowledge then, Divine Providence in this wonderful event. Let us prostrate ourselves before His sacred Throne, and evidently seeing his hand chastising impiety, instead of boasting and glorying in our victories, learn from this great and terrible example, to be modest and peaceable executors of His law and His will.”\*

In tracing the progress, and to appreciate justly the merits of the Russian campaign, we must take into view, the settled

\* Alexander's proclamation, Wilna, 6th Jan. 1813.

#### RUSSIAN OFFICIAL RETURNS.

| Battle or Bulletin.                         | Russian Loss.          |        |     | French Loss.           |        |  |
|---------------------------------------------|------------------------|--------|-----|------------------------|--------|--|
|                                             | Killed<br>and<br>Wound | Pris.  |     | Killed<br>and<br>Wound | Pris.  |  |
|                                             | <i>Brought over,</i>   | 61,551 |     | 136,305                | 17,531 |  |
| Winzengerode's, Sept. 25th, besides killed, |                        |        |     |                        | 66     |  |
| Do. Oct. 2d                                 |                        |        |     |                        | 350    |  |
| Do. do. 3d                                  |                        |        |     |                        | 40     |  |
| Do. do. 5th                                 |                        |        |     |                        | 52     |  |
| Do. do. 6th and 8th                         |                        |        |     | (a)                    | 497    |  |
| Do. do. 11th                                | 9                      |        | (b) | 300                    | 450    |  |
| Do. do. 17th                                |                        |        |     |                        | 2,781  |  |
| Do. do. 20th                                | 47                     |        |     | 50                     | 573    |  |
| Kutusoff, Sept. 25d                         |                        |        |     | 956                    |        |  |
| Do. October 1st                             |                        |        |     |                        | 5,000  |  |
| Do. do. 4th                                 |                        |        |     | 1,772                  |        |  |
| <i>Carry forward,</i>                       | 61,610                 |        |     | 139,583                | 27,151 |  |

(a) Besides 150 which died daily in the hospitals of Mojaisk, for want of food.

(b) Besides wounded, proportion 5 to 1 is 900.

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defensive plan, upon which, from its commencement, the Rus-  
sians were determined to act. Till it arrived at a certain point,  
they were resolved not to act upon the offensive, against an  
enemy so immensely superior in numbers. To render them  
able to assume that attitude with more energy at last, every  
sacrifice was to be made for the moment. No general action  
was to be fought under the smallest disadvantage, and perhaps,  
none was ever intended to be risked, till the enemy was drawn  
into the interior of the country, and till the near approach of  
winter, except to preserve the Capital, if the enemy was rash  
enough to attempt to penetrate thus far. It is evident from  
the Russian proclamations, that they contemplated this, and  
that even a general battle might not be able to preserve Mos-  
cow from his grasp. Hence the preparations of Rostopchin.  
They contemplated the worst, and were determined to suffer,  
but not to yield. Hence, although the superior forces of Bona-  
parte, gave no opportunity to attack or resist him, with any  
prospect of a decisive advantage during their retreat, except  
at Borodino; still they were not defeated, nor was he victo-

#### RUSSIAN OFFICIAL RETURNS.

| French Loss.           |        |  | Russian Loss.          |       |  | French Loss.           |       |  |
|------------------------|--------|--|------------------------|-------|--|------------------------|-------|--|
| Killed<br>and<br>Wound | Pris.  |  | Killed<br>and<br>Wound | Pris. |  | Killed<br>and<br>Wound | Pris. |  |
| 136,505                | 17,537 |  |                        |       |  |                        |       |  |
|                        | 66     |  |                        |       |  |                        |       |  |
|                        | 350    |  |                        |       |  |                        |       |  |
|                        | 40     |  |                        |       |  |                        |       |  |
|                        | 52     |  |                        |       |  |                        |       |  |
| (a)                    | 497    |  |                        |       |  |                        |       |  |
| (b) 500                | 450    |  |                        |       |  |                        |       |  |
|                        | 2,784  |  |                        |       |  |                        |       |  |
| 50                     | 578    |  |                        |       |  |                        |       |  |
| 956                    |        |  |                        |       |  |                        |       |  |
|                        | 5,000  |  |                        |       |  |                        |       |  |
| 1,772                  |        |  |                        |       |  |                        |       |  |
| 139,583                | 27,154 |  |                        |       |  |                        |       |  |

| Battle or Bulletin.                        | Russian Loss.    | French Loss.    |
|--------------------------------------------|------------------|-----------------|
|                                            | Killed and Wound | Pris.           |
| <i>Brought forward</i>                     | 61,610           | 139,383 27,154  |
| Kutusoff, Oct. 13th, from Dochorou, "      | 50               | 300 377         |
| Do. do. Sundries from 4th, "               |                  | 1,525 1,305     |
| Do. do. 18th, battle advanced guard, ~~~~~ | 300              | (a) 2,500 1,500 |
| Wittgenstein, 25th Sept. ~~~~~             | 44               | (b) 400 192     |
| Do. October 14th, ~~~~~                    | 25               | 200 62          |
| Do. do. 20th, Polotzk, &c.                 |                  | (c) 4,500 6,000 |
| <i>Carry over,</i>                         | 62,009           | 148,808 36,590  |

(a) Beside wounded: proportion 3 to 1 is 7,500.

(b) Besides wounded: proportion 3 to 1 is 1,200.

(c) The killed and wounded must have been greater on the part of the enemy, than on the 17th and 18th September, at the same place, from the length and obstinacy of the battles; the Russian loss in killed was small, in wounded considerable. A subsequent report says, 6000 French prisoners: "Roads covered with dead."

s, for want of food.

rious. The momentary possession of a large tract of country, it is true, he obtained, but that was all. He fail 1 in every attempt to defeat, intimidate, separate, or disperse the Russian armies; and till that was done, his advance could never be called the consequence of victory. His utmost generalship, and the utmost bravery of his army, almost double in numbers, was exerted in vain, to gain even one triumph, that was to be attended with any good to his cause, over the Russian forces. \* He indeed, told us at the outset of the campaign, that the Russians were acting upon no settled plan, and though his admirers continued to echo this boast throughout his advance to Moscow, yet he did not. The farther he advanced, the less he said

\* By this *unexpected*, and even impetuous inroad, into our territories, the enemy hoped to dissipate by his columns, into small portions, our military force, extending along a line of more than 800 versts, and after he had annihilated each by itself, to accomplish his vindictive designs, as it were with one blow. By such means only, however, contrary to the law of nations, has he hitherto succeeded in vanquishing other armies, and bringing other states under his dominion. But, however furious his advance against our armies has been, hitherto it has not been attended with its wished effects." Barclay de Tolli's address to the army, dated July 6th.

## RUSSIAN OFFICIAL RETURNS.

| Battle or Bulletin.                                    | Russian Loss.    |       | French Loss.     |         |
|--------------------------------------------------------|------------------|-------|------------------|---------|
|                                                        | Killed and Wound | Pris. | Killed and Wound | Pris.   |
| <i>Brought over,</i>                                   | 62,009           |       | 148,808          | 36,590  |
| Wittgenstein, Oct. 26th, ~~~~~                         |                  |       |                  | 800     |
| Steinhall, Oct. 26th, and 51 officers prisoners, ~~~~~ |                  |       |                  | 1,051   |
| Tchichagoff, October 15th, ~~~~~                       |                  |       |                  | 553     |
| Tormasoff, do. 15th, ~~~~~                             |                  |       | (a) 2,000        | 5,000   |
| Riga, Sept. 30th—London Gazette, (b) ~~~~~             | 2,000            |       | 2,000            |         |
| Kutusoff, Oct. 15th, ~~~~~                             |                  |       |                  | (c) 153 |
| Number per notes to date, ~~~~~                        |                  |       | 20,100           | 100     |
| <i>Carry forward,</i>                                  | 64,009           |       | 170,908          | 41,414  |

(a) Besides wounded: proportion 3 to 1 is 6,000.

(b) This was the Russian loss in killed, wounded and prisoners, that of the enemy was not given, but was at least as much.

(c) Besides wounded.

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(b) French  
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parte actually conceived and stated when he wrote his 20th bulletin, that the Russian army was retiring towards Kasun, that is N. E. from Moscow, and towards the confines of Asia; whereas they were within twenty miles of Moscow, on the Kaluga road, s. w. from Moscow, nearly in an opposite direction, in the line, and with the command of the communications in his rear. The Russians never calculated, that they were able to oppose or destroy, upon the banks of the Niemen, that immense host which attacked them. But they did calculate, that they would not only be able to oppose, but to destroy it upon the banks of Moskwa, and this, notwithstanding every effort of the enemy, they accomplished. The victory, therefore, from first to last, was upon the side of the Russians; their plan and object was only different in the latter part, from what it was in the former part of the campaign. The one was to

"Hitherto, besides all our plans have been successful; and with the blessing of God and the valour of our soldiers, we have not the slightest reason to doubt the successful issue of our warfare." Barclay de Tolly's dispatch, Petersburg Gazette, July 15th, 1812.

## RUSSIAN OFFICIAL RETURNS.

| Battle or Bulletin.                                                     | Russian Loss.          |       |  | French Loss.           |         |  |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------|-------|--|------------------------|---------|--|
|                                                                         | Killed<br>and<br>Wound | Pris. |  | Killed<br>and<br>Wound | Pris.   |  |
| <i>Brought over,</i>                                                    | 70,509                 |       |  | 194,908                | 50,148  |  |
| Kutusoff, Nov. 9th, by Platoff, (on right flank Viceroy's corps,) ~~~~~ |                        |       |  |                        | 500     |  |
| Milaradovitch, 7th Nov. ~~~~~                                           |                        |       |  |                        | (a) 300 |  |
| Kutusoff, Nov. 13th, Augereau's and Charpentier's corps, ~~~~~          |                        |       |  | 4,000                  | 2,000   |  |
| Passage Dnieper, ~~~~~                                                  |                        |       |  |                        | 940     |  |
| Victor's defeat on 14th Nov. ~~~~~                                      |                        |       |  | (b) 2,500              | 1,600   |  |
| Kutusoff, Nov. 15th, by Gen. Carpo, ~~~~~                               |                        |       |  |                        | 100     |  |
| Gen. Neof, 12th, ~~~~~                                                  |                        |       |  |                        | 150     |  |
| Do, Volosdini, ~~~~~                                                    |                        |       |  | 400                    | 389     |  |
| <i>Carry forward,</i>                                                   | 70,509                 |       |  | 201,808                | 56,127  |  |

(a) Exclusive of sick and wounded.

(b) Besides wounded 3 to 1 is 7,500. Kutusoff's dispatch says, 1,600 prisoners.

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h, Petersburg Gazette,

exhaust the enemy's strength, the other was to destroy it alto-  
gether.

In reviewing the conduct of Bonaparte as a General, through  
this campaign, we can perceive nothing in it but a boundless  
ambition, vanity, rashness, and obstinacy. All his plans in-  
deed, were well laid—all his manœuvres for a long time well  
executed—his force such, as to use the language of his would  
be equal and worthy coadjutor in mischief in another quarter  
of the world, was accounted sufficient to "*look down all op-  
position.*" \* His officers experienced—his army brave, and  
devoted to him almost beyond example. But then, all his  
plans were only laid for one result, namely victory, and that  
too within a stated period, as if the seasons also obeyed him.  
He never calculated upon the resistance of Russia beyond a  
certain point, which he fondly imagined when he had gained,  
that every thing would succeed according to his expectations.  
He never calculated upon the possibility of a reverse, or took

\* Hull's proclamation upon entering Canada, 1812.

### RUSSIAN OFFICIAL RETURNS.

| Battle or Bulletin. | Russian loss.          |       |  | French loss.           |       |  |
|---------------------|------------------------|-------|--|------------------------|-------|--|
|                     | Killed<br>and<br>Wound | Pris. |  | Killed<br>and<br>Wound | Pris. |  |
| French Loss.        |                        |       |  |                        |       |  |
| 194,908             |                        |       |  |                        |       |  |
|                     |                        |       |  |                        |       |  |
| 500                 |                        |       |  |                        |       |  |
| (a) 300             |                        |       |  |                        |       |  |
| 4,000               |                        |       |  |                        |       |  |
|                     |                        |       |  |                        |       |  |
| 910                 |                        |       |  |                        |       |  |
| (b) 2,500           |                        |       |  |                        |       |  |
|                     |                        |       |  |                        |       |  |
| 1,600               |                        |       |  |                        |       |  |
|                     |                        |       |  |                        |       |  |
| 100                 |                        |       |  |                        |       |  |
|                     |                        |       |  |                        |       |  |
| 150                 |                        |       |  |                        |       |  |
| 400                 |                        |       |  |                        |       |  |
|                     |                        |       |  |                        |       |  |
| 589                 |                        |       |  |                        |       |  |
|                     |                        |       |  |                        |       |  |
| 201,808             |                        |       |  |                        |       |  |
|                     |                        |       |  |                        |       |  |
| 56,127              |                        |       |  |                        |       |  |

| Battle or Bulletin.                | Russian loss.          |       |  | French loss.           |        |  |
|------------------------------------|------------------------|-------|--|------------------------|--------|--|
|                                    | Killed<br>and<br>Wound | Pris. |  | Killed<br>and<br>Wound | Pris.  |  |
| Brought forward,                   | 70,509                 |       |  |                        |        |  |
| Kutusoff, Gen. Platoff, ~~~~~      |                        |       |  | 201,808                | 56,127 |  |
| Do. Orloff Denizoff, ~~~~~         |                        |       |  | (a)                    | 200    |  |
| Do. Orgeroff, ~~~~~                |                        |       |  | (b) 500                | 400    |  |
| Do. Osterman Tolstoy, ~~~~~        |                        |       |  |                        | 250    |  |
| Kutusoff, Nov. 18th and 20th, Gen. |                        |       |  |                        | 208    |  |
| Onverow, ~~~~~                     |                        |       |  |                        |        |  |
| Davoust's corps, ~~~~~             |                        |       |  | (c)                    |        |  |
| Ney's division, ~~~~~              | 500                    |       |  | (d)                    | 9,230  |  |
|                                    |                        |       |  | (e)                    | 12,000 |  |
| Carry over, ~                      | 71,009                 |       |  | 202,308                | 78,515 |  |

(a) Besides killed and wounded.

(b) And several prisoners taken next day.

(c) No returns. "*A great number of prisoners.*"

(d) Besides killed and wounded, "*immense.*" Suppose 10,000.

(e) Besides killed and wounded which was "*enormous.*" Kutusoff's Journal



the smallest pains to render such an event, if it should happen, as light as possible. "His presumption carried 400,000 brave men 1700 miles from their own country: misfortunes against which he did not deign to provide, fell upon their heads, and 300,000 Frenchmen perished on the territory of a great empire, the Sovereign of which, had made every effort to preserve peace with France." \* The battle of Borodino, and the fate of Moscow, seem to have stupified him. From the moment he was forced to abandon that Capital, or rather from the moment that he found he would be obliged to abandon it, he appeared to have lost all his caution or his activity, either as a man or a general. No division of the French army seemed to know what the others were about. Angereau, Championet, &c. were marching s. e. from Smolensk to Kaluga, when Bonaparte was hastening to the former place by a different road. Davoust knew not where Ney was, nor Ney that Davoust was totally defeated, till he himself was so also. Where the divisions

\* Crown Prince's proclamation, Oranienburgh, August 15th, 1813.

#### RUSSIAN OFFICIAL RETURNS.

| Battle or Bulletin.                     | Russian loss,    |       |  | French loss      |        |  |
|-----------------------------------------|------------------|-------|--|------------------|--------|--|
|                                         | Killed and Wound | Pris. |  | Killed and Wound | Pris.  |  |
| <i>Brought over,</i>                    | 71,009           |       |  | 202,508          | 78,571 |  |
| Kutusoff's Journal Nov. 15th to 19th,   |                  |       |  | 1000 (a)         | 565    |  |
| Tchichagoff, 22d Oct. ~~~~~             |                  |       |  | (b)              |        |  |
| Wittgenstein, Nov. 1st at Tcheschiniki, |                  |       |  | (c)              |        |  |
| Do. do. at Witepsk, ~~~~~               | 25               |       |  | (d)              | 517    |  |
| <i>Carry forward,</i>                   | 71,034           |       |  | 203,508          | 81,488 |  |

from Nov. 15th to 19th, says, Ney's force, "left to fall a sacrifice was 50,000 men and 100 cannon."—Bonaparte says, Ney "extricated" himself with 3,000 men, so that 15,000 must have been killed, wounded, and dispersed.

(a) Besides a great number killed and wounded in skirmishes.

(b) No returns. "3 Regiments Uhlan Guards taken." (Cavalry Regiments 800 each.)

(c) No returns "Action from 7 A. M. till 5 P. M."

(d) "Besides killed and wounded," taken by storm.

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it should happen, died 400,000 brave misfortunes against their heads, and every effort to preserve Borodino, and the. From the moral, or rather from the activity, either French army seemed Augereau, Chambray to Kaluga, when a different road. Davoust was together the divisions

August 15th, 1813.

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#### French loss.

| Killed and Wound | Pris.  |
|------------------|--------|
| 202,508          | 78,511 |
| 1000 (a)         | 563    |
| (b)              |        |
| (c)              |        |
| (d)              | 317    |
| 203,508          | 84,400 |

sacrifice was 50,000 men, and lost with 3,000 men, so

ches.

(Cavalry Regiments

of the Viceroy's army were, after these were "cut in two," defeated, and scattered by Platoff, no person could tell—no person seemed to inquire after, or care any thing about them. The whole were in the bitter reproach of Kutusoff, "*forgotten and left to perish.*" He might, it has been said, have retreated in comparative safety after the battle of Borodino. This is very doubtful. His armies on the Dwina were fully occupied by Wittgenstein—those in Volhynia by Tormasoff and Tchichagoff; who could have even then been upon the Niemen before him. Victor's reserves were then upon the Niemen. The country from the Berezina, nay even from Wilna, in the line of his retreat, was laid waste. Provisions and supplies he had none. To obtain these, he madly pushed forward to Moscow; and to have retreated from Borodino without any, was almost certain destruction. The same weather which would have enabled him to retreat with greater rapidity, would also have enabled the Russians to have advanced with an equal pace. He might have lost fewer men by cold, but as many by hunger, and more by the sword; though perhaps, with a greater loss to his adver-

#### RUSSIAN OFFICIAL RETURNS.

| Battle or Bulletin,                    | Russian loss.    |       | French loss.     |        |
|----------------------------------------|------------------|-------|------------------|--------|
|                                        | Killed and Wound | Pris. | Killed and Wound | Pris.  |
| <i>Brought forward,</i>                | 71,034           |       | 203,508          | 84,464 |
| Wittgenstein, 14th Nov. with Victor, ~ | 1,018            |       |                  |        |
| Do. 24th Nov. ~~~~~                    |                  |       | (a)              | 800    |
| Gen. Kutusoff, Nov. 21st, ~~~~~        |                  |       | (b)              | 407    |
| Gov. Riga, Nov. 18th, ~~~~~            | 360              |       | 400 (c)          | 818    |
| Gen. Oertel from Mozyr, Sept. ~~~~~    |                  | (d)   | 1,000            | 153    |
| Kutusoff's Journal from 15th to 19th   |                  |       |                  |        |
| Nov. Platoff, Nov. 12th, ~~~~~         |                  |       | 1,000            |        |
| <i>Carry over, ~</i>                   | 72,412           |       | 205,708          | 86,642 |

(a) Besides killed and wounded.

(b) And 1 in another affair, "2 Gen. 1 Col. several Officers, and a great number of privates were taken prisoners."

(c) And 3 squadrons Prussian dragoons, say 600 taken.

(d) Besides wounded 3 to 1 is 3,000.

saries. But with this retreat, even had he effected it without any loss at all, would have fled that military fame which had hitherto supported his tyrannic dominion. He could not then have said that it was the elements which overcame him. To make this appear as the chief cause, he knew he must sacrifice a considerable part of the army, which had advanced to Moscow. Beyond that it is not probable that he calculated, or that he could possibly conceive or be prepared to meet the lamentable scene which followed beyond Smolensk. There, or in Poland, both his communications and the Paris papers expressly told us, that he intended, and that they expected he would be able, to maintain his ground, though he found himself dreadfully mistaken. Hence, to prevent the appearance of being defeated by the Russians, he anxiously dragged on his cannon, which, had he abandoned sooner, there can be no doubt but a greater number of his army, and with much less injury, would have escaped. But then the capture of these would have shewn, by incontrovertible evidence, that he fled before the Russians. To prevent which, the fate of his

## RUSSIAN OFFICIAL RETURNS.

| Battle or Bulletin.                                                                              | Russian loss.          |       |  | French loss.           |         |  |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------|-------|--|------------------------|---------|--|
|                                                                                                  | Killed<br>and<br>Wound | Pria. |  | Killed<br>and<br>Wound | Pria.   |  |
| <i>Brought over,</i>                                                                             | 72,412                 |       |  |                        |         |  |
| Orloff Denezoff, Nov. 12th, ~~~~~                                                                |                        |       |  | 205,708                | 86,642  |  |
| Numbers per notes, to date, ~~~~~                                                                |                        |       |  | 1,500                  | 1,500   |  |
| Russian Journal from 7th to 19th Nov. ~~~~~                                                      |                        |       |  | 27,881                 | 3,800   |  |
| Old Style, ~~~~~                                                                                 |                        |       |  |                        |         |  |
| Wittgenstein, Nov. 24th, Thichagoff's<br>affair with Dombrowski, and for 8<br>days before, ~~~~~ |                        |       |  | (a) 5,000              | 10,200  |  |
| Wittgenstein, 28th Nov. Victor, &c. ~~~~~                                                        |                        |       |  | 2,000 (b) 11,000       |         |  |
|                                                                                                  |                        |       |  | (c) 11,112             |         |  |
| <i>Carry forward,</i>                                                                            | 72,412                 |       |  | 242,089                | 124,054 |  |

(a) Only 1,500 are mentioned as killed and wounded, in two actions; the number in the others are not given, but it was great, and was, no doubt, more than is here stated.

(b) Besides wounded with Dombrowski, 5 to 1 is 6000.

(c) Besides killed and wounded.

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conceived, would ensure that important object. He rushed madly into it, and in its ruins he met more certain and severer destruction. Like the bruizer in the ring, who, receiving from his antagonist the blow which convulses his frame with agony, in the strength which results from pain and despair, he rushes headlong and unguarded against his opponent, who, for the moment, recedes before him, confounded at his temerity. The hasty applause, however, of the surrounding multitude, who mistake rashness for strength, quickly recalls the scattered thoughts of the victor. He sees his opponent more completely in his power than he ever could have anticipated. He shews him so to the astonished spectators; and, when his antagonist

|                       |               |
|-----------------------|---------------|
| Births in 1813, ..... | 2498 Males,   |
| .....                 | 2663 Females, |
| Total, .....          | 5161          |
| Deaths in 1815, ..... | 4357 Males,   |
| .....                 | 5646 Females, |
| Total, .....          | 8003          |

#### RUSSIAN OFFICIAL RETURNS.

| Battle or Bulletin.                       | Russian Loss.          |       |  | French Loss.           |         |  |
|-------------------------------------------|------------------------|-------|--|------------------------|---------|--|
|                                           | Killed<br>and<br>Wound | Pris. |  | Killed<br>and<br>Wound | Pris.   |  |
| <i>Brought over,~</i>                     | 79,412                 |       |  | 255,089                | 147,814 |  |
| Col. Kaysaroff, (per Journal 8th to 13th) |                        |       |  | (a) 500                |         |  |
| Prince Kutusoff, Jan. 19th, .....         |                        |       |  |                        |         |  |
| Platoff, Dec. 10th, .....                 |                        |       |  |                        | 1,031   |  |
| At Wilna and round it, .....              |                        |       |  | 3,000 (b)              | 9,904   |  |
| Journal from 13th to 19th Dec. and        |                        |       |  |                        |         |  |
| Kowno, .....                              |                        |       |  | 4,000 (c)              | 5,580   |  |
| <i>Carry forward,</i>                     | 79,412                 |       |  | 262,589                | 164,339 |  |

(a) And all Bonaparte's state papers of great importance.

(b) Besides Prince Kutusoff adds, "a great number of prisoners continue to be made in the neighbourhood." The number of killed in Wilna and round it is not stated, but merely that it was great, and there can be no doubt that it exceeded 3000.

(c) The battle of Kowno, and pursuit to it, cost the enemy 10,000 men, of course fully 4000 must have been killed and wounded.

ct. He rushed mad-  
tain and severer de-  
who, receiving from  
frame with agony,  
despair, he rushes  
nent, who, for the  
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ng multitude, who  
recalls the scattered  
nt more completely  
ipated. He shews  
hen his antagonist

little expected such a movement, and "could not ward off the blow,"\* lays him prostrate at his feet. Such was the conduct of Kutusoff—and such the situation of Bonaparte. They were the combatants, and the world the spectators.

Although the ruin of Moscow, no doubt, had a considerable share in occasioning the sad catastrophe which befell Bonaparte, still it would be unfair to impute it to that source alone. No! it must not. If we want the origin of all his calamities, we must turn to Borodino—the fatal—the never to be forgotten field of Borodino. Sacred be the spot through every succeeding age. May no sacrilegious hand ever disturb the remains of those firm bulwarks of European independence—those proud monuments of Russian glory. In the animated language of the venerable Kutusoff, upon a similar occasion, "May those entrenchments which we raised, and which filled the enemy's troops with dread, remain standing and unmolested. May they be suffered to fall by the hand of time, but never by human

\* Kutusoff's Journal, battle of Krasnoi.

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# RUSSIAN OFFICIAL RETURNS.

| French Loss.           |         |  | Russian Loss.          |       |  | French Loss.           |       |  |
|------------------------|---------|--|------------------------|-------|--|------------------------|-------|--|
| Killed<br>and<br>Wound | Pris.   |  | Killed<br>and<br>Wound | Pris. |  | Killed<br>and<br>Wound | Pris. |  |
| 255,089                | 147,844 |  |                        |       |  |                        |       |  |
| (a) 500                |         |  |                        |       |  |                        |       |  |
|                        | 1,031   |  |                        |       |  |                        |       |  |
| 3,000 (b)              | 9,904   |  |                        |       |  |                        |       |  |
| 4,000 (c)              | 5,580   |  |                        |       |  |                        |       |  |
| 262,589                | 164,359 |  |                        |       |  |                        |       |  |

| Battle or Bulletin.                                                     | Killed<br>and<br>Wound | Pris. | Killed<br>and<br>Wound | Pris.     |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------|-------|------------------------|-----------|
| <i>Brought forward,</i>                                                 | 79,412                 |       | 262,589                | 163,559   |
| Journal from 19th to 25th Dec. ....                                     |                        |       |                        | (a) 6,941 |
| Tchichagoff from Nov. 29th to Dec. 11th.                                |                        |       | 10,000 (b)             | 14,648    |
| Wittgenstein, 3 battallions armed men,<br>taken at Swenziany, say ..... |                        |       |                        | 1,800     |
| <i>Carry over,...</i>                                                   | 79,412                 |       | 272,589                | 187,748   |

(a) Besides those taken by other detachments, Platoff took daily, for several days, after passing Kowno, 1000 prisoners. I here only allow 5000 so taken.

(b) Tchichagoff says, that the flight from the Berezina to Wilna cost the enemy 30,000 men. By the Russian Journal kept at head quarters from 3d to 13th Dec. it appears that 20,000 were taken prisoners, 5000 of which number is previously inserted here under different heads; consequently, 10,000 must have been killed and wounded. Tchichagoff in his dispatch, December 11th, says expressly, that the roads "are covered with their killed and wounded." The number which perished with cold at this

hands. May the peasant, whilst he tills his surrounding peaceful fields, never touch them with his plough! May they, in future time, remain sacred memorials to the Russians, of the valour of their forefathers! May our posterity, when viewing them, become enflamed with the spirit of emulation; and, with transport say, *This is the spot where the pride of the robbers fell before the sons of our country!* These entrenchments, which proudly raise themselves amidst the surrounding peaceful fields, will of themselves, always remain existing monuments of Russian valour, and of Russian glory.\* At the foot of these dreadful entrenchments was buried, for ever, that fierce military fame and power, which had long constituted France and her leader, the scourge of human nature. The sun of Austerlitz there rose in splendour, but his beams were extinguished in blood. From that blow Bonaparte never recovered. Its direful effects seem to have disordered his intellects, and made him state

\* Kutusoff's letter to her Excellency Anna Neketschna Naryslakin, the proprietor of the lands around Borodino.

#### RUSSIAN OFFICIAL RETURNS.

| Battle or Bulletin.                        | Russian Loss.          |       |  | French Loss.           |           |  |
|--------------------------------------------|------------------------|-------|--|------------------------|-----------|--|
|                                            | Killed<br>and<br>Wound | Pris. |  | Killed<br>and<br>Wound | Pris.     |  |
| <i>Brought over,</i>                       | 79,412                 |       |  | 272,589                | 187,748   |  |
| Prince Kutusoff, Jan. 19th, .....          |                        |       |  |                        |           |  |
| Journal Dec. 30th, to Jan. 2d. ....        |                        |       |  |                        | (a) 1,476 |  |
| General Sachen, 29th Dec. and 2d Jan. .... |                        |       |  |                        | 131       |  |
| 2000; half sick, half prisoners, ....      |                        |       |  |                        |           |  |
| Marquis Palucci pursuit Macdonald, ..      |                        |       |  |                        | 1,000     |  |
| Prussians with Do, capitulated, ....       |                        |       |  |                        | 1,190     |  |
|                                            |                        |       |  | (b)                    | 18,000    |  |
| <i>Carry forward,</i>                      | 79,412                 |       |  | 272,589                | 209,548   |  |

time was immense. The Russian Journals and dispatches all state in the strongest language, that the country was covered with them, and that from Smorgonie to Oshminsky in particular, a distance of at least 27 miles, that "the whole road was so completely strewn with dead bodies and dead horses, and covered with artillery waggons, tumbrils, and carriages, that it was rendered almost impassable."

(a) This commences after the Koningsberg affair, and begins with Elbing.

(b) About 5000 men remained with Macdonald by Kutusoff's dispatch.



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 Russians, of the va-  
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 Its direful effects  
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a Naryslakin, the proprie-

NS.

| French Loss.           |           |  |
|------------------------|-----------|--|
| Killed<br>and<br>Wound | Pris.     |  |
| 272,589                | 187,748   |  |
|                        | (a) 1,474 |  |
|                        | 134       |  |
|                        | 1,000     |  |
|                        | 1,190     |  |
| (b)                    | 18,000    |  |
| 272,589                | 209,548   |  |

all state in the strongest  
 that from Smorgonie to  
 at "the whole road was  
 and covered with artil-  
 almost impassable."  
 gins with Elbing.  
 off's dispatch.

things the most contradictory. Such was his attempt to black-  
 en the Russian character, by asserting that they burnt 30,000  
 of their wounded in Moscow. He never reflected, that this  
 odious charge gave the lie to his decided claim to the victory  
 of Borodino. Thirty thousand wounded in Moscow, and  
 5000 which he took in Mojaisk, whose wounds were no doubt  
 of such a nature as to prevent their removal, was the very ut-  
 most number, which even according to his calculation, the  
 Russians could have lost at Borodino; and their having that  
 number of wounded in Moscow, was the most incontrovert-  
 ible evidence, that they were the victors in that battle, since  
 they had carefully removed *every one* of their wounded from

ERRATA.—Note, p. 200, for Borodino, read Tarutino.

### RUSSIAN OFFICIAL RETURNS.

| Dispatch, Battle, or Place.                                                     | Russian Loss.          |       | French Loss.           |             |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------|-------|------------------------|-------------|
|                                                                                 | Killed<br>and<br>Wound | Pris. | Killed<br>and<br>Wound | Pris.       |
| Brought forward,                                                                | 79,412                 |       | 272,589                | 209,548     |
| Pursuit to Koningsberg, besides the next<br>numbers, .....                      |                        |       |                        |             |
| In Koningsberg .....                                                            |                        |       |                        | 1,100       |
| Journal (Russian) from 25th to 30th<br>Dec. Lond. Gaz. ....                     |                        |       |                        | 1,300       |
| Number per notes to date, .....                                                 |                        |       |                        | 7,921       |
| Beyond Koningsberg, to (date Kutusoff's<br>dispatch,) 19th Jan. ....            |                        |       | 6,000                  | 3,000       |
| Russian loss in actions where these are<br>not stated, suppose ..... (a) 20,000 |                        |       |                        | 8,000       |
| Carry over, ..                                                                  | 99,412                 |       | 278,589                | 230,869 (b) |

(a) This I state merely from conjecture, and in comparison to the actions where  
 the numbers are given. It could not exceed this number to any extent. Bona-  
 parte himself only rates their killed and wounded at 116,000, during the whole cam-  
 paign. The accurate returns are wanting, not because the Russians did not give  
 these, but because the Journals which contained them were frequently not translat-  
 ed into the English paper.

(b) In this number are included a considerable number of sick in the Journal of  
 Tchichagoff's operations to the 24th November, and about 3000 in other dispatches;  
 the whole of which could not be less than 8000, nor exceed 9000. I have taken  
 the latter number as the most accurate.

that dreadful field.\* The advance of the enemy to Moscow, after the battle, was an act of despair; such as we see men attempt when the understanding is confounded. It threw a momentary glory around him, but it was the blaze of the meteor, which was to disappear forever, or in the words of the poet:

"So dying tapers give a blazing light."

Thus terminated one of the most memorable and bloody campaigns, ever recorded in the history of the world. None was ever accompanied with such rapid disasters, and such complete ruin to the aggressors, and none was ever attended with such important consequences. The firmness and perseverance of the Russians are above all praise; succeeding ages will venerate the name of the Sovereign, who remained unshaken amidst

\* Monsieur Labaume, an officer of the French guards, who was in this battle, has lately published a book at Paris, in which he asserts, that Bonaparte left all the French wounded upon the field of battle, even after his advance.

#### RUSSIAN OFFICIAL RETURNS.

| Battle or Bulletin.                                                                                                                                                                                                                         | Russian Loss.    |       |  | French Loss.     |         |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------|-------|--|------------------|---------|
|                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             | Killed and Wound | Pris. |  | Killed and Wound | Pris.   |
| <i>Brought over,</i>                                                                                                                                                                                                                        | 99,412           |       |  | 278,589          | 230,869 |
| Deduct numbers of sick included,                                                                                                                                                                                                            |                  |       |  |                  | 9,000   |
|                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             | 99,412           |       |  | 278,589          | 221,869 |
| Add lost by sickness,                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |                  |       |  | 30,000           |         |
| Do. do. by cold,                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |                  |       |  | 45,000           |         |
|                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             | 99,412           |       |  | 353,589          | 221,869 |
| which deducting the wounded recovered, and Prussians capitulated, leaves a total loss of about 555,000 men. The magazines of provisions and forage which were also taken between Smolensk and Koningsberg were prodigious. There were found |                  |       |  |                  |         |
| At Mogilheff in provisions and forage, 34,000 kouds or cools,                                                                                                                                                                               |                  |       |  | 12,240,000 lbs.  |         |
| At Wilna, in Barley and Rye,                                                                                                                                                                                                                |                  |       |  | 5,472,000        |         |
| In other places,                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |                  |       |  | 892,000          |         |
|                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |                  |       |  | 18,504,800       |         |

Besides great quantities taken in other places, and not specified; or given in Russian weights and measures, which I cannot find in the usual tables. The warlike stores captured were also immense; in two places Platoff found 60,000 musquets, &c. &c. so that it was not the want of supplies that made the French my abandon Poland.

enemy to Moscow,  
as we see men at  
bled. It threw a  
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o was in this battle, has  
Bonaparte left all the  
nce.

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| French Loss,           |         |  |
|------------------------|---------|--|
| Killed<br>and<br>Wound | Privs.  |  |
| 278,589                | 230,869 |  |
|                        | 9,000   |  |
| 278,589                | 221,869 |  |
| 30,000                 |         |  |
| 45,000                 |         |  |
| 353,589                | 221,869 |  |

titulated, leaves a total  
and forage which were  
s. There were found  
12,240,000 lbs.  
5,472,000  
892,000  
18,504,800  
; or given in Russian  
The warlike stores  
000 musquets, &c. &c.  
any abandon Poland.

the severest misfortunes, and dwell with enthusiasm upon the actions of the brave men who fought and bled for their country, and for Europe. It was no common danger which Russia had to encounter; but the resources and physical powers of 100,000,000 of people, which were marshalled against her, and guided by a tremendous energy, that knew neither pity nor remorse, which she had to combat and to overcome. She stood firm. She rose superior to the danger; and taught a noble lesson to despairing Europe. "What proofs," says the grateful Alexander, "of courage, of bravery, of piety, of patience, and of fortitude, has not Russia shewn? The enemy who penetrated into Russia with all his characteristic ferocity and rage, has not been able to draw from her a single sigh, by the severe wounds he has inflicted. It would seem, that with the blood that flowed, her spirit of bravery increased."\* It indeed did so, till at length their efforts set bounds to the career of that ambition, which threatened ruin to the liberties of the civilized world, and put to shame the haughty boasting of that proud nation, which had long trampled upon mankind. Amongst ourselves, the result silenced many of those prophets of plagues and evil, whose jaundiced eye beheld every thing through a sickly medium, which dared to league itself with their native country, in order to resist oppression, and to oppose ambition. Their efforts, in conjunction with Spain, roused and confirmed a spirit in Europe, which could never be laid to sleep, but on the ruins of French power and domination; and opened to a bleeding world, the near prospect of deliverance from the most galling misery and oppression that had ever scourged the earth. In a few words, their firmness brought down the strength of the proud, and laid "low the haughtiness of the terrible," and the issue of the campaign affords a lesson to sovereigns and nations, which never can be forgotten, that an Almighty Being governs and controuls the affairs of man here below, and who will not always hide his face from his servants, nor suffer wickedness to escape with impunity. In whatever point of view, and however we consider this sub-

\* Alexanders proclamation, Wilna, Jap. 6th, 1815.

ject, we must confess in the language of Alexander, that what has been done, "*surpasses all human power.*"

Having thus finished the affairs of the north for 1812, it is now time to turn our attention to the south of Europe.

## CAMPAIGN IN SPAIN,

1812.

THE campaign of 1811, which had liberated Portugal, had been peculiarly unfortunate to the cause of Spain. Their gallant resistance seemed only to bring down on their heads misfortunes more severe. Yet no voice cried submission, nor endeavoured to excite alarm. The capture of the important fortress of Badajoz, by the treachery or timidity of its governor, and Valencia besieged and daily expected to fall, left no place of great importance in Spain which were not in the tyrant's power, except Cadiz, the insular situation of which, had hitherto enabled it to resist the utmost efforts of the invader. In a great part of Spain, however, the dynasty of Napoleon, held but a precarious tenure. Galicia and Asturias were in a great measure free from their grasp. In Navarre and Catalonia, a most destructive warfare was waged against them by numerous bands; and in the South-east, part of Valencia and Murcia had not been entered by them, and in the southern extremities, a few places still remained in the power of the patriots, the principal of which was Tariffa. The enemy had a prodigious force scattered over the country, the principal part of whose population being condensed in cities at considerable distances from each other, and of difficult communication, occasioned him to have a considerable garrison in every place. Notwithstanding all this, Spain seemed subdued and her cause hopeless; and the close of the year 1811, saw the power of the French invaders

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flourishing in its greatest strength, with the most sanguine  
 hopes of its remaining secure and permanent.

But the deliverance of Portugal was in reality the death  
 blow to French ascendancy in the Peninsula. It left the illustri-  
 ous Wellington and his brave army, at liberty to pursue offen-  
 sive operations against his antagonists, by which the future se-  
 curity and tranquillity of Portugal could only be permanently  
 established. The enemy affected to treat the operations of the  
 preceding year in Portugal, with contempt and indifference;  
 and while their consequences stung him to the soul, he wanted  
 to make Europe believe, that the whole was a plan laid for the  
 more certain humiliation of England. Wellington's defence of  
 Portugal, was turned into ridicule—"May he one day defend  
 England in a similar manner," said the *Moniteur*. And con-  
 tinuing its strain of irony and Gallic confidence, it proceeded,  
 "The expence of maintaining your army in the Peninsula,  
 gives to France already, all the advantages she could derive  
 from the present contest; and while you are put to a ruinous  
 expence, in maintaining not only your army, but the inhabitants  
 of Portugal, the *French army, according to its fundamental law,*  
 subsists upon the country upon which it makes war, and only  
 costs us its pay, which we should be obliged to supply where-  
 ever it was. We wish with all our hearts, that the Prince of  
 Essling may manœuvre instead of attacking you, and by doing  
 so, keep you some years as you are—the consequences would  
 be, you would add 100,000,000 more to your debt, and we  
 should be certain of the more complete submission of the Pe-  
 ninsula. When the question is about a great extent of conti-  
 nent what are a few years? besides the loss of 60,000 men to  
 England, is as great as 500,000 to France." \*

Although this language was very different from that which  
 threatened only a few months before, to drive the English into  
 the sea, in such a hurry as not even to allow them time to say  
 their prayers; and which there is little doubt but that they  
 would have done, *if they could*. Yet it was greedily laid hold  
 of in Britain to prove, that the cause of Spain was hopeless;

\* *Moniteur*, Paris, Feb. 26th, 1811.

and that the plan which the enemy here laid down, was one of the surest and nicest that could be devised for the subjugation of the Peninsula and our destruction. The Opposition in Great Britain recommended the above farrago of nonsense and imbecility, as the most correct and dispassionate review of the real situation of the affairs in the Peninsula. "One would think," says the Morning Chronicle of March 7th, 1811, "that the reflections upon the measures of our government, had come from the pen of a British Patriot; for never were truths stated with *more seasonable wisdom*;" and on the 21st March, Lord Grenville asserted, that "The British army only occupied a ground which was completely circumscribed by the enemy," and that the system pursued "while it in no degree promoted the interests of that country, created an enormous drain on the resources of this, which might eventually unfit us for future exertions and a future struggle." Imbibing all the statements of the enemy, as perfectly correct, when in fact these were only meant to cover disaster, and to give food for those who opposed the measures of the British Government; it seemed never to have struck the minds of those people, that the resources of France might fail before those of England did. That a few years in such a contest, was in reality a great deal, and might alter the whole face of affairs against the enemy; and lastly, that although this mode of carrying on the war, in order to complete it the more effectually by prolonging the contest, might be believed in France to be the best, other nations might think differently, and ascribe the slow accomplishment of the object to inability to gain it, and which might induce others to resist, as the Portuguese and Spaniards had done. Delays in such matters had always been considered as dangerous, nor was Bonaparte the man, who would trust any thing to futurity which could be accomplished in the present moment.

Finding, however, that he was foiled in his views, and not able to succeed as he expected, he put the best and most appalling face upon affairs that he could: "When England shall be exhausted," said he, "when she shall at last have felt the evils which for twenty years, she hath with so much cruelty

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March 7th, 1811,  
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poured out upon the Continent. *When half her families shall be in mourning*, then shall a peal of thunder put an end to the affairs of the Peninsula, the destinies of her armies, and avenge Europe and Asia, by finishing this second Punic war." \* Vain predictions and impotent menaces! A peal of thunder did put an end to this second Punic war, but the bolt was launched by a more unerring hand, and took a very different direction.

The fiery sun of Austerlitz, which had so long desolated the world with his scorching rays, had now passed his meridian strength. From the Zenith of his power, he was about to descend rapidly to a horizon in view, where clouds, storms, and darkness, were collecting to extinguish his beams forever. The attack upon the Peninsula, as it was the most wanton and unjustifiable of all Bonaparte's wicked deeds, so it was productive of the most fatal consequences to him. It not only occasioned him the loss of vast armies, but these perished in a disgraceful manner; and even when they were victorious, they added nought to his fame. At the same time, it awakened such a spirit of resistance amongst other nations, also trampled upon and oppressed, as was evident would not be lulled asleep without a struggle.

The first operation which may be classed under the head of the Campaign in 1812, was the defence of Tariffa by Colonel Skerret. The place was invested by General Laval on the 20th December, 1811, with 10,000 men, and a regular battering train of artillery. Tariffa was only defended by a wall raised before the use of gunpowder, and was at the same time liable to be commanded within half musquet shot, and also to be flanked or taken in reverse in every part. The garrison at this time consisted of 1000 British, and 800 Spanish troops. On the 29th, the enemy's besieging army began to batter in breach, and after a tremendous fire with shot and shells for two days, on the morning of the 31st, a breach was effected from 23 to 30 yards broad. The enemy immediately advanced to the assault with 2000 picked men; but they were defeated and driven back with very great loss. The fire of musquetry from the gar-

\* Bonaparte's speech to the Legislative Body, June 16th, 1811.



rison, repeatedly checked the enemy's advance, and in less than an hour the victory was decided. The boldest of the enemy fell at the foot of the breach, and the remainder that escaped, made a precipitate retreat, abandoning their wounded, till a flag of truce from the brave garrison gave them liberty to remove them. Their loss was about 1000 men killed and wounded, and 10 officers, and 30 soldiers prisoners. The British loss only 9 killed and 27 wounded.\* In consequence of this repulse, Laval raised the siege, and retired with precipitation, leaving the whole of his artillery and stores in the hands of the victors. The defence of Tariffa, was deservedly celebrated as a most glorious exploit performed by its brave Governor and garrison.

The next event, however, was of a very different complexion. General Blake with the army on the East of Spain, having been defeated in a general battle, was obliged to take refuge in Valencia, where he was immediately besieged by Suchet with a formidable army; and on the 9th January, compelled to surrender himself and his army, amounting to nearly 20,000 men, prisoners of war. On the 5th, the bombardment was commenced, and after a refusal on the part of the garrison upon the 6th to capitulate, it was continued with the utmost fury for three days and three nights. Twenty-seven hundred bombs were thrown into the city, which did much damage, and set it on fire in several places. The engineers had effected a lodgement in the last houses of the suburbs. Two mines were placed under the principal gates of the town. The assault was upon the point of being made, under a commander the most sanguinary and ferocious of all the French banditti who have scourged Europe; when Blake, to save Valencia, a city containing 100,000 inhabitants, and at that time, says Suchet, 200,000, the horrors of such a scene, concluded a capitulation. In the place were found, according to the enemy, 374 pieces of cannon, and a vast quantity of military stores. In violation of the capitulation, the French had no sooner entered the place, than they set about butchering all the inhabitants, who had been concerned in the

\* Skerrets dispatch, Jan. 1st. and London Gazette, Jan. 20th.

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massacre of the Frenchmen in the place in 1808, at the com-  
mencement of the atrocious invasion of Spain by Bonaparte,  
and after the massacre of the inhabitants of Madrid by his orders.  
The capture of Valencia was the severest blow which the Patri-  
otic cause had yet sustained. It annihilated the only remaining  
regular army they had, and gave the enemy the command of  
one of the first cities and finest parts of the kingdom. It was  
celebrated in Paris with great rejoicings, and looked upon as  
the last operation of importance which they had to undertake, in  
order to secure the complete submission of Spain. But they  
were most grievously mistaken.

On the 30th December, General Hill made a dash at a divi-  
sion of the enemy stationed at Merida under General Dom-  
browski, but which force obtaining notice of his approach, aban-  
doned the place, in which they left a considerable magazine of  
wheat. The enemy, notwithstanding every effort to intercept  
him, effected his retreat, with the loss of about 40 men killed  
and wounded, while that of the British was 21 killed and  
wounded. Drouet and D'Erlon also effected their escape  
from Almendralejo, while he attempted to surprise them in a  
similar manner.

But operations of a more serious and decisive nature were  
now about to take place. Lord Wellington collected his army,  
and passing the Coa, entered Spain and laid siege to Ciudad Ro-  
drigo. The fortress was invested on the 8th, and on the even-  
ing of the same day, one of the outworks of the place was tak-  
en by assault. This enabled the besiegers to break ground  
within 600 yards of the place. On the night of the 13th,  
General Graham surprised the enemy's detachment in the con-  
vent of Santa Cruz, close to the body of the place; and on the  
afternoon of the 14th, the besiegers opened their fire from three  
batteries, mounting 22 guns, from the first parallel, and which  
the same evening enabled them to establish themselves in the  
second parallel, within 150 yards of the body of the place.  
Between the 15th and 19th the second parallel was completed,  
and also considerable progress was made, by sap, towards the  
crest of the glacis. On the night of the 15th, the besiegers also  
advanced from the left of the first parallel, down the slope of

the hill, towards the convent of St. Francisco, to a place where the walls of the Fausse Bray and of the town were seen, and upon which situation a battery of seven guns was constructed, which commenced their fire on the 18th. The fire of the British artillery, under the direction of Major Dickson of the Royal artillery, was well directed and did great execution. By the 19th, the fire from the first parallel had considerably injured the defences of the place, and had made breaches, both in the Fausse Bray, and in the body of the place. The battery on the slope of the hill had been equally effectual against the suburbs of St. Francisco, more to the left. On the evening of the 19th, notwithstanding the approaches had not been brought to the crest of the glacis, it was determined, by Lord Wellington, to storm the place. For this purpose the troops, after it was dark, moved forward in five columns, consisting of the 3d and light divisions, and of General Pack's brigade. The two right columns were conducted by Lieutenant Colonel O'Toole of the 3d Caçadores, and Major Ridge of the 5th regiment. These columns were destined to protect the advance of Major General Mackinnon's brigade, which formed the third column destined to attack the breach in the Fausse Bray wall. These three columns were under the command of Lieutenant General Picton. The 4th column, consisting of the 43d and 53d regiments and part of the 95th regiment, being composed of troops belonging to the light division, under the direction of Major General Crauford, were to attack the breaches on the left, in the front of St. Francisco, and also to cover the left of the body which attacked the principal breach. The 5th column, under the direction of Brigadier General Pack, was to make a false attack upon the southern face of the fort. Besides these, the 94th regiment, in two columns, descended into the ditch, on the right of Major General Mackinnon's brigade, with a view to protect the descent of that body into the ditch, and its attack of the breach in the Fausse Bray, and to oppose any obstacles which the enemy might bring forward in that quarter.

This attack, so admirably planned, completely succeeded. Major Ridge stormed the principal breach in the body of the place, along with the 94th regiment, under the command of

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Colonel Campbell. Lieutenant General Picton, and Major General Mackinnon directed and led the troops in the main point of attack. The latter gallant officer, after he had gallantly and successfully led on his men, was blown to pieces by the accidental explosion of a powder magazine, close to the main breach. Major General Crauford, and Major General Vandeleur were equally successful on their side, and Brigadier General Pack eagerly turned the false attack into a real one; and his advanced guard, under Major Lynch, followed the enemy into the Fausse Bray, and made prisoners all who opposed them. The rapidity with which the place was carried, through death and darkness, and in the face of formidable works, difficult breaches, and the most determined opposition, is the best tribute to British valour. The ardour of the troops, both officers and men, were irresistible. In half an hour after the assault began, all that remained of the French garrison were prisoners of war, and the British flag proudly waved over the turrets of Ciudad Rodrigo. Our loss in this arduous enterprise was severe, particularly in gallant officers. General Mackinnon, as has been already noticed, was killed. Major General Crauford received a wound, of which he soon afterwards died. Major General Vandeleur was also wounded, as were also Lieutenant Col. Colbourne, and Major George Napier, with many others. Lord Wellington paid high and deserved praise to Lieutenant Colonel O'Toole, Major Ridge, Lieutenant Colonel Campbell, Major Manners, and Major Grey, the latter of whom was twice wounded during the siege; and to all the officers and men, British or Portuguese, engaged in this enterprise. Our loss during the siege was 1016 British, and 243 Portuguese killed and wounded. That of the enemy, 1300 killed and wounded, and 1700 prisoners. One hundred and fifty three pieces of ordnance were found in the place, amongst which were the heavy artillery belonging to the army of Portugal, or rather that under the command of Marmont.\*

The capture of Ciudad Rodrigo, was an event which astonished Europe. It was an argument beyond the power of French so-

\* Wellington's Dispatch, 20th January, 1812, London Gazette.

phistry to refute, that the French armies were now losing ground in the Peninsula; and, accordingly, the *Moniteur* never attempted to misrepresent it. Its animating influence was felt around the shores of the Gulph of Finland; and Russia, no doubt, repeated, if the British and Portuguese vanquish the enemy, why may not we? There, and in France, the matter was readily appreciated; and it was only in Britain, amongst one class of men, that the thing could not be understood. They wondered what could be Lord Wellington's motive for taking the place—they were astonished at his want of judgment, in suffering himself to be taken in the "*trou de rat*," which the cunning French General had prepared for him. The French General, however, argued very differently. He was at no loss to guess the motives which induced Lord Wellington to attack the place, but in the sudden success attending the operations against it, "There is, says he, something so *incomprehensible*, that I will not permit myself to make any observation on it."† Marmont was right—the less he said the better—for the more he said, the more he would shew either his own want of talent, or his deficiency of means to contend with his antagonist, two things Frenchmen were not fond to acknowledge. Lord Wellington's object in attacking Ciudad Rodrigo was very obvious. It lessened the enemy's hold in Spain, and augmented his—it cut off all direct communication between the French army in the North of Spain, and that in the Southern provinces; and, lastly, was not only an additional guard to Portugal, but gave Lord Wellington an open door, by which he could safely enter Spain when he found it convenient. It was, no doubt, a bitter pill for French vanity to swallow, which, in 1810, through that Eclian trumpet, the *Moniteur*, branded Lord Wellington as the laughing stock of Europe, for suffering it to fall without risking a battle for its relief: and besides, his Lordship performed in 10 days, what the Child of Fortune, Massena, took 20 days to accomplish, when the place was not so strong as it was at this time. As to the incomprehensible manner in which it was taken, it was Wellington who planned

† Marmont's Dispatch, Salamanca, January 21st, 1812.

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it, British activity which carried on the operations, and British valour which accomplished it; and surely it was not the first time, as Aboukir and Trafalgar can witness, that these had performed equally incomprehensible things against Frenchmen.

To assist in the reduction of Valencia, Marmont had upon the 13th December, detached General Montbrun with three divisions of infantry, and one division of cavalry, having with them 30 pieces of artillery. These troops, in consequence of some error of the General, did not arrive in the neighbourhood of Valencia, till a day or two after its fall, when the rapid and unexpected advance of Lord Wellington against Ciudad Rodrigo, compelled them to measure back their steps, in all haste, after having threatened Alicante, which place they had actually reached on the 15th; and, accordingly, by the 25th January, they had again reached the Tagus, on their return; a dreadful and harassing march at that season of the year. Marmont assembled his army, from their different cantonments, as quickly as possible, but he came too late. Ciudad Rodrigo had fallen; and Lord Wellington, after having thrown a strong Spanish garrison into the place, under the command of that brave officer General Espana, retired behind the Agueda, to prepare for further operations; and Marmont was obliged for want of any point of support, and of provisions, to return, chagrined and disappointed, to Salamanca.

For this and other important services, the moment that the Regency restrictions expired, the Prince Regent conferred upon Lord Wellington, the rank of Earl, and Parliament granted him an annuity of £2000 per annum, while the Cortes, at the same time, created him Duke of Ciudad Rodrigo.

In the meantime the destructive Guerilla war, was carried on with increased activity. These men were the Cossacks of the South, who carried destruction, silent, but sure, amongst the French armies. Unless the latter marched in very formidable bodies, they had no security against the attacks of these indefatigable people. Every day cut off numbers of the invading hosts; they perished in shame and silence, unknowing and unknown. Of the different actions which took place, it is hardly possible to give any thing like a detailed account. Neither by

night nor by day could the French move to any quarter in any part of the centre or North of Spain. Their couriers were obliged to be escorted by 250, or more men; and, after all, but few of these ever reached the places of their destination. Amongst the most enterprising and most active of the leaders of these bands, was General Mina. It is hardly credible what losses this officer inflicted upon the invaders of his country, or to detail the dangers he must have undergone. About this time he captured the whole garrison of Huesca, consisting of 1000 men; and being attacked on the 4th January, by a force of 3000 men, who endeavoured to relieve the prisoners, he defeated them with the loss of nearly half their numbers. His name was a terror to the French in that part of Spain; and every exertion was made to get him into their power, but always without effect. Few convoys passed or repassed between France and Spain that Mina did not capture a part, or the whole of them; and thus left the French army frequently in great distress, for many of the first necessities to carry on their operations.

In Catalonia also a sanguinary and destructive warfare was carried on betwixt the French and Spanish troops. The latter, under the command of the Baron de Erolles and General Lacy. The brave inhabitants of that province refused submission to the French yoke; and notwithstanding their contiguity to France, which left them particularly exposed to the march and attacks of formidable French armies, still they continued to resist, and occasioned a prodigious loss of men to the invaders. Suchet having withdrawn the greater part of his force from that province, in order to carry on his operations against Valencia, Baron de Erolles and Lacy, in conjunction with Captain Codrington of the *Blake*, the commander of the British ships in that quarter, conceived it a favourable opportunity to attack Tarragona. Having assembled a considerable force, they, accordingly, marched towards the place. A series of severe actions took place between them and the enemy, in which both parties lost a great number of men. Having fallen in with a French division on their advance, they destroyed it, and

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took 600 prisoners;\* but they were obliged to relinquish their object, notwithstanding the assistance they would have received, for Gen. Decaen having collected a considerable force from Barcelona, and other places, marched upon Tarragona from the north, while part of the army which had been at Valencia being liberated by the fall of that place, marched back to relieve Tarragona from the danger which threatened it. These arrived from the South upon the very day on the evening of which the place was to be attacked; when, the Spaniards finding themselves placed in a perilous situation, retreated with considerable loss. Decaen, who makes no mention of the arrival of any part of the army under Suchet to his assistance, takes all the merit of delivering Tarragona to himself, and says, that on the 24th January he defeated D'Erolles at Alta Fouilla, with the loss of 2000 men, killed, wounded, or prisoners, with all their artillery, while his own loss was only 25 killed and 147 wounded. The whole, says he, would have been taken or destroyed, "if the mountains and deep ravines had not favoured the fugitives."† Yet, notwithstanding all this, we find, that the next day the French army was attacked, unexpectedly, at St. Feleur; and, according to their own accounts, very roughly handled, without much loss on the part of the Spaniards. But of the operations that took place in Catalonia, we are much in the dark, except through the deceitful medium of the French reports. The principal ports being in the possession of the enemy, and all communication being cut off from the other parts of the country, many a brave action has been buried in oblivion, and remains unknown. Day after day the French papers told us Catalonia was subdued; and day after day we found them inflicting deep wounds upon the enemy, and even entering the French territory, and carrying off in safety, contributions in money and provisions.

In the neighbourhood of Cartama, Don Felipe Montis, Chief of the staff of the 4th Spanish army, attacked upon the 16th February, a force of 2000 French infantry, and 4000

\* Codrington's Letter, January 26th.—London Gazette.

† Decaen's Dispatch, Gerona, January 31st. The truth was, that De Erolles cut his way through the enemy with considerable loss.—Conciso, February 16th.

cavalry, under the command of the Governor of Malaga, and defeated it with very great loss; some accounts say 2000 men. In consequence of which success, the Spaniards were upon the point of entering Malaga, when the French General, Rey, with 2000 infantry and 200 horse, came to the assistance of his comrades, and attacked the Spaniards on the flank and rear, he was, nevertheless, repulsed with considerable loss; and the Spanish force, only amounting to about 2000, were then enabled to effect their retreat in safety to Yunquera.\* On the 4th of February another of those severe misfortunes, which were but too frequent, again befel the Spanish arms, arising from the treachery of their officers. Peniscola, a very strong fortress on the East coast of Spain, to the northward of Murviedro, which had been invested by Suchet, was given up by the Governor, Don G. Navarro, without opposition, he declaring that he detested the English, and looked upon Joseph as his lawful king, whom he would, with all his heart, obey and serve. In this place was taken 1000 men, 66 pieces of cannon, and a great quantity of ammunition and provisions.† Denia, also a strong place, between Valencia and Alicante, was taken possession of by the enemy, under the command of General Harispe, acting under Suchet, who, for his conduct, had been created Duke of Albufera, a place in the neighbourhood of Valencia, yielding a considerable revenue. This was, however, amongst the last of Suchet's exploits; for though he held his position for some time longer, he could extend his conquests no further.

In consequence of the advance of Lord Wellington, and capture of Ciudad Rodrigo, General Bonnet, with the French force in Asturias, abandoned that province, and marched to join Marmont. He was followed and harrassed by General Porlier, and suffered a considerable loss in his retreat. "The Guerilla parties also continued to increase, and their operations to become every day more important."‡ Saoniel, in Upper Castile, near Medina del Campo, intercepted the communica-

\* Montis' Dispatch, Yunquera, February 17th.

† Suchet's Dispatch, Valencia, February 7th.

‡ Wellington's Dispatch, Frenada, February 19th.—London Gazette.

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tion of the French army of Portugal, and took 100 prisoners; and another party drove back a French force across the Tietar with considerable loss. Near Seguenza the corps of the Empecinado, consisting of 3500 men, were represented by the French accounts as totally defeated and dispersed, after a sharp action; but these accounts were so often repeated, that it was evident no further reliance could be placed on them, than that there was frequent and severe fighting with these parties, and with alternate success. On the 5th February, Mina fell in with General Souleir and about 1600 infantry and 170 cavalry, which he instantly attacked, and completely routed, with the loss of 900 men killed and wounded. His own loss was 200. As many of his followers and the inhabitants of Navarre had been hung by the orders of the French Generals, who insisted that they should not defend their country in the manner they did: Mina, at this time,\* issued a retaliatory decree, commanding the same punishment to be inflicted upon all the French officers and men, which might fall into his hands, and which soon put a stop to such an infernal system.

Lord Wellington having repaired the fortress of Ciudad Rodrigo, and left a force to watch the enemy's motions in that quarter, turned his attention to Estremadura. For some time previous, a considerable part of the army had been moving towards the Tagus, and took the road to Elvas, where stores, provisions, and battering artillery of all descriptions, had been bringing up from Lisbon, which left no doubt but that Badajos was his Lordship's object. General Hill, with the force under his command, had been ordered to approach Merida, to cover the operations. On the 16th, Badajos was invested from the left bank of the Guadiana, by the 3d, 4th, and light divisions of infantry, and with a brigade of Lieutenant General Hamilton's division on the right. Next day they broke ground, and established a parallel within 200 yards of the outwork, called Picurina, which embraced the whole s. e. angle of the fort. Notwithstanding the incessant rains, the works were continued with great activity. On the 19th, the enemy attempted a sortie

\* Dispatch, Sanguessa, February 7th, 1813.

with 2000 men, from the gate called La Trinidad. These were immediately driven in with considerable loss by Major General Bowes, who commanded the guard in the trenches. In the meantime, Sir Thomas Graham crossed the Guadiana, with the 1st, 6th, and 7th divisions of infantry, and General Slade's and General le Marchant's brigades of cavalry, and advanced to Valverde and St. Martha, and thence to Llerena, in order to watch any movements which Soult might make from Andalusia. At the same time, Lieutenant General Sir Rowland Hill, with the 2d, and Lieutenant General Hamilton's divisions, and Major General Long's cavalry marched from his cantonments from Albuquerque upon Mérida, and thence upon Almendralejo, which movement induced General Drouet to retire from Villa Franca, upon Hornachos, in order to be in communication with General Darican's division, which was about La Serena.\*

In the meantime, the operations against Badajos continued without intermission. On the 25th, notwithstanding every obstacle from the badness of the weather, six batteries, mounted with 28 pieces of cannon, commenced firing from the first parallel. Two of those directed their whole fire to the out-work Picurina, and the other four were intended to enfilade or destroy the defences of the fort on the side where the attack was made. On the same night, after it was dark, Major Gen. Kempt was directed to storm fort La Picurina. This fort was very strong. It had three rows of palisades, a place of arms for the garrison, musquet proof, and loop holed throughout. Notwithstanding these obstacles, 500 men of the third division formed into three detachments, the right under the command of Major Shaw of the 74th; the centre under the Hon. Captain Powys of the 83d; and the left under Major Rudd of the 77th regiment, advanced to the assault. In a short time these brave men overcame all resistance, and La Picurina was carried. The whole garrison consisting of 250 men, were killed, wounded, drowned or taken; and the enemy, who had made a sortie from the body of the place, by the Ra-

\* Wellington's dispatch, before Badajos, March 20th, 1812.

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ravelin, called St. Roque, either for the purpose of recovering La Picurina, or protecting the retreat of the garrison, were quickly driven back by the troops which watched them. Brigade Major Wade was killed by a cannon shot after the place was taken, and all the three gallant officers who led the assault were wounded, Captain Powys upon the parapet work, which he had been the first to ascend by a ladder. Lord Wellington bestowed the greatest praise upon Major General Kempts, and all the officers and men employed in this brilliant affair. In consequence of the capture of La Picurina, the second parallel was established within 800 yards of the body of the place; and notwithstanding the heavy rains which swelled the Guadiana to such a degree, as to carry away the pontoon bridge, and render the flying bridge almost useless, still the operations were carried on with uninterrupted vigour and success. Gen. Graham continued to observe the motions of the enemy, now becoming more numerous about Llerena, and General Hill communicated with him from Medellin. The enemy's General, Drouet, occupied the line between Medellin on the Guadiana, and Zalamea de la Serena and Llerena, in order to keep up the communication between the French force in the north and those in the south of Spain; but the movements of the British Generals compelled them to abandon this position. Marmont had made no movement of consequence.\*

On the night of the 29th, the enemy made a sortie from the body of the place upon General Hamilton's division, which invested the place on the right of the Guadiana, but were immediately driven back with loss. On the 31st March, the batteries in the second parallel mounted with twenty-five pieces of cannon, opened a tremendous fire on the body of the place, in order to breach the bastion in the south-east angle, or the fort called La Trinidad; and the flank of the bastion by which the face called Santa Maria was defended. On the 4th, another battery of six guns was opened from the second parallel, against the shoulder of the Ravelin called St. Roque, and the

\* Wellington's dispatch, Camp before Badajos, March 27th, 1812.

wall in its gorge. The fire from several of the former batteries had been terrible, and attended with great effect, and that from this last was no less so. On the evening of the 5th, practicable breaches were effected in all of these places; but the enemy intrenched and barricadoed the two former with such persevering skill and strength, that it was not judged advisable at that moment to attack the place. All the guns in the second parallel were immediately turned against the curtain of La Trinidad, in order to effect another breach in that place, by which means, the besiegers might be enabled to turn the enemy's works which commanded the defence of the other two. On the evening of the 6th, this breach was effected, and the fire from the face of the bastion Santa Maria, and the flank of the bastion La Trinidad being completely overcome, it was determined to storm the place that night.

As Badajos was very strong, and defended by a numerous garrison of picked men, abundantly supplied, it was evident the attempt was an arduous undertaking. But British valour knows no fears. The plan of attack was as follows: Lieutenant General Picton, with the third division, was to attack the castle by escalade. A detachment from the fourth division under Major Wilson of the 48th, was to attack the Ravelin of St. Roque upon his left, while the rest of the fourth division under Major General Colville, and the light division under Lieut. Col. Barnard, were to attack the breaches in the bastions of Santa Maria and La Trinidad, and in the curtain by which they were connected. The fifth division were to occupy the ground which the fourth division and light divisions had occupied during the siege; and Lieut. Gen. Leith was to make a false attack upon the outwork called Pardeleras, and another on the works of the fort towards the Guadiana, with the left brigade of the division under Major General Walker, which he was to turn into a real attack, if circumstances should prove favourable; and Brigadier General Power, who invested the place with his Portuguese brigade on the right of the Guadiana, was directed to make false attacks on the *tete-du-Pont*, the fort of St. Christoval, and the new redoubt called Moncaur.

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Such was the plan of the attack upon the strong and important fortress of Badajos. At 10 o'clock at night, the troops moved forward to the assault. The night was dark and dismal. The Guadiana was swelled, and except his sullen roar dashing through the gloom, all else was silent. Our troops moved forward to the breaches in silence. Instantly a rocket and several fire balls thrown up by the enemy, announced that they waited and were prepared for them. In a moment, a tremendous explosion took place in the breaches, and did much mischief to the assailants. A tremendous fire of musquetry, of artillery loaded with round and grape shot, vomited forth destruction and death, from these dreadful openings against which the British troops advanced. Whole ranks were swept away. Still they pressed forward headed by the General officers, and those attached to their respective staffs, who most gallantly led on their men. The troops despising danger, rushed forward into the very mouths of the enemies artillery. They fell, and were succeeded by others—the breaches were gained, they jumped into ditches behind them, where they perished amongst beams, stones, old gun carriages, old swords sharpened, and pikes planted in rows upon their bottom, on their sides, and along the ramparts of the place. Three different times they attempted to enter, and three different times they were beat back with great loss. None but British troops would have continued such a contest. The fourth and light divisions were ordered to retire to the ground they occupied before the attack—for a moment it was feared that their labours had been in vain, when it was found, that that brave and meritorious officer, Lieut. Gen. Picton had, about half past 11 o'clock, succeeded in escalading the walls of the castle, and fairly lodged himself and his division in that important and commanding place. In the meantime, Major General Leith had pushed forward Major Gen. Walker's brigade, supported by the 38th regiment under Lieutenant Col. Nugent, and the 15th Portuguese regiment under Lieut. Col. de Regoa. These succeeded in forcing the barrier on the road to Olivenca, and entering the covered way on the left of the bastion of St. Vincente close to the Guadiana. From thence General Walker's brigade descended into the ditch, and es-



caladed the face of the bastion of St. Vincent. As the Castle commanded the whole of the works of the place, and as the troops which had been withdrawn from the breaches were again formed and ready to advance, as soon as the morning dawned; General Philippon, who had fled into fort St. Christoval, with all the troop swchich remained in the place, surrendered at discretion; and after a night of horror, the rising sun beheld the British banners waving in triumph over the proud turrets of Badajos.

No language is adequate to describe the gallantry and good conduct of the officers and men employed in this dangerous undertaking. From the Field Officer to the private, every man not only did his duty, but surpassed their former deeds. The capture of Badajos was one of the most brilliant achievements of a war abounding with gallant deeds. It exalted the character of our illustrious General and his brave army, and will descend to posterity in one of the fairest pages of British history. It struck our enemies with fear and astonishment. It encouraged nations in their resolution of resistance. So mortified was the enemy, that this event was never so much as hinted at in any document which has since been published in France.

Our loss, as may easily be conceived, was very severe; and amounted during the siege to 3860 British, and 1010 Portuguese, killed and wounded, of which a very great proportion were officers. In the storming of the place, 264 officers were killed and wounded. Amongst the names of those officers who fell on this memorable occasion, are the names of Lieut. Col. M'Leod of the 43d regiment, a most distinguished and meritorious officer, Major O'Hara of the 95th, Colonel Grey of the 30th, and Lieutenant Colonel Ridge of the 5th, who, with many others, were killed in the breaches ordering the assault. Amongst the wounded, were Lieutenant General Picton, Major Generals Colville, Bowes, Walker, and Kempt; Major the Hon. H. Pakenham, Brigade Major M'Pherson, and many others whose names it is impossible to collect within the compass of a work like this. The Portuguese troops also had their share in the glories of this undertaking, and signalled them-

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selves greatly. The enemy's loss consisted of 4000 prisoners, amongst which was the Governor Philippon, 1200 killed and wounded during the operations against the place, besides those lost in the assault;\* which would make the force of the garrison at first about 6000 men, and which demi-official accounts stated it to have been.

The fall of Badajos was a most unexpected event to the French Generals in Spain. It had in 1811, occupied Soult forty days with open trenches, and that officer no doubt calculated upon its occupying the attention of his antagonists for a similar period. But he had mistaken his man. Lord Wellington took it in twelve days. Soult, however, as soon as he found that the seige was commenced, made all haste to his relief. He abandoned the lines before Cadiz, with only 4000 men in them, and collecting his troops from all quarters, left Seville on the 1st, with a force, which with the other reinforcements which he obtained on his march, amounted to 38,000 infantry, and cavalry. With these, he advanced to Llerena, and afterwards pushed his advance towards Usagre. General Graham retiring before this formidable force to the position of Albuera, so memorable for the battle fought there in the preceding year, and in which position, being in full communication with General Hill, he awaited to give the enemy battle. Soult, however, finding that Badajos was already fallen, had no relish for fighting, and quickly measured back his steps into Andalusia, followed by a part of the British army.

Lord Wellington having placed a garrison of Spanish troops in Badajos, and set every thing in order about the place, prepared to march to the northward with the greater part of his army, to drive back Marmont, who taking advantage of his absence, had collected his army and advanced into Portugal. In order to distract Lord Wellington's attention, he made demonstrations against Ciudad Rodrigo, but his Lordship was

\* Wellington's dispatch, Badajos, April 7th. The Gazette says the garrison was 3000, but 4000 prisoners and 1200 killed and wounded during the operations, exceeds that number, without accounting any thing for those which fell in the storming of the place. It is evident there is a mistake, and perhaps 5000 put for 6000.



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portance. For this purpose, Lord Wellington detached General Hill, with a considerable force. He succeeded in his object. The bridge was destroyed. The enemy were surprised and defeated, with the loss of 100 killed, 250 drowned, and 300 made prisoners, with only the loss of 177 on our part. A considerable quantity of artillery, stores, and provisions were found in the place.\* The French force, under Bonnet, which sometime previous, had evacuated the Asturias to come to the relief of Ciudad Rodrigo, finding Lord Wellington was gone to the South, returned again to their old positions in that province, after having made some demonstrations against Galicia, in order to cover their real intentions. About this time the town of Burgos was occupied by the Spanish General, Mendizabel, but the French still held the castle.

While these important operations were taking place on the frontiers of Spain and Portugal, numerous severe actions, upon a smaller scale, were fought by the Spanish forces, and the Guerillas, in different parts of Spain, all of them most injurious to the enemy, even where he had a momentary advantage. These actions consumed a vast number of men, who perished daily in all directions. I can only enumerate a few of the most particular of these affairs. On the 6th March, at Roda, the Baron de Erolles had a severe engagement with 3000 French, who attacked him, but were beaten after 10 hours fighting, with the loss of 900 men, and compelled to abandon part of their wounded in their retreat. About this time D'Erolles, and Lacy, penetrated into France, as far as the neighbourhood of Thoulouse, and Narbonne, from whence they brought away a considerable booty in clothing, horses, and four millions reals, (£50,000 sterling.) In Murcia, General Freyre dislodged the French from Zujar and Baza, and occupied the whole kingdom of Jaen. Between the 10th and 20th May, with the assistance of the British ships off that part of the coast, which landed 300 Spanish troops, Freyre succeeded in compelling the enemy to abandon the port of Almeria, which had been a refuge for the enemy's privateers, and rased the fortifications of the place. Near Po-

\* Hill's Dispatch, Truxillo, May 21st.—London Gazette.

zendron, General Villacampa defeated and totally destroyed a French force of 600 men. On the 9th April, he again attacked a French detachment, consisting of 2000 infantry and 150 horse, near Castellego de Arlebau, defeated them with great loss, and released 400 Spanish prisoners. The enemy left 500 dead on the field; one hundred waggons entered Vittoria with their wounded; and, besides, 150 prisoners were taken, some of whom were wounded. The strong position of Chinchilla, which had been fortified and garrisoned by 500 Spanish troops, was attacked by a body of 3000 French, who were repulsed with great loss. On the 14th April, near Arollo, General Ballesteros destroyed a French column, under General Rey.\* Amodea Marquinez surprised a French detachment which were collecting contributions, killed 150, and took a number prisoners. Cura Merino also surprised a body of French troops, and after killing 73 and wounding 98, he took 500 prisoners, all of whom above the rank of privates he put to death, in retaliation for the murder of some of his troops, and of the Junta of Soria, by the French. In another attack, immediately after, by means of an ambuscade, he surprised another body, killed 30 and wounded many more. Mina also captured the garrison of Brihuega, consisting, it was said, of 800 men; and near Alicante, General Roche attacked a body of 2000 of the enemy, who came to levy contributions; killed and wounded 210, and took 53 prisoners. Many other actions took place in other parts, in a similar manner, but the above is supposed sufficient to shew the destructive nature of this warfare, which every day cut off hundreds, without either glory or advantage to the enemy.† A more sanguinary and regular affair took place at Borrios, on the 1st June, between Ballesteros and a strong force of the enemy, under General Currus; Ballesteros attacked them with great spirit, in order to compel them to abandon their positions; but finding them more numerous than he expected, he was defeated with the loss of upwards of 1000 men. That of

\* Wellington's Dispatch to Portuguese Government, May 18th.

† See Spanish Official Papers, and Lisbon and London Gazettes.

the enemy, he pursued the Spaniards.

On the 21st Home Popham, Rhin, landed the marquiteo, a town of Bilbao; and dispersed a considerable number of their magazines. On the Guerillas lost 5000 men.

Previous to and in order to and her allies, proposing negotiations, equivocal terms, for a moment of miseries of war, lawless manner pretty broad terms, all the miseries of view of the past. "Many changes years, which have been effected by the his master were to point, he proceeded which Spain, and naturally excite with an equal anxiety, Sir, in a manner able to the sincerity

\* Spanish and other

† Sir Home Popham

‡ Bassano's Letter to

the enemy, however, was also so severe, that he was unable to pursue the Spaniards, who retired unmolested.\*

On the 21st June, the squadron, under the command of Sir Home Popham, consisting of the Venerable, Magnificent, Surveillante, Rhin, Medusa, Hotspur, Rover, Sparrow, and Lyra, landed the marines belonging to their respective ships, at Lequiteo, a town in the province of Biscay, a little to the eastward of Bilbao; and assisted by a party of Guerillas, they completely dispersed a considerable enemy's force there assembled, destroyed all their magazines and provisions, and also took 300 men prisoners. On the part of the British not a man was hurt. The Guerillas lost 56 men, but the loss of the enemy was more considerable.†

Previous to his setting out upon his Northern expedition, and in order to sow doubt and distrust between Great Britain and her allies, Bonaparte had recourse to his usual trick of proposing negotiations for peace, but in such insulting and equivocal terms, as he was sensible would not, and could not for a moment be listened to. After affecting to deplore the miseries of war, upbraiding Great Britain for the arbitrary and lawless manner in which it was carried on, and stating in pretty broad terms, that to her ambition was to be attributed all the miseries which Europe had suffered; he took a weeping view of the past, and a fearless prognostication of the future. "Many changes have taken place in Europe for the last 10 years, which have been the necessary consequence of the war between France and Great Britain, and *many more changes will be effected by the same cause.*"‡ More, indeed, than Bassano, or his master were then aware of. Coming, however, to the main point, he proceeded: "the calamities (who caused them?) under which Spain, and the vast regions of South America suffer, should naturally excite the interest of all nations, and inspire them with an equal anxiety for their termination. *I will express myself, Sir, in a manner which your Excellency will find conformable to the sincerity of the step which I am authorised to take, and*

\* Spanish and other accounts.

† Sir Home Popham's Dispatch, June 21st.—London Gazette.

‡ Bassano's Letter to Lord Castlereagh, Paris, April 17th, 1812.

nothing will better evince the sincerity and *sublimity of it, than the precise language which I have been directed to use.*"\* In truth, the word was well fitted to the action, and the action to the word; but with this special provision, that this French sublimity so far outstripped the modesty of nature, that justice could only treat it with scorn. But mark the object of this sublime language. "The integrity of Spain shall be guaranteed. France shall renounce all idea of extending her dominions beyond the Pyrennees. *The present Dynasty shall be declared independent, and Spain shall be governed by a national Constitution of her Cortes.*"† Very well, Monsieur Bassano; but who was the Sovereign you meant should call together and govern this Constitutional Cortes? Whether was it Joseph or Ferdinand that you meant? Lord Castlereagh, in the name of his Sovereign, very properly, put this important question to the Duke de Bassano, declaring, explicitly, that if the present Dynasty meant Joseph, such a proposition could not be listened to for a moment; but if it meant Ferdinand, that then his Sovereign was ready to take the matter into his serious consideration, in order to adjust the differences between the two countries.‡ To this reply no answer whatever was returned by the French Government. Perhaps the annals of history never produced a more barefaced attempt, to insult the understanding or the feelings of an independent nation, than this letter which the Duke de Bassano was *directed* to send to the British Government. Nothing but French insolence could have attempted it. It deserved no answer; and it is only to be regretted that it received one. Had such a message been sent to Rome, in the days of Roman glory, she would have ducked the messenger who brought it in the Tyber, and stood acquitted in the eyes of posterity, for either intemperance or imprudence in her conduct. Strange to say, however, there were men in Britain, who saw nothing unfair or improper in the conduct of Bonaparte at this moment, and in this instance, but every thing that was haughty and improper in the conduct of the ministers of their

\* Bassano's Letter to Lord Castlereagh, Paris, April 17th, 1812.

† Ditto, ditto, ditto.

‡ Castlereagh's Letter to Bassano, London, April 23d, 1812.

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country. Mr. Whitbread thought "that it was highly imprudent in the noble Lord (Castlereagh) to send the answer which he did; that he believed that Bonaparte "now was sincerely desirous of negotiation," and that his Majesty's ministers should have returned for answer, "On such terms we will meet you in negotiation: we will set apart, for the present, the question with regard to the dynasty of Spain; that shall form a subject for a distinct discussion." A strange peace, indeed, it would have been, without settling this point in the outset! Would Russia have resisted as she did, had Britain at that moment sheathed the sword? Mr. Sheridan, however, came forward in a true British spirit, and branded the proposal of the French Government as it deserved, in a few words, as "*perfidious, insidious, and insulting*," to this country. In order too, to prevent the answer of the British Government from reaching Paris on the 25th, before important dispatches were sent off to Russia, the French Government directed the flag of truce which carried it, to be fired on at Calais, and compelled it to go round to Morlaix, like a *carter*; and, then had the consummate audacity to send over to make an apology for such conduct, attributing it to the ignorance of the commanding officer at Calais, as if he did not know the flag of truce, when he saw one dispatched, or, rather had dispatched one to England, and was certain that an answer would be returned. Such were the miserable tricks of this diabolical Government.

Lord Wellington having left a considerable force, under General Hill, to watch the motions of Drouet and Soult, on the side of Andalusia, commenced his march, as has been already mentioned, to the Northward. On the 13th June, the whole army crossed the Agueda; and, on the 16th, the whole arrived at Volmusa, a rivulet about six miles from Salamanca. The enemy shewed his intention of defending the heights, near the Tormes, but his cavalry being immediately driven in by the British, during the night of the 16th, he evacuated Salamanca, leaving a garrison of 800 men in the forts, which he had constructed upon the ruins of the convents and colleges. Of these,

\* Mr. Whitbread, House of Commons, July 21st, 1812.



object of the enemy, by this movement, was to endeavour to communicate with the garrisons in the forts, but which was foreseen, and prevented by Lord Wellington, who immediately made the army change front, according to the position of the enemy. On the morning of the 24th, the enemy persevering in his plan, crossed the Tormes at Huerta. General Graham, with the 1st and 7th divisions, and General Le Marchant's brigade of cavalry was also ordered to cross that river to oppose the designs of the enemy, who, perceiving the preparations which were made to receive them, very prudently withdrew upon the afternoon of the 24th, recrossed the Tormes, and occupied the position which he held on the preceding day. In the operations against the forts, the allied armies met with considerable difficulties. They were three in number, and so constructed that each protected the other. Although breaches had been effected in St. Vincente, which was the principal work, still it could not be carried till the allied army had obtained possession of fort St. Cayetano. For this purpose, Major General Clinton, on the night of the 23d, attempted to take it by storm. In this attempt, however, he did not succeed, notwithstanding the gallantry of those employed in the service. Major General Bowes was unfortunately wounded, in the commencement of the assault—he retired to get his wound dressed—returned to the charge again—received a second wound which quickly deprived him of life.\* He was a brave officer—he fell in a noble cause, and in a glorious manner. Wellington lamented, and his country mourns his loss.

The obstinate defence made by these forts, and their strength, exceeded so much Lord Wellington's calculations, that a supply of ammunition was necessary from the rear, which took up six days to bring forward. Having obtained this, the fire against the forts recommenced with great vigour, and by the forenoon of the 27th, a practicable breach was effected in fort St. Cayetano; and nearly about the same time the buildings in St. Vincente was set on fire. Directions were immediately given to storm forts St. Cayetano and La Merced; but some

\* Wellington's Dispatch, Salamanca, June 25th.

delay took place, on account of the respective commanding officers of these forts, offering to capitulate, but upon such terms as made it obvious, that the whole was proposed with the sole design of gaining time, till the fire in St. Vincente was extinguished. The attack was ordered to take place without any further delay; and the operations were accordingly carried into effect, in the most gallant manner, by Lieutenant Colonel Davies of the 36th regiment, under Major General Clinton. The troops entered fort le Cayetano, by the gorge, and escalated that of fort La Merced. The 9th regiment of Cacadores had actually entered one of the redoubts of fort La Vincente, when the Governor sent a flag of truce, offering to give up the place, upon being allowed to march out with all the honours of war; the garrison to be prisoners of war; and the officers to retain their personal military baggage, and the soldiers their knapsacks. This was agreed to, and the place entered by the allied troops. The enemy's force, at first, consisted of 800 men, which were all taken prisoners, except what were killed and wounded during the operations. Thirty pieces of cannon were taken in the forts, and considerable quantities of clothing and military stores. The loss of the allies consisted of 481 British, and 24 Portuguese killed and wounded, of which number 144 were in the action with the army of Marmont, whose loss must have been at least, as many. Seven hundred and six prisoners were taken in the forts; consequently, about 100 must have been killed and wounded in them.\* All these operations were carried on in the sight of Marmont and his army, who had it not in his power to render any assistance, so closely was he watched by his skilful antagonist.

While these operations were going forward at Salamanca, other affairs, of less importance, had taken place in other quarters. Amongst these was an unfortunate rencounter with some French cavalry, and part of those under the command of General Hill. The British force consisted of a detachment, under the command of General Slade, and the enemy's force of two regiments of dragoons, under the command of General le Alle-

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\* Wellington's Dispatch, Fuente La Pena, June 30th.

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mand. The action took place on the 11th of June at Llerena. At first the British were successful, but our troops engaging too eagerly in the pursuit, after having overthrown the enemy, advanced so far in an irregular manner, as to give the enemy an opportunity of bringing up a fresh force and attacking in a body the British cavalry, now scattered and disunited from each other. The consequence of which was, that the British were defeated in their turn; and were obliged to retire, with the considerable loss of 46 killed and wounded and 118 prisoners. General Drouet having been at this time reinforced by three battalions, advanced upon Llerena, with a force consisting of 7000 men; and Soult with 13000 more was advancing from Seville towards Estremadura. In consequence of these movements, General Hill fell back to the position of Albuera, where he was joined by the 5th, 17th, and 22d regiments of the line, and the 11th Portuguese Cacadores from Badajos, and by the Spanish troops under Conde de Penne Villemur, which would have rendered him a match for the enemy.\* All Soult's demonstrations, however, were only feints, to alarm Wellington for the situation of the south of Portugal; for the situation of Andalusia was such, that Soult could not possibly spare a sufficient force from that quarter to endanger the British force under Hill. This Lord Wellington was fully aware of, and paid no attention to his movements. On the 12th, Gen. Hill having learnt, that the enemy had left at Maguella the greater part of the prisoners which he had taken from General Slade on the 11th, sent Lieutenant Strenewitz with a detachment of 50 men under the command of Lieutenant Bridges to endeavour to release them. This detachment fell in with a party of eighty French dragoons, which they immediately attacked and defeated, with the loss of several killed and wounded on the part of the enemy, and 20 prisoners, while the British loss was only one man killed.† The dispatch of Lord Wellington referred to, does not say whether the prisoners were released or not.

\* Hill's and Slade's dispatches of the 11th and 17th of August.

† Wellington's dispatch Fuente La Pena, June 20th.

In Catalonia, General Lacy, on the 26th May, attacked the French garrison which held the town of Molins del Rey, and which amounted to 3500 men. The engagement, which lasted for five hours, was obstinate and severe: but the enemy were at last totally defeated, with the loss of 1000 men put *hors de combat*.\* On the 21st May, at Vega de Matagorda, the Empecinado fell in with a party of the enemy, consisting of 500 infantry and 100 cavalry, all chosen grenadiers; and notwithstanding that his troops were very much exhausted, he attacked the enemy's force, which was under the command of the traitor Don S. Manco, and totally routed them. One hundred and seventy-eight men only escaped. Amongst the prisoners taken, were 19 Juramentados who were immediately shot as traitors.† The town of Tudela was taken on the 29th May by J. D. Duran. The place was attacked, and the enemy driven from it at the point of the bayonet, with considerable loss in killed and wounded, and from 800 to 1000 prisoners. The Spanish loss was 23 killed and wounded, and they also released several Spanish prisoners. There was found in the place 15 cannon of large calibre, one 9 inch mortar, and two howitzers, with a number of carriages for cannon which had been sent from Saragossa, and were supposed to be intended for an attack upon Ciudad Rodrigo. All these were either brought away, or rendered useless.‡ In the south, Ballesteros was recruiting and reorganizing his forces after his last severe affair with the enemy, and was nearly in a situation again to take the field.

The surrender of the forts at Salamanca, was the signal for the retreat of the army of Marmont. Lord Wellington having destroyed the forts which he had taken, followed him closely with the allied army. Marmont fell back in the direction of Toro and Tordesillas, and passing the Douro, (in which operation his rear lost near 500 men, from the exertions of the allied army;) he took up a position on the north bank of the Douro, his left at Simanca, his centre at Tordesillas, and his right

\* Lacey's dispatch, Cavallo, May 1st.

† Empecinado's dispatch, Ibiennas, May 23d.

‡ Duran's dispatch, Prihuela, June 6th.

|| Espana's dispatch to Cortes, June 30th.

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at Pollos. The north bank of the Douro is here high and rugged, only at one place where it was possible to ford the river, there was a considerable plain, but which was completely commanded by some adjoining heights which the enemy held in great force, and covered them with artillery. The British army were on the opposite bank, the left at Pollos on the 3d, and the centre opposite the bridge of Tordesillas, and the head quarters on the 7th at Rueda. Under the circumstances which have been mentioned, Lord Wellington did not conceive it prudent to force the passage of the Douro, until he had obtained more adequate means to accomplish that object.\* Operations of the first magnitude, and events of the first importance were now approaching. Marmont had assembled all the disposable force in that part of Spain. Bonnet, with 10,000 men collected in Asturias, had again evacuated that province, and was marching with the utmost haste to join him, Joseph himself was in motion. The fort of Mirabete on the Tagus was abandoned on the 11th, and the garrison marched to Madrid, from whence Joseph with the army of the Centre, consisting of 12,000 infantry and 3000 cavalry, set out for the northward to join Marmont, and arrest the progress of Lord Wellington. Marmont, whose force could not amount to much fewer than 60,000 men, without either Bonnet or Joseph's troops, now conceived himself strong enough to risque a battle with Lord Wellington, or if the British General declined it, to compel him to retreat into Portugal. A series of the most masterly movements now commenced on his part, to accomplish this important object, in which all the skill and judgment of those French tactics which had so long alarmed, confounded, and defeated Europe, were exerted to the utmost, against the skill of the British General; and the result proved most glorious to the latter. Masterly as the movements of Marmont were, they were all culminated upon that scale of "Grand French military combinations, which command victory, and decide the fate of empires, that noble *audacity* which no reverse can shake, and which commands events."† In other words, that they could

\* Wellington's dispatch, Rueda, July 7th.

† Moniteur, April 16th, 1813, upon Bonaparte's setting out for the North.



not be beaten, and therefore they not only calculated upon victory as certain, but took measures before hand to render the fate of their antagonists complete; without ever reflecting, that by doing so, they might place themselves in the very situation in which they expected to place their adversaries. This was certainly Marmont's object with Lord Wellington—he wanted to cut off the British army from the possibility of a retreat, and never reflected, that his skillful antagonist might place him in a similar situation. All his art, all his judgment, collected from twenty years experience on the fields of war, and against which Bonaparte had so often proclaimed that no British officer could oppose effectual resistance, was now exerted upon the largest scale against the British General, but exerted in vain; and for the first time, Europe saw these tactics, and all that military skill which had so long alarmed her, most conspicuously and signally defeated.

On the 15th and 16th, Marmont moved his army to the right, and concentrated it between Toro and St. Roman, and on the evening of the latter day, a considerable body passed the Douro at Toro. To counteract this movement, Lord Wellington drew his army more to the left. This movement of the enemy was only a feint, to deceive Lord Wellington with regard to his real intentions. He recrossed the Douro at Toro on the evening of the 16th, and marching his troops 10 leagues without halting, crossed the Douro again at Tordesillas, and advanced to La Nava del Rey. All these operations of crossing the river, Marmont had in his power to effect without the possibility of Lord Wellington being able to prevent it, as he had the command of all the bridges and the fords over the river. With the view of assembling the British army on the Guarena, the 4th and light divisions, with Major General Anson's brigades of cavalry had marched to Castri-gon on the 16th, where they remained under the command of Sir Stapleton Cotton, on the 17th, not having received orders to proceed farther. Before these troops could receive the orders for their retreat, the enemy attacked them early on the morning of the 18th, but Sir Stapleton Cotton nobly maintained his post, without any loss, till the movement of the 3d division to Tordesillas de la Orden, and Major Gen-

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ral Le Marchant's, Major General Alten's, and Major General Bock's brigades of cavalry to Alajos, enabled them to retreat, and join the remainder of the army in safety. The enemy turned the left flank of the allied army at Castrejon, but could not prevent the troops from retiring in admirable order, first upon Tordesillas de la Orden, and next, in the same order, across the Guarena, which they passed in the face of the whole army of the enemy. The Guarena, which falls into the Douro, is formed of four streams, which issue from a ridge of mountains, and flow northward to the latter river. These streams unite below Canizal, and form the Guarena. On the heights upon the right bank of this river, the enemy took up a strong position, while the 4th, 5th, and light divisions of the allied army occupied heights on the opposite bank. The remainder crossed the Guarena, at Vallesa, to oppose the enemy, who appeared to have the intention of turning their right. Soon afterwards, however, the enemy crossed the river at Carteillo, below the junction of the streams, and pressed forward upon the left of the allies, with the intention of entering the valley of Canizal. This brought on a sharp affair, in which Major General Alten's brigade of cavalry, supported by the 3d dragoons, Major General Anson's, and Brigadier General Harvey's brigades of infantry were engaged. The enemy were defeated with considerable loss in killed and wounded, by the 37th and 40th regiments, which advanced to the charge with their bayonets; and General Alten's brigade took 200 prisoners. On the 19th, the enemy withdrew all their troops from their right, and marched upon their left, by Tarragona, apparently with the intention of turning the right of the allies. The whole army of the allies therefore crossed the upper Guarena during the night, and made every preparation for a decisive action, which was expected to take place on the 20th, upon the plains of Vallesa, but early in the morning the enemy made another movement with several columns, to his left, and crossed the Guarena at Santa la Piedra, and encamped on the night of the 20th, at Bibalafuente. The allied army made a corresponding movement to its right, by Cantalpino, and encamped the same night at Cabesa Velloso; the 6th division and Major

General Alten's brigade of cavalry being at the same time at Aldea Lingua, a small village upon the Tormes. Next day the whole army was concentrated on that river, with the enemy on their front, his principal force being near Huerta. The object of the enemy, by these masterly manœuvres, was to cut off the communication of the allied army with Salamanca and Ciudad Rodrigo, from which places they received all their supplies, and in which direction all their reinforcements marched. The movements of each army was watched with the most eager solicitude, by their respective commanders, but nothing less than the total destruction of his antagonist was the calculation of the French Marshal. He made himself sure of not only beating the allied army, but he wanted to do that in a situation where he had previously cut them off from all possibility of assistance, and to scatter them, so as they would never after be able to make head against him. This important object occupied his whole thoughts, and called forth his utmost skill and exertions. It prompted every movement, guided every motion. It brought on the general and glorious battle of Salamanca.

Salamanca, the capital of the Province of that name, in the kingdom of Leon, is a very ancient and venerable city, situated upon the river Tormes, a tributary stream of the Douro. It is built partly on a plain, and partly on three hills, and contains about 7000 houses and 24,000 inhabitants. Besides the cathedral, there are 25 parish churches, 39 convents, and 6 hospitals. Its University was once the most celebrated in Europe, but is now much declined. It is about 75 miles South of Leon, and 110 North West of Madrid. Over the Tormes is a bridge of 25 arches, built by the Romans. The Tormes is here a considerable river. During the upper part of its course it runs N. passing by Alba de Tormes and Huerta; but, about nine miles above Salamanca, it bends in a circular manner, and then continues its course, almost due West, to the Douro. It was within this bend, between the city and Alba de Tormes, that the memorable battle of Salamanca was fought.

On the afternoon of the 21st, the enemy crossed the Tormes between Huerta and Alba de Tormes, with the greater part of his army, the remainder being left at Bibalafuente. Continu-

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**THE LINE OF THE OPERATIONS  
OF THE ALLIED ARMY  
COMMANDED BY THE  
DUKE OF WELLINGTON**

1812

Drawn by J. A. McQueen

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SCALE.  
MILES OF 1760 YARDS; ABOUT 60 TO A DEGREE.

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ting his movement upon the left, he endeavoured to gain the roads which led to Ciudad Rodrigo. The allied army also crossed the Tormes, by the bridge of Salamanca and the ford of St. Martha, with the exception of the 3d division, and General Urban's cavalry, which were left on the right bank to oppose the enemy's force at Bibalafuente. Lord Wellington was now most anxious for an opportunity to engage his antagonist, as he had received certain intelligence that General Chauvel with the cavalry and horse artillery of the army of the North, had reached Pollos, and would certainly join Marmont next day, or the 23d at farthest. Still continuing to press forward, in furtherance of his favourite plan, Marmont, during the night of the 21st, occupied the village of Calvaresa de Ariba, and the height near it, called Nuestra Senora de la Pena. The cavalry of the allied army occupied the village of Calvaresa de Abaxo; and, early in the morning of the 22d, detachments from both armies attempted to obtain possession of one of the two hills called Dos Arapiles, which was the most distant from the right wing of the allied position. The superiority, however, of the enemy's force enabled him to succeed in gaining this hill, the possession of which materially strengthened his position, and gave him additional means of annoying the allies. All this time the light troops of the 7th division, and the 4th Cacadores, belonging to General Pacl's brigade, were engaged with the enemy upon the height called Nuestra Senora de la Pena, and on which height they maintained themselves throughout the day, notwithstanding every effort of the enemy to dislodge them. The possession, however, of the more distant of the Arapiles, by the enemy, rendered it necessary for the British General to extend the right of his army beyond Arapiles, and to occupy the village of that name with light infantry. Previous to the general attack by our troops, the village of Arapiles was held by Lieutenant Colonel Woodford, with the light battalion of the brigade of Guards, supported by two companies of fusileers, under the command of Captain Crowder. These brave men maintained this important post against every effort of the enemy. Here Lieutenant General Cole, with the 4th division, was placed. Major General Pakenham, who commanded the

3d division, on account of the absence of General Picton from ill health, was directed to move across the Tormes with the troops under his command, including Brigadier General D'Urban's cavalry, and to place these forces at Aldea Trejada. At the same time, Brigadier General Bradford's brigade of Portuguese infantry, and Don Carlos de Espana's Spanish infantry moved up likewise to the neighbourhood of Las Torres, between the 3d and 4th divisions.

From the variety of the enemy's movements, it was no easy matter to guess his real intentions; but, after a variety of evolutions, about two o'clock on the afternoon of the 22d, he determined upon his plan; and, under cover of a heavy cannonade, which did but little execution, he extended his left, and moved forward his troops, with the intention to embrace the position of Arapiles, which the allies held, and from thence to attack and break the line, and separate the right wing from the main body.\* The plan was daring; and, had it succeeded, might have been most ruinous, for he would not only have turned and cut off the communication of the allied army, with Ciudad Rodrigo,† but he would have placed between two fires, not only the right wing of the allies, but also by means of his force from Bibalafuente, the centre and left wing also. Success, decisive and complete, seemed before the eyes, and within the grasp of the French Marshal; billets were given out to the French soldiers, to lodge that night in Salamanca; but he had British troops to contend with, and a Wellington to direct them.

With the eye of the eagle when in search of his prey, Wellington perceived the moment was arrived, the consequences of which would rebuke the pride of Marmont. "The extension," said our gallant General, "of his line to his left, however, and its advance upon our right, notwithstanding that his troops still occupied very strong ground, and his position was well defended by cannon, gave me an opportunity of attacking him, for which I had been long anxious."‡ This long expected and critical

\* Wellington's Dispatch, Flores de Avila, July 24th, 1812.

† "Of carrying myself on the enemy's communications on Tamames,"—Marmont's Dispatch, July 31st.

‡ Wellington's Dispatch, Flores de Avila, July, 24th, 1812.

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moment was seized with the characteristic energy and skill of the British General—that “unfortunate moment which destroyed the result of six weeks of wise combinations, of methodical movements, the issue of which had hitherto appeared certain, and which every thing appeared to presage to us that we should reap the fruit of.”—*Marmont's dispatch*. That unfortunate moment was immediately taken advantage of. The spirit of the British soldier, long checked by the judgment of their General, was now given its full play. To attack the enemy at all points, heedless of his position or his numbers, had long been the wish of every individual. The order was now given. It was obeyed with alacrity. Officers and men, like lions, rushed to the combat. The General had done his duty, it belonged to them to do theirs. The right wing of the allied army was immediately reinforced by the 5th division, under Major General Leith, who were placed behind the village of Arapiles, on the right of the 4th division, with the 6th and 7th divisions in reserve. As soon as these troops had taken their station, the Hon. Major General Pakenham, with the 3d division, General Urban's cavalry, and two squadrons of the 14th light dragoons, under Lieutenant Colonel Harvey, in four columns, were ordered forward to turn the enemy's left on the heights; while Brigadier General Bradford's brigade, the 5th division, under Lieutenant General Leith, the 4th division, under the command of the Hon. Lieutenant General Cole, and the cavalry under the command of Lieutenant General Sir Stapleton Cotton, were appointed to attack them in front, supported in reserve by the 6th division, under Major General Clinton, the 7th division, under Major General Hope; and Don Carlos de Espana's Spanish division, and Brigadier Gen. Pack, were to support the left of the 4th division, by attacking the height of Dos Arapiles, which the enemy held. On the left, the 1st and light divisions were placed in reserve.

Such were the positions, and such was the duty which the different columns of the British army held and were to perform at Salamanca. The grand attack began at four o'clock in the afternoon, and was irresistible. The troops on the left, under the command of the Hon. Major General Pakenham, gallantly sup-

ported by the Portuguese cavalry under Brigadier General Urban, and Colonel Harvey's squadrons of the 14th dragoons, overthrew every thing opposed to them, and defeated completely every attempt of the enemy to retrieve his disasters on his left, and all his endeavours to annoy the flank of the 8th division. It was on the centre, however, where the attack was most determined, and the defence most obstinate. The divisions under the command of Bradford, Leith, and Cole, with the cavalry under Sir Stapleton Cotton, performed prodigies of valour. They attacked the "*inexpugnable post which completed the enemy's position,*"\* and drove him from one height to another, bringing forward their right so as to acquire strength upon the enemy's flank, in proportion as they advanced. General Pack, in the meantime, made an attack upon the front of Arapiles. In this, however, he was foiled, after every effort; and which advantage gave the enemy an opportunity to detach from this point, a considerable force to the assistance of that part of his line pressed by the 4th division, under General Cole. The engagement here was exceedingly hot and sanguinary. The British troops, under a tremendous cannonade, descended from the heights they occupied, in silence. At the bottom of the valley, before they began to ascend the height occupied by the enemy, while grape shot and shells poured against them as thick as hail, they met the sharpshooters of the enemy, whose incessant fire greatly annoyed them; ascending the hill in a firm and determined mass, they came in close contact with the enemy, who perceiving that the British columns were resolved to come to close quarters, immediately sent their guns to the rear, and in solid squares waited the approach of their antagonists. The British were now within 40 yards of their front, without having fired a shot, when the French masses, with the front rank kneeling, commenced a general discharge of musquetry upon them. It was received, and answered in a moment. With three cheers, and with fixed bayonets, the British columns advanced against the enemy's masses. Terror struck they fled—

\* "This post which was otherwise well occupied, was *inexpugnable*; and in *it* *it* completed the position I had taken."—Marmont's dispatch, July 31st.

at a distance division, they enemy's army, been reinforced General Pack' the efforts of the Marshal Beresford Brigadier General were in the second upon the flank service, he received was, in this place general officers against a column and cut to pieces ral Le Marchant wounded; Marmont much about the obliged to quit the Bonnet, second many other officers continuing to remain general Clinton, was overthrown; "the cess,"\* In the night troops which fled from Arapiles, still divisions which had Stubb's Portuguese re-formed, and Marmont the 4th division, when they were also attacked by the 3d and 5th enemy was driven general. The enemy towards Huerta, and

\* Wellington

at a distance they again rallied. Again, charged by the 5th division, they turned and fled. One division, however, of the enemy's army, more courageous than the rest, and which had been reinforced from the post of Arapiles, after the failure of General Pack's attack, bravely maintained its post against all the efforts of the 4th division, who were compelled to give way. Marshal Beresford, who was upon the spot, immediately ordered Brigadier General Spry's brigade of the 5th division, which were in the second line, to change its front, and bring its fire upon the flank of the enemy's division. While engaged in this service, he received a severe wound. How hot the engagement was, in this place, may easily be inferred from the number of general officers which fell. In a brilliant charge of the cavalry against a column of the enemy's infantry, which they overthrew and cut to pieces, that gallant and meritorious officer, General Le Marchant, was killed. General Cole had already been wounded; Marshal Beresford next shared the same fate; and much about the same time General Leith was wounded, and obliged to quit the field. On the side of the enemy, General Bonnet, second in command, was wounded and taken, and many other officers fell. The enemy's division, at this point, continuing to remain firm, the 6th division, under Major General Clinton, was ordered to relieve the 4th. The enemy was overthrown; "the battle was soon restored to its former success."\* In the meantime, the enemy's right, reinforced by the troops which fled from his left, and by those who were driven from Arapiles, still continued to resist. The first and light divisions which had been placed in reserve, together with Colonel Stubb's Portuguese brigade of the 4th division, which was re-formed, and Major General William Anson's brigade, also of the 4th division, were ordered to turn the enemy's right, while they were also attacked in front, by the 5th division, supported by the 3d and 5th divisions. After an obstinate conflict, the enemy was driven from his position. The route became general. The enemy fled through the woods in consternation, towards Huerta, and the fords of the Tormes, pursued by the

\* Wellington's dispatch, Flores de Avila, July 24th.

British cavalry, and General Anson's brigade, "as long as they could find any of them together."\* The darkness of the night alone saved the remains of the French army from total destruction. In their flight they were completely broken. The cavalry penetrated their ranks, and made a dreadful carnage. At these points were found three French dead bodies for every British.

Such is a general sketch of the important battle of Salamanca, in every point of view one of the most brilliant achievements which ever adorned the military annals of Britain. With the rapidity of lightning, the shock vibrated to every part of the Peninsula. It made a deep impression upon the minds of the population of Europe. Its animating influence was felt and acknowledged on the banks of the Moskwa. Salamanca nerved the arm which resisted and overcame the tyrant's utmost strength, upon the fatal fields of Borodino.† It was the first general battle, where in large armies, and in an open country, the utmost military skill of France was set at defiance, and vanquished. It broke the charm which bound Europe in subjection, and which entailed misery on millions. The glory of all this was justly reserved for the British General and his followers—to the heroic champion of that happy land, who had hitherto saved herself by her firmness, and who was appointed to save Europe by her exertions and example. Justly did Marmont characterise it as an "*unhappy event*." "The dire influence which this battle would have upon the success of the army;" and most correctly did he lament, in strains of sorrow, which he must have felt, "it is difficult for me to express the different sentiments which agitated me at the fatal moment, when the wound I received caused my being separated from the army"—but the wound in the body was little in comparison to the wound in the mind. "I could with delight (says he) have exchanged this wound, for the certainty of receiving a mortal stroke at the close of the day, to have preserv-

\* Wellington's dispatch, Flores de Avila, July 24th.

† "On the eve of that battle, Prince Kutusoff animated his troops by telling them what the English had done at Salamanca."—Lord Castlereagh's Speech, House of Commons, December 3d, 1812.


ed the faculty given his life, his own vanity, invincibility of talent and skill, and his mastery of war. Under the veil which had been destined to be torn in agony, its dreary strength is not very apparent on the side of that of the British, which each hero of the campaign found from the mark, 60,000 strong. In the battle of Chief, and four second in command, tenant Colonels, privates made pards, and a colonel into the hands of the cavalry in the number of dead, (say loss,) is very large. The day viewed the their infantry with of the dead bodies have rated the perhaps 10,000 of Salamanca, followed it, from the



ed the faculty of command."\* In other words, he would have given his life, could he have recalled that fatal moment, when his own vanity and rashness, laid not only his fame, but the invincibility of the French arms—the infallibility of French talent and skill, open to the mercy of that antagonist, whom he and his master had so often ridiculed as a school-boy in the art of war. Under the command of the unhappy Marmont, that veil which had so long blinded the nations of Europe, was destined to be torn asunder, and no wonder that he regretted, in agony, its dreadful consequences.

The strength of the respective armies on this dreadful day is not very accurately known. It has been variously estimated on the side of the French, at from 50 to 70,000 men, and on that of the British, at from 40 to 60,000. From the losses which each here sustained, and their strength at future stages of the campaign, the mean betwixt them was perhaps not far from the mark, viz. The allied army 50,000, and the French 60,000 strong. Marmont was certainly superior in numbers. In the battle of Salamanca, the French had the General in Chief, and four General Officers severely wounded. Bonnet second in command wounded, and with 3 Colonels; 3 Lieutenant Colonels; 130 Officers of inferior rank, and about 7000 privates made prisoners; 20 pieces of cannon; 2 eagles, 6 standards, and a considerable number of baggage waggons, also fell into the hands of the victors. The killed and wounded was not stated, but it must have been great. They were broken by the cavalry in their flight, and severely cut up. "The number of dead, (says Lord Wellington, when speaking of their loss,) is very large," and officers of respectability who next day viewed the field of battle, state, that in the places where their infantry was broken by the British cavalry, the number of the dead bodies was as three to one. Private accounts have rated the killed and wounded from 8 to 12,000, and perhaps 10,000 is not far from the real number. The battle of Salamanca, with the operations which preceded and followed it, from the time that the French crossed the Douro,





\* Marmont's dispatch, July 31st.







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until they recrossed that stream in their flight, certainly cost their army 20,000 men. The loss of the allied army amounted during the same period, to 5563 killed and wounded, 572 missing, the greater number of whom were most probably amongst the first number, as Marmont does not attempt to claim any prisoners on the 22d, and only 60 were missing in the skirmishes before and after.

The individual acts of heroism performed in the British army on this memorable day, can only be recorded by those who were eye witnesses of it. All did their duty. To particularize any of the names of those gallant men, who fought, who bled, and fell in defence of their country's dearest rights, and for the liberty of mankind, is altogether unnecessary, beyond what the dispatches of their gallant chief has already given to the world. "Throughout this trying day," says the brave General, "I had every reason to be satisfied with the conduct of the General officers and the troops. There was no officer of corps engaged in this action, who did not perform his duty for his Sovereign and his country. I cannot say too much in praise of every individual in his station."\* Volumes

\* Wellington's dispatch, Flores de Avila, July 24th.—The following is the list enumerated by the gallant General himself: "I am, (says he,) much indebted to Marshal Sir William Pakenham, for his friendly counsel and assistance, both previous to and during the action; to Lieutenant Generals Sir Stapleton Cotton, Leith, and Cole; and Major Generals Clinton and the Hon. Edward Pakenham, for the manner in which they led the divisions of cavalry and infantry under their command respectively; to Major General Hulse, commanding a brigade in the 6th division; Major General G. Anson, commanding a brigade of cavalry; Col Hinde, Colonel the Hon. William Ponsonby, commanding Major General le Marchant's brigade, after the fall of that officer; to Major General William Anson, commanding a brigade of the 4th division; Major General Pringle, commanding a brigade in the 5th division, and the division after Lieutenant General Leith was wounded; Brigadier General Bradford, Brigadier General Spry, Colonel Stubbs, and Brigadier General Power of the Portuguese service; Likewise to Lieutenant Col. Campbell of the 94th, commanding a brigade in the 3d division; Lieutenant Colonel Williams of the 60th foot; Lieutenant Colonel Wallace of the 88th, commanding a brigade in the 3d division; Lieutenant Colonel Ellis of the 23d, commanding General Pakenham's brigade in the 4th division, during his absence in the command of the 3d division. The Hon. Lieutenant Colonel Greville of the 38th regiment, commanding Major General Hay's brigade in the 5th division, during his absence on leave; Brigadier General Pack; Brigadier General the Conde de Rezende, of

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wrote on the subject cannot say more. Let the individuals who fought at Salamanca carry those lines in their bosoms, and these will prove their passport through the world. For his services at Salamanca, Wellington was raised to the rank of a Marquis of the United Kingdom; and for the third time within the space of six months, did our brave General and his gallant troops, receive the undivided thanks of the British Legislature, and the unbounded applause of their country. They deserved it. Nor was our allies in the Peninsula forgotten—they also shared the praise of Wellington and his country—they also heaped thanks and honours upon their deliverer. The accounts of the victory of Salamanca, were received with the greatest joy at Cadiz. A monument was decreed by the Cortes, to be erected upon the spot where it was fought, and taking advantage of the feeling of exultation with which it was received, and the cheering prospects which its results held out, of ultimate and complete success in their glorious cause, a levy of 50,000 men was ordered to be made in the different provinces.

The account which Marmont gave of these memorable operations, has been characterised as tolerably correct. In his relation of the movements and manœuvres which led to the battle, the difference is indeed not very material. But in his account of the skirmishes upon the 18th at the Guarena, it was far from true, when he says he took from 3 to 400 prisoners, but lost none; whereas the missing in the British army was only 34, while they took 280 prisoners, besides killing and wounding

the Portuguese service; Colonel Douglas of the 8th Portuguese regiment; Lieutenant Colonel the Conde de Ficalho of the same regiment; and Lieutenant Colonel Bingham of the 52d regiment; likewise to Brigadier General de Urban, and Lieutenant Colonel Harvey of the 14th light dragoons; Colonel Lord Edward Somerset, commanding the 4th dragoons; and Lieutenant Colonel the Hon. Frederick Ponsonby, commanding the 12th Light dragoons. Lieutenant Colonel Woodford; Captain Crowder; Lieutenant Colonel Farmingham; Lieut. Colonel de Lancy, the Deputy Quarter Master General; The Hon. Lieutenant Colonel Dundas, and Lieutenant Colonel Sturgeon of the Staff. Major Scovell; Lieutenant Colonel Waters; Lieutenant Colonel Lord Fitzroy Somerset, His Serene Highness the Prince of Orange Mariscal Del Campo Don Carlos de Espana; Brigadier Don Miguel de Alava, and to Brigadier Don Joseph O'Lawlor. Also to Commissary General Mr. Bisset, and to Dr. McGregor, the Chief of the medical staff.

a considerable number of the enemy. Equally so is the account of the loss at Salamanca, stated at 6000, killed and wounded and prisoners; that is only one third of the real number. If compared, indeed, with other accounts through the medium of the same manufactory, it is comparatively speaking, more correct than others are; but it was mean, disgraceful, and incorrect in the very highest degree, for the French Marshal to lay the consequences of his own fatal error to the blame of the troops, who so bravely fought to retrieve his error and his fortune. He, it is true, acknowledged, that he had been severely beaten, a thing no French General for 22 years before had done; but then the fault was not his, but that of part of his army. The 2d, 5th, 6th, and 7th divisions, with Generals Bonnet, Boyer, and Foy, who were ordered to reinforce his left, which he had too much extended, when he saw Wellington determined to take advantage of his error—all these troops were accused of irregularity and want of attention. "The most of these movements were performed with irregularity. The 5th division after having taken the post assigned to it, extended itself on its left, *without any cause or reason*; the 7th division which had orders to support it, marched to its position, and in short the 2d division was still in the rear."\* Instead of this undeserved censure upon brave men, his language should have been that of Telemachus, when his negligence had placed himself and his friends in imminent danger:

"Falsehood is folly, and 'tis just to own  
The fault committed, it was mine alone;  
*My haste neglected yonder door to bar.*"†

This should have been the language of Marmont, as his was in reality a similar case. "For my object in taking this direction," says he, "*was to continue the movement by my left*, in order to drive the enemy from the neighbourhood of Salamanca, and fight them with greater advantage. I depended upon tak-

\* Marmont's dispatch, Tudela, July 31st.

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\* This dispatch of Marmont in the *Moniteur* till the 20th of July. It travelled separately. It travelled in the 16th and 17th Bulletins.

ing a good defensive position, in which the enemy could undertake nothing against me; and in short, come near enough them to take advantage of the *first faults* they might make, and vigorously attack them." \* This was truly the case—he grasped at too much—he forgot in his hurry an important operation. His antagonist, who had the same object in view which he had, though not so arrogant in his expectations, had as good a right, and was fully as able to see and take advantage of the *first faults* the French General might make. This was done, and it was foolish and base to blame the army, who were placed in danger from their obedience to his commands. If Marmont wrote that dispatch it does him no honour; but if it was transformed either in the *Boutique* of metamorphosis at Paris, which changed things wonderfully, or on the banks of the Dnieper, then he was not to blame. But be this as it may, French vanity has had a hand in it. His account of the affair after the battle, where he states, 200 of our cavalry were killed, and only one regiment of French infantry, (which he admits the cavalry abandoned,) broken, is equally devoid of truth: the loss of the allies there, was only 101 killed and wounded, and 6 missing; while 1700 prisoners were taken from the enemy, and the rest of the body, consisting at first of 2000 men, were killed or wounded. That the wound which the French General received, and which compelled him to leave the field, was a great loss to his army, cannot be doubted, and is most readily admitted; but the error was committed before that took place. It was irremediable, and the more obstinately that he fought to retrieve it, the more decisive would he have rendered his disasters.

From the bloody fields of Salamanca, the discomfited French army fled in dismay towards the Douro. Next morning after the battle, the British army continued the pursuit, and came up with the rear guard of the French army, consisting of 2000 infantry, and a considerable body of cavalry, who upon the approach of the British forces abandoned their infantry and fled,

\* This dispatch of Marmont's, though dated the 31st July, did not appear in the *Moniteur* till the 20th Sept. In fact, it durst not be published till ordered by Bonaparte. It travelled to Russia, and returned with the Courier which brought the 16th and 17th Bulletins from Viasma and Ghajt, Aug. 31st, and Sept. 3d.



The consequence was, that the whole of the infantry was destroyed; 1700 were taken prisoners, and about 300 killed and wounded. General Clauzel took the command of the routed French forces; and certainly, considering the circumstances in which he was placed, he conducted himself with great ability. The French force took the direction of Arevalo, in hopes no doubt, of being joined by Joseph and the army of the Centre, amounting to 13,000 infantry and cavalry. On the 23d, the day after the battle, they had been joined by the cavalry and artillery of the army of the North; but too late to render them any material assistance. Joseph was, however, too late. His army only reached Blasco Sancho on the 25th, a town between Avilla and Arevalo, by which period, the defeated army had been compelled to fly with all speed to the Douro. On the evening of the 25th, Joseph's army obtained some information of the disastrous issue of the battle of the 22d, and immediately commenced its retreat in the direction of Espinar; and Joseph himself, who had only passed the Guadarrama pass on the 27th, having received the disagreeable news, commenced his march to Madrid, and afterwards continuing his retreat south east, through the province of Cuenca, he effected his junction with the army of Suchet.

The victorious allied army continued its advance, interposing its force between Joseph's army and that under Clauzel. By the 28th, the head quarters were at Olmedo; the main body upon the Zapardiel and Adaja rivers, and during the whole line of their advance, they had daily the most convincing proofs of the loss of the French army in the battle of Salamanca. "All accounts," says Lord Wellington, "concur with regard to the great losses sustained by the army of Portugal."\* The light cavalry of the allied army were in close pursuit of the enemy, and in the advance "Continued to take many prisoners."† The enemy's army crossed the Douro at Puente de Douro, and their left wing at Tudela on the 28th, and took the road for Valladolid. The British army conti-

\* Wellington's dispatch, Olmedo, July 28th.

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ued to advance. On the 30th, they entered Valladolid, having made 300 prisoners in the neighbourhood, and 800 sick and wounded in the place; with 17 pieces of cannon, and a considerable quantity of stores. The inhabitants of Valladolid received the allied army with the greatest joy, and hailed them as their deliverers from the oppression under which they had so long groaned. From Valladolid, the French army continued its retreat upon Villa Vanez, with the intention of forming a junction with the army of the Centre on the Upper Douro. Lord, now the Marquis of Wellington, immediately commenced his march to the South East, and on the 1st August, had his head quarters at Cuellar. Joseph Bonaparte left Segovia on the 1st, having destroyed all the cannon and ammunition which were in the place. He carried off also all the church plate; and in the true French system, ended as they always began in every place where they went, by exacting from the inhabitants a considerable contribution. On the 3d, a division of the allied army under the command of General D'Urban, entered the place, and freed them from their oppressors. The rear guard of the French force under General Epert, withdrawing in the direction of Ildefonso, while Joseph had previously re-passed the famous pass of Guadarrama. \*

Few events of much importance took place during this period in other parts of the Peninsula, except the landing of a considerable British and Sicilian force at Alicant, under the command of General Frederick Maitland, where they were joined by some Spanish troops, and the united forces perhaps amounted to 16,000 men. This force, however, was deficient in cavalry, and was too weak to commence offensive operations against Suchet. In the south, Soult continued to augment his force on the confines of Andalusia, where he was watched by General Hill. On the 24th, a very brilliant affair took place near Los Santos, between three regiments of French cavalry, and part of that attached to General Hill's army, and under the orders of Col. Campbell and General Long. The enemy were worsted, and pursued to a considerable distance, with the loss of 30 men killed and wounded, and 11 taken; while on the

\* Wellington's dispatch, Cuellar, Aug. 4th.

side of the allies, only one man was killed and seven wounded. In the north, Sir Home Popham, with the squadron under his command, continued to disturb and annoy the enemy all along the coast of Biscay and the Asturias, till the latter province was evacuated by them. Astorga was besieged by a Spanish force from Galicia, under the command of Castanos and Santocildes; and after a vigorous defence, was obliged to surrender. Fourteen hundred of the garrison were made prisoners, besides the loss in killed and wounded during the siege. \*

In other parts of Spain, severe and destructive operations were carried on between the Spaniards and the enemy, with various success. The second and third Spanish armies, 10,000 strong, under the command of Gen. O'Donnel, had formed the plan of attacking the advance of Suchet's army stationed at Castilla. The plan was well laid, but in the execution of it, from some gross mismanagement of the Spanish officers, but chiefly brigadier Santestivan with 763 horse, who did nothing, it was unsuccessful, and attended with great loss. The enemy though vastly inferior in numbers, (only 3000 strong,) resisted every attempt made by the Spaniards to force their positions; and in the end compelled them to abandon the project, with the loss of about 4000 men. The action took place on the 21st July. A charge of French cavalry seems to have decided the fortune of the day; which the Spanish General fairly admits, was performed with "such unequalled promptitude, that his troops had not time to fire a single shot, before they were either sabred or taken prisoners." The Spanish troops also conducted themselves in the most gallant manner. They withstood the shock of the enemy, and although they had no hope of victory, they refused to give way; "to avoid dispersion (says Don Juan Potoces,) they allowed themselves to be killed, wounded, and made prisoners."† The Spanish officer who conducted himself with the greatest skill, was the brave General Roche. He fought bravely, and carried off his division, consisting at first of 3500 men, to Alicant, with the loss of only

\* Erskine's dispatch, Los Santos, July 25th. Spanish and other accounts.

† Don Juan's dispatch, Orihuela, July 31st, 1812.

300. The enemy at that time was defeated which was severely censured, and Gen. 14th and 22d desperate attacks constantly foiled upon the 22d, and pursued as command of Gen. retreat was com the Spanish Gen. fence of Bilbao nessed it, as a great honour up employed in it. During this p ed. On the 16th left Pampluna grain, Mina atta ly 500 men killed prelude to a still being in great wa men, to which h which augmented and five pieces of to collect grain, ing country. Re met him, loaded twixt them. Mi being advantageo tion; "every fire all sides the killed ed were heard. were employed ag

300. The enemy also suffered considerably; and his situation at that time was such, that he could take no advantage of the defeat which the Spaniards had sustained. O'Donnell was severely censured for his misconduct, and removed from his command, and General Elio appointed in his stead. Between the 14th and 22d of August, the French forces made repeated and desperate attempts to obtain possession of Bilboa, but were constantly foiled with considerable loss. In the last attempt, upon the 22d, their force consisted of 6000 men, who were beaten and pursued as far as Durango, by the Spaniards under the command of Generals Carol, Mendizabel, and Longa. Their retreat was converted into a disorderly flight, by the bravery of the Spanish Generals, and their loss was very great. The defence of Bilboa was characterised, by a British officer who witnessed it, as a most gallant achievement, and such as reflected great honour upon the Spanish Generals and troops who were employed in it.\*

During this period, Mina was actively and usefully employed. On the 16th August, the French General, Abbe, having left Pampluna with a considerable force, in order to collect grain, Mina attacked and drove him back with the loss of nearly 500 men killed and wounded. This, however, was but the prelude to a still more sanguinary affair: on the 21st, Abbe, being in great want of supplies, again left Pampluna with 2500 men, to which he added the garrisons of Tudela and Caperoso, which augmented his force to 3000 infantry and 200 cavalry, and five pieces of cannon. With these he marched to Tafalla, to collect grain, and to plunder the inhabitants of the surrounding country. Returning from his predatory excursion, Mina met him, loaded with spoils, and a terrible combat ensued betwixt them. Mina had only two pieces of cannon, but these being advantageously posted, and well served, did great execution; "every fire from them, as well as the musquetry, told. On all sides the killed fell by dozens, and the groans of the wounded were heard. Cannon balls, grape shot, and even grenades, were employed against Mina's followers, but in vain; they re-

\* Parker's dispatch, Zornosa, Aug. 24th.

maintained firm and constant, notwithstanding the losses which they continued to suffer.\* The enemy were signally defeated; a great part of their plunder and baggage fell into the hands of the Spaniards, whose loss was 166 killed and wounded. That of the enemy was severe, and amounted to 17 officers and 300 privates killed, and above 700 wounded.† “They are terrified (says Mina) and I am persuaded that nothing but the distress they suffer for want of provisions, could oblige them to repeat these forlorn attempts.” On the 29th, Abbe again made another attempt to collect wood, but was driven into Pampluna with the loss of the wood which he had collected, and the waggons which he had brought to carry it away. The loss occasioned to the enemy, by these incessant attacks, was incalculable, and must have rendered the situation of the French soldier most galling and miserable.

Leaving a considerable force in the North, the Marquis Wellington marched with the remainder of the army to the Southward, in order “to bring Joseph Bonaparte to a general action, or compel him to abandon Madrid.”‡ On the 6th, the British General left Cuellar, on the 7th he reached Segovia, and on the 8th, Ildefonso, where he halted one day, to allow the right of the army more time to come up. No opposition was made by the enemy, to the passage of the army through the formidable pass of Guadarrama. On the 9th, Brigadier General D’Urban, with the Portuguese cavalry and the 1st light battalion of the King’s German Legion, and Captain Macdonald’s troop of horse artillery, advanced through that pass; on the 11th, in the neighbourhood of Galapagas, supported by the heavy cavalry of the King’s German Legion, he drove in the French cavalry, about 2000 in number, and placed himself at Majalahonda. On the evening of that day, however, the enemy’s cavalry again returned, and the Portuguese cavalry, in advance, were ordered to charge the enemy’s leading squadrons, which appeared too far advanced to be supported by their main body. The Portuguese advanced to the attack; but as

\* Mina’s dispatch, Puente la Rey, August 23d.

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they were about to come in contact with the enemy, a sudden panic seized them, and they turned and fled. They were, however, again rallied, upon the German cavalry, who charged and arrested the progress of the enemy, while, by the activity of Colonel Macdonald's troop, the guns were at one time moved off; but the carriage of one being broken and two others overturned, these fell into the hands of the enemy, who, towards the evening, perceiving the advance of other detachments of the allied army, retired upon Alcoron, leaving the guns which they had taken at Majalahonda. The officers of the Portuguese cavalry behaved themselves well, particularly the Visconde de Barbacena, who was taken prisoner. The loss of the allies in this affair, was 53 killed, 98 wounded, and 45 missing, or prisoners.\* The enemy magnified this encounter to an affair of great importance, and swelled the loss of the allies to 800 men, killed, wounded, and prisoners.† In the meantime, all was consternation in Madrid, amongst the friends of the Usurper. Every one was busy packing up and trying to escape, with as much of their most valuable goods as they could. Joseph abandoned the place, and continued his retreat to Valencia, having left a garrison in the Retiro, with the intention, perhaps, of overawing the inhabitants, and preventing the effects of the public indignation against his adherents, till the arrival of the allied army, which, he was aware, would maintain order. It was impossible that the force left could, in such a place, make any resistance. The British army advanced to the city, without further opposition; and, on the 12th, entered the Capital of Spain, amidst the congratulations and benedictions of its inhabitants. On the 14th, the garrison left in the Retiro capitulated. Their number, including the sick and convalescents, amounted to 2506 men. In the place was found 189 pieces of brass cannon, in excellent condition, 9000 barrels of powder, 20,000 stand of arms, and large magazines of clothing, provisions, and stores; amongst the latter were 2,653,299 ball cartridges, and 6,736 bayonets.

\* Marquis Wellington's dispatch, Madrid, August 13th.

† Treillard's dispatch to Jourdan, dated Albacette, August 22d.

The eagles also of the 13th and 15th French regiments were found, and forwarded to England.\*

The consequences of the battle of Salamanca were now felt in every corner in Spain, and filled the minds of the French adherents with alarm and consternation. The fall of the Capital, was a blow which no French sophistry could disguise or palliate. Its effects were felt throughout Europe, and particularly in Russia, at that moment also contending for her existence. The account of the capture of Madrid reached Petersburg, the very day before the fall of Moscow was made known to the public by the Russian Government. It spread with the rapidity of lightning, throughout Russia. If Spain has regained her Capital, why may not we? was the language of every Russian.† It is scarcely possible to appreciate the effects which this occurrence had upon the minds of the Russians, at this moment. It opened a bright prospect also to Spanish patriotism, and gave them a fairer chance of shaking off the odious yoke, under which they had so long suffered. Soult, who kept a strong hold of Andalusia, and menaced Cadiz, and who was "loth to depart," now began to conceive himself really in danger. No communication between him and the North now remained, but by the circuitous route of Valencia. General Hill being upon his flank, from Estremadura, with perhaps 25,000 men. About 9000 were detached from Cadiz, under the command of that active officer Colonel Skerret, accompanied by Captain Fleming. These joined General Monilla, after being landed on the *Candada del Niebla*. The enemy, unable to oppose them in that quarter, blew up the castle of Niebla, and retired upon Seville, followed by this force. A considerable force, also from the South, under Ballesteros, menaced the enemy on that quarter, so that his retreat now became a hazardous undertaking. But retreat he must, as it was evident that he could stay no longer where he was, without incurring greater danger. At last the long and anxiously expected day of their deliverance from danger, dawn-

\* Marquis Wellington's dispatch; Madrid, August 15th.

† "After the loss of Moscow, the Russians were animated by the accounts that the French had been compelled to abandon Madrid and Cadiz."—Lord Castlereagh's Speech, House of Commons, December 3d, 1812.

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ed upon the inhabitants of Cadiz. They beheld all those formidable works which had been raised with so much labour and expense, in order to ensure their destruction, now blown to atoms by the enemy himself—his artillery burst to pieces, and his stores destroyed by his own hands. It was a joyful sight; while the great cause of it, the victory of Salamanca, continued yet to fill their hearts with joy and gladness. Having collected his army, and ready to commence his march, Soult communicated to them his objects, and the cause of this alteration in the face of their affairs. "Soldiers! (said he) it is indispensably necessary to march, in order to revenge the misfortunes which have befallen the Imperial Eagles, in another Province, getting rid of what can be sold, and calling in the persons attached to the army."\* On the 25th of August, the last detachment of French troops left their positions before Cadiz, after having been three years before it, without making the smallest impression upon it. Continuing his retreat, he abandoned Seville, to the great joy of the inhabitants. As usual, it was intended to lay on heavy contributions, and to plunder the inhabitants, in order to make them remember that Frenchmen had been amongst them; but, the rapid advance of Colonel Skerret compelled them to abandon Seville, having sustained some loss in attempting to obstruct the entrance of the allies into the place. Seville was delivered from her oppressors on the 27th. The loss of the enemy was about 500 men; and, it was said, nearly 2000 sick remained in the hospitals. Considerable quantities of artillery and stores were also left in the place; for which it was declared, by Soult, that upon his return he would consider the inhabitants responsible; but he has never yet called upon them for an account of their charge.

Collecting his forces from a wide extent of country, where, besides the disposable force, every town had a garrison; his army was soon swelled to a strength which overpowered all opposition to his retreat in that quarter. Its united strength could not be less than 40,000 men, if not more. Avoiding the Sierra Morena pass, he, with this force, took the direction of

\* Proclamation, Port St. Mary's, August 18th, 1812.

the kingdom of Jaen. During the early part of his retreat, his rear was considerably annoyed, by the exertions of Ballesteros, who entered the large and populous city of Granada, the Capital of the kingdom of that name, upon the 17th September, from which period a dark and disgraceful cloud overspread his future operations. From Jaen, Soult penetrated into the Northern parts of Murcia; and, on the 20th September, at Jumilla, formed a junction with the army of the Centre, united to that of Valencia, under Suchet. The Spanish armies under Elio, were not sufficiently organised, after their late severe discomfiture, under O'Donnel, to create Soult much trouble; while the force under General Maitland, could not possibly move from Alicante, without the prospect of certain destruction. Suchet, and the army of the Centre, with forces very superior in numbers, were ready to attack it, if any movement in advance took place. From this moment, Soult was out of any immediate danger, or great dread for the future. His force, united to the army of the Centre, now exceeded 50,000 men, all veteran troops, without reckoning the army of Valencia. Why he was allowed to march with so much composure, and deliberately to take measures which had such an effect upon the future operations of the campaign, it is now incumbent upon us to attend to.

For a long time back the deficiency of the Spanish Generals, in military talents, had engaged the attention, and excited the regret of all who wished well to their cause. The example of Portugal was held out to Spain as worthy of her imitation; namely, to place her troops under the supreme command of Lord Wellington. This plan met with great opposition amongst that proud-spirited people. Great Britain, however, urged the scheme with all her influence; and a large portion of the Cortes were also sensible of its propriety, and the benefits likely to be derived from it. The brilliant exploits of the present campaign, but particularly the glorious victory of Salamanca, was prudently seized upon as a fit opportunity to introduce this important change. The Marquis of Wellington was declared Generalissimo of all the Spanish armies, an event which held out the prospect of the greatest advantages to Spain. Ballesteros, who had hitherto signalized himself so much in the cause

of his country, in an evil hour, had fallen from him. He had marched where his forces and power were needed, quickly, and in many months, to counteract the Spanish cause. After perceiving we can hardly do this measure, are not dead, and recollect in joy, under such circumstances, thwarted this Bonaparte; and we can form a way.

After the end, sepulchre continued the Guerillas, done by the party of el Marquis of 700 men, similar terms to the Retiro. In the British army, defeated, an opportunity from thence to favour to relieve taken place, across the Pisuerga, the enemy, a considerable gallantly volunteers of the king

of his country, took offence at this judicious appointment; and, in an evil hour, and at this critical moment, refused to obey him. He paid no attention to his instructions; refused to march where he was directed; and allowed Soult to collect his forces and pursue his plans without molestation. He was, indeed, quickly arrested, and his command given to another; but many months of danger, trouble, and loss, were not sufficient to counteract the effects of the fatal error of this single moment. Although this appointment was not generally relished amongst the Spanish officers, yet none of them resisted it; and they soon after perceived its beneficial consequences. While we lament, we can hardly blame the reluctance of the Spaniards to submit to this measure; such feelings being common to all nations who are not dead to every sense of national honour; and we should recollect in judging of it, what our conduct might have been under such circumstances; and that the national feeling which thwarted this object, was the same which made them resist Bonaparte; and, which, through dangers and privations which we can form no idea of, made them refuse to submit to his sway.

After the entrance of the allies into Madrid, the army of Joseph continued its march towards Valencia, greatly harassed by the Guerillas, and diminished by desertion. Toledo was abandoned by the enemy, and taken possession of by the Guerilla party of el Medico. The garrison of Guadalaxara, consisting of 700 men, surrendered to the Empicenado, upon nearly similar terms to those granted by the Marquis of Wellington to the Retiro. In the meantime, the absence of the main force of the British army, gave the army of Portugal, so recently defeated, an opportunity of again advancing to Valladolid, and from thence to detach a force, under General Foy, to endeavour to relieve Astorga. The fall of that fortress had already taken place, and the enemy were again compelled to retire across the Pisuerga. Foiled in their object of relieving Astorga, the enemy, under Foy, endeavoured to surprise and cut off a considerable force of Portuguese militia, who had at that time gallantly volunteered to extend their services beyond the frontiers of the kingdom. In this, however, he was prevented, by the

judicious conduct of the Conde de Amarante; and, after relieving and carrying off the garrison of Zamora, Foy returned to Tordesillas. The Marquis of Wellington having arranged every thing at Madrid, and conceiving that the different armies in the South would prevent Soult from distressing him, should he make any movement in a northern direction, he left Madrid on the 1st of September; and, assembling the army at Arevalo on the 4th, he crossed the Douro on the 6th, and entered Valladolid on the 7th, from whence the enemy retired with precipitation, crossing the Pisuegra, and blowing up the bridge over that river. The army of Galicia, which had retired upon the approach of the French army, again advanced and approached the Esla. In the Centre of Spain, General Villa Campa took prisoners the troops which composed the garrison of Cuenca, consisting of 1000 men, with two guns, and who had abandoned the place in order to join the army of Suchet, to which they belonged.\*

On the 8th, Marquis Wellington halted at Valladolid in order to refresh the troops. Leaving Valladolid, he continued to follow the enemy's army, who retreated upon Burgos. On the 16th, at Pampliega, the allied army was joined by three divisions of infantry and one division of cavalry, belonging to the army of Galicia, and under the command of Captain General Castanos. The united forces continued to press the enemy, who, on the 17th, were driven to the heights close to Burgos; from whence they retired during the night, leaving a considerable quantity of clothing and other stores, with a large quantity of wheat. From thence they fell back to Briviesca, where they were joined by 7000 conscripts.†

The castle of Burgos, strong by nature, had been strongly fortified by the enemy. It was situated on that part of Spain which was allotted to the army of the North; and Gen. Cafarelli, on the 17th, had left a garrison of 2500 men in it. This castle commanded completely the passages of the river Arlanzon, a tributary stream to the Douro, and also all the communications

\* Wellington's dispatch, Valladolid, September 7th.

† Wellington's dispatch, Villa de Tora, September 21st.

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with them. On the 19th the army effected the passage of the river, and attacked the enemy's force stationed on the height, on which stood the strong fort of St. Michael's, which commanded some of the works of the castle, and drove them from all their works, with the exception of this fort, which was very strong, and about 300 yards from the body of the place. It was impossible to ascertain the real state of the works of Burgos, without first being in possession of this place. As soon as it was dark on the evening of the 19th, it was determined to carry it by storm. For this purpose, the 42d regiment was directed to the attack, and who gallantly carried the place, though the enemy had occupied it in considerable force. On the side of the British, Brigadier General Dick, Lieutenant Col. Hill, of the 1st Portuguese regiment, Colonel Campbell of the 16th, Major Williams of the 4th Cacadores, Major Dick of the 42d, and the Hon. Major Cocks of the 79th, greatly distinguished themselves. The enemy lost 3 pieces of cannon, and 63 prisoners; while the loss of the allies amounted to 418 killed, wounded, and prisoners.

The retreat of Soult to the Eastward, through Andalusia, having relieved Estremadura from all danger, General Hill was directed to march upon Madrid with the troops under his command. On the 14th, he reached Truxillo, and on the 18th Oropessa, and on the 23d Toledo. In the meantime, the siege of Burgos was vigorously pressed; but the want of heavy artillery, which the rapid advance of the army prevented from being brought forward in time, was severely felt. The enemy's guns were superior in weight of metal to the British, and, of course, rendered all the operations and approaches more difficult, and destructive. On the night of the 22d, an attempt was made to take the exterior line of the enemy's lines by escalade; but it failed, with a severe loss. The Portuguese troops belonging to the 6th division, who occupied the Town of Burgos, and invested the castle on the South and West side of the enemy's left, were so "*strongly opposed*," that they could make no progress; and, in consequence, a detachment of the 1st division, under the command of Major Lawrie of the 79th, who were to scale the wall in front, were also unable to gain their point. Major

Lawrie was unfortunately killed, and Captain Frazer of the Guards wounded.\* Every exertion was made by both officers and men; but the attempt was found totally impracticable. The loss of the allies was 348 killed and wounded. The batteries intended to attack the enemy's interior lines, were completed on the 27th, and ready to open the moment that the allied armies established themselves within the enemy's exterior line. The army of Portugal continued at Pancorbo and Miranda de Ebro, without making any attempt, at this time, to relieve the place. In order to secure the speedy surrender of the place, recourse was had to mining the works; on the 29th at midnight, the first mine was sprung in the exterior line; but the troops ordered to support the party in advance missed their way, by reason of the darkness of the night, and the consequence was, that the advanced party was beat back from the breach, which was of such a nature, that the enemy rendered it impracticable except at the first moment. It was endeavoured to widen it by the fire of the batteries, but the superiority of the enemy's fire, rendered that impracticable to any extent. On the 4th, however, a second mine was sprung with better effect, and the fire of the batteries had considerably widened the first breach. Both breaches were immediately stormed by the 2d battalion of the 24th regiment, under the command of Captain Hedderwick; and the allied troops, after great exertion, were established within the exterior line of the Castle of Burgos. Captain Hedderwick and Lieutenants Holmes and Frazer led the two storming parties, and greatly distinguished themselves. The loss to the allies in these severe operations, was 367 killed, wounded, and prisoners. The army of Portugal extended their left to Lograno, but made no other movement during this period.\* The enemy perceiving, that the perseverance of the British troops was gaining ground, in defiance of every obstacle, made two sorties from the place, by which the works of the besiegers were considerably injured, and also caused them a considerable loss of men. Amongst those who fell on this occasion, was Major Cocks of the 79th, a gal-

\* Wellington's dispatch, Villa Toro, Oct. 5th, 1812.

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lant officer. The total loss was 407 killed, wounded, and prisoners. On the evening of the 18th, another mine was sprung under the church of St. Roman, which stood upon an outwork upon the second line of the place. This mine succeeded, and Lieut. Col. Browne of the 9th Cacadores, and a detachment of the Spanish regiment of Asturias lodged themselves in the outwork. A detachment of the King's German Legion under Major Wurm, carried the breach, and a detachment of the Guards succeeded in escalading the line; but the enemy brought such a fire to bear upon them from the third line, and the body of the castle itself, and they were attacked by numbers so superior, that they were compelled to give way, before the support detached to their assistance could reach them. In this attack Major Wurm was killed. All the troops engaged in this arduous undertaking, acted in the most gallant style. Some of the men even scaled the walls of the third line, and one was killed in the embrasures of the place. It was now plain, that if a breach could be effected in the walls of the Castle, that the bravery of the allied troops would carry the place. Another mine was commenced under the church of St. Roman, and a few days would certainly have put the allies in possession of the Castle; but the army of Portugal having received considerable re-enforcements, and aware of the importance of the place, now began to make movements, which indicated their determination to effect its relief. Their efforts, however, would certainly have been unavailing, had not danger of a superior kind pressed upon the allied army from another quarter, and to which it is now time to return.

It was obvious, that the force which the enemy still had in Spain was such, that if he abandoned any part of it, he could obtain such an accession of strength to any particular army as would give it a decided superiority over the allies at any particular point. This was now found to be the case. Soult and Joseph having united, the latter with 15,000 men, \* and Soult by private accounts, 40,000 strong, formed a very powerful army. These, with Suchet's, made a force of 70,000 effective

\* Wellington's dispatch, Villa Toro, Oct. 5th, 1812.



men, \* in the kingdom of Valencia. Of these, 50,000 at least would be disposable, and now actually commenced their march for Madrid. General Elio, who had taken the town of Consuegro on the 22d September, had about 6000 infantry, and 1500 cavalry under his command. With these he was in communication with General Hill, whose force could not exceed 30,000 men, stationed in advance of Aranjuez and Toledo. The army under General Maitland, near Alicant, was inferior to that which remained with Suchet; and even with the assistance it might derive from the Spanish forces in Murcia, could not be expected to do more than keep Suchet in awe. Ballesteros had at least 16,000 men in Granada, but he would do nothing. Other troops were in Andalusia advancing towards Madrid, but then it was obvious that they would be too late to prevent Soult's advance. That General, therefore, continued his march towards Madrid, with a force exceeding 50,000 veteran troops. The fortress of Chinchilla was in the line of his advance, in which there was a Spanish garrison of 200 men. He laid siege to it, and after battering it for four days, a breach was effected. The assault was ready to be made, when the Governor agreed to capitulate. The place was given up on the 9th, and totally destroyed by the enemy. With this overwhelming force, the Usurper, and the two French Marshals, Jourdan and Soult, pressed forward to Madrid; Elio with the force which he had in New Castile, retired to the westward; and General Hill, with whom was Generals Espana and Villemur, retreated upon Madrid, which place they abandoned, after destroying all the military stores which could not be carried away, and agreeable to the commands of Lord Wellington, marched northwards to Arevalo. On the 2d November, the French troops again entered that unfortunate city, to the sorrow and regret of its inhabitants. The situation of the people of Spain at this moment was truly pitiable. The events of the war were such, that they could hardly tell, who was ultimately to be their master; and the severity of the French was of the most unmerciful kind, against every one who shewed the smallest satisfaction at

\* Wellington's dispatch, Caceron, Oct. 26th, 1812.

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any misfortune which befel their armies. It may well be conceived what were the feelings of the people of Madrid at this moment, when they saw their oppressors again return, for whose expulsion they had lately shewn such striking marks of satisfaction.

It was on the morning of the 21st, that this unwelcome and unexpected intelligence, of the advance of Soult, was communicated to the Marquis Wellington, by advices from Gen. Hill. He was at that moment, engaged in opposing the various attempts making to relieve Burgos, by the French army, called the army of Portugal, now placed under command of Souham. This army had been re-enforced by 10,000 men from France, two divisions of infantry, and one division of cavalry, from the army of the North, under Cafarelli,\* and the united forces could not be less than 50,000 men, 5,000 of which were cavalry. With this force, of itself much superior to that under the British General, which perhaps did not exceed 35,000 men, if so many, the enemy were determined to raise the siege of Burgos if they possibly could. Several sharp affairs had already taken place between the advanced divisions of the respective armies, in all of which, the superior skill of the British General and his troops, were conspicuous, and attended with success. In one of these attacks at the bridge in front of Monastario, Lieut. Col. the Hon. Frederick Ponsonby was wounded. On the evening of the 20th, Lieut. Gen. Sir E. Paget, signalized himself in an attack made by the 1st and 5th divisions of the army under his command, upon the right flank of the enemy, who were driven back with loss upon Monastario, and the British posts again established at Quintana Palla, which had been abandoned upon the approach of the enemy.

The superiority of the enemy's force at this point was such, that joined with the danger to be apprehended from the South, to guard against which not a moment was to be lost, no prospect remained of being able to reduce Burgos in sufficient time to be able to oppose the movements of Soult, which the culpable inactivity and obstinacy of the proud Ballesteros had

\* Marquis Wellington's Dispatch, Cabecon, October 26th, 1812.

given such scope to. Nothing was left to the British General, but the painful alternative of raising the siege, after all the exertions and great sacrifices which he had made to obtain possession of it. The siege of Burgos had altogether been a most arduous undertaking, and in which the bravery and perseverance of the allied army had been eminently conspicuous. They had difficulties of no common kind to contend with: during the latter part, the troops suffered much from rains, they had overcome the worst, and were upon the point of surmounting them all, when the palm of victory was snatched from their hands. Nothing could surpass the gallantry displayed in the different attacks and assaults made upon the place, which was defended with equal obstinacy, gallantry, and skill, by its Governor and brave garrison. The last attack on the 18th, was peculiarly severe. The breach effected at the church of St. Roman being entered by the allied troops, the enemy, who was not able to oppose them in that point, withdrew, and setting fire to the trains, blew up the church, which fell with a hideous crash upon the assailants. This, with a tremendous fire from a half moon battery, obliged this column to retreat. That which ascended the main breach alone, succeeded for the moment, and the enemy himself fairly admits, that the allied troops had entered the body of the place. In this attack, the British loss was 272; and in the operations from the 11th to the 17th, 101 killed, wounded, and missing, making altogether a loss of 1970 men before this place. The Governor of Burgos, Dubréton, states his loss at 623 men killed and wounded; and estimates that of the allies to have been about 2000 men,\* one of the most accurate accounts ever given by a French officer since the revolution, which taught them the road to falsehood as well as to injustice. But in this case they had no object whatever to disguise facts, as the defence of Burgos deserves the greatest praise, and does honour to the Governor who commanded in it. Casarelli, however, in his dispatch of the 8th, magnifies our loss to 3000, as if he knew better than the Governor.

\* Dubréton's Journal, *Moniteur*, 30th Nov. 1812.

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It was on the night of the 20th October that the siege of Burgos was raised. "I felt severely the sacrifice I was thereby obliged to make,"\* said the British General, which says more than volumes wrote upon the subject can. The whole army was withdrawn without the enemy being aware of the movement, and marched to gain the Douro. Every thing was carried away except three pieces of cannon rendered useless by the enemy's fire, and the eight pieces taken in the horn work, which, as the cattle that should have drawn them had been sent towards Santander, in order to bring supplies from that quarter, could not therefore be removed. The British General continued his movement to the Douro with that judgment and ability, for which he was so remarkable, pressed by an enemy superior in numbers, but who could not gain the smallest advantage over him. Various skirmishes took place between the rear guard of the allies, and the advanced guard of the French; but that on the 23d was particularly severe. The enemy continued to press the rear guard of the British army, commanded by Lieutenant General Sir Stapleton Cotton, and composed of two light divisions of the King's German Legion, under the command of Colonel Halkett, Major General Anson's brigade of cavalry, and the brigade of Major General Bock. In front of Calado del Camino they made two successful charges upon the enemy's advance, who was detained for three hours by these troops at the passage of the Hormazo, and in front of the village. Hitherto the rear guard had retreated in excellent order, but a Guerilla force which marched on the hills on the left of it, having been driven in amongst General Anson's brigade, four or five squadrons of the enemy mixed with them, and being at first mistaken for Spaniards, occasioned a considerable loss to the allied army. Lieutenant Colonel Pelly of the 16th dragoons was taken prisoner at this time. The delay which this surprise occasioned enabled the enemy to bring up a superior force of cavalry, which charged General Anson and General Bock's brigades, near the Vinta del Pozo, but without success. The enemy were repulsed in every charge, by the two

\* Wellington's dispatch, Cabezon, October 26th, 1812.

light battalions of the King's German Legion, with considerable loss. Sir Stapleton Cotton, Colonel Halkett, Major Downman, and Captain Ramsay, greatly distinguished themselves in this affair.\* Cafarelli, in his dispatch of the 30th October, dated Cegales, gives a singular account of this skirmish. He states that the charge of the French cavalry was most brilliant, and cost the allies 300 men. But, says he, "by some inconceivable fatality, the division of dragoons which was in line to the right of these corps, and should have sustained them, took themselves off to the right *at full trot and disappeared.*" But for this, says he, the English cavalry would have been destroyed or taken, amongst which, at that time, was Lord Wellington and the Prince of Orange. What a prize was this to relinquish in such a shameful manner? However, Cafarelli knew very well that the same cause which now operated against them, had oftener than once made both French cavalry and infantry take "*themselves off to the right, trot off and disappear.*" The army continued its movements, closely pressed by the enemy; who, on the 25th, were repeatedly repulsed and driven across the Carrion, under a severe fire, in which both sides suffered a considerable loss. The 5th division of infantry were principally engaged, then under the command of Major General Oswald, as General Leith was absent from bad health. In this attack, the Spanish General, Alava, was wounded while urging on his men. The bridge over the Carrion, at Villa Muriel, was broken down, and the army continued its retreat. No event of great importance took place for some time. During this memorable retreat the great object of the British General was to secure his junction with General Hill, so that they might act in concert against the enemy; who, it was now evident, were determined at all hazards and all losses, to collect the whole disposable force which they had in Spain, and bear upon Wellington, in order, if possible, to wipe away the disgrace of Salamanca. On the 29th, the allied army crossed the Douro without any difficulty, by the bridges of Tudela and Puente del Douro, that at Tor-

\* Wellington's dispatch, Cabecon, October 26th, 1812.

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desillas having been blown up. On the 30th, the head quarters were established at Rueda, where they remained till the 6th November; the enemy, during that period, making no attempt to pass the Douro, but were busily employed in repairing the bridges. The bridge of Toro having been repaired sooner than was expected, and the enemy making preparations to pass at that point, the British army was again put in motion; and, on the 6th, commenced its march for Salamanca. General Hill, who continued his retreat from Madrid with very little obstruction, except in some trifling skirmishes in which the enemy were worsted, was directed to march by Fontiveros upon Alba de Tormes, which place he occupied on the 8th, and the main army the same day occupied the heights of St. Christoval de la Cuesta in front of Salamanca. The army of the enemy under Joseph, with Soult from the south, and the army under Souham from the north, having effected a junction on the 7th near Arevalo, their united forces, 90,000 strong, with 200 pieces of artillery,\* marched directly after the British army to Salamanca. There the enemy repeated the manœuvres of Marmont, but, from his superiority in numbers, with better success, and which ultimately obliged the British General to abandon the place. On the 10th, a severe attack was made by the enemy, upon Alba de Tormes, with a force of 15 squadrons of cavalry, 6000 infantry, and 20 pieces of cannon; but, from the gallant conduct of the 51st regiment, under Colonel Stewart; the 71st regiment, under the Hon. Colonel Cadogan; the 92d regiment, under Colonel Cameron; and Major Howard's brigade, the enemy, notwithstanding the greatest efforts, was foiled in all his attempts. His light troops advanced to the very walls of the place, and Jourdan, who had not been used to the French style of dispatch writing, very candidly admits, that "the Duke of Dalmatia fired 1500 cannon shot on this point without being able to dislodge the enemy."† The enemy, threatening to turn the British army, and cut it off from Ciud

\* Wellington's dispatch, Ciudad Rodrigo, November 19th, 1812.

† Jourdan's dispatch, Salamanca, November 10th—but the British troops passed through the place on the 14th.

dad Rodrigo, the Marquis of Wellington broke up from St. Christoval, and directed the troops to move upon the 14th to the famous position of Arapiles; and as soon as he had ascertained the direction of the enemy's force, which had crossed the Tormes at three fords above Alba, he moved with the 2d division of infantry, and all the cavalry he could collect, in order to attack them, leaving General Hill with the 4th, and General Hamilton's divisions in front of Alba, to protect this movement, and the 3d division in reserve at Arapiles, in order to secure the possession of that position. The enemy, however, were by this time too strongly posted, and too formidable in numbers to attack them with any prospect of success. Having reconnoitered their position, the British General decided upon a retreat to Ciudad Rodrigo; during the night of the 14th and morning of the 15th, he moved the greater part of the troops through Salamanca, though Jourdan had dated his dispatch of the 10th from it, as if it had been then in his possession. Joseph, who had the supreme command of the enemy's forces, conceiving himself invincible at the head of such a mighty army: eager, perhaps, to see a battle, and no doubt anxious to gain a victory over the celebrated British General, was determined, on the 14th to attack the British army posted at Arapiles. "The position (says he) occupied by the enemy was formidable. It had long since been studied; it was still *that of Arapiles*." The very thought seemed to have brought him to his senses—should it again prove Arapiles! "I was (continued he) at first tempted to attack it in front; for by penetrating the Centre, the enemy would perhaps have been cut in two, and would have lost the half of his army; but I was struck by the observations of the Generals who are acquainted with the country, and I resolved to operate upon the right of the enemy, passing the Tormes at Gallisancho."\* The unburied skull of some Yorick, then no longer the King's master, perhaps crossed his sight at the moment, and convulsed him in emphatic strains,

"Insulting man, thou shalt be soon as I,  
Black fate hangs o'er thee, and thy hour is nigh."

\* Joseph's dispatch, Salamanca, November 20th, 1812.

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Joseph had no doubt been dreaming about Marengo or Jena, and thinking how easily he might become as great a man as his brother; but his Generals, some of whom were acquainted with the country, quickly brought him out of his reverie, by shewing him that it was dangerous ground he had chosen for his operations; and placing the fate of Marmont before his eyes, it struck him with terror. Fortunate it was for Joseph that he had wiser heads than his own along with him at that moment, to direct him, or there can be little doubt but his conduct would have, upon the same spot, added another wreath to the head of the British General. But Joseph's turn was approaching, and a more disastrous field than that of Arapiles was destined to cure him of ambition.

The British General having withdrawn his troops from Salamanca, commenced his retreat upon the 16th for Ciudad Rodrigo, which he carried into execution during the 17th, 18th, and 19th, followed by the whole of the enemy's cavalry, and part of their infantry; but who, except a cannonade upon the rear of the allies, which did little injury, were not able to effect any thing against him. On the 17th, Lieut. Gen. Sir E. Paget, having rode alone to the rear of the army, in order to ascertain the cause of the delay of the march of some of the divisions, missed the road, and was taken prisoner by a detachment of the enemy's cavalry. The army crossed the Agueda on the 20th, after a severe and harassing retreat, during which time they were exposed to the greatest privations. The weather, for some time, had been dreadful, and the roads uncommonly bad; "from the 15th (says the Marquis Wellington) it has been worse than I have ever known it at this season of the year."\* "The rain was uninterrupted, (say Joseph) and the smallest rivers suddenly became torrents."† Under such circumstances, the retreat of the allied army before such superior forces, eager to obtain an advantage over it, must have been attended with great want and distress. The troops suffered much. For several days they were, literally, without food; ex-

\* Wellington's dispatch, Ciudad Rodrigo, November 19th, 1812.

† Joseph's dispatch, Salamanca, November 20th, 1812.

cept what they could pick up in an exhausted country, and from which the inhabitants fled in dismay, upon the appearance of those destructive swarms of Gallic locusts, which had so often robbed them of their all.

The total loss of the British and Portuguese, during this arduous retreat, was, 857 killed and wounded, and 421 prisoners; a trifling loss indeed, considering the nature of the operations, and the overwhelming force brought against them. The French accounts, as usual, exaggerate the loss of the allies, during the advance of Soult and the other armies, to 12,000 men; but their accounts, regarding the loss of their enemies, have so long been known as odious fabrications, even when stamped as official, or rather most at variance with truth, when they were so, that these scarcely deserve notice but to shew their absurdity. For instance, Joseph's dispatch dated Nov. 20th, estimates the loss of the allies at 12,000. Cafarelli's dispatch, Burgos, November 8th, estimates the loss of the allied army in the retreat from Burgos to the Douro at 7000 men, including 300 on the 23d Oct. Souham's dispatch, Tordesillas, November 3d, states, that in the affair of the 30th Oct. the enemy took 500 prisoners. Marquis Wellington states it at 40 men altogether. From the preceding statements it will be seen how different every one of their official dispatches are, a clear proof not one of them on the enemy's side was telling the truth; and it is only remarkable that the Editor of the *Moniteur* did not make the figures to correspond. His workshop had often exhibited more wonderful instances of transformation.

The advance of the French army was like the advance of every army of theirs, sacrificing every thing for one object, and calculating only upon one issue, namely, success. They made themselves sure of defeating Wellington, when things would have been all their own way. They never reflected what would be the consequences if they did not accomplish their object. Could their armies follow him into Portugal? If he took up a position under the cover of Ciudad Rodrigo, could such an army find subsistence in that part of the country to carry on further operations against the allies? Lord Wellington knew well

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they could neither do the one nor the other. The country was exhausted, and could furnish them with no supplies for such an army; and, therefore, they must retreat to a place where they could not only find, but command these. If they advanced into Portugal, the Guerillas, the Spanish army from Galicia, and those from the South, would place themselves in their rear, and intercept all supplies from France, unless escorted by such a number of troops as it was impossible, situated as they then were, they could spare for that purpose. A victory, great and decisive, over the British General, could alone set them at ease; without that, it was evident that all their labour was of little use, and only protracted the struggle to another campaign. It is not in a continued career of success that the best talents of a General are displayed. No, it is when severe and unexpected reverses, which he had no reason to calculate upon, assail him, that his superior powers are displayed. Such, in this case, was the situation of the Marquis of Wellington. He never could, for a moment, suppose that Ballesteros would not only disobey his commands, but sacrifice the best interests of his country, in open defiance of the will of his Government, by suffering Soult to retreat unmolested as he did. The British General calculated, and had every reason to calculate very differently. Had Ballesteros entered La Mancha by the great pass of the Sierra Morena, as he might easily have done, he would have got to Madrid before Soult could, and there can be no doubt but that his force, united to that under Elio, first, and then to that under Hill, if not sufficient to engage and defeat Soult, might at least have retarded his march so much, and defended the approaches from the South, in the Guadarrama mountains, so long, as would have enabled the Marquis Wellington to have driven back the army of the North, and taken Burgos, when Soult would have been glad to move off towards Valencia, or perhaps Catalonia. But this not being done, the British General was forced to forego the toils and labours which had been spent upon Burgos; and once more, his great talents, completely foiled the utmost efforts and best laid plans of his united and still formidable opponents. A King and three Marshals, with a force at least one third su-

perior to his own, contended against him in vain; he carried off his army in safety, and compelled them to seek other quarters than they then had, and other quarters than before they marched to attack him the greater part of them possessed. In these operations, the talents of the British General eclipsed those of his opponents, and more particularly those of the "Greatest Captain of the age," who seemed only fit to command when advancing, but who never could, by his talents as a General, extricate his army when his rashness had placed it in danger. Considering the situation in which the allied army was placed, their loss during the retreat was small, and in all probability the loss of the enemy was equal to theirs. Souham, in his dispatch of November 1st, acknowledges his loss from Burgos to the Douro to have been 300, which, in the usual style of French arithmetic, may be fairly multiplied by 4, to come at the truth. Marquis Wellington states the loss of the allies for that period at 900.

Scarcely had Soult and Joseph withdrawn from Madrid, in their advance to the Northward, than the garrison left there were compelled to abandon the place to the Spanish troops, on the 7th, seven days after the enemy had entered it. But it soon reverted into the hands of the French again. The allied armies having taken up secure quarters upon the frontiers of Portugal, set the French forces at defiance; and who, not daring to attempt any thing further against them, were quickly compelled to disperse, and seek cantonments for their troops, in a country where they could obtain supplies. For this purpose, Souham fell back upon Salamanca, but principally along the Douro and towards Valladolid; while Soult, with his army, took up his quarters in the valley of the Tagus, extending from Placencia to Madrid, which the Spanish forces were again obliged to abandon. There they remained for a while, "unable to advance, unwilling to retire, and renouncing the hope of victory."

The retreat of the allied army from Burgos, and the ascendancy thereby obtained by the enemy in that quarter, gave them an opportunity to advance and re-occupy Bilbao and other places in Biscay, which the Spanish forces in that quarter, were too weak to defend against the force now brought to bear

on them. In other parts the allies and such a wide they were not felt in with a action, defeated in this end of October, army and too November, d ed 250, and

In Catalonia ments took place and vigilant and annoy the the 7th September to re-engage tacked by a Spanish driven back to loss. At the joined Dr. Ross and compelled which they had the 19th, 3000 Expert, and ap pulsed with the prisoners. The wounded. A Baron de Erol which he was extricated, by It is impossible merous contests, of the 26th September Tarragona and war, Blake and rington of the

on them. Few operations of great moment had taken place in other parts of Spain. The Guerillas, during the advance of the allies and retreat of the enemy upon the Ebro, had not such a wide field as formerly, for their operations. However, they were not idle. On the 15th October, near Zeranga, Mina fell in with a considerable force of the enemy, and after a sharp action, defeated them, with the loss of 1400 men; and 639, wounded in this engagement, entered Pampluna. Longa, in the end of October, fell in with a convoy from France for the French army and took 300 prisoners. Duran, near Soria, on the 16th November, destroyed a party of the enemy, killed and wounded 250, and took 20 prisoners.

In Catalonia, during this period, several severe engagements took place between the contending armies. That active and vigilant officer, Baron de Erolles, never ceased to harass and annoy the enemy, and occasioned him a severe loss. On the 7th September, a body of 4000 men left Barcelona in order to re-enforce Suchet. During their march, they were attacked by a Spanish force in the mountains of Villavina, and driven back to the very gates of Barcelona, with considerable loss. At the same time the Spanish General Milans, having joined Dr. Robiro with about 4000 men, they entered Matarro, and compelled the French garrison to shut itself up in the fort which they had constructed in the Capuchin's Convent. On the 19th, 8000 Milans, with men, attacked the French General Expert, and according to the accounts of the enemy, was repulsed with the loss of 300 men killed and wounded, and 70 prisoners. The French loss as usual only trifling, viz. 24 wounded. A severe engagement also took place between the Baron de Erolles and a considerable force of the enemy, in which he was in imminent danger, but from which he was extricated, by the timely assistance brought to him by Manso. It is impossible to ascertain the loss in these destructive and numerous contests, which were frequent and severe. On the night of the 26th September, an attack was made upon the Port of Tarragona and the Mole, by the boats of the British ships of war, Blake and Franchise, under the orders of Captain Codrington of the former ship. This attack was concerted with

the Baron de Erolles, who was to march from Reuss, and attack from the land side. The Baron conducted his part of the operations with great secrecy, and arrived upon the spot at the appointed time. The attack was accordingly made, and was completely successful. The enemy were taken so completely by surprise, that Gen. Bartalotte actually mounted his horse without either his boots or stockings.\* Five vessels, a launch, and five small boats were brought away, the whole of which were cheerfully given up by the British Crews, to the troops under the Baron, for their gallant and good conduct during the affair. The British suffered no loss, and that of the Spaniards was only 3 killed and 8 wounded. The loss of the enemy was more considerable, but could not be ascertained from the darkness of the night. Various other operations were carried on with similar success, along the Spanish coasts in possession of the enemy, in which the British ships of war cut off considerable quantities of supplies, which were transporting from France, and the chief Spanish sea ports possessed by the enemy, to their armies in different places.

The French government, and their organ the *Moniteur*, which had been long silent about Spanish affairs, now began to speak out, and extol their own successes, and magnify the reverses of the allies. The turn which their affairs were taking in the North of Europe, rendered it necessary to have as much to say as possible, from a quarter where they had the appearance of success. In order to divert the attention of the public mind in France, from the deep humiliation and disgrace which their ambitious schemes were suffering in Russia, they turned their whole attention to the Peninsula. They were well aware, that notwithstanding appearances, there was in reality no cause for boasting on their part, at the issue of the campaign in Spain. But they calculated as usual, to frame their declamation in such a manner, that it would give food for annoyance to the British Ministers, and divide the attention of the public mind in Britain. On this head, they could scarcely calculate wrong; however extraordinary their assertions, these were certain to find supporters in Britain. The campaign of

\* Captain Codrington's dispatch, Salon Bay, Sept. 27th, 1812.

1812 in Spain found out, not dency, but act feat. Nay, S Dec. 7th, 181 putation suggest have been fought was nothing but with such senti and asserted, t who were befrin vereign. In t said, "Again Spain, *does it* should be left f think most like French or Eng acknowledge th ing; yet we do

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† Was it for actin character and condu House of Commons, Baronet, "admired" taken "Tarragona, S during the time in w Ciudad Rodrigo—in the conduct of a Gen every Spaniard who odious violence and they would not obey and which prisoners that odious and unp admired and praised, to the invasion of Spa after-ages will scarce country, when the for by him sent to the h polled to work with

1812 in Spain, which might now be considered as closed, was found out, not only to have been attended with no beneficial tendency, but actually to have been productive of disgrace and defeat. Nay, Sir Francis Burdett, in the House of Commons, Dec. 7th, 1812, insisted, that "some military characters of reputation suggested, that the battle of Salamanca ought never to have been fought;"\* and that the conclusion of the campaign was nothing but failure and defeat." Not content, however, with such sentiments as these, the same gentleman went farther, and asserted, that we had no right to compel these Spaniards who were befriending Joseph, to submit to their legitimate Sovereign. In the House of Commons, Dec. 3d, the Baronet said, "Again Sir, on the contest which is now carrying on in Spain, *does it not seem perfectly equitable*, that every Spaniard should be left free to attach himself to which ever party he may think most likely to save his country; to be an adherent of French or English, as may seem good to him? To refuse to acknowledge this principle, is to be any thing but conciliating; yet we do not acknowledge it."† This was precisely the

\* Perhaps it was Gen. Suchet, or Bonaparte, who suggested this to the Baronet—hardly an, other person would.

† Was it for acting in this manner, that the Honourable Baronet exalted the character and conduct of Suchet far before that of Lord Wellington? (see debates, House of Commons, Feb. 21st, 1812.) Was it for acting in this manner, that the Baronet, "*admired*" the conduct of that General, whose merit, consisted in having taken "Tarragona, Saguntum, and Valencia, and sent 47,000 prisoners into France," during the time in which Lord Wellington had only taken the paltry fortress of Ciudad Rodrigo—in other words, and more intelligible language, who "*admired*" the conduct of a General, whose sole merit consisted in butchering without mercy, every Spaniard who dared to oppose his career; a career marked with the most odious violence and injustice—Who sent 47,000 prisoners to France, because they would not obey one, who had no earthly right to claim obedience from them; and which prisoners were in France treated in the most barbarous manner, by that odious and unprincipled government, whose chief supporters, the Baronet admired and praised. The whole conduct of France and her Ruler, with regard to the invasion of Spain, was odious and disgraceful in the highest degree: but after-ages will scarcely credit, that those brave men who rose to defend their country, when the fortune of war threw them into the power of their enemy, were by him sent to the hulks of Brest and Rochefort, and there *chained*, and compelled to work with the worst convicts in France. Yet this was the case. One



principle which the French inculcated, from the earliest dawn of that revolution, the baneful effects of which, the world will feel for a century to come; and the same cant which would have been preached up to us, had the enemy of mankind come over either to Ireland, or Great Britain; or whether he was upon the plains of Germany, or on the fields of Russia.— Let them alone, would have been the cry, let the discontented, the traitors to their country, resist its lawful authority, and establish in its stead, such a government as suits their conveniency. The Baronet surely must have forgotten there are such things as right and wrong; and that while one Spaniard remained faithful to his country, and called upon Great Britain to assist him in repulsing, I do not say French invasion, but French atrocity! that policy, honour, and justice demanded of us to lend him our firmest support, and to consider his opponents as traitors, and to allow him to treat them as such. Posterity will never credit, that at this moment, such sentiments as those promulgated by the Honourable Baronet, could be delivered in a British House of Commons, which for 20 years, had been resisting the operation of similar principles.

The retreat from Burgos, again opened the door for gloom and despondence to come forward, and prognosticate with as much boldness as ever, the complete subjugation of Spain by the armies of France—the hopelessness of all our efforts to prevent it, and the complete expulsion of our armies from the Peninsula. Ministers, were charged by another party, as guilty of negligence, in not forwarding the necessary means to our General in Spain. This charge was not difficult to repel, as it was easy for the public to see the motive which prompted it. To feed the hopes of our enemy and to aid his sinking cause, it was loudly echoed, that the walls of Ciudad Rodrigo, and the ramparts of Badajos, had been sealed

of the first acts of the Provisional Government, after Bonaparte's overthrow, was to liberate 800 peasants who were taken in Figueras in 1811, and sent to France by Suchet; where they were chained in the hulks at the forementioned places, till the Provisional Government, April 9th, 1814, decreed their instant release. For them the bowels of the Baronet had no pity.

for no purpose; been conquered; ions forgot, or s completely clear Estremadura, A Valencia; secure thus setting fre Spanish provinces cost the enemy the best Generals, years. When to Moscow, these natural defences, kept them during inhabitants than this Spanish campaign believed to be prosperous let even more difficult be performed by part of his means the deed! Nay, v

If moderation have found, that ed, and far more was clear to command the greater part any particular position in the field. But this, he must sacrifice while the war had the enemy was baffled. When m like Spain, by a peasants were aware sent instance, it was as sanguine minds Spanish nation with arguments in the f

for no purpose; and that the proud field of Salamanca had been conquered in vain. The individuals who sported these opinions forgot, or seemed to forget, that these glorious events had completely cleared Andalusia, Granada, Murcia, New Castile, Estremadura, Asturias, part of Biscay, Leon, Old Castile, and Valencia; secured the repose of Portugal, and covered Galicia; thus setting free nearly 6,000,000 of inhabitants in these Spanish provinces, and raising the siege of Cadiz, which had cost the enemy an immense expense, and occupied some of his best Generals, with 14,000 choice troops, for nearly three years. When Bonaparte overran Lithuania, and penetrated to Moscow, these countries, (destitute either of fortifications or natural defences,) which he had conquered, even could he have kept them during the succeeding winter, did not contain more inhabitants than these Spanish provinces, freed by the events of this Spanish campaign. Yet, at that moment, the world was believed to be prostrate before him. But change the scene, and let even more difficult actions, from the nature of the country, be performed by Britain and her allies, and that with one sixth part of his means, and O then how trifling and insignificant the deed! Nay, what ruin and disgrace are to result from it.

If moderation had been for a moment attended to, we should have found, that as much was done as could possibly be effected, and far more than could reasonably have been expected. It was clear to common reflection, that if the enemy concentrated the greater part of his disposable force, that he would upon any particular point, be for the moment, superior to the allies in the field. But it was equally evident, that to accomplish this, he must sacrifice the possession of the one half of Spain, while the war had assumed a totally different character, and the enemy was become no longer the assailant, but the assailed. When military possession was obtained of a country like Spain, by a powerful and warlike enemy, before the inhabitants were aware of his intentions, as was the case in the present instance, it was not so easy to drive that enemy out of it as sanguine minds were apt to imagine. It was to charge the Spanish nation with doing nothing in its own cause. Such arguments in the first place, were not correct; and in the next

place, operated against the conduct of those, whom, the individuals who advanced these doctrines, wished to praise for activity. If the Spaniards did nothing, it was saying little for the honour of the French Generals, that during a period of five years, with 300,000 men, and as many re-enforcements as they chose to call for at their command, they had not subdued that country, nor obtained a foot of land, but what was held by a military force sufficient to overawe the inhabitants. With all due acknowledgment to the great talents of Lord Wellington, and the invincible bravery of the army under his command, it surely will not be contended, that with 40,000 British troops and as many Portuguese, that he did every thing. No, Lord Wellington was well aware, that though to their loss, they did not always act as he wished them, yet that the Spaniards did much, and assisted him greatly. Without pretending to say, that every Spaniard did his duty, it is wrong in us to treat the inhabitants of other countries, particularly when joined in the same common cause, with the contempt and ridicule we do. They have their foibles, superstitions, and weaknesses. So have we. They have their national pride, which perhaps stands in the way of their true interests—Have we none? And while we may justly condemn that feeling, when it will not stoop to receive the advice which is most conducive to its real interest, still we should recollect, that it was this national feeling which roused them against Bonaparte, and which, through disasters and defeats, privations and miseries, still encouraged them to refuse obedience to his will. People among us may say, that the Spaniards and Portuguese are base and bigotted, and the Russians ferocious and ignorant;\* but that does not constitute them

\* "They are descended from our loins—they speak our language—they have adopted our laws—they retain our usages and manners—they read our books—they have copied our freedom; they rival our courage; and yet they are less popular and less esteemed among us, than the *base and bigotted* Portuguese, or the *ferocious and ignorant* Russians," *Edin. Review*, Vol. 20th, page 460. Reader, these people—those kind and affectionate souls, here so much lauded, are the Americans, who descended from our loins, joined the foe of the human race against us; who took advantage of our distress, to deprive us of our territories and our independence,

such; and shew mankind, in the Spain could not were directed by who sat compar and rise in safet or point out wha or should do, our Government the mask of frien to Edinburgh— our whole proper the pitiless storm eyes—Our child into a foreign lan without the opp means which ma rience, or sold b all these things n tion, still if place others who rema such was truly th But in Spain,

and who leagued in the here extolled above the ferocious, and American of Baltimore! Speak ye rope!

\* I have made it my rarity, who dwell in Spain they all relate such tale the heart with anguish. were directed with a pec smallest favour to the B milles, whom I knew on the sea shore, without a charity,) to cover themse sions or the means of pro to afford it." Yet these by—These the men who

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such; and shews no great degree of liberality, or knowledge of mankind, in those who speak thus; and who conceived, that Spain could not be delivered, nor Russia preserved, unless they were directed by one particular class of men. It was easy for us, who sat comparatively at our ease, and could lie down in peace and rise in safety, when none else in Europe could, to suppose, or point out what other nations, differently situated, could do, or should do. But let us from the inattention or imbecility of our Government, have our country overrun with enemies, under the mask of friends—The kingdom occupied by them from Dover to Edinburgh—Let us have our dwellings burnt about our ears, our whole property destroyed;\* and ourselves driven naked into the pitiless storm—Our wives and daughters violated before our eyes—Our children murdered in our sight, or carried captive into a foreign land, by a powerful and remorseless enemy, and without the opportunity of combination, to use the scanty means which may be left, and these too often lost by inexperience, or sold by cowards and domestic traitors; and though all these things may call forth our deepest hatred and indignation, still if placed in such a situation, we might in the eyes of others who remained at ease, also be thought wanting.—Yet such was truly the situation of Spain.

But in Spain, with all her failings, first arose that spirit of

and who leagued in the cause of injustice, (and left to feel its consequences,) are here extolled above those who nobly defend their country against both. Russia ferocious, and America civilized! Stand forward unashamed ye lawless brutal mobs of Baltimore! Speak ye Counties in those States peopled with the refuse of Europe!

\* I have made it my business to converse with gentlemen of knowledge and veracity, who dwell in Spain, and who went through many parts of it at this period, and they all relate such tales of misery and distress as fills the mind with horror, and the heart with anguish. The animosity and vengeance of the unprincipled invaders, were directed with a peculiar degree of ferocity, against every one who shewed the smallest favour to the British. "I have seen says an informant, "numerous families, whom I knew once possessed of great wealth, living in crouds together upon the sea shore, without any thing but a single sheet, (and that perhaps the gift of charity,) to cover themselves from a burning Sun, and wholly destitute of provisions or the means of procuring any, even if the country around them had been able to afford it." Yet these were the people who would suffer nothing for their country.—These the men who would not resist Frenchmen,

resistance, which shook the stupendous fabric of Gallic oppression to its foundation. The angry spirit of the Ebro and Tagus, awakened to vengeance, glory, and renown, the guardians of the Wolga and Moscow. The feelings and example of those who defended Zaragossa, and bled on the ramparts of Tarragona, nerved the arm that conquered at Borodino, and spread destruction on the fatal plains of Krasnoi.\* But in Spain, it would be vain to look for those terrible features which marked the campaign in Russia. There destruction almost outstripped imagination. Spain has not a Russian climate—not a tenth of her extent, nor a fourth of her population; yet in proportion, the work of destruction in Spain, though slower, was equally severe as in Russia, and armies vanished in shame and silence, like snow before the beams of summer. Since the commencement of this memorable contest in Spain, at least 500,000 men, of the legions of France, have been sacrificed by ambition, in this unhallowed cause.† By attending to the great expenditure of human life which has taken place in the campaign, the events of which we have just related, a short examination will shew us, that this

\* "Even after the loss of Moscow, the Russians had been animated by the intelligence, that, through a plan similar to their own, the French had been obliged to abandon Madrid and Cadiz." Lord Castlereagh's speech, House of Commons, Dec. 3d, 1812. "We have this moment, received the intelligence of the Spaniards and English having defeated the French, and taken possession of Madrid; and thus will our enemies every where meet with defeat. They have come to the extreme parts of Europe; and having penetrated through the borders of Russia, will probably find their graves in the bosom of our native country." Kutusoff's Bulletin to the army at Letschewska, Oct. 18th, 1812.

† French force which entered Spain by Bayonne is as follows, from 1807 till Jan. 1st, 1811.

|                             |                             |                     |
|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|---------------------|
| 1807, { Infantry... 47,500  | 1809, { Infantry... 44,950  | Infantry... 426,620 |
| { Cavalry, ... 7,120        | { Cavalry, ... 4,302        | Cavalry, ... 73,356 |
| 1808, { Infantry... 209,300 | 1810, { Infantry... 124,500 | Civil list... 7,650 |
| { Cavalry, ... 36,200       | { Cavalry, ... 23,734       | Guides, ... 7,330   |
|                             |                             | Artillery... 820    |
| Total, ... 515,616          |                             |                     |

During this period, only 55,000 had returned to France.

During this period, 42,228 Spanish and Portuguese prisoners had passed Iron to France.

The French force which entered Portugal in 1811, was 105,000 men.

estimate is certain of the former years; less, for, to the with various success in Spain, so brave have cost the enemy by what other force cost us during

In enumeration us, that 300,000 of Spain. that 300,000 were campaign; and talions\* infantry re-enforce that to the North. positively, that preceding campaign cavalry, and 300,000 men which the Spain, to supply ty never went the of men joining t 7000 at another, must, however, h way of the Easter enforcements durin ly do not exagger attend to the follo authority of both my's boast of his f aggeration. It w enemy which ever despise his statem they had carried face of them. No

estimate is certainly within the truth. So far from exceeding any of the former years, great as it is, it is more probable that it is less; for, to the numerous bloody battles which were fought, with various success, the sieges of the different fortified towns in Spain, so bravely defended, and as desperately assailed, must have cost the enemy a prodigious loss of men, if we may judge by what other fortifications of less note, and not so long defended cost us during this campaign.

In enumerating his military force in 1811, Bonaparte told us, that 300,000 men were destined to accomplish the subjugation of Spain. The *Journal de Paris*, told us in April, 1812, that 300,000 were in Spain at the beginning of the present campaign; and the *Moniteur*, that more than 60 fresh battalions\* infantry, and 6000 cavalry, were then marching to re-enforce that army, and make up for those withdrawn to the North. The *Moniteur*, January 7th, 1813, states positively, that the French force in Spain during the preceding campaign was 300,000 men, 20,000 of which were cavalry, and 300 pieces of horse artillery. The re-enforcements which the French papers boasted of as marching for Spain, to supply the place of those taken away, in all probability never went there, as we never heard of any considerable body of men joining their army, except 10,000 at one time, and 7000 at another, before the siege of Burgos was raised. There must, however, have been some re-enforcements sent also by way of the Eastern Pyrenees; and if we estimate the total re-enforcements during the year 1812, at 20,000 men, we certainly do not exaggerate, nor err much in the amount. Let us attend to the following statement as derived from the official authority of both friends and foes, and we will find, that the enemy's boast of his forces in Spain was neither gasconade nor exaggeration. It was ridiculous to underate the means of an enemy which every one knew was truly most powerful, and to despise his statements; unless from the way they were made up, they had carried either a falsehood or impossibility in the face of them. Not so has Spain fought, and Russia conquered.

\* *Moniteur*, April 3d, 1812.

## STATEMENT OF THE FRENCH ARMY IN SPAIN.

|                                                              |               |
|--------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
| French troops in Spain, 1st January, 1812,                   | 500,000       |
| Re-enforced, by Bayonne, before raising the siege of Burgos, | 17,000*       |
| Ditto, suppose entered Catalonia,                            | 5,000         |
| Suppose wounded rejoined their ranks,                        | 10,000        |
|                                                              | <hr/> 530,000 |
| Withdrawn 8 regiments and some Imperial guards, in all,      |               |
| by various accounts, from 30 to 40,000 men,                  | 35,000        |
| Killed, wounded, and prisoners,                              | 103,000       |
| By sickness, fatigue, and other incidents,                   | 20,000†       |
|                                                              | <hr/> 157,000 |
| Remain, 1st January, 1812,                                   | 173,000       |

## HOW DISPOSED OF.

|                                                          |               |
|----------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
| Army collected against Wellington,                       | 90,000        |
| With Suchet disposable in Valencia,                      | 20,000        |
| Army of the North, under Cafarelli, in Biscay, Asturias, |               |
| &c. about,                                               | 10,000        |
| Disposable in Catalonia, under Decaen,                   | 12,000        |
| In garrisons throughout Spain,                           | 41,000        |
|                                                          | <hr/> 173,000 |

Although the number in the fortified towns in several places, were not at this time so great as when these places were besieged or re-enforced, when the French army abandoned, or rather were driven out of the open and unfortified parts of the country, still the strength in each garrison could not be less than the following numbers, viz.

|                |              |                       |        |
|----------------|--------------|-----------------------|--------|
| Burgos,        | 2000         | Brought up,           | 22,500 |
| Santona,       | 2000         | Gerona,               | 2000   |
| St. Sebastian, | 3000         | Tarragona,            | 2000   |
| Pampluna,      | 4000         | Tortosa,              | 1000   |
| Zaragossa,     | 2000         | Peniscola,            | 2000   |
| Figuera,       | 2000         | Murviedro,            | 2000   |
| Hostalrich,    | 1000         | Valencia,             | 5000   |
| Barcelona,     | 5000         | Denia,                | 1000   |
| Madrid,        | 1500         | Jaca, Bilboa, &c. &c. | 5500   |
|                | <hr/> 22,500 | Total,                | 41,000 |

\* See Lord Wellington's dispatches.

† Considering the nature of the service in which they were engaged, their marching and counter-marching in all seasons, this is certainly not too large a number to state as rendered unfit for service, or the wear and tear of an army of 300,000 men, employed in the manner which they were.

Besides the formidable force considered as the sons of Spain; perhaps 15 or 20,000 men, therefore gave of his force was neither broken. His strength at to disguise it or the world believed.

To oppose the places and positions the force of the army to the account February, 1812 and other levies the 30th October 60,000 regulars Peninsula amount had been seen it; we learn, that the Peninsula, assumed, all the mounting to per therefore, at the 280,000 men; could not be called and part, perhaps played in the force was scattered organised from still greater power completely isolated considerable number that the allies

† Lord Liverpool

† Ditto,



Besides the forces already enumerated, the enemy had a considerable force which he had raised amongst the degenerate sons of Spain; but this force it is difficult to ascertain, perhaps 15 or 20,000 was the utmost. From the preceding statement, therefore, it is obvious that the account which the enemy gave of his force in Spain at the commencement of this year, was neither bravado nor exaggeration, but perfectly correct. His strength at that time was so great, that he had no occasion to disguise it or call it more than it really was, in order to make the world believe that it was folly to contend against it.

To oppose this force, which was also possessed of all the strong places and positions in the kingdom of Spain, the following was the force of the allies. First, the Spanish army, which, according to the accounts of the Spanish Government, amounted in February, 1812, to 117,747 men, augmented in July by 39,500, and other levies and enlistments, which made the total force on the 30th October, 157,297 men.\* The Portuguese force was 60,000 regulars and as many militia. The British force in the Peninsula amounted to 50,000 men,† 20,000 of which number had been sent during that year; and from the same authority‡ we learn, that all the troops in the pay of Great Britain in the Peninsula, during 1812, were 127,000, including, it is presumed, all the Sicilian and other troops from that quarter, amounting to perhaps 10,000. The total force of the allies was, therefore, at the beginning of the year, not more than 270 or 280,000 men; of these 60,000 were Portuguese militia, who could not be called out of the kingdom unless they chose it; and part, perhaps 25,000, of their regular force might be employed in the country, in garrisons, &c. &c. The Spanish force was scattered over an immense extent of country, but ill organised from the impoverished nature of the country, and the still greater poverty of the Government, and in many places completely isolated from each other. They had also a considerable number placed in garrisons. It is therefore obvious that the allies were numerically inferior to the enemy, and

\* Cortes, October 30th.

† Lord Liverpool's Speech, House of Lords, November 3d, 1812.

‡ Ditto, ditto, ditto.

still more so from the positions held by the contending parties. It is also plain, that the Marquis Wellington could never have above 60 or 70,000 men with him at one place, even when his whole force was united, if these even amounted to so many. The armies of the allies, however, had a powerful auxiliary in the Guerilla force throughout the Northern provinces of Spain. These hardy and indefatigable people annoyed the enemy most dreadfully, and the loss and inconvenience which he suffered from their exertions is incalculable. These bands frequented the country in the Centre of Spain and towards the confines of France, and every person or thing that was marching or carrying to or from the French army, that appeared in moderate strength, was seized in a moment, and frequently after severe and sanguinary actions, where the positions chosen by them in the mountainous districts gave them a decided superiority over their enemies. Every effort was made by the French Generals to subdue them, but in vain. They even went the length of shooting those which were taken prisoners, but which cruel orders and actions were retaliated upon their own heads, with tenfold vengeance, by these brave people, which soon put a stop to this barbarous custom, which France wished to introduce into Modern Europe. The following is a list of their leaders, and the number of troops under the command of each, upon the 7th October, 1812.

| Leaders Names.       | Force.                        |
|----------------------|-------------------------------|
| Epos y Mina, ~~~~~   | 4000 Infantry and 1000 Horse. |
| Longa, ~~~~~         | 6000 do. 700 do.              |
| Tapia, ~~~~~         | 1000 do. —                    |
| El Empicenado, ~~~~~ | 3400 do. 700 do.              |
| Padella, ~~~~~       | 1000 do. 250 do.              |
| Herreros, ~~~~~      | 800 do. 400 do.               |
| Compello, ~~~~~      | 1000 do. 400 do.              |
| Salazha, ~~~~~       | 1500 do. 500 do.              |
| Merino, ~~~~~        | 2000 do. 600 do.              |
| Marquinez, ~~~~~     | 600 do. 700 do.               |
| Saordal, ~~~~~       | 500 do. 300 do.               |
| El Pastor, ~~~~~     | 700 do. 300 do.               |

Carry over, 22 300

5,850

Leaders N

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Borbon, ~~~

Binto, ~~~

Duran, A

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Almaraz ~~~

Fort at Salama

Battle of Salar

Valladolid and

Madrid ~~~~~

Astorga, beside

Guadalaxara, g

Cuenca, do

Capture of Sevi

Burgos (a) ~~~

| <i>Leaders Names.</i>            | <i>Forces.</i> |                           |
|----------------------------------|----------------|---------------------------|
| <i>Brought forward,</i>          | 22,300         | Infantry and 5,850 Horse. |
| Rorilla, .....                   | —              | 123 do.                   |
| Borbon, .....                    | —              | 300 do.                   |
| Binto, .....                     | 1000           | do. 250 do.               |
| Duran, Amor, and Taguenca, ..... | 3000           | do. 400 do.               |
| Porlier, .....                   | 4000           | do. 400 do.               |
| Temprano, .....                  | —              | 300 do.                   |
| Ortiga, .....                    | —              | 300 do.                   |
| <b>Total,</b>                    | <b>30,300</b>  | <b>7,923</b>              |

It may very readily be conceived what destruction a force like this, constituted as it was, would occasion to an invading enemy; and a Frenchman a-piece, annually, is not too many to suppose killed, wounded, or taken by them.\*

The other events of the war during this year were of minor importance, except the American contest, which is to be related under a distinct head. The French navy had long ceased to shew itself upon the ocean, and but very few instances oc-

\* The following is the list from whence the preceding abstract of losses is taken. Besides many petty actions indistinctly related are omitted, and no account can be taken of the numbers destroyed privately by Spanish hatred and revenge. The actions are those which took place in the Peninsula from the 1st January, 1812, till the 1st January, 1813.

| <i>Distribution.</i>                  | <i>British</i> | <i>Total</i>  |               |
|---------------------------------------|----------------|---------------|---------------|
| <i>British official.</i>              | <i>loss.</i>   | <i>Allied</i> | <i>French</i> |
| Tariffa, .....                        |                | 30            | 1,000         |
| Ciudad Rodrigo .....                  | 1,016          | 1,529         | 3,000         |
| Badajos .....                         | 3,860          | 4,870         | 6,000         |
| Almaraz .....                         | 173            | 176           | 550           |
| Fort at Salamanca .....               | 468            | 497           | 800           |
| Battle of Salamanca .....             | 3,678          | 3,855         | 20,000        |
| Valladolid and near it .....          |                | 5             | 1,141         |
| Madrid .....                          | 107            | 207           | 2,506         |
| Astorga, besides loss in siege, ..... |                |               | 1,300         |
| Guadalaxara, garrison of, .....       |                |               | 1,000         |
| Cuenca, do. do .....                  |                |               | 1,000         |
| Capture of Seville .....              | 16             | 16            | 2,506         |
| Burgos (a) .....                      | 1,719          | 1,970         | 625           |
| <b>Carry over,</b>                    | <b>11,037</b>  | <b>14,885</b> | <b>41,328</b> |

(a) French returns from Moniteur.

curred in comparison of what formerly did for the British navy to signalize itself. But, where these offered, it was found our tars were still those which had conquered at Aboukir and Trafalgar. On the 22d February, in the Gulf of Trieste, the Victorious of 74 guns, and the Weazle brig, fell in with the Rivoli, a new French 80 gun ship, and 862 men, accompanied by the Mercure of 18 guns, 143 men; Jean, 18 guns; Mameluc, 10 guns; and two gun boats. An obstinate action commenced. The Weazle attacked the Mercure and Mameluc, when, after

| <i>Distribution.</i><br><i>British official.</i> | <i>British</i><br><i>loss.</i> | <i>Total.</i>                 |                               |
|--------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|
|                                                  |                                | <i>Allied</i><br><i>loss.</i> | <i>French</i><br><i>loss.</i> |
| <i>Brought forward,</i>                          | 11,037                         | 14,885                        | 41,328                        |
| Wellington's Retreat (a) .....                   | 961                            | 1,334                         | 1,300                         |
| Skirmishes (various) .....                       | 520                            | 563                           | 1,037                         |
| Guerilla actions, &c. ....                       |                                | 219                           | 5,606                         |
| <i>Spanish official.</i>                         |                                |                               |                               |
| Garrison of Guetano .....                        |                                |                               | 792                           |
| Ballasteros, at Bornos .....                     |                                | 1,000                         | 650                           |
| O'Donnell's Defeat .....                         |                                | (b) 3,919                     | 1,500                         |
| Deserters (c) .....                              |                                |                               | 7,000                         |
| Various Actions, regulars .....                  |                                | 1,779                         | 11,170                        |
| Ditto, do. by Guerillas .....                    |                                | 492                           | 26,100                        |
| Consuegra and Tafalla, garrisons of              |                                |                               | no returns                    |
| <i>French official.</i>                          |                                |                               |                               |
| Valencia .....                                   |                                | 20,000                        |                               |
| Peniscola .....                                  |                                | 2,000                         | (d) 5,000                     |
| Altafouilla, by Decaen .....                     |                                | 2,000                         |                               |
| Actions not mentioned by Allies ..               |                                | 3,807                         | 437                           |
| <i>Total, .....</i>                              | 12,518                         | 52,000                        | 102,000                       |

(a) French loss unknown, but must have been considerable, at least as many.

(b) The action was very severe, and the enemy suffered considerably; it is not too many to state his loss at 1,500 men.

(c) This number is difficult to ascertain; various accounts make it much more; besides many prisoners, not particularly stated.

N. B. Demi-official accounts stated the sick at Seville at 2,000, the rest were killed, wounded, or taken.

(d) It is not too many to state the loss of the enemy in all these places at 5,000 men. The actions which preceded the immediate fall of Valencia were very sanguinary. I do not take into account the first general action, where victory even according to Suchet's account, was for some time doubtful. That loss was great, but belongs to 1811.

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an action of 45 minutes, the *Mercure* blew up, and only three of her crew were saved. At the same time the *Victorious* brought the *Revoli* to action, and, after a severe engagement of four hours, in which the French ship lost 400 men, killed and wounded, the *Victorious* succeeded in capturing her. On the 22d May, Captain Hotham of the *Northumberland* of 74 guns, and the *Growler* gun brig, fell in with two French frigates and a brig,\* returning from a cruise, in which they had destroyed 36 vessels, English, Portuguese, Spaniards, and Americans, the most valuable parts of the cargoes of which vessels they had on board at the time. In endeavouring to enter the harbour of L'Orient, they were intercepted by the British ship, and run ashore, after a sharp engagement under their own batteries, where they were totally destroyed. The British loss in this gallant affair was 43 killed and wounded, and the *Northumberland* suffered considerably in her sails and rigging from the batteries on shore, as she went so close in as to anchor in seven fathom water.

The domestic events of this period, which were likely to have had a considerable effect upon the conduct of the war, were the following. Upon the expiry of the Regency restrictions, the Prince Regent wished to form a ministry from the leading characters of both parties, that the nation, at that important moment, might have the full benefit of the advice of the most conspicuous characters of the State. For this purpose, his Royal Highness applied to Lords Grenville and Grey, in order to obtain their counsel and assistance, declaring that he had "*no predilections to indulge, no resentments to gratify, no objects to obtain but such as were common to the whole Empire.*"† Notwithstanding, however, this manly and frank declaration, these noble personages declined the invitation of his Royal Highness, declaring explicitly, that with regard to public measures, their difference of opinion from the ministry were "too many and too important to admit of an Union with them;" and that there

\* L' *Ariadne* and L' *Andromache* of 44 guns and 450 men each, and Mameluke brig of 18 guns and 150 men.

† Prince Regent's letter to Lords Grey and Grenville, February 13th, 1812.

opinions, with regard to public measures, in which they were at variance with the ministers of the crown, "*embraced almost all the leading features of the present policy of the Empire.*"\* What the policy was which these noble personages wished this country to pursue it is impossible to determine; but we see the glorious results which have ensued from that open and manly policy, which the unchanged councils and counsellors of the Prince Regent have so stedfastly pursued; and if the noble personages already mentioned had followed another line of conduct, and adopted other plans, these could hardly have brought round such mighty consequences; so that this country and Europe have, therefore, to congratulate themselves, that these illustrious Statesmen did not at this moment comply with the wishes of their Sovereign.

The next event was, however, of a more serious and alarming nature. This was no less than the assassination of the Right Hon. Spencer Perceval, Chancellor of the Exchequer, and first Lord of the Treasury, in the lobby of the House of Commons. This lamentable event happened on the afternoon of the 11th of May; the perpetrator was a wretch of the name of Bellingham, who gloried in the deed. The monster accomplished his purpose with a pistol, with which he shot the unfortunate Minister through the heart. He fell, and instantly expired. The assassin made no attempt to escape. He was seized, tried, condemned and executed; and till the last moment of his existence exulted in the crime. It is impossible to describe the consternation and horror which filled the minds of both Houses of the Legislature, and which overspread the country upon hearing of this unprecedented act—a stain to the national character. Yet there were a few wretches who rejoiced at the deed, particularly about Nottingham; and one writer, long known for his inflammatory and disgraceful harangues, endeavoured, in pretty broad terms, to justify the atrocious act. But these were soon silenced, by the universal burst of indignation with which the intelligence was received throughout the kingdom. Mr. Perceval died regretted by

\* Lords Grey and Grenville's letter to the Regent.

every good man. Ample provision for the numerous family. highest station. general change and ineffectual. out of the opposition. Grey and Grenville. the ministers of the country, and content with the Mr. Perceval's. Sovereign, the Regent's House. amongst their associates. of their friends. they split, and. lesly was next. the consequences. power, who were whose counsels. At this moment. pled expedition. change in the policy. productive of the. Europe, and to. ambition of the. of Mr. Fox's system. obstinacy excluded. arrogance and. from the summit. ment of both.

every good man—even by his bitterest political opponents. Ample provision was made for his unfortunate widow and numerous family, by his country, whom he had served in the highest station with diligence and fidelity. Upon his death, a general change of ministers was expected; but, after repeated and ineffectual attempts to form one out of all parties, and lastly out of the opposition party, at the head of which was Lord Grey and Grenville, the Prince Regent determined to continue the ministers of his father, to the general satisfaction of the country, and advancement of the cause of Europe. Not content with obtaining the total exclusion of the ministers of Mr. Perceval's, or the Pitt party, from the councils of their Sovereign, these noble Lords insisted that the officers of the Regent's Household should be appointed by them, from amongst their adherents, which point was objected to by some of their friends. On this point, fortunately for the country, they split, and the negotiations failed. The Marquis of Wellesley was next applied to, and he had even worse success; the consequence of which was the continuance of those men in power, who were the followers and pupils of Mr. Pitt, and whose counsels have saved their country and delivered Europe. At this moment Bonaparte had just set out upon his unprincipled expedition against Russia; and any lukewarmness or change in the policy of the British Cabinet, might have been productive of the most disastrous consequences to Britain—to Europe, and to the world. From this danger, however, the ambition of that party which called themselves the followers of Mr. Fox's system, relieved the country. Their pride and obstinacy excluded them from power, at the moment when the arrogance and obstinacy of Bonaparte was going to hurl him from the summit of his. The world rejoiced at the disappointment of both.



# CAMPAIGN

IN

## GERMANY AND SPAIN,

1813 AND 1814.

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**H**AVING now finished the military events which took place in Europe during 1812, let us next turn our attention to those of the following years. In recording these, I shall relate them in the order of time in which they occurred, either in the North or South of Europe. The year 1812 is now fled; but the memory of the glorious deeds performed in it, will live for ever. These never can be forgotten amongst men. They will live and be remembered with admiration, while Moscow, Borodino, and Salamanca adorn the page of History, and while the Tormes, the Dnieper, and the Berezina roll their billows to the deep.

Memorable as the campaign of 1812 was, from the devotion of a *whole* people to the cause of their country, and from the terrible destruction which overtook the hosts of the unprincipled invader; still those of the following years, which we are now about to enter upon, afford grander features, and were productive of more important consequences. It is the more gratifying to trace the progress of these glorious events, when we recollect, that our native country acted such a conspicuous part in the contest; and then we remember, that by the firmness of our rulers and the wisdom of their councils, the British

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\* “What admiration  
character during that  
could take away none

† Answer to Senate

banners joined with those of the Peninsula, instead of being driven into the sea at Lisbon, were, before the conclusion of 1812, waving in triumph and defiance over the fertile banks of the Adour; and also, that animated by our example, and encouraged by our assistance, the hands of indignant nations who panted to be free, and to punish their odious oppressors, unfurled their standards in the breeze which ruffled the proud bosoms of the Po, the Maese, and the Rhine.

Escaped to Paris, almost the sole survivor of the finest army the world had ever seen, the disturber of Europe was so far from expressing sorrow or regret\* at the consequences of his unjustifiable conduct—so far from shewing any wish to give peace to Europe, or of curbing the reins of that insatiable ambition which had desolated kingdoms and destroyed millions, that he became but the more determined to pursue his unprincipled career, and endeavoured but the more eagerly to renew the contest on the largest scale, in order to accomplish his darling object, and the darling object and pursuit of France and of Frenchmen, namely the subjugation of Europe. Not sufficiently taught in the school of adversity, his proud heart and theirs, refused to acknowledge “ambition as the cause of their destruction,” and his unbending spirit to listen to counsel. Within 24 hours after his arrival in Paris, from the most awful scenes of misery which man had ever occasioned, or human nature beheld, his audacious tongue had the effrontery to declare, “The war I maintain with Russia, is a war of policy—I have waged it without animosity.”† Justice and honour in this undertaking were out of the question, entirely beneath his notice, or below his regard. Notwithstanding the woes which his ambition had entailed on France—the awful reverses she had experienced, and losses that she had sustained, he still looked upon her as invulnerable, and himself as invincible. In that domineering spirit, and in those haughty predictions, which had so often been ominous of the fate of nations, he continued

\* “What admiration must not be excited by the developement of the most august character during that month of perils and of glory. when the sufferings of the heart could take away none of its vigour from the intellect.” Address of Senate, Dec. 20th.

† Answer to Senate, Dec. 20th, 1812.

to alarm and menace Europe. Addressing himself in a particular manner to Great Britain, which he considered as the centre of all the opposition which could be brought against him, he said, "Forty millions of Frenchmen fear nothing. Woe to you, if any weak Cabinet hearken to your counsels. No fresh assistance of men or money are necessary to France; but if they were—if the destinies of the Empire were menaced; know that 300,000 men and 300 millions of money are every year forthcoming. By this immense developement of forces, the interests, the consideration of France, and the *safety of her allies*, will be guaranteed against all events."\* Such was the language of France and her Emperor, even at the moment when they found themselves compelled to defend the frontiers of their Empire, or rather its existence, against the formidable power and just indignation of a State, whose fate only three months before, he had boasted he would decide, on the confines of Asia; and now again that he would confine them within their dreadful climate. Vain predictions! and impotent menaces! as if the spirit which kindled the flames that laid Moscow in ashes had been eradicated—as if the proud fields of Salamanca and Borodino, had been already obliterated from the records of Europe, and their laurels been conquered in vain.

But their effects were not lost upon Europe. The genius of patriotism and independence was beginning to arouse oppressed millions, from that state of torpor and despair into which successful robbery and ambition had thrown them. A bright ray of hope from the East darted its animating influence through the dark tempests which had long desolated and benighted Europe. Providence, whose arm hurled destruction upon invading hosts in the snows and wilds of Russia, was preparing for the lips of oppression, the bitter chalice of still severer retribution, upon the plains of Germany. Prussia with countless wrongs to redress—in whose bosom, "curses not loud, but deep," had long struggled to get free, eagerly snatched the golden opportunity to obtain redress, and to punish her oppressor. Austria bleeding at every pore, humbled and compel-

\* *Moniteur*, Dec. 31st, 1812, and other dates.

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ed to kiss the rod which beat her to the ground, raised her drooping head, and beheld with sorrow and indignation, the days of her former glory, greatness, and renown. She recalled to her memory the disasters and disgrace of Marengo, Austerlitz, and Wagram—the arrogant, domineering conduct of the conqueror—the sacrifice which parental affection had been forced to make for his people's safety, and resolved to avenge the dishonour, and wipe away the stains. That stupendous fabric of military despotism—that “*badge of German slavery*,”\* the Rhenish Confederation, trembled to its lowest foundations, and threatened its founder with destruction. Sweden had relinquished the chains which bound her to French interests, and was actively employed in making preparations to assist in the deliverance of Europe. In the South as in the North, things were equally cheering, and that country, which the *Moniteur* declared no power on earth should ever wrest from France, was now, under the auspices of Great Britain, and the direction of the illustrious Wellington, about to be cleared of its odious invaders; and its sovereign and its diadem, stolen and transplanted by French audacity, were both about to be restored to their proper station and lawful possessors.

The independence of Russia could not be perfectly secure, so long as the rest of Continental Europe remained under the shackles of French tyranny. Alexander was sensible of this, and in concert with Britain, he was determined to make an effort to burst these shackles asunder. For this purpose, a new levy of eight men out of every 500 in that vast Empire was ordered:† Russia was sensible, that though much had been done, yet more remained to do. Her formidable foe, though defeated, was not ruined; and so long as France and the other nations of Southern Europe bent their necks to the yoke, it was not difficult to foresee, that he could soon collect equally formidable means. From such a foe, it was impossible at this mo-

\* Kutusoff's proclamation, Kalisch, 26th March, 1813.

† Alexander's proclamation, Dec. 12th, 1812. The governments in Poland were accepted, and Siberia had a regulation for itself.—This levy it was calculated would raise 300,000 men.

ment to expect peace, nor was it to be desired with him, it could not have been of long duration. His pride, and the vanity of the nation which he governed, had been too deeply wounded, not to induce them to make some desperate effort for the purpose of recovering what they had lost, and to secure what they still tyrannized over. Alexander had by this time been taught, by bitter experience, enough of the character of his antagonists not to know, that even if they professed other sentiments for the moment, that these would be relinquished upon the first favourable opportunity. "The arm of the giant," said Alexander, "is broken; but his destructive strength must be prevented from reviving: and his power over the nations, who serve him out of terror, *must be taken away*. Russia, extensive, rich, and pacific, seeks no conquests—wishes not to dispose of thrones. She desires tranquillity for herself and for all. She will not, however, suffer the *wicked* so to abuse her moderation, as to endanger the well-being of herself, or of other nations."\* Plainer language could not possibly be used, than here was used by the Russian sovereign, to shew his views and intentions. Yet in the very face of these declarations—on the very heels of the ruin and destruction which had overtaken the hosts of France, a party in England called loudly for peace with her, and that this moment was the most favourable which ever could again occur for that purpose. It never once entered their minds, to consider whether Bonaparte would listen to them on any terms, while if he was inclined for peace, it belonged to him to make the overtures for that purpose. In the House of Commons, this course was strongly urged by the opponents of Ministers. "For his own part," said Mr. Whitbread, "he wished, and he spoke sincerely, that the noble Lord, (Castlereagh,) was on his way with Joel Barlow, for the purpose of entering into negotiations for peace;" for, continued he, "Notwithstanding all the losses which Bonaparte may have suffered, I cannot doubt of his ability to *extricate himself*, and retire upon his resources in Poland."† "Every

\* Alexander's proclamation, Dec. 12th, 1812.

† House of Commons, Nov. 30th, 1812. This would have been an excellent way

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\* Mr. Whitbread

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year," continued he in the following debate, "brought causes for lowering our hopes and pretensions, and the probability was, that they would sink still more. The moment, (for peace) was in his opinion, peculiarly favourable; and he would have a messenger sent, not in a creeping and sneaking way, but boldly and openly to the head quarters of Bonaparte."\* But upon what terms did Mr. Whitbread wish to negotiate a peace? Were these such as the French Emperor wished, or was ready to give? "I will never," said Bonaparte, "make any but an honourable peace, and *one conformable to the interests, and grandeur of my Empire*. My Policy is not mysterious, I have stated all the sacrifices I could make."† Surely Mr. Whitbread could not advise Great Britain to become a party to establish views, "Conformable to the interests and grandeur of his Empire," in other words, to leave all Continental Europe, chained down under French controul, while such a fair opportunity was within their grasp, to deliver themselves from oppression. Such a line of conduct would have been as extraordinary, had it taken place, as the advice here given, was imprudent at this important moment. To judge from such advice, it would appear, that the belief of Bonaparte's invincibility, had obtained such a firm hold of the mind of Mr. Whitbread and others, that it had confounded their understanding, and reversed their reasoning powers, else at this moment, such language could never have escaped their lips. The whole political wisdom of preceding ages seemed lost upon those men who spoke thus. An instance was never known, where the people who had been dragged into a war against their will, and by its issue became most signally the conquerors, solicited peace from the vanquished; and if any thing could have riveted in the minds of France and of Europe the idea of her strength, and that the winter alone had been the cause of her disasters in Russia; the solicitation of peace on the part of

to get rid of his Lordship, who like Joel, would have found it difficult to light upon the French head-quarters—certainly he would not have found Bonaparte in Poland at that time.

\* Mr. Whitbread's speech, House of Commons, Dec. 1st, 1812.

† Bonaparte's answer to Senate, Feb. 14th, 1813.

Britain, would have accomplished it most completely. It would have struck the weapon from the indignant arm of Alexander, confirmed the misery and servitude of Europe, and in the end, our own destruction. Fortunately for the world, Mr. Whitbread and his associates did not direct the Councils of Great Britain or Russia, at this eventful moment. Their Sovereigns and advisers spoke a different language. "The giant's arm is broken—his power over the nations must be taken away," were resolutions Europe little expected to hear so soon, and which filled the breasts of millions with hope and exultation. This was the proper answer to all such impolitic advisers: to use the animated language of Tettenborn to the Hamburgers. "Shame and disgrace fall on every one, who in these *eventful times*, when the struggle is for the greatest blessing of the human race, can sit with his arms folded.\*" But greater shame certainly ought to fall upon the heads of those, who could not only sit down themselves with their arms folded, but advise others to sit down and fold theirs; and not content with this, should at the same time endeavour to deter those who would not follow their example, by gloomy predictions and evil omens. To such, for such there were, disheartening *vagrants* of the political sky—birds of night, whose obstinate "bosoms would not vibrate to this noble appeal,"† may with great propriety be applied the animated and cheering language, which Homer puts into the mouth of the gallant Hector, the Trojan hero, who, when contending for the liberties of his country, was thus endeavoured to be checked and deterred in his career of victory, by similar timid advisers, whose constant practice was to hold out inauspicious omens, and unfavourable times:

"Are these the faithful counsels of thy tongue,  
Thy will is partial, not thy reason wrong:  
Or if the purpose of thy heart thou vent,  
Sure Heaven resumes the little sense it lent.  
What coward counsels would thy madness move,  
Against the word, the will reveal'd of Jove?"

\* Proclamation, Hamburg, 19th March, 1815.

† Sir Francis Burdett's speech, House of Commons, Dec. 3d, 1815.

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The leading sign, th' irrevocable nod,  
 And happy thunders of the fav'ring God,  
*These shall I slight? and guide my wav'ring mind*  
*By wand'ring birds, that flit with every wind.*  
*Ye vagrants of the sky! your wings extend;*  
*Or where the sun's arise, or where descend;*  
*From right to left, unheeded take your way,*  
*While I the dictates of high Heaven obey.*  
*Without a sign his sword the brave man draws,*  
*And asks no Omen but his COUNTRY'S CAUSE.\**

To Prussia, first, the allied powers of Great Britain and Russia directed their attention. The manner in which she had been trampled upon and insulted, made them conceive she would willingly snatch the present moment to retrieve her former disgrace and misfortunes. "His Majesty offers his assistance to every people, who, being at present *obliged* to oppose him, shall abandon the cause of Napoleon, in order to follow that of their real interest. I invite them to take the advantage of the fortunate opening which the Russian armies have produced, and to unite themselves with them in the pursuit of an enemy, whose precipitate flight has discovered his loss of power. It is to Prussia, in a particular manner, that this invitation is addressed. It is the intention of his Imperial Majesty to put an end to the calamities by which she is oppressed, to demonstrate to the King the friendship which he preserves for him, and to restore to the monarchy of Frederick its éclat and its extent."† "Ages may elapse before an opportunity equally favourable again presents itself, and it would be an abuse of the goodness of Providence not to take advantage of this crisis," &c.‡ Prussia eagerly listened to these invitations. The inhabitants of East Prussia took every measure to rise in defence of their independence; and, at the same time, resolved to pay no attention to the mandates of their Sovereign, while he remained a prisoner under French power, and was dictated to by French arrogance. This last resolution, however, was saved them, by the escape of their King from French thralldom.

\* Pope's Homer's Iliad, Book XII. verses 269—284.

† Kutusoff's proclamation, London Gazette, January 23d.

‡ Alexander's ditto, ditto, ditto.

About this time also, Lord Walpole, attached to the British embassy at St. Petersburg, was sent upon an important mission to Vienna; and, shortly after, a person of considerable rank arrived in Britain from the Austrian Government; the consequences of which communications we shall have occasion to notice more at large in the sequel. The pen of satire and tongue of ridicule were busily and loudly employed in scoffing at the mission of Lord Walpole to Austria. What! a *school boy* detach Austria from the interests of her son-in-law!—Lord Walpole deceive the eagle eyes of the Satellites of Napoleon, and match French wisdom in the arts of diplomacy! How arrogant and presumptuous the talentless ministers of England, ever to expect success from a mission like this. Yet he did deceive the Argus eyed Satellites of Napoleon, and was in Vienna for a fortnight, and had left it again before Monsieur Otto had any information of it; no bad omen that his journey had not been in vain—and hence the Opposition anger.

On the 6th January, the Emperor and Kutusoff left Wilna, and on the 9th their head quarters were established at the village of Meretsch. On the 13th, being the first day of the new year in the Russian calendar, after having publicly implored the blessing of the Almighty upon their undertaking, these great personages crossed the Niemen, amidst the acclamations of their brave troops, and continued their advance to the Westward. Milaradovitch and Doctoroff, with the troops under their command, which had crossed the Niemen at Grodno, moved in a parallel line to the Emperor's left, and Sacken's corps, in another line still farther to the left, moved in the same direction. Wittgenstein and Platoff moved along the sea coast. On the 12th January, General Chernicheff entered Marienwerder, and the Viceroy of Italy and Victor had a very narrow escape from the Cossacks.\* On the 19th January, the head quarters of the Russian army were at Lyck. By the 24th, the Russians had crossed the Vistula in great force. Dantzic was surrounded by their light troops. Bromberg was in their possession; Thorn threatened; and Platoff, with his Cossacks, sent foraging par-

\* Kutusoff's Journal, January 19th, 1813.

ties in advance the Russians and received corps, and some where the well rison was thus of force, among men, and then General Regnier Austrians under ons, 2500 Pole his original force mount, which the Russian he and on the 27th Miawa; on the On the 26th January with 2000 cavalry with loss. By sides. Posen was Oder. Warsawazines of every sians.

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ties in advance towards the Oder. In every place to which the Russians came, they were welcomed with unfeigned joy, and received as deliverers. The remainder of Macdonald's corps, and some others, had thrown themselves into Dantzic, where the well known General Rapp commanded. The garrison was thus considerably increased, and with this accession of force, amounted, according to the *Moniteur*, to 40,000 men, and there was no doubt that it exceeded 30,000 men. General Regnier's force, which soon after separated from the Austrians under Schwartzberg, consisted of only 6,000 Saxons, 2500 Poles, and 1500 French,\* the remains not only of his original force, but of re-enforcements to almost the same amount, which had at different times joined him. On the 23d, the Russian head quarters were established at Iohannesburg, and on the 27th at Willenberg. On the 1st February, at Miawa; on the 3d, at Radzeons; and on the 5th, at Plock. On the 26th January, the garrison of Dantzic made a sally with 2000 cavalry, on the side of Oliva, but were driven back with loss. By the 7th February, Thorn was invested on all sides. Posen was taken by Woronzow. Platoff crossed the Oder. Warsaw was entered on the 9th. Supplies and magazines of every description fell into the hands of the Russians.

The head quarters continued to advance; and, on the 13th, Prince Kutusoff Smolensko, after four days forced marches, came up with General Regnier and his forces, near Kalisch, where he was endeavouring to form a junction with 4000 Poles. Regnier was immediately defeated. Thirty-six officers and 2000 privates, with two flags, were taken, and upwards of 600 killed and wounded. The Russian loss was 600 men.† At Kalisch the head quarters remained for a considerable time, where negotiations of great importance were going on. Still, however, the Russian army continued to advance in all directions. One division took the road through Silesia and Lusatia, towards Dresden, which city they entered on the 22d of

\* Russian Journal from 20th to 30th January, 1812.

† Kutusoff's dispatch, Kalisch, February 14th, 1812.

March. A second, under Wittgenstein, marched upon Berlin, which city they entered on the 4th; and a third, under Tettenborn and others, marched towards Hamburg, which they entered on the 18th. Every where they were received with wonder and with joy. The sight of a warrior of the Don broke asunder the shackles of nations; and these indefatigable troops continued to move in all directions, the harbingers of glad tidings and of better days to Europe. The minds of men so long bowed down by misfortunes and oppression, now began to look forward to the future with a confidence that they had long been unaccustomed to. In October 1812, who could have believed that the French army which then threatened Russia, would have been sought for in vain in January, 1813? Who could have believed that in five months from that date, the victorious Russian armies would have been West of the Elbe—that all Prussia would be free—that the French eagles would be trembling in Hanover—and that the animating voice of Liberty and Independence, would, in March, be heard from the summits of the lofty Alps, to the shores of the German Ocean? Heroes of Salamanca—of Borodino—Inhabitants of Moscow—to your firmness Europe owed this wonderful change. The present age will regard you with esteem and veneration, and every succeeding one will bless you.

The disasters which the French army had experienced in Russia, spread rapidly throughout Europe. In all the Austrian States it was heard with joy and exultation. Still more favourably were the tidings received in the North of Germany. The King of Prussia eagerly snatched the opportunity to restore his country to independence. A plan was laid, by the French authorities in Berlin, to seize his person; conceiving that if they had him in their power, they would paralyze the efforts of the Prussian nation. His Majesty, however, eluded their snares, and left his residence in the neighbourhood of Berlin, and, with his attendants, marched off in all haste to Breslaw, the capital of Silesia. Here he was free from French power and influence; and the first use that he made of his liberty, was, to free General D'York from the censure he had been compelled to pass on him—for his joining the Russians,

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continue him in his command; and what was of still greater importance, on the 6th of March, he concluded a treaty, offensive and defensive with the Russian Sovereign. This fairly determined his future conduct; for he had nothing now to look to but either complete success or total destruction. On the 15th, the two Sovereigns met at Breslaw, and their meeting was of the most affecting nature. The scenes that had happened to each since their last meeting, rushed upon their memory, and caused them to shed tears. Both had drunk deep of the cup of affliction, and had received a severe lesson in the school of adversity. An alliance founded under these circumstances, upon the same principles, and with the same objects in view, had the most certain prospect of being permanent and beneficial to Europe. That alliance was formed, and the united energies of both Sovereigns and of their people, were now about to be called forth, to combat for the repose and liberty of Germany, and of Europe.

While these things were going on in Prussia, preparations for important events were taking place in France. It was a busy winter with Bonaparte. On the 2d February, a law was enacted, by order of Bonaparte, creating, in case of his death, the Empress Regent during the minority of her son, and commanding an oath of fidelity to be taken to the King of Rome. This, with the ceremony of crowning them, was one of those political stage tricks which amused and diverted the minds of the Parisians from other objects of more serious importance. Bonaparte, however, was really alarmed at the fate which might attend his son, in case of any evil befalling himself. The conspiracy of Mallet and Lahorie, in conjunction with many other Generals, during the preceding autumn, when he was in Russia, shewed him that, if any accident befel him, his dynasty was not likely to reign in France; and he, therefore, endeavoured to provide against the worst, by the measure in question. He also no doubt had in view, by advancing the Empress to this important trust, that he would thereby bind Austria to his cause; and, in case of his death, induce her to support the interests of his wife and his son. But all these things, were done too late. Bonaparte had too long trampled upon

all the feelings of mankind, to induce any part of them beyond the limits of France, to regard his fate with the smallest concern.

The defection of Prussia from his cause, or rather her emancipation from French shackles, could no longer be kept secret. Bitter as the disclosure of this was to the people of France, Bonaparte was compelled to make it. On the 27th March, M. de Krusemark, the Prussian minister at Paris, demanded his passports, communicated the treaty made with Russia; and, at the same time, laid before the French Government a list of her grievances, which discloses another chain of those galling proceedings of French arrogance and injustice, scarcely equalled at any other time or place in Europe. To shew, if possible, her utter contempt of justice, France without hesitation, published what she never once attempted to correct, or even to palliate in the smallest degree. "Notwithstanding (says M. Krusemark) the hard and humiliating terms of the treaty of Tilsit, France did not observe even these. French garrisons were placed in the fortresses of the Oder. Arbitrary and exorbitant contributions were imposed; and the French army lived for 18 months, at discretion, upon the inhabitants, and remained in the country contrary to the stipulations of the treaty. Upon the breaking out of the war with Russia, the King having every thing to fear from France, sacrificed his affections and entered into a treaty with her. In the meantime, the Prussian agents at Paris, were *compelled* to sign the most oppressive contracts; yet, to avoid offence, these Prussia endeavoured to fulfil. French troops poured into Prussia; and while Prussia was fulfilling the oppressive contracts, in filling magazines for them, the *French armies lived at the expense of the inhabitants*. Their property was taken away without any remuneration; and, in a short time, Prussia was robbed of 70,000 horses, and 20,000 carriages. The enormous contribution laid upon her in 1806, had been paid up; and besides all these things, at the end of 1812, Prussia had advanced to France 94,000,000 francs, every demand for which was answered by the most contemptuous silence. All the fortresses so unjustly retained, and filled with French troops, were provisioned at the expense of Prus-

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sia; and, at last as affairs became more urgent, the Governors of these places received orders to take by main force every thing wanted for their use, within a circle of ten leagues round each fortification, and which arbitrary and unjust order was put in execution, without ever deigning to inform the King of Prussia of it. These, and numerous other grievances, determined the King upon the approach of the Russian armies, to appeal to his people—they heard his call—they flew to support him, and now having leagued his arms with those of Alexander, he was determined to rescue the inheritance of his fathers from French shackles, or to perish in the attempt.”\*

In answer to these grievous charges, Bassano, (for his master does not attempt to deny one of them: he and his Sovereign were above noticing such things;) reproaches Prussia for interested and vacillating policy, before the treaty of Tilsit; designates the youth of Prussia, who were obeying their Sovereign's call to the field of honour, as turbulent and factious—declared his master preferred an open enemy to a friend always ready to abandon him; and, lastly, stated that “*the finger of Providence* had shewn itself in the events of last winter, and had produced them to unmask false friends and to mark faithful ones.”† The past winter had indeed taught France and Bonaparte that there was a Providence. Before that, they considered it as very doubtful, and altogether unnecessary. Their Emperor foresaw every thing—connected every thing in his conceptions—controuled every thing—penetrated into futurity—decided the fate of Empires—and commanded events, which Providence only can do. But after what had befallen them, nothing but French arrogance and audacity would have attempted to ascribe the interference of Providence for the purposes to which they attributed it. The world believed, and with good reason, that it was for a very different purpose. France had forgot her God in her prosperity—denied Him in her madness, and she had felt, and was still further to feel that important truth, immutable as its au-

\* Krusemark's letter, Paris, March, 27th, 1815.

† Bassano's letter, Paris, April 1st, 1815.



thor, and equally applicable to nations as to individuals "When you call upon me I will not answer—I will mock when your fear cometh."

Prussia, now fairly committed in the arduous contest, made the greatest exertions to organize her means and her forces. Though stripped of her wealth, her people had a willing mind, and soon supplied every deficiency. None were idle in Prussia—none stood with their arms folded—none advised others to do so. Her youth flew to arms at the call of their Sovereign. Her women of all ranks threw aside every thing approaching to luxury, and sold every thing they could spare, to supply the wants of their country, and to prepare necessaries for the comforts of her defenders. The lower orders worked round the fortifications, and wherever labour was necessary; the higher classes purchased garments and made them for their husbands, fathers, and friends, who marched to the field of honour. The Spirit of the Wolga and Moscow breathed his animating influence, and called forth Courage upon the streams of the Elbe and the Oder. The Prussian ranks were quickly filled with thousands of brave men, eager to fight in behalf of their country. Blücher, the venerable Blücher, appeared once more upon this important theatre: He readily heard the voice of his country, and flew to her assistance. Unable to bear her disgrace, and determined never to carry arms in the cause of her oppressor, he had retired into Sweden to mourn over the miseries of his native land, from whence he now returned to save it. He was immediately appointed to the chief command of her armies. His eye soon made soldiers.

While these things were going on in Prussia, the Russian head-quarters were at Kalisch, a town in Prussian Poland; a central position, in which recruits and convalescents were daily arriving, and from which point reinforcements and supplies could be sent to the armies in advance in every quarter, with equal facility. The Austrian troops by this time had concluded an unlimited armistice, and had retired into Galicia, where they remained unmolested. The Government of Warsaw, with Prince Poniatowsky, had fled first to Petrikaw, and afterwards to Zentochan, where they

endeavoured and in which corps, under saw to observe Russian soldiers giving help.

In the mean time She could not attend to these events. Couriers were sent to Paris in rapid succession, and the auxiliary corps† and the commander in chief were given instructions.

Austria, and for specific purposes of conjecture.

particularly in the new system of burgh, by that address, and language, and with mind, eager to words which he

no doubt, to use, ly, those of "the following,

"The tyrant who forged your fettered bodies—

sian snows. Mads which once shake off your your independence to the last drop could hardly re-

† Cathcart's dispatch.

endeavoured to raise troops for the assistance of Bonaparte, and in which they in some degree succeeded. A Russian corps, under Sacken, was stationed to the Southward of Warsaw to observe their motions, and Warsaw was left without a Russian soldier;\* so little fear had Alexander of the inhabitants giving him any trouble.

In the meantime, Austria was beginning to bestir herself. She could not remain an inattentive observer of the passing events. Couriers and ambassadors passed between Vienna and Paris in rapid succession. The commander even of the auxiliary corps† set out from Galicia to Paris, to wait upon his commander in chief, as the most *respectful way of obtaining his instructions*. Troops were collecting in all haste throughout Austria, and marching to her northern frontier; but for what specific purpose, was yet, with the world in general, only matter of conjecture. But it was generally believed over Europe, and particularly in France, that Austria was improving fast in the new system of education carried from Britain and St. Petersburg, by that "*school boy*,"‡ Lord Walpole. His Lordship addressed her, it was supposed, in plain unsophisticated language, and with all the ardour of an uncorrupted youthful mind, eager to learn himself, and also to instruct others. The words which he used, and the doctrines which he taught, were, no doubt, to use the appropriate language of St. Jean de Angély, those of "*truth and nature*." With sentiments similar to the following, he, perhaps, addressed the Austrian Monarch. "The tyrant who trampled upon you is fled—the army which forged your fetters is no more. My eyes have seen their emaciated bodies—their cold remains scattered in heaps upon Russian snows. My feet have trode over the bones of those myriads which once made you tremble; arm then, and without fear shake off your fetters—"Be every inch a King;" to secure your independence Great Britain and Russia will support you to the last drop of their blood." To such reasoning Austria could hardly remain inattentive.

\* Cathcart's dispatch, Kalisch, March 6th, 1815.

† Schwartzenberg.

‡ So the Opposition in Britain called him.

The victorious Russians, strengthened by the accession of Prussia to the good cause, now approached the Elbe. They quickly over-ran the fertile kingdom of Saxony, passed the Saale, and penetrated to Erfurt. Beauharnois, who commanded the French army, assembled under cover of the important fortress of Magdeburgh, and now amounting to a considerable force, tried to retrieve in some measure the disgrace of his previous rapid flight, by endeavouring to seize Berlin. But he had not properly appreciated the talents of his indefatigable opponent. Wittgenstein was aware of his object, and prepared to oppose it. By a decided step he prevented it, met and defeated Beauharnois with the loss of 3000 men, and compelled him to seek shelter on the other side of the Elbe. General Morant, who was endeavouring to escape from Swedish Pomerania, shared a worse fate. Met on the banks of the Elbe by the watchful Tettenborn, he was completely defeated, himself killed, and his whole force, amounting to nearly 4000 men, were cut to pieces. Hamburg was thus freed from any immediate danger from her former arbitrary masters. Bremen was threatened, and all Hanover was ready to rise in arms and join the approaching armies of the allies.

To prevent all misrepresentation of their conduct and views, the object of the confederates was most distinctly stated, and manfully and openly avowed. It was the overthrow of that odious system of tyranny exercised by France over Continental Europe, which had so long covered the latter with desolation, and the people thereof with poverty and mourning. Nothing less would satisfy them, although to obtain this, they were well aware, would be an arduous undertaking. Yet, unless that power was taken away, they were sensible, and had been taught by bitter experience, that it would instantly be marshalled for their destruction. Their stubborn foe despised all concession, and treated with scorn every idea of a pacification which should in the smallest degree curb French power or lower French vanity. The allies, however, were equally determined to persevere. Nearly one half of Europe were now arrayed under the banners of independence, and a large portion of the other half, they were sensible, wished them success.

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As the Russian armies advanced into Germany they continued to issue the most animating and cheering proclamations to the German people. These spoke truths which every one understood, and which came home to the noblest feelings of the human bosom. Wrote in the strongest language, they breathed the noblest sentiments, in a manner which must have animated the feelings of the most callous and the most careless. They afford such a striking contrast to that denationalizing jargon of French vanity, arrogance, and impiety, that it would be unpardonable to omit a few of the most striking passages in several of them. "Noble Prussian warriors," said Wittgenstein, "ours is the strife of liberty, of virtue, against the enemy of the independence of all nations. Let us in fraternal love and unity, proceed onward to the attainment of the greatest end, for which armies ever were united."\* Addressing himself to the people of Germany, from the Oder to the Rhine, he proceeds thus. "Notwithstanding the chains you bear, and debasement you suffer, take courage! strongly has the justice of God shewn itself on the banks of the Dnieper, the Dwina and the Berezina; and heavy has the sword of his vengeance fallen on the head of your enemies, of the general enemies of liberty, of the laws of nations, and of the independence of your Princes; the enemies of all social virtue. Heavily injured German Friends! the hour of your redemption draws nigh. Irritated and revengeful, that good fortune which has been so much misused by your oppressor, has suddenly turned her back upon him. He has lost an army of half a million of experienced warriors. He may still drive together some heaps of unhappy sacrifices to his ambition. With powerful hand, has Russia torn away the bandage from the eyes of nations—Already have you too long obeyed a foreigner, never called to any throne—Who has no share in your interests—Who has torn from you your rightful Princes, that he might purchase a brainless vision for his horrid ambition, with the strength of your country and the blood of your children. This insatiable ambition, he fastened to the dreadful chain,

\* Proclamation, Berlin, March 13th, 1813.

which he calls Conscription, to draw away your sons and brothers, the hopeless flower of your country, to distant lands, where they dreadfully ended their lives in battles, in prisons, and in hospitals, venting imprecations on their cold blooded tyrant, and your weakness—lives which belonged to their native country, to their families, and which should have gladdened your days."

"Much injured German Friends! your despair, the bitter tears of your mothers, wives, and brides, have become heavy in the scales of Heaven. The hour of your deliverance is struck—Receive the valiant Russians as your friends and allies. Join yourselves to them and to the Prussians—your brethren—your relations—who come with them in the noblest and most sacred cause for which an alliance was ever formed. *But ye, ye few unworthy Germans, the despicable instruments of expiring tyranny, trembling at the impending vengeance of God and man: while I shall continue to treat every French warrior, that falls into my hands, according to the most liberal laws of imprisonment in war; every German taken with arms in his hand, against his native country, shall in the most distant provinces of Russia, bewail his ever having drawn his sword against the Liberty of his fellow citizens.*"\* To his subjects, the King of Prussia, said, "We bent under the superior power of France—that peace which deprived me of half my subjects, procured us no blessing; it on the contrary hurt us more than war itself. Nothing but haughtiness and treachery were the result. Victory proceeds from God. Shew yourselves worthy of his protection, by obedience and fulfilling your duties. Your King will always be with you, and with him the Crown Prince and the Princes of his house. They will fight along with you."† "The confederation of the Rhine," said Kutusoff, "that deceitful fetter, with which the general disturber bound Germany, after dismembering her, and even obscuring her ancient name, can no longer be tolerated; as it is the effect of foreign constraint and of foreign influence, *It must be dissolved.* Their Majesties

\* Wittgenstein's proclamation, Berlin, March 16th, 1813.

† King of Prussia's proclamation to his army and his people, Berlin, March 23d, 1813.

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*will only give protection*, while the German Princes and nations are engaged in completing the grand work. Let France, who is beautiful and strong through herself, occupy herself in future, in promoting her internal welfare! No Foreign power intends disturbing her—no hostile power shall be sent against her rightful borders. But be it known to France, that the other powers are solicitous of conquering lasting tranquillity for their subjects, and that they will not lay down their arms, until the foundation of the independence of every European State is established and secured.”\* This was open and decided language—No power could plead ignorance of their views, none who after this continued, unless from imperious necessity, to resist them, could afterwards complain of whatever fate might await them from their hands, if they were victorious. Their cause was just, their object noble, and those who would not league themselves, when they could, with their deliverers, were fairly liable to the consequences of their own cowardice or baseness. They could have no right to complain, nor expect, if they did so, that their complaints could for a moment be listened to. Whoever is not with me is against me, was the constant maxim of Bonaparte. Their own safety and future repose, compelled the allies at this moment to view every power in the same light; and those who when an opening was afforded them, by which they might with a prospect of success, contend for their liberties, would not do so, but who rather preferred to cling to the cause of ambition, and to support its odious power and nefarious designs, were justly exposed to, and had nothing to expect but vengeance, from the hands of justly indignant nations. Their bane and antidote were both before them; and if they would not *risk* their strength in a good cause, they deserved to *lose* it in a bad one. The present contest was different from all others which ever had preceded it. It was not a combat betwixt two rival nations for their individual interests, but a contest of every thing that was good, against every thing that was not good; of every thing that

\* Proclamation by Kutusoff, in the name of their Majesties the Emperor of Russia, and King of Prussia, dated Kalisch, March 25th, 1813.

was just, against every thing that was unjust; and he who could with his eyes open and his hands free, support the latter against the former, deserved neither compassion nor forgiveness from mankind.

Another campaign of still greater magnitude and importance than the last was now rapidly approaching. Both parties were powerful, and animated by the strongest feelings, though of a very different description. The one party had to retrieve his disasters, and prevent a further diminution of his power. The other had to secure their independence and future repose, by taking away the destructive power of their still formidable opponent. Approaching commotions of a wider extent, and bloodier wars, it was now evident, must ensue from these conflicting interests and resolutions. Though Bonaparte had lost the most formidable army that Europe had ever seen, still the military resources of France, and the states yet under his immediate controul, were such as to enable him to carry on a sanguinary and extensive warfare, for some time longer. But a contest, very different indeed to that which he had looked forward to; a contest not to be carried on upon the Wolga, and *finished* on the confines of Asia; but a contest to be carried on around the borders of the Elbe, and the confines of France—a contest not now for the existence of Russia, but for the liberty of Germany—not with the North of Europe aiding him, but united against him, and calling loudly for vengeance on his guilty head. Such was the nature of the contest, the issue of which was to decide the destinies of Europe for ages. Although a deep silence seemed to overspread France, still she was not inactive. The silence which then prevailed, was the calm before the storm; it was the silence which precedes the approach of death, and was ominous of the fate of nations. One class of men in Britain, conceived it to be impossible for Bonaparte to collect an army of any force; another, that he could raise one more numerous than the one he had lost, and with greater hopes of success; and therefore, when his new and formidable force made its appearance, the former endeavoured to treat it as a fiction; and the latter who could prognosticate nothing but evil, were loud in their exultation, at this proof of

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their sagacity, and endeavoured with all their might, to spread consternation and alarm amongst the nations who opposed him. The conduct of both parties was equally injurious and ridiculous. It was evident, to any one who would give himself the trouble to think, that so long as France supported Bonaparte, he would find no difficulty in procuring another army, in a country whose whole male population were trained to arms, and who gloried in the profession; nor had Europe any more reason, or indeed so much reason, to dread this fresh force, as it was evident he could never assemble a force much superior to the one he had lost, nor could wiser heads be appointed to direct it. On the other hand, the force which was to oppose him, was much augmented in number, and also justly more confident in their own strength; and altogether invincible, upon the principle of the justice of their cause. It was not by underating her danger, neither was it by magnifying it, but by fairly contemplating, and firmly meeting it, that Europe could expect to succeed; and therefore, the attempt which was made in both ways at the opening of this campaign, was a system of deception most vexatious, injurious, and hurtful to the public mind.

Bonaparte in reality had not been idle during the winter, though for reasons which were obvious, he made less noise about his preparations than usual. From the vast population of France, Italy, Switzerland, and the States forming the Rhenish Confederation, he had again collected a numerous and formidable army, though certainly not composed of such veteran troops as those which had perished in Russia. From Spain, he withdrew a number of Subaltern officers, to supply the places of those lost in the North, and mixed them with the raw levies, in order to forward these more quickly in their military duties. By exertions, he had obtained a formidable train of artillery; and he had also made a very considerable progress in replacing his cavalry.\* Though no very great portion of this force was so complete and efficient, as he could have wished, yet he was forced to take the field, least the far-

\* In France and Germany, according to the *Moniteur*, these amounted to 80,000.

ther advance of the allies should loosen the chains of his vassal states, thereby increasing the number of his foes, and lessening his means and resources. If possible, to prevent this, he on the 15th April, secretly and suddenly as usual, left Paris, and on the 16th joined the army assembled at Mentz, and at Frankfurt upon the Mayne. The force, at this time there collected, according to his official accounts subsequently published, could not be less than 300,000 men,\* under his most celebrated Generals; amongst the number of which was Soult, who having spent the winter in a milder climate than his brother Marshals had done, was now recalled from Spain, to assist in what was conceived at the moment to be the more pressing danger. All these men had their characters to regain, and to wipe away by their future deeds, the disgrace and danger with which the Russian campaign had covered them, and now threatened the French Empire. They were also aware, that they had to contend with their present antagonists, at a season, and in a country where the miserable shifts of the premature intervention of the elements, would not avail them to cover defeat. They were also aware, that upon the issue of the approaching campaign, depended the existence of the whole fabric of French power and domination, established at such an enormous expense of treasure, honour, and blood. The fate also of their own power and dignity, as far as man could see, were also likely to depend upon its issue. Every exertion therefore, of which they were capable, was to be expected from both them and their master.

As it is of importance, to ascertain as exactly as possible, the strength of the respective armies, both in order to appreciate the future operations, and also to shew the number of the human species who have perished to gratify the pride and ambition of one overbearing individual, and of the haughty nation over which he ruled; I shall therefore attend particularly to this point. In another place, I shall state particularly the strength of the French army, while here I shall only endeavour to ascertain that of the Russians and the Prussians, as yet the only troops on the Continent actively employed against them.

The following account of the Russian army at the beginning

\* See statement of forces in subsequent pages.

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of the present and close of the preceding dreadful year, is the most accurate I have been able to find, and which cannot be far from the truth. At the commencement of the last campaign, it consisted of twelve divisions, which would amount to 300,000 men, besides the garrison of Riga, perhaps 20,000, and the Cossacks, said to be 50,000. From the number which fought at Borodino, and what was lost previous to that event, it appears to have been divided in the following manner after leaving the Dwina, viz.

|                                                       |         |
|-------------------------------------------------------|---------|
| Main army under De Tolli, Regulars, .....             | 140,000 |
| Left with Tormasoff in Volhynia, &c. ....             | 40,000  |
| Garrison Bobrunsk, .....                              | 10,000  |
| With Wittgenstein, about .....                        | 40,000  |
| Garrison of Riga, .....                               | 20,000  |
| Troops in Finland, .....                              | 28,000  |
| Moldavian army, .....                                 | 60,000  |
|                                                       | <hr/>   |
| Lost previous to the battles at Smolensk, .....       | 338,000 |
|                                                       | <hr/>   |
| <b>Cossacks.</b>                                      | 12,000  |
| With main army suppose, .....                         | 25,000  |
| Do. with Wittgenstein, do. ....                       | 10,000  |
| Do. at Riga, and with Tormasoff and Tchichagoff. .... | 15,000  |
|                                                       | <hr/>   |
|                                                       | 50,000  |
|                                                       | <hr/>   |
|                                                       | 400,000 |

From the above statement it appears, that Russia at the commencement of the campaign, had only 240,000 regular troops and the Cossacks, to oppose the tremendous army brought against her. Her losses during the campaign was also very considerable, and cannot be estimated at less than 160,000 men killed, wounded, sick, and prisoners. Of the latter indeed, the number was small, for though the enemy boasted in his bulletins of having taken a considerable number, it was never known where he sent them, nor were they ever heard of at any place in any considerable body. The re-enforcements which the Russian army received around Moscow, is more difficult to determine, but these were very considerable. Private accounts, from high sources of information, in Russia, (Petersburgh, October 27th,) stated Kutusoff's army at 200,000 strong, when the French began their retreat; in which account it is probable, Winzengerode's force of 40,000 men is included. Count Rosen, the Russian ambassador at Stock-

holm, in his official letter, Nov. 19th, detailing the battles of Viasma, &c. expressly mentions, that Kutusoff was following the French army, with a force of 150,000 men; but whether he includes Winzengerode's force in that number or not, is uncertain. If he did not, then the private accounts which represented the force as 200,000 strong, were nearly correct,

|                                                                                                                              |             |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
| The main army at Borodino was.....                                                                                           | 130,000     |
| Lost there, .....                                                                                                            | 40,000      |
| Remained after the battle, .....                                                                                             | 90,000      |
| Re-enforced by Miloradovitch, .....                                                                                          | 33,800      |
| Do. Count Markoff, .....                                                                                                     | (a) 31,000  |
| Troops at Klin, .....                                                                                                        | 14,000      |
| Other troops from Twer, .....                                                                                                | (b) 16,000  |
| On 26th October, Cavalry and Cossacks, .....                                                                                 | (c) 20,000  |
|                                                                                                                              | 114,800     |
| Total, .....                                                                                                                 | 204,800     |
| Allow they lost in killed, wounded, sick, and prisoners, from battle Borodino, till battle Maloyaroslavitz, inclusive, ..... | 20,000      |
| Remain, .....                                                                                                                | (d) 184,800 |

By the same authority which stated Kutusoff's army at 200,000 strong, we are informed, that Wittgenstein's force at the last attack upon Polotzk, was 60,000 men, which must be tolerably correct, for

|                                                             |        |
|-------------------------------------------------------------|--------|
| His force at first engagements, 31st August, was about..... | 40,000 |
| Re-enforced by troops from Finland, .....                   | 18,000 |
| Do. by troops from Petersburg, .....                        | 17,000 |
| Total including re-enforcements, .....                      | 75,000 |

(a) Rostopchin's Proclamation, Sept. 11th.

(b) Thirty thousand troops joined from the Twer side; but those at Klin, at the date of Rostopchin's proclamation, must have been included in that number.

(c) Order of the day to main army, Oct 26th, and Kutusoff's Journal, from 4th to 13th Oct.

(d) Allowing 35 or 40,000 men to Winzengerode's force, the remainder would make in the one case, exactly 150,000 men for Kutusoff's army, according to Count Rosen's dispatch.

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(b) Lord Cathcart's  
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|                                                        |        |
|--------------------------------------------------------|--------|
| Wittgenstein's force brought forward, .....            | 75,000 |
| His loss to last attack upon Polotzk, was about, ..... | 15,000 |
| Remain, .....                                          | 60,000 |

The condition of the Russian army at the beginning and the close of the campaign, would therefore stand thus:

|                                                                      |         |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------|
| Total force at first, .....                                          | 302,000 |
| Garrison Riga, .....                                                 | 20,000  |
| Troops from Finland, .....                                           | 18,000  |
| Moldavian army, .....                                                | 60,000  |
| Re-enforcements joined main army till the flight of Bonaparte, ..... | 114,800 |
| Do. do. Wittgenstein, .....                                          | 17,000  |
|                                                                      | 531,800 |
| Lost during the campaign, killed, wounded, and pris. ....            | 160,000 |
|                                                                      | 371,800 |
| Suppose of wounded, recovered, and joined, .....                     | 10,000  |
| Re-enforced at end of the campaign, .....                            | 70,000  |
|                                                                      | 451,800 |
| Off Poles, deserted per 8th Bulletin, .....                          | 20,000  |
|                                                                      | 431,800 |

But of these, perhaps 70,000 were militia, which would not go out of the Empire; perhaps 60,000 might be left in the garrisons of Riga, Bobrunsk, and in Poland, which would leave 300,000 as the force which passed the Niemen and entered the Prussian territory, viz. 260,000 Regulars, and 40 or 50,000 Cossacks. These were re-enforced afterwards at different times. In the returns of the Russian losses during the campaign of 1812, it is supposed, that these were only the returns of the regular troops and not of the Cossacks, which were kept sepa-

(a) "Officers and soldiers who are recovering their health are daily joining the army. The sick, and those wounded in the field of honour, being in the middle of Russia, among their relations and fellow citizens, receive every support and attention, which can only be expected from mothers and wives, from brothers and children.

(b) Lord Cathcart's dispatch, December 12th, 1812, and Russian do. and Journals, but these were all militia, and could not go out of the country.

rate; but this I do not state from official authority, however, it was generally believed to be the case. When the Russian army passed the Niemen, the Prussian and other German papers stated, that they did so in three bodies of 90,000, 80,000 and 70,000, besides the guards, which is nearly what I have supposed to have been.

What the force was which Prussia had organised at this moment is more uncertain. We know from official authority, that her force by the month of August was augmented fully to 200,000 men, regular troops. At this moment, it would scarcely exceed 80 or 100,000 men, if so many; and which, deducting the numbers employed in besieging the different fortresses, would not leave above 240,000 Russians and Prussians employed in all quarters in the field; and not above 160 or 180,000 as the army in Saxony, to oppose this immense force, again collected by Bonaparte. It is impossible, however, to ascertain this exactly, as the allied accounts of these things are more deficient, (at least unknown to the people of Great Britain,) than those of the enemy. But a due consideration of the subsequent narrative will shew, that the above numbers are not far from the truth, and sufficiently accurate to guide us in our future statements and relations.

With a force of 200,000 men, as elsewhere more particularly mentioned, on the 24th April, Bonaparte left Mentz, and issuing through the forest of Thuringia, he on the 27th,\* approached the Saale, and joined the army under Beauharnois. The advanced parties of the allies which were on the left bank of that river, fell back upon the main body as this overwhelming force advanced. The *Moniteur* and other Paris Journals then sovereigns of public opinion in France, and abject slaves of the tyrant's will, now recovered from that state of torpor, into which the premature rigours of a Russian winter had thrown them, and cheered at the appearance of this new army, which they endeavoured to make France, and perhaps themselves believe, was part of that which had retreated so gloriously † from Russia during the close of the preceding year, began once more to

\* Bonaparte's dispatch, April 30th, 1812.

† From hence the necessity of this *glorious retreat*. *Moniteur*, Dec. 31st, 1812.

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open their artillery of bravado and menace upon Europe. "Your moments of joy," said the haughty *Moniteur*, "are passed—we are awaking—the Lion slept, and you have believed him dead."\* To the cabinet labours of his Majesty, "are going to succeed warlike works, and those grand military combinations, which *command* victory and *decide* the fate of Empires—that noble *audacity*, which no reverse can shake and which commands events, leaves *no doubt* as to the issue of the campaign."† According to them, the greatest Captain of the age was gone forth conquering and to conquer. The glory of the French arms, it was haughtily predicted, should suffer no decay, the strength of the French Empire no diminution. The Russians were to be driven back into their "*frightful climate*," and Napoleon the great, still to be the arbiter of Europe. Nor was the slavish press of Paris singular in their predictions and evil forebodings for the cause of Europe. Their doctrines were eagerly imbibed, and cheerfully echoed on this side of the water, where as men have the liberty to speak what they think, it must have proceeded from choice, not necessity; while the native of France or Russia might very readily suppose, it was also what they wished. By such men, prophecies, which for blackness and darkness, might have cut a conspicuous figure in the *Moniteur*, were confidently promulgated in the diurnal press of London. What! contend with the mighty Napoleon—"Oh! *calumniated crusaders*"—with the Lion which has slept during a whole winter, and thereby gathered strength which is irresistible—with the greatest Captain of the age, whom frosts and snows alone can conquer, and even these to vanquish, must attack him *prematurely*. Similar to these, were the arguments and declamation with which the better feelings of Britons were doomed for a while again to be annoyed—and as of the awful events of 1812 had never taken place—as if Bonaparte had been issuing from the Kremlin, "*to finish the contest on the confines of Asia*"—and as, if the 500,000 warriors, whose unburied bones were bleaching on the frozen wilds of Russia, had now been re-animated, the usual knell of despondency was

\* *Moniteur*, March 30th, 1812.

† Do. April 16th, 1812.



rung in the ears of nations, of "Tremble Europe, for your doom is sealed—your destinies are determined." To such might properly be applied the severe language of Hector to Polydamas, in the conclusion of the speech to him, which has been previously quoted.

"But why should'st thou suspect the war's success,  
None fears it more, as none promotes it less:  
Tho' all our chiefs amid yon' ships expire,  
Trust thy own cowardice to 'scape their fire.  
Troy and her sons may find a gen'ral grave,  
But thou can'st live, for thou canst be a slave.  
Yet should the fears that wary mind suggests  
Spread their cold poison through our soldier's breasts:  
My jav'lin can revenge so base a part,  
And free the soul that quivers in thy heart."\*

In the end of April, the Russian army sustained a great loss in the death of their venerable leader, Kutusoff. He fell ill at Buntzlau, during the advance of the army, and there he died, deeply regretted by his Sovereign and his country. "Your tears (said Alexander in his letter to his widow) flow not alone for him—I weep—all Russia weeps with you."† His death was concealed from the army ‡ for some time, lest it might dispirit them, so great was their attachment to him, and confidence in his abilities as a general. By order of Alexander, his remains were carried to Moscow, and there interred in a public manner, with all the honours due to his rank and his services. On the 12th of June, this solemn ceremony took place. It was of the grandest and most imposing kind. The people drew the funeral car containing the body of their Great Chief, to the Church of Notre Dame of Casan, where it was interred under a picture which represents the deliverance of Moscow, and the tomb was covered by the trophies of French eagles, and colours taken from the Turks. There a monument is to

\* Pope's Homer's Iliad, Book XII. verses 285—294.

† Alexander's letter to Princess Catharine Ilinishina, (the wife of Kutusoff) Dresden, April 25th, 1813.

‡ Lord Cathcart's dispatch, May 6th, 1813.

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be erected to his memory, by his grateful Sovereign, "beholding which, the Russian will feel his heart swelled with pride, and the Foreigner will respect a nation that gives birth to such great men."\* The name of Kutusoff can never be forgotten. It will stand the theme of future ages, and will claim the undivided admiration of Russia, while Borodino stands recorded in her history—while her Wolga rolls his current to the deep.

Before commencing his operations, Bonaparte communicated the manner in which his future progress was to be made known to the world. A new course was adopted to publish French falsehoods and French successes to Europe, and the first bulletin of the Grand army was no longer to be the war-whoop of massacre, and the watchword for desolation. Bonaparte, who was in all things superstitious, conceived bad fortune might attend him unless he changed his system. The 29th of the name of bulletins, that awful jumble of truth and falsehood, in whose terrific page

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had proved too harsh a lesson for French vivacity and credulity to study, and therefore a dispatch to the Empress, Queen and Regent, was thenceforward to inform France, and was conceived to be sufficient to alarm Europe.

The disposable force of the allies, at this moment, was certainly much inferior in numbers to that brought against them, and at the same time they were advanced into a country on whose friendship they could not depend. The conduct of Saxony, at least the Government and the majority of its people, had been and still was decisively in the French interest. However, what the force of the allies wanted in numerical strength, was in some measure made up by the excellent quality of their troops, and the spirit which animated them. The Russians had before their eyes that deliverance of their country which they had wrought—the glorious deeds which they had achiev-

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\* Alexander's letter referred to above.

ed in the preceding campaign, and they were well aware, that the present could not be a more formidable enemy than those hosts which they had already overcome. Before their manly bosoms, that impenetrable shield of their native land, suspended from a blue ribbon, now hung that silver shield, the gift of their grateful Sovereign, and the noble memento of their former glory and renown. Its lustre was not to be dimmed on the plains of Germany. The Prussians had cruel wrongs to redress—dreadful defeats to wipe away. They had every thing that was pleasing to expect from success, and the most terrible calamities to dread if unsuccessful. “The moment (said their Sovereign to them) is now arrived, in which no illusion respecting our condition can remain; you know what a miserable fate awaits you if we do not honourably finish the now commencing contest—every thing else must now give way to this.”\* The disgrace of Jena hung in a dark cloud over their country, and the bloody streets of Lubec stood in all their horrors before the eyes of their veteran leader. Their country, with one voice, called for their utmost exertions; and Germany, they well knew, beheld their efforts with hope and exultation.

Such were the feelings, and such were the sentiments of the two nations, immediately engaged in this important contest, when on the 29th April and 1st of May, the contending hosts, under their respective Sovereigns, met on the banks of the Saale, near Wiessenfels. On this point there was for several days some very sharp skirmishing, particularly on the 1st, in which, on the side of the French, the Duke of Istria (Bessieres) was killed by the first cannon ball that was fired;† and on the side of the allies, a son of Marshal Blucher had his ear cut off by a stroke of a sabre, in the first rencounter the enemy had with the Prussians; and as it was done by a French soldier of the same name, and belonging to the same corps, which, with a sabre, first drew blood in the disastrous campaign of 1807, by killing Prince Louis of Prussia, Bonaparte therefore augured equally favourable of the result of the present campaign.‡ By

\* King of Prussia's address, Berlin, March 23d, 1813.

† Bonaparte's dispatch, morning of the 2d May, 1813.

‡ Ditto, ditto, ditto, 1st May, 1813.

such miserable army, and keeping them in confusion, however, as a prelude to more place on the fo

Early on the 1st, the commander the command following position, the corps, under the Duke of Ragusa, formed the right wing, and General Bessieres marched to the aid of the army up from Rotha and Pegau, and up in battle array right wing to the Gruna. Bonaparte to attack him, but he did not do so till the 6th, when he taken such measures as enabled him to attack the French, who marched a considerable number of divisions, under the Duke of Leipsic, which, when stationed, he effected, and accomplished, was making it pivot on the words, turn the communications with the operation, the position and Torgau, on the 1st, would have enabled

\* Bonaparte

† Ditto,

such miserable shifts did he attempt to raise the spirits of his army, and keep up those of the French nation. The operations, however, in which these things took place were only the prelude to more sanguinary and important scenes, which took place on the following day at Lutzen.

Early on the morning of the 2d May, the French army, under the command of Bonaparte in person, was posted in the following positions. The left, consisting of the 5th and 11th corps, under the Viceroy, leaned upon the Elster. The centre, commanded by Ney, held the village of Kara. The Emperor, with the young and old guards, was at Lutzen. The Duke of Ragusa with his corps, consisting of three divisions, formed the right, and was stationed at the defile of Poserna, and General Bertrand with the 4th corps, was directed to march to the same place.\* The main army of the allies broke up from Rotha and Borna, passed the Elster at Zwickaw, Zeitz, and Pegau, and without any opposition from the enemy, drew up in battle array upon the left bank of the Elster, with their right wing to the village of Wrexen and their left to that of Gruna. Bonaparte was aware that the allies were determined to attack him, but he conceived that they would not be able to do so till the 6th,† by which time he calculated upon having taken such measures as would either prevent this, or enable him to attack them to advantage. For this purpose he had marched a considerable force from his left, consisting of four divisions, under Lauriston, in order to obtain possession of Leipsic, which, after a sharp engagement with the force there stationed, he effected. His intention, as soon as this was accomplished, was to march all his force in that direction, and making it pivot on Leipsic, to take the allies *en revers*, in other words, turn the right of their army, and cut off all their communications with the Elbe and their re-enforcements; which operation, the possession of the strong fortresses of Wittenberg and Torgau, on the Elbe, and in the flank and rear of the allies, would have enabled him to have done with comparative security

\* Bonaparte's dispatch, morning of the 2d May, 1813.

† Ditto, ditto, ditto.

on his part. In this intention, however, he was for a moment prevented, and he had to turn his attention to fight, and save himself from destruction.

Wittgenstein, who at present had the chief command of the allied army, was aware of the enemy's intention, and by a similar measure on his part, and by a general engagement, was determined to prevent it. He resolved to turn the enemy's right wing, while he directed his principal force against the centre, where he had ascertained that the enemy's principal strength and best troops were stationed. This brought on the most obstinate and bloody battle of Lutzen, or Gros Gorchien. While Bonaparte was upon the point of marching his main force to Leipsic, about 10 o'clock in the forenoon, he was surprised, to see the whole allied army marching against his right wing and centre. "In deep columns (said he) whose extent obscured the horizon, the enemy presented forces which seemed immense."\* His own, which was still more numerous, he did not think fit to enumerate. Preparations were as quickly as possible made to receive them. The Viceroy was ordered to move to the left of Ney to support him—exactly at noon the attack began upon the enemy's centre. Blücher led the van of the allied army, and where he was, it is not likely they would be idle. The attack was dreadful. Ney, with five divisions, said the enemy, supported the battle at this point, which, at "the end of half an hour became terrible,"† so much so that Bonaparte himself, at the head of the last of the guards, marched behind the centre of the army to support Ney. The village of Gros Gorchien was taken by storm. D'York's corps moved to the right of the village; the whole allied army at the same time wheeled to the right, when the battle became general along the whole line. The villages of Klien Gorchien and Ratho were also taken by storm. The enemy retook them, and at the same time Gros Gorchien, but they were as quickly retaken from him again.‡ This place was taken and retaken six times during the day. The enemy's army was placed behind a long ridge, in a

\* Bonaparte's dispatch, May 2d, 10 p. m.

† Ditto, ditto.

‡ Official bulletin of the allied army.

string of villages; stream fit to float artillery of 12 pounders. The open fields were squares. The plan with infantry and to pierce the enemy the troops more to gaging as quick as mit. The Prussian important operation advanced to the centre turned to the combat character of attack and retaken;"\* but half, they succeeded in the possession of the battle raged with Gerode and D'York General Berg, had under Marmont and the allies "were" regiments supported the field of battle with parties, indeed, for stood," said Wittgenstein at the distance of 10 became general."‡ what a sanguinary 500,000 men in opposition, and continuing short distance from said the enemy at this (nearly six miles) c

\* Cathcart's dispatch, May 2d.

‡ Bonaparte's dispatch, May 2d.

string of villages; in the front was a hollow way, on the left a stream fit to float timber. He had an immense train of artillery of 12 pounders, and upwards, and all his batteries in the open fields were supported by masses of infantry in solid squares. The plan of the allies was to attack Gros Gorchon with infantry and artillery, and by a strong column of cavalry to pierce the enemy's line to the right of that place, and cut off the troops more to the right; the other parts of the army engaging as quick as they could, and as circumstances would permit. The Prussian guards were now directed to execute this important operation. Under a tremendous fire of artillery they advanced to the charge—they were driven back—again they returned to the combat—"the affair assumed the most extensive character of attack and defence of a post, repeatedly taken, lost, and retaken;"\* but after an obstinate combat of an hour and a half, they succeeded; all the villages were retaken, and remained in the possession of the allies.† In other parts of the field the battle raged with equal fury. The troops under Winzengerode and York, with part of the Russian troops under General Berg, had engaged the right wing of the French army under Marmont and General Compans. The enemy, said, that the allies "were stopped quite short," and that the Marine régiments supported several charges with *sang froid*, and covered the field of battle with the best of the enemy's cavalry;‡ both parties, indeed, fought with the utmost obstinacy. "We stood," said Wittgenstein at this time, "opposed to the enemy at the distance of 100 paces, and one of the most bloody battles became general."§ A moment's reflection is sufficient to shew what a sanguinary scene it must have been, where above 100,000 men in opposite sides stood under the fire of 12 and 18 pounders, and continued discharges of musquetry, at such a short distance from each other for 10 hours. "The battle," said the enemy at this moment, "occupied a line of two leagues, nearly six miles) covered with fire, smoke, and clouds of

\* Cathcart's dispatch, May 6th.

† Official bulletin of the allied army, May 3d.

‡ Bonaparte's dispatch, May 2d.

§ Official bulletin of the allies, May 3d.

dust."\* The villages on the left wing were also taken and retaken several times. But it was on the centre where the battle continued to rage with the greatest fury. The village of Kara was once more taken by the enemy. Again it was wrested from him, after an attack still more tremendous than any which had yet taken place. The enemy's centre gave way—the troops fled—and several battalions threw away their arms in consternation.† Never did the enemy before, in any battle, make such an admission; but again they rallied, said he, exclaiming, *vive le Empereur*, the moment that he made his appearance. Bonnet, with a division from Marmont's force, was now ordered to Kara. All the young and old guards, under Mortier, Drouet, &c. with 80 pieces of cannon, and supported by the cavalry, were now ordered to this point to make a last desperate effort. "They set out," said the enemy, "at full gallop, the fire became dreadful,‡ and the allies at this point were overthrown;" this latter assertion was not true; "the enemy," said Wittgenstein, "again attacked our centre and the villages with great briskness, but we maintained our position."§ On the right of the enemy's position, Bertrand, with the 4th corps, was directed to debouch upon the rear of the allies, at the moment when he should perceive the engagement at the hottest. But he was too strongly opposed to do much injury. After sustaining several charges of cavalry, he succeeded in entering the line, said the enemy, but not till Bonaparte had been obliged to throw forward his whole right wing to enable him to do so; but that was not the object which he was sent to perform; in fact, he was almost cut off, and with difficulty rejoined the army. Bonaparte, in his usual light way, gives a very curious account of the charges made against Bertrand by the allied cavalry. "It was in vain that the enemy's cavalry *capered* about his squares; his march was not relaxed by it."|| In some of these *capers*, however, they succeeded in breaking into the squares, and

\* Bonaparte's dispatch, May 2d.

† Bonaparte's dispatch, May 2d.—"Our centre gave way, (*flechet*) some battalions fled (*se debanderent*.)"

‡ Bonaparte's dispatch, May 2d. § Wittgenstein's bulletin, May 3d.

|| Bonaparte's dispatch, May 2d.

cutting down the things. They had the banks of the With equal slip- tant operation. and the Duke of and reached the right," at the time Kara; but for what. However, that was his desperate effort the fortune of the right wing of the parate it from the plished, he would they had gained of the Viceroy's corps which occupied L them for the same the enemy with this the fire of several the right wing of the a reserve was now br wing, and the bat- Soon after the who dered from the left charge the column ment, said Lord C nassing the destruc before the cavalry thing could be dis- The shades of night derous battle, conti at night, with the both sides. With

\* Lord Cathcart's dispatch

† Bonaparte's dispatch,



cutting down the infantry."\* Such capers were rather serious things. They had sent him, without *relaxing* his march, from the banks of the Moskwa, to fight on the banks of the Saale. With equal flippancy does he pass over a still more important operation. "The Viceroy entered the line on the left, and the Duke of Tarentum attacked the enemy's reserve, and reached the villages upon which the enemy rested his right," at the time the last dreadful attack was made upon Kara; but for what purpose we are left by him to conjecture. However, that want is supplied by other authority. Foiled in his desperate efforts in the centre, he endeavoured to turn the fortune of the day by making a desperate attack upon the right wing of the allies; while Macdonald endeavoured to separate it from the centre of the army, which, if he had accomplished, he would have wrested every thing from them which they had gained on the left and the centre. For this purpose the Viceroy's corps *entered the line on the left*; and all the troops which occupied Leipzig,† having been recalled, and joined to them for the same purpose, about seven o'clock in the evening, the enemy with this force, perhaps 50,000 strong, supported by the fire of several batteries, made a desperate effort against the right wing of the allies. The infantry of a part of the Russian reserve was now brought forward to the assistance of the right wing, and the battle was maintained with great obstinacy. Soon after the whole of the cavalry of the allied army was ordered from the left to the right, to turn this attack, and to charge the columns of the enemy, and at this critical moment, said Lord Cathcart, "I was not without hopes of witnessing the destruction of Bonaparte *and all his army*; but before the cavalry could arrive it became so dark that nothing could be distinguished but the flashes of the guns."‡ The shades of night therefore, only put an end to this murderous battle, continued from noon till ten or eleven o'clock at night, with the utmost skill, obstinacy, and valour, on both sides. With that contempt of truth which had so long

\* Lord Cathcart's dispatch, May 6th.

† Bonaparte's dispatch, May 2d.

‡ Bonaparte's dispatch, May 2d.

§ Lord Cathcart's dispatch, May 6th.

distinguished the official communications of Bonaparte, he asserted, that "the enemy fled, and we pursued him for a league and a half."\* "The allies said Lord Cathcart remained in possession of the disputed villages, and of the line on which the enemy had stood."† "We constantly kept the field of battle—the victory was ours," said Wittgenstein.

Thus terminated the great and important battle of Lutzen, in which the gallant Wittgenstein commanded the allied army. In it the veteran General, Blucher, and the Emperor Alexander greatly distinguished themselves. The post of honour and of danger was well occupied by the former; and the latter, despising all personal danger, was found throughout the ranks, animating the men by his presence and his example. He rode through the Russian lines, said the enemy in his usual sneering manner, animating his men, by exclaiming, "*Courage! God is with us!*"‡ This was not the way, indeed, in which the enemy animated his men—they did not understand such language—the feelings that it occasioned were foreign to their hearts. "Before you is Leipsic—plunder it," they would have more readily understood. Every man in the allied army did his duty on this day; and there is little doubt but that had there been a few hours more of day light, there would in reality have been an end of Bonaparte and all his army. But a more glorious field, within hail of this one, was reserved to accomplish this mighty object. The loss on both sides was severe, and in all probability exceeded what is stated in the official dispatches. The enemy rated the loss of the allies at from 25 to 30,000 men, and his own at 10,000; equal to what, he said, Borodino cost him. In general, in his dispatches, Bonaparte rated the loss of his adversaries according to what his own really was. The official accounts of the allies state their loss at 10,000 men, and that of the enemy at 15,000 men, and 1400 prisoners with 16 pieces of cannon. The enemy vaguely stated that he had taken "some thousands prisoners;" and it was not till some days

\* Bonaparte's dispatch, May 2d, 10 P. M.

† Lord Cathcart's dispatch, May 6th.

‡ Bonaparte's dispatch, May 5th.

after the battle, exceeding number, 5,000 prisoners. Homburgh was taken by the Russians Kanovintzin, the enemy, General Souham, General were wounded.

Of the number of the army, ably in the dark, made the allied army force is not stated data to ascertain patch we will find are there expressly To these we have mounting to near have been in this battle by 20,000 men.† add the army under stated at 100,000 soldiers after deducting the dead against Bremen and son of Magdeburgh leave from 50 to 60 zen; and that it did when he says it comes and that Lauriston was ing, however, of foot is generally 6,000, of particular corps, which

\* Bonaparte's dispatch, Erfurt. Marmont's, (6th) bourg." Most of the London numbers. Imperial guards are, 31,000, besides Danes † Trevino (Mortier) in the millions of the young guards,

after the battle, when he found the Russians claimed the preceding number, that he thought it necessary to lay claim to 5,000 prisoners. On the side of the allies, the Prince of Hesse Homburg was killed; General of cavalry, Blucher, and Generals Kanovintzin and Sehamhorst, wounded. On the part of the enemy, General Gourie was killed; Marshal Ney, Count Souham, Generals Gerard, Brennier, Chemeneau and Guillot, were wounded.

Of the numbers engaged on each side we are left considerably in the dark, except from the narrative of the enemy, which made the allied army from 150 to 200,000 strong; but his own force is not stated. But, fortunately, he has furnished us with data to ascertain it with tolerable accuracy. In his first dispatch we will find, that three corps which were in this battle are there expressly set down at 60,000 men each, or 180,000.\* To these we have to add the Imperial guards themselves, amounting to near 40,000 men; but as part only were stated to have been in this battle, we shall take those which were, at only 20,000 men.† To these united numbers, we have again to add the army under Beauharnois, which was sometime before stated at 100,000 strong; (Moniteur, April 4th) but which, after deducting the detachments under Davoust and Vandamme, against Bremen and Hamburg, re-enforcements to the garrison of Magdeburgh, and the losses it had sustained, would still leave from 50 to 60,000 men, which joined Bonaparte at Lutzen; and that it did amount to so many the enemy admits, when he says it consisted of two corps, the 5th and the 11th, and that Lauriston was detached with only a part of it, consisting, however, of four divisions, or 24,000 men, as a division is generally 6,000, unless it alludes to the grand divisions of a particular corps, when it is more. Thus, according to the ene-

\* Bonaparte's dispatch, Mentz, April 21st.—"Ney's corps, 60,000, in advance of Erfurt. Mermont's, (6th) 60,000, at Gotha. Bertrand's (4th) 60,000, at Cobourg." Most of the London papers in publishing this dispatch struck out the numbers. Imperial guards, under Bessierres, at Eisenach. Davoust and Vandamme, 21,000, besides Danes.

† Treviso (Mortier) in the last dreadful attack upon Kars, had with him 16 battalions of the young guards, perhaps 10,000 men.

my's accounts, his force must have amounted to 250 or 260,000 men. Nor was the whole of his force in this battle, for he expressly tells us that the 2d division of the young guards, half of the old guards, Oudinot's corps, Victor's corps, and Sebastiani's cavalry, were not in the battle.\*

That the force of the allies in that quarter amounted to 160,000 men is extremely probable, though this number does not tally with Sir C. Stewart's subsequent dispatches, which shall be more particularly noticed in another place. But if the force of the allies at this time was only what these dispatches, as published in the London Gazette, would have us believe, it is unaccountable how Lord Cathcart should express himself in the strong language he does, when he looked forward to the total destruction of Bonaparte and all the French army, a thing which must have been utterly impracticable had the number of the allies been many fewer than the enemy states them to have been. The bulletin of the allies expressly states, that "near 50,000 of our best troops have not yet been engaged;"† and which was perhaps the corps of General Milaradovitch, which was at Zeitz, with 100 pieces of artillery, and which was ordered to join the main army on the 3d. Including Milaradovitch's corps, therefore, the allied army perhaps amounted to 160,000 men or upwards, a force, however, still very far inferior to that of the enemy. It is not in statements such as this that the enemy wanders from the truth, so far as he does in other things. Indeed he was more apt to underrate than over-rate the force of his antagonists, in order to persuade mankind that they could not possibly succeed in opposing him.

The allied army remained on the field of battle, ready and determined to renew the engagement on the following morning: but the enemy, who had been so roughly handled, did not think it proper to await the attack. Under cover of the night he had a recourse to manœuvre which the allies were not prepared for, and which he foresaw would gain him the object for which he had contended. He drew off his army from the bloody fields of Lutzen, and marched to Leipsic, from whence he attempted to throw his whole force in the rear of the allied

\* Bonaparte's dispatch, May 2d, 1813, 10 p. m.

† Wittgenstein's dispatch, May 3d, 1813.

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army, in order to intercept their communications with Dresden, the only road by which they could obtain either reinforcements or supplies. To prevent this, the allied army were reluctantly obliged to abandon the field they had won, and to fall back upon Dresden, after having fully sustained its character, and afforded a cheering prospect of what it would one day perform against the enemies of Europe. The superiority of numbers on the part of the enemy, here again enabled him to appear the victor. The operations which he now undertook, could be performed by him, even though defeated at Gros Gorchon, with a great degree of security. Whoever looks at the map will see, that if pressed by the allies he could retire upon Torgau and Wittenberg, as sure points of support, in the midst of a country friendly to him. The allies on the contrary, had not a single fortified place in their rear, on which they could form a point of support, while the enemy had not only the line of the Elbe, but the fortresses also on the line of the Oder. Saxony was also their enemy. Yes, to the eternal disgrace of that country and her Sovereign, he refused to join the standards of freedom and independence; not an arm was lifted up to assist the allies when the whole country was cleared of the French troops; and Torgau, which had a garrison altogether of Saxon troops, was instantly placed in the hands of the enemy, which enabled him to cross the Elbe with perfect security, and practise the same manœuvres between the Elbe and the Oder, which he was now enabled to do, with the assistance of Saxony, between the Saale and the Elbe. Thus situated, the allied army could not act otherwise. Their business was caution, till the means of their friends were more completely organised and ready to assist them. But to the King of Saxony they owed nothing—he did every thing at this moment which could injure their cause, and which might have been fatal to the liberty of Europe—he did what no other European Prince did; namely, when his troops were free to have joined the allies; instead of doing so, he joined their enemies. On their side he would risk nothing—but with the mighty Napoleon every thing—to him he voluntarily linked his fortunes, when he could have acted otherwise, and of course richly merited the

punishment which he has since received, though far from being equal to his deserts. Had Torgau been put in the possession of the allies, and had the Saxon troops joined them, as there can be no doubt but this was promised to be done, Bonaparte could not have advanced in the manner he did, and Saxony might have been spared the miseries she afterwards suffered. But what appeared at this moment as the greatest misfortune to the allied cause, turned out in defiance of the wish and power of Saxony, more to their advantage, and led their unprincipled foe into a situation where greater destruction and misfortunes awaited him. Still Europe owes the Saxon Government nothing but contempt and indignation.

The enemy eagerly snatched the opportunity which the retreat of the allies afforded him, to proclaim himself the conqueror at Lutzen. French vanity and falsehood, had once more full room to exert themselves, and the usual style of boasting and menace was resorted to, in order to stifle truth, and to alarm Europe. "We will drive these Tartars into their *frightful regions*, which they ought never to have left. There let them remain, amidst their frozen deserts." &c.\* Levelling his sarcastic artillery against Britain, where he knew the contents would afford valuable materials to party spirit and discontent, he proclaimed the events of a day, which according to his ideas, "like a clap of thunder, has *pulverised* the chimerical-hopes, and all the calculations for the destruction and dismemberment of the Empire. "The cloudy train collected by the cabinet of St. James's during a whole winter, are in an instant destroyed, like the Gordian knot by the sword of Alexander." The disasters in Russia had not yet cured France of ambition and vanity. But the hour was numbered, that was to accomplish this, and little did this pest of human nature—this evil genius of Europe, imagine when he spoke thus, what a Gordian knot the banks of the Saale and Elster were to see the sword of Alexander cut asunder.

The allied army commenced its retreat in excellent order,

\* Bonaparte's address to the army, May 9th, 1813.

† Do.                      dispatch, May 23, 1813. 10, p. 2.

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and continued to fall back upon Dresden, followed by the enemy. Several skirmishes took place during the retreat, particularly at Waldheim, and again between Noessin and Wilsdruff, in which, the Viceroy who commanded the advanced corps of the French army, claimed the advantage, but which were in reality in the favour of the allies. Ney marched to raise the blockade of Wittenberg, while the remainder of the army advanced towards Dresden. On the evening of the 8th, Bonaparte entered that capital, the allied sovereigns having left it the same morning, and after their whole force had previously crossed the Elbe without any thing remarkable happening. On the 9th, a sharp affair took place at Prielnitz, where the enemy was constructing a bridge, and which he accomplished with considerable loss. On the 10th, the enemy began to pass to the right bank of the Elbe. Ney had raised the siege of Wittenberg, the allied forces prudently retiring from before it; and a French force was immediately admitted into the strong and important fortress of Torgau. That place, which, with a garrison of 12,000 men, Bonaparte formerly upbraided, when he supposed Saxony would join the allies, with suffering themselves to be blockaded by a few Cossacks, now shared his praises for their noble and obedient conduct. The Saxon troops were immediately put under the orders of a French General, and on the 12th, the King of Saxony returned from Bohemia to Dresden, where he received, and was received by Bonaparte, with open satisfaction and public rejoicing. When the allied Sovereigns advanced and promised him peace, security, and protection, he scorned their invitation, and fled from their generous offer. But no sooner does the despotic and arbitrary ruler of France, with his destructive swarm of Gallic locusts, whose object was ruin and destruction, arrive in his capital, than he hastened to embrace his friends. He had made his choice—Europe can never forget what that choice was. When her fate, to all appearance, trembled in the balance, Saxony threw her weight into the scale of injustice, when she had it in her power to have acted otherwise, with at least equal safety, and more honour. A few brave men indeed, indignant at the conduct of their Sovereign and the degradation of their country, took up arms



in the defence of European independence. But these were declared rebels and traitors, and none said it was wrong that they were so. While Bonaparte remained at Dresden, immense re-enforcements joined him, which were not in the battle of Lutzen. On the 11th May, the Viceroy was dispatched from the banks of the Elbe in great haste to the banks of the Po. He was sent, says the French dispatch, upon a *special mission* to Milan, the nature of which we shall presently become acquainted with.

In the meantime, the allied army continued its retrograde movements in such excellent order, that the enemy with every effort, had it not in his power to give them much disturbance. At Bautzen, about 25 miles from Dresden, and at Hochkirch, famous in the seven years war, they took up a strong position, and there awaited the approach of the enemy. The principal part of the French army having arrived in the neighbourhood of these places, Bonaparte, on the 18th, left Dresden, and on the 19th, arrived opposite Bautzen, which day he spent in reconnoitring the position of the allies. This he found so strong and advantageously chosen, that to account for the army which he had beaten so completely at Lutzen and pursued so hotly, having been able to post themselves so advantageously in the face of his formidable host, he was a good deal at a loss. However, he was obliged to confess, that notwithstanding the loss of the battle of Lutzen, and eight days retreat, "it was easy to conceive, how the enemy could still have hope in the chance of fortune,"\* and anxious to learn what the intentions of the allies were, and what they intended to do first, he inquired at a Russian officer, who informed him, that "they neither wished to advance nor retire."† The enemy was determined, if possible, either to defeat, or force them to the latter, and which brought on the sanguinary but indecisive battles of Bautzen.

Ney having relieved Wittenberg, and left a considerable force to menace Berlin, advanced with about 20,000 men to-

wards Bantzen men, was direct ing united the allied army by of his formidable voured to outfla the allied army in view by this be exposed, if according to th with 25,000 P Russians,\* to a and prevent the The exact stren them, but the fo was admitted to was "a strong c pletely successfu fell in with the the head of Me after a sharp co night, drove bac 1,500 prisoners, Piguerie, and al ber killed and obstinately oppo than his, yet he an obstinate con the Prussians re completely frustr The loss of the most moderate c 2000 prisoners, this affair acknow and 3 enissons; s

\* Bonaparte's dispatch, 23d May, 1813.

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wards Bantzen, by Hoyerswerda. Lauriston with 14,000 men, was directed to move in the same direction, and after having united their forces, to throw themselves in the rear of the allied army by their right, while Bonaparte with the remainder of his formidable force, attacked them in front, and also endeavoured to outflank their left. Wittgenstein, who commanded the allied army, perceiving the object which the enemy had in view by this movement, and the danger to which he would be exposed, if it was allowed to succeed, sent on the 19th, according to the accounts of the enemy, General D'York with 25,000 Prussians, and Barclay de Tolli with 18,000 Russians,\* to attack the French Force already mentioned, and prevent the dangerous movement which they had in view. The exact strength sent by the allies is not particularized by them, but the force sent out for the purpose already mentioned, was admitted to be considerable. Sir C. Stewart says, that it was "a strong corps."† The issue of the expedition was completely successful. At Konigswerda, General Barclay de Tolli fell in with the corps under Lauriston, "which marched at the head of Moskwa's, to turn the enemy's position,"‡ and after a sharp contest, which was put an end to only by the night, drove back the enemy at all points, and took upwards of 1,500 prisoners, among whom were one General of division, Piguierie, and also 11 pieces of cannon, besides a great number killed and wounded. General D'York was still more obstinately opposed. Ney's force was much more numerous than his, yet he did not hesitate to attack it, and continued an obstinate combat with him till 11 o'clock at night, when the Prussians remained masters of the field of battle, and completely frustrated the plan that the enemy had in view. The loss of the enemy was severe, and amounted by the most moderate calculation, to 3000 killed and wounded, and 2000 prisoners,§ and a number dispersed. The enemy in this affair acknowledged his loss at only 600 men, 2 cannon, and 3 caissons; and says, that General Perin, who was de-

\* Prussian and Russian official accounts of the operations, but not the numbers.

† Sir C. Stewart's dispatch, May 20th, 1813.

‡ Bonaparte's dispatch, May 23d, 1813.

§ Russian official Bulletin bulletin of the 19th.

tached by Bertrand, with the *Italian* division to Konigswerda, to keep up the communication between the corps, "*made bad dispositions,*" in consequence of which, at four o'clock, P. M. he was "*assailed by a hurra, which threw some battalions into disorder.*"\* The allies alleged, that there were *some* Frenchmen with this division; and it is well known, that this was not the first time, such "*hurra's*" had frightened other people as well as Italians. The enemy attempted, as usual, to claim the victory, and says, General D'York's corps would have been "destroyed, had it not been for the circumstances of the troops having to pass a defile, which caused that they could come up only in succession;"† but why they did not march at that time to *turn* the position of the allies, he did not condescend to inform us: but Sir C. Stewart and Wittgenstein unravelled the mystery, by informing us, that they could not. After this brilliant exploit, the allied Generals, agreeable to their instructions, re-joining the main army, in order "to wait with united forces, the attack of the enemy, in the position chosen for that purpose."‡

Defeated in this important object, which if successful, he calculated would have compelled the allied army to abandon "all the entrenchments which had been erected with so much pains, and the objects of such great trouble."§ No choice now remained, but with his whole united forces to attack their entrenchments, and in them, whatever it might cost him, to overthrow and annihilate the allied army. As at Borodino, his situation was such, decisive victory could alone support him any longer the Lord of the ascendant in Germany. No time was to be lost. The clouds were collecting upon the Bohemian mountains, which cast a dismal gloom, and indicated a mighty tempest lowering from that quarter, and which a victory at Bautzen might serve to disperse or dispel. On the morning of the 20th, this attack began. Ney and Lauriston had joined, after their defeat on the preceding day. Regnier, Sebastiani, Marmont, and Soult had all joined, so

\* Bonaparte's dispatch, May 23d, 1813.

† Do. do. do.

‡ Russian official bulletin of the battle of the 19th.

§ Bonaparte's dispatch, May 23d, 1813.

that the enemy's force passed the Spree, and on the left of the allies between Bautzen and the river at the bend, he commanded the whole of the Spree, and "*disturbed*" the third corps, besides moving forward on Klix, to the allies, "*carry*" Wiessenberg.\* S. The French army on the 20th began, and the action continued with great obstinacy. The enemy's exertions, in numerous efforts were chiefly directed towards Bautzen, where General Reppe's army, who were four times the attempts of the enemy, reported his right, had an admirable defence, and had so long defended, that he withdrew from his position on the Spree river, and directed his army towards the mountains, in the position which he had chosen, the enemy admitted, he held the heights in front of themselves "between Bautzen and the Spree." About 8 o'clock Bonaparte received with him (the allies,) "who were" Stein, Kotzebue, and

\* Bonaparte's dispatch, May 23d, 1813.

† Do. do.

that the enemy's force was truly formidable. Oudinot was to pass the Spree, and to attack the mountains which supported the left of the allied army. Macdonald to pass the Spree, between Bautzen and the mountains. Marmont to cross the same river at the bend, half a league from Bautzen. Soult, who commanded the whole centre of the French army, was to pass the Spree, and "disturb" the right of the allies; and Ney, with the third corps, besides Lauriston's and Regnier's, were to push forward on Klix, pass the Spree, and turning the right of the allies, "carry" Ney's head quarters from Wurtchen to Wiessenberg.\* Such were the positions and objects of the French army on the 20th May. About noon, the cannonade began, and the action continued for six hours with great obstinacy. The enemy made the most desperate efforts in all directions, in numerous, compact, and close columns. But his efforts were chiefly directed against the heights in the front of Bautzen, where General Milaradovitch was stationed. This brave General repulsed every attack made on him by the enemy, who were four times his number. On his left, all the attempts of the enemy were vain, but General Kliest, who supported his right, having been compelled, after a most obstinate and admirable defence, to fall back upon the heights which he had so long defended; General Milaradovitch was obliged to withdraw from his position, retiring from Bautzen and the Spree river, and during "the night, he occupied the ground marked out for him in the general line."† On the left, towards the mountains, Oudinot was driven back from every position which he had gained, and on the right of their position, the enemy admitted he could effect nothing, and that the allies held the heights in that part of their line, and maintained themselves "between Neys corps and the rest of the army."‡ About 8 o'clock Bonaparte entered Bautzen, where, he says, he was received with the greatest joy by the inhabitants, (Saxons,) "who were happy to find themselves delivered from Stein, Kotzebue, and the Cossacks."§ The engagement lasted

\* Bonaparte's dispatch, May 23d, 1813.

† Sir C. Stewart's dispatch, May 24th.

‡ Do.

do.

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§ Bonaparte's dispatch, May 23d.

till ten o'clock at night, with an uninterrupted fire of artillery and musquetry. The loss on the part of the French, was 6000 men killed and wounded.\*

The battle of the 20th was only the prelude to a more dreadful and general affair next day, in which the whole force and energies of each army were brought into action. On the morning of the 21st, before five o'clock, Bonaparte in person, with his whole force, attacked the allied army in their strong position, in advance of Wurtschen and Hochkirch. These positions were most obstinately and gallantly defended by the allied army, against the repeated and determined efforts of an enemy careless about the loss of his men, provided he accomplished his object, and who was also at this time almost double their numbers. Macdonald and Oudinot commenced the attack on the left towards the mountains, where Milaradovitch and the Prince of Wurtemberg were stationed. These Generals resisted their utmost efforts, and obliged them to give way. About noon, the enemy renewed the attempt, but with no better success. It was in another quarter, however, that the enemy made his most desperate efforts. Marmont attacked the Centre, for a long time without success; the cannonade increased—the allies stood firm. Ney, with a large force under his command, was to attack and turn the right wing of the allies. Against it the enemy's efforts were principally directed. Ney advanced across the Spree, and by 10 o'clock had driven back the allies under de Tolli, and taken the village of Prieltitz. General Kliest was ordered to this point; Ney was quickly arrested in his progress, and the village of Prieltitz was retaken. The enemy's plan now became obvious. Soult also with a large force, debouched to attack the right wing of the allied army. About noon, Bonaparte with his Guards, General Latour's four divisions, and a great quantity of artillery moved in the same direction. The vast superiority of numbers on the part of the enemy, enabled him after a dreadful struggle, to practice his usual manœuvres with success. He wanted not only to gain a victory, but to place his antagon-

\* Russian official bulletin.


ists in such a situation destroyed. For the turn the right wing Oder, and its resources the troops in the righting numbers. Repetitions as often returned prepare for this fresh attack their right. Ney then again advanced, returning upon the right flank on all sides, Barclay repeated efforts and possession of the village the force under Barclay was ordered with to the assistance of the ally afterwards, General The engagement here The cannonade was in field, about 1500 pieces incessantly employed in ment the career of the Blucher, and the troops art, was beyond all possession of the village charged the columns place. All the efforts unavailing, from the forward by the enemy efforts on the left wing radovitch had now "the enemy, destroyed threatening to turn this critical moment, Conical heights, and



as in such a situation, that if defeated, they must be totally destroyed. For this purpose, he directed all his attention to turn the right wing of the allied army, and cut it off from the Oder, and its resources and supplies. Barclay de Tolli and the troops in the right wing, were now assailed by overwhelming numbers. Repeatedly the enemy had been repulsed, but he as often returned to the charge with fresh troops. To prepare for this fresh attack, the allies were obliged to uncover their right. Ney took advantage of this circumstance, and again advanced, retook the village of Prielitz, and marched upon the right flank of this part of the allied army. Attacked on all sides, Barclay de Tolli was obliged to give way. After repeated efforts and a dreadful carnage, the enemy obtained possession of the villages of Klietz and Cannervitz, from which the force under Barclay de Tolli and Kliest was driven. Blucher was ordered with a part of the force under his command, to the assistance of this part of the allied army, and immediately afterwards, General D'York was directed to support them. The engagement here became most dreadful and sanguinary. The cannonade was terrible. On the different parts of the field, about 1500 pieces of artillery were at this moment incessantly employed in the work of destruction. For the moment the career of the enemy was checked. The conduct of Blucher, and the troops under his command, says Sir C. Stewart, was beyond all praise. The enemy having obtained possession of the village of Krakwitz, 4000 Prussian cavalry charged the columns of the enemy's infantry, and retook the place. All the efforts, however, of the allies at this point were unavailing, from the numbers of fresh troops constantly brought forward by the enemy. He, at the same time, redoubled his efforts on the left wing of the allies, but without effect. Miloradovitch had now "pushed forward, taken many cannon from the enemy, destroyed some battalions, and was in advance, threatening to turn the left wing of the French army."\* At this critical moment, the enemy assaulted the batteries on the Conical heights, and those on the heights of Krakwitz, the

\* Russian official bulletin.













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latter of which he carried, and also one of the former, which commanded in a great measure the position of the allies. It was now three o'clock in the afternoon, and "*the army,*" says the enemy, "*was in the greatest incertitude of success.*"\* The conflict became more sanguinary and severe every moment. Though compelled to give way at this point, "still in every other part of the line, the allies firmly sustained the combat."† "The instant was now arrived," said Wittgenstein, "wherein it was necessary to bring all our means into action, and risk all, or *put an end* to the battle. We determined upon the latter. To expose all to the hazard of a single day would have been to play the game of Napoleon."‡ Although a general assault by the Grenadiers and guards in reserve, said Sir C. Stewart, might have recovered the commanding height in the Centre, still the pressure round the flank of de Tolli would have compelled the allies to abandon it again; it was, therefore, resolved upon at five o'clock P. M. to draw off the troops from this well contested field, which they did "in full daylight, under the eyes of the enemy."§ The rear being protected by the cavalry, the army moved off as at a field day, withdrawing all their cannon, amounting to 700 pieces, without their having lost even the wheel of a gun carriage.|| The troops were in their position at Hochkirch at night. "*Important considerations,*"¶ which we shall presently become acquainted with, decided the conduct of the allies in this measure. Bonaparte attempted to say, that their retreat was a flight; yet he acknowledges, that all that Macdonald could effect against the left wing, was to push it briskly and do it considerable damage, and that he himself wanted day-light to attack and turn the next position which they had taken. He also stated, that on the morning of the 22d, he did not find their first posts, until past Weissenberg," that he "*could not take*

\* Bonaparte's dispatch, May 23d, 1813.

† Sir C. Stewart's dispatch.

‡ Russian official bulletin.

§ Russian official bulletin.

|| Do. do. and Sir C. Stewart's dispatch, May 24th.

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any colours, as *the*," and that *the*," which was, that until it was of No part of these the conduct or and with regard dispatch informed endeavouring to back on the 22d, very great loss, for a charge against *the* The battle of *the* chen was very severe Lutzen. When *the* tion of the battle morning, till seven which it was fought loss. Bonaparte *the* which had so often day without his usual day, upon a command the battle. He acknowledged of from 10 to 12,000 any battle before. the allies at 18,000 for the dead, is 24, counts. There is a 21st, as rendered French loss during ed, wounded, and 6000. This is clear to the previous battle 20th, 6000, at which general action on *the*

\* Bonaparte's dispatch,

any colours, as the enemy always carried them off the field of battle," and that he "only took 19 cannons," the reason of all which was, that "the Emperor kept his cavalry in reserve; until it was of sufficient numbers, he wished to spare it."\* No part of these proceedings on the part of the allies, were like the conduct or actions of a flying enemy completely routed; and with regard to his keeping his cavalry in reserve, the same dispatch informed us, that he was himself at the head of 16,000, endeavouring to attack the rear of the allied army at Reichenbach on the 22d, but in which attempt he was defeated with very great loss, for of all those which entered Reichenbach in a charge against the Russian cavalry, not a man escaped.†

The battle of the 21st, or as the enemy calls it, that of Wurtschen was very severe, and the loss must have exceeded that at Lutzen. When we consider the numbers engaged, the duration of the battle from half past four or five o'clock in the morning, till seven o'clock in the evening, the obstinacy with which it was fought, it may serve to give us some idea of the loss. Bonaparte exerted all his military talents and manœuvres, which had so often decided the fate of empires, but on this day without his usual success. He was visible throughout the day, upon a commanding eminence, directing the operations of the battle. He acknowledged a loss on the 20th and 21st alone, of from 10 to 12,000 men, more than he ever acknowledged in any battle before. In the same dispatch he stated the loss of the allies at 18,000 in wounded, which, allowing three to one for the dead, is 24,000, as their loss, even according to his accounts. There is a confusion in the Russian bulletin of the 21st, as rendered in the English papers, which makes the French loss during the three days, only 14,000 men killed, wounded, and prisoners; and that of the allies only 6000. This is clearly a mistake. On the 19th, according to the previous bulletins, the French loss was 5000, on the 20th, 6000, at which rate, only 3000 would remain for the general action on the 21st, or 9000 for the 20th and 21st,

\* Bonaparte's dispatch, May 23d, 1813.

† Russian official bulletin.

while Bonaparte himself allows a loss of about 12,000 killed and wounded alone on these days. The loss on the 21st must have been 14,000, which I presume is the real meaning of the Russian bulletin. Sir C. Stewart says expressly, that "the loss on both sides was great," but that the enemy's "must have been enormous,"\* an expression which certainly never can apply to 3000 on the 21st, or even to 9000 on the 20th and 21st. The loss therefore, it is obvious should stand thus, viz. 5000 on the 19th, 6000 on the 20th, and 14,000 on the 21st, altogether 25,000 men on the side of the enemy on these three bloody days; and on the part of the allies 6000 on the 21st, and perhaps as many on the other days. There is a degree of carelessness and inaccuracy in translating and publishing these official documents which is highly reprehensible, and of which we shall presently see a still more striking instance. The Russians lost no officer of note. But on the part of the enemy, the *last* cannon ball that was fired by the allies on the 21st, said Bonaparte, struck down close to the Duke of Treviso, tore the lower part of the Great Marshal (Duroc,) and killed General Kergener on the spot."† Duroc expired next day, declaring before his death, in an interview with the Emperor, that he had "lived an honest man;" a thing which all Bonaparte's dignitaries could not say. While regretting, that he was thus prematurely snatched from his beloved Emperor, Bonaparte reminded him that they should not be for ever separated. "Duroc (said he) there is a life to come: it is there you are going to wait for me, and where we shall one day meet again." "Yes," replied Duroc, but that will not be yet these 30 years, when you will have triumphed over all your enemies."‡ This moving scene overcame the fine feelings of the Emperor. Yet he did not weep. No! With his head reclined upon his hand, he remained for "*a quarter of an hour in deep silence.*" It was perhaps the first time in his life that the Emperor had ever spent so long thinking of another world, and who he was to

\* Sir C. Stewart's dispatch.

† Bonaparte's dispatch, May 23d, 1813.

‡ Do. do. do.

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meet in it. That such a meeting, as he contemplated, will take place there can be no doubt, but when and *where* is not for flesh and blood to determine. But when that event takes place, Duroc's will not be the only *shade* that will be waiting for his arrival. No! a Turk from Jaffa, then no longer a prisoner—a Palm, a Pichegru, and a Wright, then no longer suffering in the Mameluc's bow string, or in the tyrant's chains—the thousands frozen in Russia—the millions *prematurely cut off* in Europe, then free from their pain and anguish—all these will burst their dread cerements, and rejoice at his approach: in the inimitable language of Isaiah, "Hell from beneath is moved for thee, to meet thee at thy coming: it stirreth up the dead for thee, even all the chief ones of the Earth; it hath raised up from their thrones all the Kings of the nations." All they shall speak, and say unto thee, "art thou also become *weak* as we? Art thou become like unto us? Thy pomp is brought down to the grave—the worm is spread under thee, and the worms cover thee."\*

In the battles of Bautzen the enemy had the whole of his force engaged, Soult, Marmont, Regnier, Sebastiani, the whole of his guards and the Saxon troops had been called up, and this accumulated force could not be less, from his previous accounts, than 300,000 men. The force of the allies he stated to be from 150 to 180,000, though Sir C. Stewart's dispatches, as published in the London Gazette, reduced the number of the allies to 65,000, and the French to 120,000 men. This account of the forces of the respective combatants, particularly of the allied army, differed so widely from all the previous accounts which had been received, and from what the public had been taught, by both friends and foes to consider as its strength, that it excited no small degree of surprise throughout Britain, mixed with fear, for the issue of a contest wherein two such formidable powers, which were so deeply interested, had only such a force as was here represented to oppose their powerful adversary, and so disproportionate to the strength of the Russian armies alone, during the preceding Campaign. As this is

\* Isaiah xiv. 9, 10, 11.



a point of considerable importance to have correctly stated, I shall shortly shew the reasons why it appears to me that there is an error in the publication of the dispatches alluded to, relative to the preceding numbers.—First, because we have already seen that Wittgenstein said near 50,000 of their best troops were not engaged at Lutzen, and which were the troops under Platoff, Milaradovitch, &c. at Zeitz and Dresden. Barclay de Tolly joined at Bautzen with a force estimated at 25,000 men, which numbers united were greater than all the force here stated to have fought at Bautzen; and, besides, Langeron, Saas, and Kliest had also joined at Bautzen, or before it.\*—Secondly, if the allied army had been only 65,000 strong, it is hardly possible that they could have had 700 pieces of artillery, which the Russian official bulletin stated expressly that they had, and that they had brought these off in safety.—Thirdly, because if the allies had been only 65,000 strong, they could scarcely detach from the main position, in face of the enemy's mighty force, 38,000 men to Hoyerswerda; and though the French accounts probably exaggerate that force, yet we know from other authority that the force detached was very considerable.—Fourthly, had the force of the allies been only 65,000 men, their loss in the battles, would have left such a small force when compared to Bonaparte's, even allowing it to have been 120,000 men, that it would have placed the allied army completely at his mercy; and, therefore, he never would have concluded an armistice upon any terms, much less upon terms disadvantageous to him.—Fifthly, because errors do take place in throwing off the Gazette, as was seen in another dispatch from the same hand, relating the arrival of the Russian reserves, under Benningsen, where several copies of the Gazette had 18,000 as his force, instead of 80,000; other examples of a similar nature might also be advanced.—Lastly, because after the rupture of the armistice 80,000 men were detached from this army into Bohemia, while about 100,000 remained under

\* "The Prussians have got several new corps come up, and the Russians several thousands convalescents. Barclay de Tolly's re-enforcements expected in a few days." Sir C. Stewart's dispatch, May 15th, 1813.

Blücher; and yet never heard of while almost all the parts, joined the Crown Prince. In count of the allies still his was almost number, 65,000, accounts from the enemy wholly so. The possession Great Glogau, gave the allied army, which his possession stowed on him, after continued their retreat with the French cavalry took place during 26th May, between Blücher, and the army desperate charge made signally overthrown wounded, 1320 men. From that time forward his movements after events were about to Ney's division from

\* The only re-enforcement of a corps, and of several on the 21st ultimo." Lord

† The following particulars Breslaw, April 8th, 1813

15,000 strong, with the intention from Kalisch to advance marching in the same

The first army above-mentioned 40,000 strong, are daily all the force under Blücher all the re-enforcements

Blucher; and yet, during the time the armistice continued, we never heard of any Russian re-enforcements which joined,\* while almost all the Prussian levies, and Russian troops in other parts, joined the army forming under the direction of the Crown Prince. I have no doubt, therefore, that the enemy's account of the allied army was in this instance nearly correct; yet still his was almost double. It is clear there is a mistake in the number, 65,000, or else all the previous as well as subsequent accounts from the allies must be falsehoods, and those of the enemy wholly so.†

The possession of the fortresses upon the Oder, particularly Great Glogau, gave the enemy a commanding influence over the allied army, after the battle of Bautzen; similar to that which his possession of those on the line of the Elbe had bestowed on him, after the battle of Lutzen. They therefore continued their retreat into Silesia. Besides the brilliant affair with the French cavalry at Riechenbach, other sharp contests took place during the retreat, particularly at Haynau, on the 26th May, between the cavalry belonging to the corps under Blucher, and the advanced guard of the French army. In a desperate charge made against them, the enemy's force was most signally overthrown; and besides a great loss in killed and wounded, 1320 men and 12 pieces of cannon were taken. From that time forward, the enemy was more circumspect in his movements after the allied army. While these important events were about to take place, the enemy had detached a part of Ney's division from Torgau, to menace Berlin; but finding

\* The only re-enforcement mentioned was soon after the battle, viz. "by the arrival of a corps, and of several battalions, the Russian army is stronger than it was on the 21st ultimo." Lord Cathcart's dispatch, June 1st.

† The following particulars place the error in a still clearer point of view: Breslaw, April 8th, 1813. On the 5th inst. the Imperial Russian Grand Army, 100,000 strong, with the head-quarters of the Emperor Alexander, put itself in motion from Kalisch to advance. Milaradovitch, with another corps of 10,000 men, also marching in the same direction to cross the Oder." "Berlin, April 13th. The first army above-mentioned) composed of the flower of the Russian troops, about 40,000 strong, are daily expected at Dresden." Here then was 55,000, besides all the force under Blucher, Wittgenstein, and others, at that time in Saxony; and all the re-enforcements which joined, down to the battle of Bautzen.

that he would have enough to do with all his force, they were recalled, and marched on the 22d to join the Grand Army. In consequence of which, Berlin was freed from alarm, and Bulow's corps, with some others, advanced to the Elbe, and in the rear of the enemy; while Woronzow, with some Russian troops, observed the important fortress of Magdeburgh. The allied army, in the mean time, continued its retreat; and abandoning Breslaw, the capital of Silesia, they, to the astonishment of all, instead of passing the Oder, and keeping completely open their communications with the Northward and East, from whence they derived their supplies and resources, the main body turned in a Southerly and Westerly direction, and took up a position in the strong country round Schweidnitz, stretching from the Oder, above Breslaw, Westward to the Bohemian frontier. As it was obvious that this movement on their part was the result of choice, not necessity, it could only have proceeded from their certainty, at the time, of the friendship and future co-operation of Austria. At any rate, the enemy could now advance no further without the most imminent danger. He could not turn their present position on the West side, without violating the Austrian territory, and if he advanced across the Oder to attempt it from the Eastward, they were ready to throw themselves in his rear, and cut him off from the Elbe; while, if they kept him where he was, the forces under Bulow, constantly accumulating, menaced his rear, and all his communications from the South side. To prevent this, and to make another attempt upon Berlin, the enemy detached Oudinot with a considerable force. On the 28th May, General Bulow met him at Hoyerswerda, and after an obstinate combat defeated him with the loss of 3000 men, and rendered his plan completely abortive. The French claimed the victory, as usual, but gave a curious reason why they did not advance after it. "The enemy (said Oudinot) came to attack me in the position of Hoyerswerda, where I am, and *where I am detained* expecting the division of General Gruyere."\* From this period, the corps under Bulow, and others, had nothing to oppose them on that side, and detachments were sent out in all

\* Oudinot's dispatch, May 28th, 1815.

directions, which even intercepted the enemy, on the completely in his rear. The retreat of might easily have city of Hamburg the forces of the French under D. these operations had here a considerable men. "Denmark eternal shame and eager mind. To series of Hamburg the deliverance of same excuse as Sax assentment of Bonap she could have no c Hamburg, was su penetrate in that q and ignobler part, forgotten by Europe No sooner was Bonap her court to the all he connived at; no force, and the allies Denmark eagerly cl and strenuously supp tions to the allies. mark say their Gov way, about which so ment for its inhab ed the acts of their pendence, and assist do so—no—they fou themselves to Bonap —from him let them

directions, which approached to the very gates of Leipsic, and even intercepted the supplies and re-enforcements advancing to the enemy, on the road between Zwekau and Chemnitz, completely in his rear.

The retreat of the main army from the Upper Elbe, as might easily have been foreseen, laid open the unfortunate city of Hamburg, and all the lower part of that river, to the forces of the enemy. After a good deal of skirmishing, the French under Davoust, succeeded in entering that city. In these operations he was aided and assisted by the Danes, who had here a considerable military force of upwards of 10,000 men. "Denmark acted with us,"\* said Bonaparte. To her eternal shame and disgrace she did so, with a willing and an eager mind. To her may be attributed all the woes and miseries of Hamburg—to her and all her dominions no part of the deliverance of Europe is owing. She had not even the same excuse as Saxony, that she was exposed to the anger and resentment of Bonaparte, by his immediate advance; of this she could have no dread, and her force, if joined to the allies in Hamburg, was sufficient to defy all the efforts of Davoust to penetrate in that quarter. But she chose a more disgraceful and ignobler part, one that cannot and that ought not to be forgotten by Europe. Her conduct was deceitful and odious. No sooner was Bonaparte overthrown in Russia, than she made her court to the allies, which Bonaparte openly declared that he connived at; no sooner did he appear at the head of a fresh force, and the allies were obliged to retreat before him, than Denmark eagerly clung to the hope of his invincibility, willingly and strenuously supported his cause, and forgot all her protestations to the allies. Nor did a single dissentient voice in Denmark say their Government was wrong. No, not even Norway, about which so much noise has been made—then was the moment for its inhabitants to have come forward and disobeyed the acts of their Government, proclaimed their own independence, and assisted Europe in recovering hers. Did they do so—no—they fought against her to the last—they linked themselves to Bonaparte, and from him let them demand pity—from him let them claim their reward.

\* Bonaparte's dispatch, June 7th, 1813.

Tettenborn, agreeable to the orders he had received, evacuated Hamburg and retreated up the Elbe, where he was joined by part of the Swedish troops, and where his communications were open with the armies. He no doubt left Hamburg and its unfortunate citizens with regret; but it was not at Hamburg where the future fate of that city and of Europe was to be decided. Davoust having entered the place, and considering from that moment his possession as permanent and secure, began a system of tyranny most disgraceful to the French name, and which ages will not wipe away. Immense contributions were imposed upon the inhabitants, and every species of indignity and misery were heaped upon them with an unsparing hand. Bonaparte had threatened them with his vengeance, and he sent a very fit agent to put it in execution. His proclamations will stand upon record, an indelible disgrace to the nation to which he belongs; and the innocent blood there shed, all the waters of the Seine will not wash away. Immense fortifications were begun to be constructed, by orders of Bonaparte, who was determined to make Hamburg a fortification of the first rank. All the inhabitants were obliged to work upon them, and even the females, without distinction of age or sex, as a punishment for their endeavours to escape from the tyranny of the lawless hordes of France. To such a height did this odious despotism reach, that four persons were not allowed to meet in the streets together, nay, even "*Ladies collecting in the same manner shall be separated by an armed force; and for disobedience shall be arrested, whipped with rods, and imprisoned;*"\* and dare the nation who produced a monster like this call themselves civilized, and brand others with the appellation of barbarians! Robespierre was a cypher to such wretches as these. At Bremen similar measures of severity were resorted to, and several of its inhabitants were shot by that cold-blooded monster Vandamme. Yet Davoust and he dare to lift up their heads in society; nay, with regard to the former, it is asserted in France, he was justified in what he did, because, forsooth, it was for the honour of the French nation—the honour of the French nation! How

\* Hogendorp's order, by command of Davoust, Hamburg, August 23d, 1813.

dear has it cost humanity!

The rapid advance after his favour chief force of his derations, had, was beginning this moment his had of success. and destroyed op was thereby incre known to Europe ed the world, and lesser evils only, dangers. On the tween the hostile afterwards extend previous notice by hostilities. By th a considerable po ate Breslaw; Ha power which held France did. The ters so as if it had from him, which friends and alarm stronger and the The bait was green ers, who became would soon be able ful climate, and s of Europe. "We of night, who tried dence, and distract "what Napoleon c and as there will be soon scatter all his never inquired wh ments or not, but

dear has it cost Europe!—How long has it trampled upon humanity!

The rapid advance of the French leader with all his forces, after his favourite system of endeavouring to annihilate the chief force of his antagonists, without regarding minor considerations, had, as we have already seen, failed at this time, was beginning to place him in a critical situation. But at this moment his old system afforded the only chance which he had of success. If he succeeded, he kept down secret enemies, and destroyed open ones. If he was not successful, his danger was thereby increased—But this was scarcely felt by him, or known to Europe, when an event took place which astonished the world, and which, for the moment, relieved him from lesser evils only, to plunge him into greater difficulties and dangers. On the 4th of June, an armistice was concluded between the hostile armies, to last for six weeks, and which was afterwards extended to the 16th of August, including six days previous notice by either party, who were determined to renew hostilities. By this armistice the enemy agreed to relinquish a considerable portion of Silesia which he held, and to evacuate Breslaw; Hamburg was to remain in possession of the power which held it at that date, which, thanks to Denmark, France did. The enemy, as usual, endeavoured to relate matters so as if it had been the Allies which solicited this armistice from him, which idea, he knew, would tend to encourage his friends and alarm his enemies, with the thoughts that he was stronger and the allies weaker than either party really was. The bait was greedily swallowed by his supporters and admirers, who became quite gay with the grand reflection that he would soon be able to drive back the Russians into their frightful climate, and sweep the kingdom of Prussia from the map of Europe. "We always told you," said these ill-omened birds of night, who tried to damp the spirit of European independence, and distract and paralyze the councils of Great Britain, "what Napoleon could do, when rescued from frost and snow; and as there will be none in Germany during summer, he will soon scatter all his foes, and re-establish his authority." They never inquired whether the enemy was correct in his statements or not, but took it for granted that the allies were so

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broken down as to be glad to call for mercy from him. The King of Prussia, however, who was certainly better authority, expressly stated that it was Bonaparte who solicited the armistice from the allies, and which put a different face upon affairs\*. The enemy eagerly snatched this short breathing-time to abuse the Prussian Landstrum, the calling out of which he characterized as not like the act of any civilized nation, and to sneer at Wittgenstein, who had now resigned the command of the allied army into the hands of Barclay de Tolli, a senior officer, while the Prussians were placed under the sole command of Blucher. Wittgenstein had baffled his utmost efforts, and he acted wisely not to play the game of Napoleon by risking all in one day; and, as in Russia, the enemy, before the end of the campaign, found that the conduct of the allied Generals excited very different feelings than laughter and ridicule. He triumphed a little in outward shew—but that was of short duration. "Since the commencement of the campaign," said he, "the French army has delivered Saxony, conquered the half of Silesia, re-occupied the 32d military division, and confounded the hopes of our enemies. The Dukes of Cambridge and Brunswick, princes of the House of England, arrived in time at Hamburgh to give more *eclat* to the success of the French. Their journey was reduced to this—they arrived and saved themselves."—(Bonaparte's dispatch, June 27th.) It would have been fortunate for the Emperor and the French, if their journey had been attended with a similar result, for though the Ides of March were past, the 18th and 19th of October, days equally dangerous to tyrants, were not arrived.

But it is now time to turn our attention to the Peninsula, where affairs of the greatest importance were taking place. "Far from evacuating Spain, fresh troops are marching

\* "The enemy has proposed an armistice,"—King of Prussia's proclamation, June 5th, 1813. And, further, in an Address published to the inhabitants of Berlin, by the Prussian Government, it says, "the Emperor of Russia and King of Prussia only granted this armistice to the French Emperor, after three applications, and then only upon the mediation of Austria."—Berlin Gazette, 18th August; and the Petersburg Gazette, Aug. 17th, says, that it was the enemy who demanded the suspension of arms.

thither—Spain can prevent it\*," organ, upon the mirrors on this side themselves to niteur is correct. the notion of d and all the effort the grasp of Fr opinion. To his the matter better I have elsewhere last campaign, and glorious and imp we left Lord W session of all Po and Ciudad Ro Andalusia, Estre in the south;—G cay and old Cast the mountainous c in constant alarm, feetly miserable. The enemy still rinces, and almost the kingdom. An ger was yet to tak preparations neces with his character he is so remarkable re-organize the ar The efforts of the Governments for v Britain. Supplies be forwarded to hi for active operation

\* Moniteur, Dec.  
‡ Mr. Curwen, Hon



thither—*Spain belongs to the French dynasty—no human effort can prevent it\**," said the haughty despot, through his usual organ, upon the last day of 1812. "Certainly" echoed his admirers on this side of the water, who for years had accustomed themselves to measure merit by success, certainly the Moniteur is correct, "the contest in the Peninsula is hopeless†—the notion of driving the French out of Spain is absurd‡—and all the efforts of Great Britain cannot rescue Spain from the grasp of France§." Lord Wellington was of a different opinion. To his authority the nation bowed—he understood the matter better.

I have elsewhere taken a brief review of the occurrences of last campaign, and shall now proceed to notice the still more glorious and important events of this. On the 1st Jan. 1813, we left Lord Wellington in the free and undisturbed possession of all Portugal—the important fortresses of Badajoz and Ciudad Rodrigo—the provinces of Granada, Murcia, Andalusia, Estremadura, part of Valencia, and New Castile in the south;—Gallicia, Asturias, most of Leon, part of Biscay and old Castile in the north,—while patriotic bands kept the mountainous districts of Navarre, Arragon and Catalonia, in constant alarm, and rendered the enemy's forces there perfectly miserable. Much, however, yet remained to be done. The enemy still held the capital, most of the northern Provinces, and almost all the strong and important fortresses in the kingdom. Another campaign of great difficulty and danger was yet to take place, and our Great Leader set about the preparations necessary to open and to carry it on with effect; with his characteristic ardour, and that judgment for which he is so remarkable. Every attention was paid to recruit and re-organize the army, after the fatigues of the last campaign. The efforts of the General were cheerfully seconded by the Governments for which he fought, but more particularly by Britain. Supplies of men, and every necessary, continued to be forwarded to him, so that, by the time the season arrived for active operations, he found himself at the head of the most

\* Moniteur, Dec. 31st, 1812.

† Mr. Curwen, House of Commons.

‡ Lord Milton, and others.

§ Mr. Whitbread, do.

numerous and best appointed army ever seen in the Peninsula; over which he had, by the wise measures of the Spanish Government, obtained, in military affairs, the whole direction and absolute controul. Public expectations were sanguine, nor were these expectations disappointed.

The terrible disasters which France had suffered in the North, and the danger which menaced her on the side of Germany, rendered it utterly impossible for her to send any considerable re-enforcements to Spain. On the contrary, she was reduced to the necessity of withdrawing a considerable number of veteran battalion officers to replace, in her armies forming on the Mayne, the ravages of the Russian campaign, and whose places were supplied by raw troops from France. These with a few conscripts from the southern departments of France, and what troops could be spared from the principal garrisons, formed all the addition which the French army, so much exhausted in last campaign, could receive at the opening of this. Nevertheless, the army was still formidable, at least 173,000 French troops were still in Spain; of these 32,000 were with Suchet and Decaen in Valencia and Catalonia, under the command of the former officer; 10,000 of the army of the North, in Biscay, under Caffarelli; and about 90,000 of the armies of Portugal, the Centre, and the South, under Soult, Jourdan, and Clauzel, commanded by the first of these Generals. About 41,000 were in the different fortified places which the enemy still held. To the above should be added the number of convalescents that might have joined the army.

To oppose these, Lord Wellington had, under his immediate command, 90,000 men, viz. 45,000 British, 30,000 Portuguese, and 15,000 Spaniards. Under Sir John Murray at Alicant, about 20,000 British and Sicilians, besides several Spanish armies under Elio and others, in a state to take the field, amounting to at least 50,000 men, besides Guerilla parties and other corps at that time less efficient; so that, considering the situation of the enemy, from the numerous strong fortified places which he held, and the natural strength of the provinces which he possessed, the force may be considered as

pretty nearly equal to the enemy. Spain, which were necessarily disorganized state; my; but, nevertheless, be rendered a conclusion of

The enemy, particularly him in the south, experienced General numbers, and un to strike a decisive enemies there; a in Spain, before try arrived. But by the bravery however, had be mand of the arm Marshal Jourdan to be rendered st campaign.

After the close armies, the Guer compelled the Fr in order to collect mitted the greater sions gave the G off vast numbers possible to give a conspicuous, was t General Fromant, town of Sedano. who had been out c robbing the inhab mentioned, on his an obstinate and s In the town of Se where they were p

pretty nearly equal, but any thing that is of it in favour of the enemy. Spain had it not in her power to make the exertions which were necessary to secure her independence, owing to the disorganized state of the provinces so lately freed from the enemy; but, nevertheless, these were organizing fast, and about to be rendered a certain and extensive source of supply, before the conclusion of the campaign.

The enemy, perceiving the storm that was collecting against him in the south, under a leader whose powers all his most experienced Generals dreaded, endeavoured, by overwhelming numbers, and unremitting diligence bordering upon rashness, to strike a decisive blow in Germany, which might paralyze his enemies there; and enable him to spare supplies to his army in Spain, before the season for active operations in that country arrived. But in this he was most completely disappointed, by the bravery and good conduct of his antagonists. Soult, however, had been called away to Germany, and the command of the army opposed to Lord Wellington, intrusted to Marshal Jourdan, famous in the revolutionary war, and now to be rendered still more remarkable from his fortune in this campaign.

After the close of the last campaign between the regular armies, the Guerillas were, as usual, very active. Necessity compelled the French to spread themselves over the country, in order to collect supplies, where, at the same time, they committed the greatest robberies and oppression. These excursions gave the Guerilla leaders daily opportunities of cutting off vast numbers of them. But of these actions it is hardly possible to give any connected account.—Amongst the most conspicuous, was the action between Longa and the French General Fromant, on the 29th November, 1812, close to the town of Sedano. The French force amounted to 4000 men, who had been out collecting supplies, levying contributions, and robbing the inhabitants; Longa met him at the place already mentioned, on his return to Burgos with his spoils; and, after an obstinate and sanguinary action, defeated him completely. In the town of Sedano, and for two leagues along the road where they were pursued, more than 700 dead, with a great

number of wounded, were left; 490 prisoners, 2 small cannon, all their baggage, musquets, camp kettles, &c.; all the brandy, biscuit, bacon, and other things, of which they had robbed the inhabitants, were taken, and sixty of the respectable inhabitants were released, whom the enemy were conducting to Burgos as hostages, till the contributions which they had levied were paid. General Fromant and several other officers were killed.\* Mina was also constantly and usefully employed, To the 14th June, in various actions, he had occasioned the enemy a loss of 2500 men.† In Catalonia also, numerous and severe actions took place with various success, and attended with much bloodshed and loss to both parties. In various other parts of Spain the Guerilla system of warfare was pursued with success against the enemy, during the winter and the spring of this year.

In the interim of active operations, the Marquis of Wellington paid a visit to Cadiz, where he was received with every mark of respect and regard; and having arranged with the Cortes the operations and measures necessary to be followed during the ensuing campaign, he returned to the army. The opening of the campaign was, however, delayed till a late period, owing to the coldness and backwardness of the spring, which prevented any forage being obtained for the cavalry, as the supplies in the country had been completely exhausted.

The British army on the east coast of Spain, composed of British, Sicilian, and other foreign troops, amounting to about 20,000, were assembled at Alicante, and were now under the command of Sir John Murray. Suchet occupied a strong position upon the Xucar, with about 23,000 men, and occasionally advanced considerably to the southward of that river. The British army having made a movement in advance from Alicante, in conjunction with a Spanish division which was in advance near Yecla, the latter were attacked by Suchet while detached from the British force, and on the 11th April, compelled to fall back towards Castella, with consider-

\* Longa's Letter to Mendizabel, Nov. 30th, 1812.

† Mina's dispatches to June 14th, 1813. Conciso, July 14.

able loss. On to the enemy, his advance upon proach, had on 13th, the enemy position, the left division, he enemy to advance, bayonets, when overthrew them sought safety in was soon converted into a considerable distance, and positions on the Xucar of the British army cavalry, alone enjoyed comparative safety. 14th, "that more place, in front of miles in length." Every thing being in the campaign, the Marquis Suchet the enemy. On the 26th, entered on the 26th, entered. The right wing was and the left by the precipitately before of which river he by Zamora onto might have occasionally prevented, by order under his command frontier, and, advanced Elsa near its junction with the Gallician rear. The enemy whole line of the I

\* Wellington

able loss. On the 12th, the garrison of Vallena surrendered to the enemy, after a trifling resistance, and Suchet continued his advance upon the British army, who, hearing of his approach, had concentrated themselves at Castella. On the 13th, the enemy made a desperate attack upon the British position, the left of which, covered by General Whittingham's division, he endeavoured to turn. The allies allowed the enemy to advance, and to approach to the very point of their bayonets, when they immediately charged, and, in a moment, overthrew them with a prodigious carnage. The enemy then sought safety in a quick retreat from the field of battle, which was soon converted into a flight: he was pursued to a considerable distance, and obliged to retrace his steps to his former positions on the Xucar. His loss was about 5000 men, and that of the British army 1030 men. The inferiority of the allies in cavalry, alone enabled the enemy to make his retreat with comparative safety. Sir John Murray says, in his dispatch, April 14th, "that more than 800 of the enemy were buried at one place, in front of the British line, which extended near two miles in length."

Every thing being now completed for the opening of the campaign, the Marquis Wellington put his army in motion against the enemy. On the 22d May, he quitted Ciudad Rodrigo, and, on the 26th, entered Salamanca, where the enemy lost 300 men. The right wing was commanded by the gallant General Hill, and the left by the hero of Barossa. The enemy retreated precipitately before them to the Douro, on the northern bank of which river he held a strong position, extending from Toro by Zamora unto Tordesillas. To have forced this position might have occasioned some loss, which our gallant General prevented, by ordering General Graham, with the divisions under his command, to pass the Douro, near the Portuguese frontier, and, advancing along the north bank, to cross the Elsa near its junction with the Douro, and in conjunction\* with the Gallician army, to take the French army in the rear. The enemy perceiving this movement, abandoned the whole line of the Douro; and being joined by the troops from

\* Wellington's dispatch, Carvajales, May 31st. 1813.

Madrid, retreated with the utmost expedition by Valladolid, in the direction of Burgos. The British army, under its prudent commander, continued to follow them, without allowing them a moment's repose. By the 13th of June their army had reached Burgos, when, finding themselves unable to make a stand, they blew up the fortifications of that place, which had the preceding year arrested the progress of Wellington, and retreated with precipitation across the Ebro, which the hero of Barossa, who kept more to the westward, crossed at the same time at Avena, still threatening to turn the enemy's right. On the 16th, the whole allied army crossed this famous river at Quintana; the French army, under the command of Joseph and Jourdan, continuing to fall back in the direction of Vittoria, and, at which place, they, on the 20th, took up a strong and very favourable position, determined to try the fate of an engagement, and which indeed they could no longer avoid, without sacrificing part of their army, artillery, or stores, so rapid was the pace at which they were compelled to move.

It was now obvious, upon what a slight foundation were built the French successes against Wellington, at the close of the preceding campaign; and that when he had obtained a short period to re-organize his plans, after these were so unexpectedly deranged, by the fatal errors of Ballesteros, how little able the enemy was to oppose him. The British General's movements were carried into effect in the most decisive and rapid manner; and, without striking a blow, soon put him in possession of more than he had lost in the previous campaign, through the pride and obstinacy of others. Bursting from the banks of the Agueda, the flood of war rolled along with irresistible impetuosity; and almost at the same moment in which Britain and Germany heard that the campaign in Spain was opened, they learned with satisfaction that the allied banners floated in triumph over the noble banks of the Ebro, while the rapid and disastrous retreat of the enemy, discovered his loss of power. It was a new and a cheering sight to Europe, to see a French army of upwards of 70,000 men, completely equipped and prepared, and at the very opening

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of the campaign, driven before the British General, like the thistle-down before the autumnal blast; and all this done in a country strong by nature, in a climate, and at a season of the year, where no Sarmatian storms, nor hail, nor snow, nor rain, could be brought forward as enemies to the French, and auxiliaries to the British. Their flight was forced upon them, by means which all could see and every one appreciate. It was the fear

"Of man and steel, the soldier and his sword."

While things were thus rapidly approaching to a favourable crisis in Spain, a different opinion was loudly maintained, and strenuously propagated in Britain. This rapid retreat, or rather flight of the French army, was construed into an act of the most profound generalship and consummate prudence on the part of the enemy; and Burgos which when resisting the British arms, was accounted of such importance, now that it was in their possession, was deemed a matter of no consequence at all. The freedom of the capital and three of the finest provinces in Spain, without the loss of a man, was not worth the minding; while the consummate wisdom of the enemy was praised in choosing a favourable position, where he could husband his resources, as Britain should long ago have done; and where concentrated, they would "possess the means of maintaining a defensive position, until Bonaparte, having *finished the war in the North*, was enabled to send a force to the Peninsula, *strong enough to compel* Lord Wellington again to retreat, and once more to leave to the enemy the undisputed occupancy of the greater part of Spain."\* Two things were here rendered quite certain, the conquest of the North, and the subjugation of Spain. One is at a loss to account for such a perverse spirit, in the face of all reason, patriotism, and obvious facts. If the enemy gained a victory, we were undone. If he was defeated, O then it is of no consequence; it is just what he wished, that he

\* Morning Chronicle, July 1st, 1815.



might be driven back a long way, in order to have the pleasure of advancing again. But totally different was it with his antagonists—If they were defeated, it was utter ruin—If they were victorious, it could do no good. Similar to this, were the doctrines inculcated in this country, concerning the illustrious Wellington and his exertions, and which not even the proud field of Salamanca had been able to check. How the enemy husbanded his resources and how well his prudent plan succeeded, will presently appear.

The French army under the command of Joseph Bonaparte, having Marshal Jourdan as the Major General of it, took up a position on the 19th, in front of Vittoria, the left of which rested upon the heights which ended at Puebla de Arlanzon, and extended from thence across the valley of Zadora, (through which flows the river of that name,) in front of the village of Arunez. With the right of the Centre, they occupied a height which commanded the valley of Zadora, and the right of their army was stationed near Vittoria, and was destined to defend the passages of the river Zadora in the neighbourhood of that city. They had a reserve in the rear of their left at the village of Gomicha. The nature of the country between the Ebro and Vittoria, rendered it necessary to extend the columns of the allied army in its advance. The Marquis Wellington halted the troops on the 20th, in order to close up the columns, and at the same time moved the left of the army under Gen. Graham, to Margina. The enemy's position was reconnoitered, and found to be very judiciously chosen; but not so much so, as to dread the issue of an attack upon it. Against this position, strong by nature, and occupied by a numerous army, the forces of the allies advanced; and on the morning of the 21st June, attacked the positions at every point. The operations of the day began, by Sir Rowland Hill attacking and carrying the heights of Puebla, which the enemy had occupied in great strength. In this service, a Spanish brigade, of the troops of General Murillo was employed, and who sustained a considerable loss. The enemy very soon discovered the importance of these heights, and re-enforced their troops there to a great extent. Against these, General Hill was first obliged to detach

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COUNTRY FROM  
VITTORIA TO THOULOUSE  
THE FIELD OF THE OPERATIONS  
OF THE ALLIED ARMIES  
COMMANDED BY THE  
DUKE OF WELLINGTON**

In 1813 & 1814

Drawn by James M. Green  
Reprinted by H. L. Ash & Co.



West Longitude from London



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the 71st Regiment and the light infantry battalion of Major General Walker's brigade, under the Hon. Lieutenant Colonel Cadogan, and successively other troops. The contest now became severe, but the allies finally overcame all obstacles, and carried their point. The 71st regiment and its gallant leader, signalized themselves in a most conspicuous manner; and his country sustained a severe loss in Colonel Cadogan, who fell in the arms of victory. This brave and lamented officer, feeling his end rapidly approaching, insisted that they should bear him to a height which overlooked the glorious plains of Vittoria, that to the last moment of his existence, his eye might behold those fields on which his gallant countrymen were gathering such an abundant harvest of honour and glory. His desire was complied with; and, this brave man died, contemplating with satisfaction, the valour of his comrades and the glory of his country. Gen. Murillo was wounded, but refused to quit the field. Under cover of these important heights, General Hill passed the Zadora at La Puebla and the defile formed by the heights and that river, and attacked and carried the village of Sabijana de Alava, in front of the enemy's line, and which he retained possession of in defiance of repeated attempts of the enemy to regain it.

Immediately after Sir Rowland Hill had obtained possession of Sabijana de Alava, the fourth and light divisions passed the Zadora, the former at the bridge of Nanclares, and the latter at the bridge of Tres Puentes; and nearly at the same time the third division under General Picton crossed at the bridge higher up, followed by the 7th division, under the Earl of Dalhousie. These four divisions, forming the Centre of the army, were destined to attack the heights, on which the right of the enemy's Centre was placed, while General Hill from his last position moved forward to attack the left. The enemy, however, who had previously weakened his line to strengthen his detachments on the hills, no sooner saw the disposition the allies had made to attack him, than he abandoned his position in the valley, and commenced his retreat in good order to Vittoria.

In the mean time, General Graham, who had the command of the left of the allied army, consisting of the 1st and 5th di-

and General Pack's and Bradford's brigades of infantry, and General Bock's and Anson's brigade's of cavalry, moved forward from Margina towards Vittoria, by the high road from that town to Bilbao. He had under him also the Spanish division under Colonel Longa and General Giron. The enemy had a division of infantry and some cavalry on the Bilbao road, and occupied in strong force the villages of Abechuco and Gamarra Major, as *tetes du ponts* to the bridges over the Zadora at these places. General Pack with his Portuguese brigade, and Longa with his Spanish division, supported by Anson's brigade of light dragoons, and the 5th division of infantry under Major General Oswald, were ordered to turn and gain the strong heights near these villages. In this service the Spaniards and Portuguese greatly distinguished themselves; and Colonel Longa, on the left, took possession of Gamarra Minor. No sooner were these heights in our possession, than the village of Gamarra Major was stormed and carried, by Brigadier General Robinson's brigade of the 5th division, under a heavy fire of artillery and musquetry. The enemy suffered severely, and lost three pieces of cannon. The Lieutenant General then proceeded to attack the village of Abechuco, with the 1st division. Under cover of a heavy fire from Captain Dubourdieu's brigade, and Captain Ramsay's troop of horse artillery, Colonel Halket's brigade advanced to the attack, and immediately carried the place. While these operations were going on at Abechuco, the enemy made the most strenuous efforts to regain possession of the village of Gamarra Major, but were most gallantly repulsed by the troops under Major General Oswald. Two divisions of infantry, which the enemy had in reserve, on the left of the Zadora, were attacked and driven through Vittoria. The movement of the troops under General Graham, and the success attending his operations, completely cut off the enemy's retreat by the great road to France; who perceiving that the field was totally lost, took the road to Pampluna, the only one left to them, and fled in the utmost consternation. So great was their fear, and so rapid their flight, that they abandoned the whole of their cannon and baggage to the conquerors. In a few words, "every thing

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Joseph had carriage and his baton of victory. One an immense qu into the hand 70,000 men, fields. "It con of the Centre, army of Port North."† The the allies amou army the Marc Every man dic fields and exte Vittoria. The taken on any o

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‡ In the motion fo reagh, in the House o than 70,000, and that men;" and Mr Free reports, he knew fro great a mind to state not assured,) that it e House of Commons, J lose at 25,000 men.



they had was taken, close to *Vittoria*,\* but one gun and one howitzer was carried off by the enemy from this glorious field, and the former of these was taken on the road to Pampluna. If the hilly nature of the country had not prevented the cavalry from acting with effect, there can be no doubt but that the whole French army must have been cut to pieces.

Joseph had a narrow escape, and was obliged to abandon his carriage and seek safety on horseback. Jourdan threw away his *baton* of office, which was sent to Britain as a trophy of victory. One hundred and eighty one pieces of cannon, and an immense quantity of treasure, ammunition, and baggage fell into the hands of the allies. The enemy's army exceeded 70,000 men, all veteran troops, and long tried on bloody fields. "It consisted of the *whole* of the armies of the South, and of the Centre, and of *four* divisions and *all* the cavalry of the army of Portugal, and *some* troops from the army of the North."† Their loss was certainly 15,000‡ men, while that of the allies amounted only to about 5000 men. On the allied army the Marquis of Wellington bestowed the highest praise. Every man did his duty; and if there has been more bloody fields and extensive victories, none was ever more complete than *Vittoria*. The number of cannon captured, exceeded those taken on any other field of battle which we read of, except the

\* Wellington's dispatch, Irunum, June 24th, 1813.

† Wellington's dispatch, Salvatierra, June 32d.—The army of the South and Centre, consisted of about 50,000 at the end of the last campaign; the army of Portugal about 45,000, besides the garrison of Burgos; and as the Marquis Wellington expressly states that only two divisions of the army of Portugal were absent, while in their place there were some troops of the army of the North, it is more likely that the enemy's force exceeded 80,000 than 70,000 men.

‡ In the motion for the thanks of Parliament to Lord Wellington, Lord Castlereagh, in the House of Commons, stated, that "the French army could not be less than 70,000, and that the lowest calculation estimated the loss of the French at 12,000 men;" and Mr. Freemantle in the same place stated, "that he knew from private reports, he knew from the testimony of Lord Wellington himself, (who had too great a mind to state his public dispatch that of the exact truth of which he was not assured,) that it exceeded double the amount stated by the noble Lord." See House of Commons, July 7th. In fact, all accounts from Spain stated the enemy's loss at 25,000 men.

awful plains of Leipsic, and there is perhaps not an instance upon record in modern times, where an army of this magnitude, in one day, and at one place, lost every thing that they had, and which could distinguish them as soldiers. It was a proud day for Britain, and for the hero and the army which achieved it. In the brightest page of history it has placed,

"Great Well'sley's name, Vittoria's war;  
By Nelson's deeds, and Trafalgar."

It added another wreath of glory to those which already encircled the brows of our great leader; who, as a reward for his services at this time, was raised to the rank of Field Marshal in the British army; and the unanimous thanks of both Houses of Parliament voted to him, his officers, and brave army. The Spanish Government, in reward for these services, voted him an estate of 12 or £15,000 per annum; and decreed the erection of a monument upon the plains of Vittoria, to commemorate that glorious day. In Britain the glad tidings were received with unbounded applause and admiration. Nor were these feelings confined to ourselves: they spread throughout Europe, and the victory of Vittoria was beheld by oppressed nations as the dawn of a bright day of freedom and glory. The accounts of this brilliant event was received at the head quarters of the allies in Germany, about the time the armistice was renewed for a short period; and had no doubt a great weight in their deliberations. While the victory of Vittoria called forth the applause and admiration of Europe, a public and solemn thanksgiving was appointed at the head quarters of the allied Sovereigns, in Germany, on account of this decisive event. A victorious army ready to enter France, was a thing the enemy had never calculated on, and was what Europe had long looked upon as chimerical and absurd to attempt. But British bravery had dissipated the charm of French invincibility, and the sacred territory trembled in her turn before embattled hosts ready to enter it. No language could gloss over—no falsehood lessen his disgrace at Vittoria; therefore the enemy endeavoured to conceal



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from the knowledge of those under his sway the issue of that fatal day. "All their *ammunition and baggage, and every thing they had was taken, close to Vittoria,*" was a sentence which no sophistry could disguise—no logic confute, and before which "let their destinies be fulfilled,"\* sunk into insignificance, and which filled even the breast of Bonaparte with alarm and sorrow.

The 21st of June was a death blow to the French interest and power in Spain. Their army, reduced to a rabble, fled in consternation into France, abandoning Pampluna and St. Sebastian's to their fate. The remains of the main army took the road by the pass of Roncesvalles. That of the North, under General Foix, fled on the Bayonne road, followed by General Graham, who came up with them at Tolosa on the 23d, and after a sharp engagement drove them across the frontiers. General Clausel, who had under his command a part of the army of the North, and a division of the army of Portugal, but who had been too late to reach Vittoria on the day that the battle was fought, was now cut off from the rest of the army, and fled in the direction of Tudela de Ebro, towards Saragossa, throwing his cannon into the rivers; and having reached that place, retreated in a Northerly direction, and passing by Jaca entered France by one of the central passes of the Pyrenees, having been closely followed by Mina with some Spanish troops.

Such is a short sketch of the battle of Vittoria, and its more immediate consequences. Less fortunate, however, were the operations on the east coast of Spain. Sir John Murray, with the army from Alicant, having embarked at that place on the 31st May, proceeded to the northward, to land in the rear of Suchet, and cut off his communication with France. His army, amounting to 19,000 men, were disembarked on the 3d of June at Col de Balaguer, to the southward of Tarragona. The fort of Col de Balaguer was soon forced to surrender, and the army advanced and laid siege to the important fortress of Tarragona. Suchet, aware of the danger which threatened

\* Bonaparte's 2d bulletin, Gumbiunen, June 20th, 1812.

him, marched with all expedition to that quarter, and the enemy in Catalonia equally alarmed quickly assembled their disposable force, which was much more considerable, than the allies had any idea of, and marched towards Tarragona to join Suchet, and attack the allied army. The enemy approaching with superior numbers and veteran troops, to the amount of 26,000, and scarcely any progress having been made in the operations against Tarragona, the British General considered it the most prudent plan he could adopt, to raise the siege of the place, which he did with such precipitation as to abandon part of his heavy artillery, which, however, was rendered of no use to the enemy. Having embarked the army upon the 17th, the whole sailed for Alicant, where they were again landed, and the command assumed by Lord Wm. Bentinck, who had arrived with re-enforcements from Sicily.

The enemy loudly boasted of his success in this instance, and exaggerated the loss that the allies had sustained, which was, in reality, very trifling; and knowing the expression which would take, he, or the Moniteur for him, in the publication of his dispatches, artfully introduced the words, "*the English General was frightened*," \* &c. which accordingly afforded food for the diurnal press of London for a considerable time. Suchet himself, however, seemed not to be entirely free from the feeling with which he accused the English General, for he marched in all haste back to Valencia, at the rate of near 40 miles a-day, lest the English army should land and attack that place, and where he arrived in time to prevent an attack had it been intended. These marches, at that hot season of the year was certainly most injurious and destructive to his army.

A dreadful outcry was raised in Britain against the unfortunate General, and which the previous accounts of the success at Vittoria served to increase. And upon a matter on which Lord Wellington himself could not express a decided opinion, a great number in Britain who never heard a cannon fired, either in peace or in war, expressed themselves

\* Suchet's dispatch.

perfectly correct. John Murray adopted the measure not then of less of the victory he took up his advance of. The enemy was not than his, could scarcely possibly the garrison sanguine prospect victorious, but not afford; well so, it would be from the advance none; at least ignorant of the and which were the Peninsula.

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While these and that under Vittoria continued to Pampluna part of the army was destined. A considerable retained a position within the Spanish detached Sir

perfectly competent to decide. Situated, however, as Sir John Murray was, it is difficult to say if he did not, after all, adopt the most prudent plan. It must be remarked he knew not then of the rapid advance of Lord Wellington, much less of the victory of Vittoria. Neither did he know, when he took up his resolution, and commenced his retreat, of the advance of Lord Wm. Bentinck, with an additional force. The enemy was coming up fast with a more numerous army than his, composed of veteran troops, and it certainly was scarcely possible that he could leave a sufficient force to check the garrison of Tarragona, and give Suchet battle, with any sanguine prospects of decisive success. He might have been victorious, but it would have been at an expense he could not afford; while unless he was most completely and decisively so, it would have been ruin to the army under his command, from the advance of more French troops, while he obtained none; at least he could form no other opinion, as he was ignorant of the great and decisive events which had happened, and which were immediately to take place on the west side of the Peninsula.

The battle of Vittoria, however, *frightened* Suchet in his turn; and he, "*without seeing the enemy*," yet dreading his approach, thought it prudent to make the best of his way from Valencia. Accordingly, he abandoned his lines on the Xucar; and, leaving a garrison in Murviedro, he left Valencia on the 5th July, and proceeded to Catalonia by the sea-coast, closely followed by Lord Wm. Bentinck, and the army under his command.

While these events were passing between the Sicilian army and that under the command of Suchet, the conquerors of Vittoria continued to pursue the flying enemy, and advancing to Pampluna commenced the blockade of that place; while part of the army, under the command of General Graham, was destined to besiege the strong fortress of St. Sebastian. A considerable force of the centre of the enemy's army, still retained a position in the rich and fertile valley of Bastan, within the Spanish frontiers. Against these Lord Wellington detached Sir Rowland Hill, who, after some sharp affairs on



the 5th, 6th, and 7th of July, succeeded in dislodging them, from all their positions, and obliged them to fall back into France, through the Pass of Mayo, of which he also obtained the command. The beaten and dispirited army of the enemy now took up their quarters in their native country, where every exertion was made to re-organize and re-equip them.

No enemy in that part of Spain remaining in the field, within the frontiers, the siege of St. Sebastian was commenced in a vigorous manner, under the direction of Sir Thomas Graham. This place was very strong, and commonly known by the name of the Gibraltar of the North of Spain; and, with the exception of that impregnable fortress, was by far the strongest place in Spain. Besides the town, which was a regular and very strong fortification, a castle of great strength, situated upon a lofty height, commanded the whole. Being in a great measure the key of Spain on the west side of the Pyrenees, and otherwise of great importance, it was well provided with every thing, and had a garrison of about 6000 men.\* Every thing being prepared, our army commenced the arduous undertaking: on the 14th July, a battery of four 18-pounders was opened, within 600 yards of the fortifications of St. Sebastian, against the convent of St. Bartolome; and, by the 17th, it and an adjoining work upon a steep hill, were so far destroyed, that Sir Thomas Graham ordered the place to be stormed. This order was carried into effect in the most gallant manner, by some divisions of the Portuguese and British troops, under the command of Major-Gen. Oswald. Nothing could withstand their impetuosity, and the enemy were quickly driven from the place.

The siege continued to be pressed with the most persevering ardour, when Bonaparte, to retrieve the disasters his arms had suffered in Spain, and, if possible, to arrest the career of Lord Wellington, dispatched Soult from Dresden, to take the supreme command of the French armies in Spain. Soult's power was unlimited in the command which was conferred up-

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on him. Upon his arrival at the army, on the 13th July, he immediately assumed the command, and published one of these menacing and gasconading proclamations so peculiar to French Generals, but which had now ceased to make nations tremble. In this curious paper, he endeavoured to throw the blame of the disgrace at Vittoria, upon the incapacity of his predecessor, and loudly boasted what he would perform; the errors of Joseph and Jourdan were soon to be repaired. Their conduct was accused of being every thing but that of Soldiers, and all the disasters were attributed to their errors. "The fortresses were abandoned and blown up; hasty and disorderly marches gave consequence to the enemy. When at length the indignant voice of the troops arrested this disgraceful flight, and its commander, touched with shame, yielded to the general desire, and determined upon giving battle near Vittoria; who can doubt from this generous enthusiasm, this fine sense of honour, what would have been the result had the General been worthy of his troops? I have borne testimony to the Emperor, of your bravery and zeal. His instructions are, to drive the enemy from those *lofty heights* which enable him *proudly to survey our fertile vallies*, and chase them across the Ebro. Let the account of our success be dated from Vittoria—and the birth-day of his Majesty be celebrated in that city," &c. \* The French army being re-organised and equipped, prepared again to act upon the offensive on a grand scale; being joined by Clausel's corps and that under Foix, together at least 25,000 men, besides other re-enforcements, it was become really formidable in numbers, and perhaps exceeded 70,000 men, and was at least fully as strong as that which fought at Vittoria. It was evident, that the utmost skill and bravery was necessary on the part of his antagonists to baffle his projects, supported as he was by the two important fortresses of St. Sebastian and Pampluna. It was, therefore, no sooner perceived that Soult had resumed the offensive, than the utmost efforts were made on the part of the allies, to obtain possession of the former place. Accordingly, on the

\* Soult's proclamation, July 23d, 1813.

morning of the 25th, the breach being considered practicable, an attempt was made to storm the place. The troops advanced in the most determined manner, but notwithstanding every effort, and though some of them did force their way into the town, the defences of the enemy were such, and the place so ably defended, that General Graham found it necessary to recall the troops. The loss, as may easily be conceived, was severe, and amounted from the commencement of the siege, to upwards of 1200 men, of which, nine hundred fell in the last assault. On the same day, Soult commenced his operations for the relief of the place, and which gave rise to a series of engagements of the most sanguinary nature, and highly honourable to the British arms.

Previous to these battles, the allied armies occupied the following positions, viz. General Byng's brigade of British, and General Murillo's division of Spanish infantry, were on the right, in the pass of Roncesvalles, supported by Sir Lowry Cole's brigade at Viscaret, and Gen. Picton with the third division, was at Olague in reserve. Gen. Hill occupied the valley of Bastan with the remainder of the second division, and the Conde de Amarante's Portuguese division, detaching General Campbell's Portuguese brigade to los Alduides within the French territory. The eighth and seventh divisions occupied the heights of Santa Barbara, the town of Vera, and Puerto de Eschalar, and kept up the communication with the valley of Bastan; and the sixth division was in reserve at St. Estevan. General Longa's division kept up the communication between the troops at Vera and those under General Graham and Mariscal del Campo Giron on the great road; the Conde del Abisbal blockaded Pampluna.\*

The enemy's army consisting of nine divisions of infantry, two divisions of dragoons, and one of light cavalry, besides artillery, under the supreme command of Soult, and under him Generals Reille, D'Erlon, Clausel, Vilette, Treillard, Tilly, and Pierre Soult; occupied a position in front of our army, extending from the pass of Roncesvalles, in a semicircular direc-

\* Wellington's dispatch, St. Estevan, August 1st, 1813.

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tion to the sea, the head quarters being at St. Jean Pied de Port upon the river Nive."\*

On the 24th, Soult, with between 30 and 40,000 men, broke up from St. Jean Pied de Port, and on the 25th attacked General Byng's force at Roncesvalles. Sir Lowry Cole moved up to his support, and these gallant officers maintained their ground, during the day, against superior numbers. The enemy, however, having turned the position in the afternoon, Sir Lowry Cole withdrew during the night to Zubiri. Two divisions of the enemy's Centre, 12,000 strong, upon the afternoon of the same day, attacked General Hill's position in the Puerto de Mayor, at the head of the valley of Bastan. The brunt of the action fell upon General Pringle's and Walker's brigades, under the command of General the Hon. W. Stewart. These troops were at first obliged to give way, but being supported by General Barnes' brigade of the seventh division, they recovered the ground they had lost, and would have kept it, had not the retreat of Sir Lowry Cole to Zubiri rendered it necessary for Gen. Hill also to fall back, which he did to Iturita. The enemy did not advance beyond the Mayo pass on the 26th. In these actions, contested for seven hours against superior numbers, the troops behaved with great bravery. The 20th and 82d regiments particularly distinguished themselves. Gen. Stewart was slightly wounded.

The retreat, however, of these divisions, gave the enemy an opportunity, which he eagerly embraced, of claiming decided advantages, and magnifying the loss of the allies, which were published in the *Moniteur* with all haste, with an intimation in the last dispatch, dated on the 26th, that a more decisive attack and more important events would take place next day;† but which has never yet, through the medium of the French press, been heard of by the world.

It was on the night of the 25th that the Marquis of Wellington was made acquainted with these occurrences, who instantly took his measures, and marched to the point where the danger

\* Wellington's dispatch, St. Estevan, August 1st, 1813.

† Soult's dispatch, Lincoln, 26th July, 10 p. m.

was most urgent. The heavy artillery was withdrawn from the lines before St. Sebastian's and embarked, in case a retrograde movement should be rendered necessary; but the troops still held the lines in front of the place. In the meantime, Generals Sir Lowry Cole and Sir Thomas Picton, not deeming the position of Zubiri sufficiently secure, fell back on the 27th to Huarte, a short distance from Pampluna, occupying the hill beyond Olaz, the heights in front of Villalba, the high road from Ostiz to Pampluna by the village of Sorausen, and a height which defended the high road from Zubiri to Roncesvalles. This was the most important part of the position, and was occupied by two Spanish regiments, those of Travia and el Principe. Sir Stapleton Cotton, with the cavalry, was stationed near Huarte, being the only ground on which that force could act. The enemy continued to advance and occupy every position in their front. Pampluna he was determined to relieve, and cut off the allied army from the Vittoria road; but he had Wellington to oppose his plans, and it was generally supposed, that Soult was ignorant that this great commander had joined the force he was about to attack.

The Marquis of Wellington joined the third and fourth divisions just as they were taking up their ground, and immediately afterwards the enemy attacked the height already mentioned with the utmost impetuosity. The troops, however, maintained their post, and drove the enemy back at the point of the bayonet. Aware of the importance of this place, the Marquis of Wellington re-enforced it with the 40th regiment, which with the other force there stationed, continued to defend it against all the efforts of the enemy to obtain possession of it. Nearly at the same time, the enemy took possession of the village of Sorausen, on the road to Ostiz, and thus obtaining the communication by that road, he continued to keep up a fire of musquetry along the whole line till it was dark.

The 28th, however, was destined to behold the enemy's most desperate efforts defeated. On the morning of that day, the allied army was joined by the 6th division; and scarcely was this effected, when they were attacked by a large force of the enemy which had been collected in Sorausen. The enemy was, how-

ever, soon exposed to flanks and the heights of bell's Portu from the d attacked the sion stood, session. Th to abandon i dores, suppo came general the fourth di the enemy to sense loss." The contest w 7th, 20th, an The enemy's and wounded gallantly.

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ever, soon driven back with immense loss, and found himself exposed to a most galling and destructive fire, on his front flanks and rear, from the light troops of this division, and from the heights occupied by the fourth division, and General Campbell's Portuguese brigade. In order to extricate his troops from the difficulties in which they were placed, the enemy attacked the height on which the left of the fourth division stood, and of which they obtained a momentary possession. They were, however, quickly attacked, and obliged to abandon it with great loss, by the efforts of the 7th Cacadores, supported by Major General Ross. The battle now became general along the whole front of the heights occupied by the fourth division; and after repeated and desperate efforts on the enemy to force this position, he was repelled "*with immense loss.*" The fourth division greatly distinguished itself. The contest was almost entirely with the bayonet; and the 40th, 7th, 20th, and 23d regiments, charged no less than four times. The enemy's loss was severe, and exceeded 6000 men in killed and wounded. The Spaniards and Portuguese behaved most gallantly.

Baffled in his great object, the relief of Pampluna, and finding it vain to expect any success against the allied army, the enemy began to strengthen himself in the formidable position which he occupied, and accordingly called to his assistance the troops which had been opposed to General Hill, and who had followed his march. Re-enforced by these, they endeavoured to turn the left of the allied army, by an attack upon that General. The 29th was spent by both armies in movements connected with their future views; and while the enemy's whole attention was directed to the plan of turning the left of the allied army, he found himself, by the skilful manoeuvres of his antagonist, placed in the situation he had in view to place the allied army. His right was turned by the allied army, and himself attacked and driven "*from the strongest position ever occupied by troops,*"\* and in his retreat from which he lost a great number of prisoners. Every effort of the enemy

\* Wellington's dispatch, August 1st, 1815.

to maintain himself for any length of time within the Spanish frontier was totally unavailing. His most skilful manœuvres were watched and defeated. Position after position was chosen by Soult. Every one was instantly turned, or taken at the point of the bayonet; and, by the 2d of August, the enemy's remaining force was driven completely beyond the Spanish frontier, in disorder, shame, and disgrace; and the allied troops occupied the same positions along the whole line which they did on the 25th July, the day on which Soult began those operations that were to enable him to celebrate his Master's birth day in Vittoria. The attack on the lower Bidassoa, made by General Villate upon the Spanish troops under General Longa, for the purpose of succouring St. Sebastian's, and which was made on the 28th, had no better success than the others, as the enemy were driven back with considerable loss. The enemy, on the 28th, finding all hopes of defeating the allied army vain, sent off his heavy artillery into France, for which reason none fell into the hands of the allies. On the 28th and 30th, he lost fully 4000 prisoners and much baggage. His killed and wounded must have been great, and have been estimated at 15,000 men. And it is certainly not too much to state his total loss at 30,000; though officers, who were eye witnesses of these battles, describe them as most sanguinary, and estimate his loss as high as 25,000 men.\* The conduct of

\* From a British officer belonging to the 92d regiment, who was in these battles, I am indebted for the following account of the French loss, as acknowledged by French officers of rank at the time. It bears every appearance of being tolerably correct:

|                                  |              |
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| 25th July, at the Mayo pass,     | 4,000        |
| Do. Roncesvalles do.             | 1,700        |
| 26th and 27th, different places, | 700          |
| 28th, near Pampluna,             | 6,000        |
| 30th, do.                        | 7,000        |
| 31st, Donna Maria,               | 2,000        |
| 1st and 2d August,               | 1,000        |
|                                  | <hr/> 32,400 |

To which must be added the loss on the 28th, in the attack on the lower Bidassoa, in order to relieve St. Sebastian's, which was considerable, but no where mentioned.

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the whole allied army, officers and men, merited and received the highest praise. Their loss was also severe, and amounted to 7,000 men, 4,500 of whom were British. To add to the honour of these brilliant achievements, the most desperate and skilful efforts of the French Chief and his *whole* army, were baffled and defeated by only a part of the army of the allies; for a strong force was employed against both Pampluna and St. Sebastian's at the same moment.

In this battle the Marquis of Wellington is said to have had a narrow escape. A nearly spent shot struck the sword plate of his aid-de-camp, the Marquis of Worcester, knocked him off his horse, and, glancing, passed through the Marquis of Wellington's sash. The allied troops bore the severe privations they were exposed to with the greatest cheerfulness. The enemy's retreat was most disastrous, the soldiers throwing away their arms, and begging on their knees for quarter. Nearly the whole was decided by the bayonet, at which no soldier can equal the British; and hence the enormous loss of the enemy in attacking the strong positions where they were uniformly repulsed. The Spaniards and Portuguese did their duty; the soldiers of these nations rivalled the heroes of Britain, and in a more particular manner the Spanish regiments of el Principe and Travia distinguished themselves, in defence of the height which commanded the entrance of Pampluna. Such was the results of the battles of the Pyrenees, where Marshal Soult, the best of the French Generals, commenced his operations with the most determined ardour and consummate skill, and was every where baffled and defeated with great loss and disgrace. The plan of the enemy was of a gigantic nature. It was skilfully laid, and of the most daring and comprehensive kind. He was sanguine in his expectations of success, even to a point much beyond the celebration of the birth day of Bonaparte at Vittoria. Those tactics, which in French phraseology, had so often commanded success and decided the fate of empires, were here called forth and put in execution to the utmost limits that the means would allow, and again these were most signally defeated. Again and again had the British General and his brave army arrested

their utmost strength and baffled their utmost skill, before the other nations had learned to follow up with success his glorious example. The French papers, so eager to publish the first accounts of Soult's partial success, suddenly dropped the curtain over his operations; and preserved then, and since a profound silence with regard to them. Jourdan and Joseph enjoyed the satisfaction to find that other men were only like themselves. Soult was compelled to celebrate his Master's birth-day on the banks of the Nive, in place of the banks of the Zadora; while the British General, from those "proud heights which overlooked their fertile vallies," cast down such a frown of scorn and indignation on the servile race below him, as turned their joy into mourning. The feelings of the inhabitants of this part of the *sacred* territory, could not, at this moment, be of the most pleasing description. As they cast their eyes to the Pyrenees, they beheld their lofty summits covered with embattled hosts, arrayed in arms against them. The storm their collected was altogether unlooked for, altogether unexpected. The approach of the Spanish troops they must have beheld with fear and dread, as the conduct of their own government and armies in that unhappy kingdom, warranted the utmost evils which the Spanish warrior could inflict on the enemies of his country. The army appointed for their protection had, before their eyes, been most signally and completely overthrown. The situation of their affairs in other quarters was such, that no assistance which might turn the scale in their favour could be expected. The prospect before them was gloomy. On those proud heights which nature seemed to have planted as an impervious barrier against the attack of every foe, Justice, marshalling her hosts to the battle:

" Before their eyes indignant low'r'd,  
On Marac's \* gloomy, guilty tow'rs;  
And stern Iberia's Genius calls,  
Remember Tarragona's walls."

While these brilliant events were passing in the Pyrenees, Zaragossa, so famous for its glorious defence under the brave

\* The castle near Bayonne, where Bonaparte resided when he kidnapped the royal family of Spain.

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Palafox, surrendered to the indefatigable Mina, on the 30th July. In the fort was found 47 pieces of cannon and 500 prisoners, together with a vast quantity of ammunition, arms, and clothing. On the East, Lord William Bentinck continued to follow Suchet, without any affair of moment taking place between them; and, by the 1st August, he had reached the neighbourhood of Tarragona. Suchet had here collected about 40,000 men, and Lord William not finding himself sufficiently strong to risk a pitched battle, retired from before the place, which he was preparing to invest in a regular manner, and of which the enemy immediately took the advantage to withdraw the garrison and blow up the fortifications.\* On the 15th, a very brilliant affair took place between a detachment of the enemy's cavalry and the Brunswick Hussars, under the command of Lord Frederick Bentinck, in which the latter repulsed the enemy with considerable loss.

The complete discomfiture of Soult was the signal for the re-investment of St. Sebastian's. The heavy artillery which had been sent on board the ships in the bay, were quickly re-landed, and again placed in the batteries. The operations against the place were carried on with unabating ardour. On the 26th August, the fire was opened against the town, and "directed against the towers which flanked the curtain on the Eastern face, against the dung bastion on the South Eastern angle, and the termination of the curtain of the Southern face."† On the night of the same day, the small fortified island of Santa Clara, at the entrance of the harbour, the fire from which greatly annoyed the approach of the allied troops, was taken, and the detachment which occupied it made prisoners. This greatly facilitated the ulterior operations; and, on the 30th, in addition to the breaches which had been previously made, another was effected, and upon the following day it was determined to storm the place. This was an operation of the greatest difficulty and danger, and one that perhaps no other but British troops could have succeeded in. The storming party was led by Colonels

\* Wellington's dispatch, August 27th, and Lord William Bentinck's, August 16th.

† Wellington's dispatch, Lesaca, September 2d.

Hunt and Cooke, and by Majors Robertson and Ross, with about 750 volunteers from the 52d regiment, the guards, the 4th division, and the King's German Legion. The enemy made the most desperate and skilful resistance; every thing that bravery could effect was tried, but long without success. Notwithstanding the extent of the breach there was but one point where it was possible to enter, and there by single files. All the inside of the wall, to the right of the curtain, formed a perfect perpendicular scarp of at least 20 feet to the level of the streets. Troops were brought forward in succession to force it, but in vain; "no man outlived the attempt to gain the ridge"\* of the curtain. At this critical moment the presence of mind of General Sir Thomas Graham was most conspicuous. He ordered the artillery to be turned against the curtain. Under the direction of Colonel Dickson a tremendous and well directed fire was opened against it, the shot "passing a few feet only over the heads of our troops on the breach."† This measure being attended with the desired effect, orders were given to gain the high ridge at all hazards, while an attempt was made to storm the horn work. The troops destined for this hazardous enterprize were the 2d brigade of the 5th division, commanded by the Hon. Colonel Charles Greville, the battalion of the Royal Scots, under Colonel Barnes, supported by the 38th under Lieutenant Colonel Miles. These troops fortunately arrived, when an explosion of the rampart of the curtain (occasioned by the fire of the artillery) created some confusion amongst the enemy. The narrow ridge was quickly gained, and maintained after a severe conflict; and in the meantime the troops had forced their way into the town in other places, upon which the enemy fled, and after a great loss retired into the castle, leaving the allies in possession of the town, almost in ruins. The loss on the part of the allies, as may easily be conceived, was severe, and amounted to 2,500 men, killed and wounded, of which 1,700 were British.

Thus fell the important fortress of St. Sebastian's. The re-

\* Sir T. Graham's dispatch, Oyarzun, September 1st, 1813.

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mainder of the garrison shut themselves up in the castle, where they surrendered themselves as prisoners of war, on the 9th, after having defended the place in the most determined manner, until it was literally a heap of ruins, and all the artillery nearly rendered unfit for service. In it surrendered about 1800\* men, being about one third of the original strength. A great quantity of ammunition, and 93 guns were found in the place. On this occasion the British army surpassed its former exploits, and the siege and capture of St. Sebastian's forms one of the boldest and most honourable events in the history of the war in the Peninsula. Aware of the vast importance of the place, Soult on the very day on which the town was taken by storm, having collected a force, from 30 to 40,000 strong, on the Lower Bidassoa, made another desperate effort for its relief. In this attempt, however, he was equally unsuccessful as in all his other operations. After repeated efforts he was driven back with great loss; and, what was of greater importance, his discomfiture was chiefly owing to the bravery and the firmness of the Spanish troops, "whose conduct (said the Marquis of Wellington) was equal to that of any troops that I have ever seen engaged."† In this second defeat of the enemy's designs, part only of the allied army was engaged, whose conduct, officers and men, received the highest praise from their great leader. The loss of the allies in this affair exceeded 2400 men, of which only 417 were British. That of the enemy has been estimated as high as 7000 men, and probably exceeded 5000.

On the east coast, however, the operations of the war, seemed destined to be attended with different results. Suchet, having collected a considerable force, on the 13th attacked the advanced divisions of Lord W. Bentinck's army, posted at the pass of Ordal. After a gallant resistance they were forced to give way, and abandon four pieces of cannon to the enemy. Lord William Bentinck immediately drew off the army, on the 14th, to Vendrills, and afterwards to the neighbourhood of Tarragona, without further loss, notwithstanding the attempts of the ene-

\* Wellington's dispatch, Lezaca, September 10th.

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my's superior cavalry. The loss of the allies in this affair amounted to 470 men, killed, wounded, and missing; but which the enemy, with his usual effrontery, magnified to 3500 men. Finding, however, he could make no farther impression upon the allied army, he retired behind the Lobregat. The Duke del Parque was more successful against a part of the garrison of Tortosa, 4000 strong, who, on the 19th August, made a sortie from that place, and which he drove back with very considerable loss.

Leaving Spain for a little, it is now time again to turn our attention to a wider field, and still more important operations. During the continuance of the armistice in Germany, an attempt was made to assemble a Congress at Prague, in order to negotiate a general peace; but in which scarcely any progress was made, from the domineering spirit and unbending disposition of the enemy. The system of education carried by the "School Boy," Lord Walpole, to Vienna, had been generally learned, and its doctrines and maxims were now about to be put fairly in practice. "Already, in the beginning of December, considerable steps had been taken on the part of the Austrian cabinet, in order to dispose the Emperor Napoleon to a quiet and peaceful policy, on grounds which equally interested the world and his own welfare. These steps were from time to time renewed and enforced,"\* but without any effect. "Bonaparte would hear of no proposition for peace, that should violate the integrity of the French empire, *in the French sense of the word*;"† and Austria, who had in vain attempted to secure the independence of Europe, by acting the part of a mediator, saw that she could remain so no longer. France would yield nothing that could restore even a shadow of liberty to Europe; and when Austria began to speak of peace to "the Sovereigns united against France, instead of any answer to Austria's propositions for negotiation, and her offers of mediation, they laid before her the public declarations of the French Emperor."‡ Indeed, how could they act otherwise. Austria was deeply sensible of the justice of these pro-

\* Austrian declaration, August, 1813. † Do. do. ‡ Do. do.

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ceedings, and the propriety of their conduct, and aware, that "the actual state of things could not be continued;" and "that by one means or other, either by negotiation or by the force of arms, a new state of things must be effected."\* Revolving this important truth in her mind, Austria saw plainly, that "under existing circumstances, she ought no longer to confine herself to act a secondary part, but should appear in force upon the stage, and *decide as an independent power.*"† This she did in a manner which justified the hopes of Europe; and without further circumlocution, she told Napoleon, that if he would not negotiate under her auspices, he must fight with her as his enemy. Napoleon reluctantly consented to the first part of this inauspicious course, still hoping, that in the mean time, he might have it in his power to set Austria at defiance; and wishing as usual, to have it believed, that he consented to a negotiation for the sake of humanity, he caused it to be announced, that he had proposed a Congress. But "to whom this proposition was addressed, in what manner, in what diplomatic form, through whose organ it could have been done, *was perfectly unknown to the Austrian Cabinet*, which was only made acquainted with the circumstance through the medium of the public prints."‡ After various delays, however, it was at last settled, that a Congress should assemble at Prague, but in which France was no longer to dictate to Europe. Into the history of these negotiations, it is not my intention, largely to enter; as the chicanery of French diplomacy is seldom either entertaining or instructive in any thing that is good; and the principal account which we have of them, are only from the doubtful authority of the enemy. Bonaparte in his account of the correspondence with Austria previous to this event, attempts to load the Austrian Cabinet with duplicity and insincerity; and if his statements were correct, certainly he had some reason to do so, had his own conduct been at that moment sincere and correct. As matters stood, it was at the utmost but the bitter bit; and Austria was under all circumstances, easily acquitted of blame in the eyes of Europe. Aus-

\* Austrian declaration, August, 1813.

† Do. do. ‡ Do. do.



tria knew what she had suffered from French tyranny and ambition, and saw, that she could at that moment regain what had been by fraud or force wrested from her. She was aware, that the moment was approaching, when she would have it in her power to chastise her ancient and implacable enemy; she was also aware, that at this moment, she, in a great measure, held in her hands the fate of Europe; and wisely, and without reserve, determined to throw all her strength into the scale of justice. Situated, however, as Austria was, at the beginning of the year, she was compelled to act with caution. The only army which she had, was upon the Russian frontiers, at the eastern extremities of the Empire, while any movement by her in favour of the allies, before these were brought nearer the scene of action, would have exposed the principal part of her territories to have been over-run by the formidable force which the enemy had assembled in Italy, upon the Mayne, and in Bavaria, thereby losing those important provinces, where a combination was formed in the most favourable position, which ultimately brought utter ruin upon the enemy. Still nothing but French security could have been so completely duped, or vanity deceived, if these were so, by the mission of Prince Schwartzberg to Paris; which Metternich assured Otto was only intended to shew the greater respect for the French government, "by making appear at the Court of France, the Commandant of the Austrian corps, proceeding to his Chief to receive his orders."\* There he very likely received orders he never meant to obey, and obtained information of the enemy's plans and designs, which enabled him afterwards to act such a decisive part against him. Bonaparte though he wished to load the character of the Austrian cabinet with insincerity, was not a person to be so easily duped; and saw clearly the intentions of Austria, as the death-like silence which he always maintained concerning her, clearly evinced to the impartial observer. But while he had any hopes of attaching her to his cause, or procrastinating her junction with the allies till it might be too late, he affected not to notice her conduct, nay even to applaud the

\* Metternich to Otto. Otto's letter to the French Government.

spirit which mediator,\* v these processes deavoured which he d never mean her arm ag her power, of Europe. Prussian mo tion from Fr urged her to order to ind his willing s had agreed t choose, as w in for their a worship the however, Au leon, from bi him only sen at pleasure. proffered gift pushed on a regardless ma year in Russia after which h date or dicta allies complet Nevertheless terminated to e they at that t no reason to offered to the

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spirit which she shewed in taking upon herself the part of a mediator,\* while he supposed, or affected to suppose, that these proceedings would render him any service. He endeavoured to cajole her with a deference to her opinion, which he disregarded in his heart, and with promises he never meant to fulfil. Prussia who had dared to lift up her arm against French tyranny, was not to be curtailed of her power, if beaten, but to be obliterated from the map of Europe. "Napoleon considered the dissolution of the Prussian monarchy, as a natural consequence of her defection from France."† He offered to guarantee to Austria, and urged her to seize the finest provinces of that kingdom,‡ in order to induce her to join his cause; and what parts thereof, his willing slaves, Saxony and Denmark were to obtain, and had agreed to accept, Saxony and Denmark can tell if they choose, as well as Austria. They would of course, have come in for their *dependent* share, if they continued to fall down and worship the golden image of French ambition. These gifts, however, Austria rejected with contempt; the conduct of Napoleon, from bitter experience had taught her, that any gift from him only sealed her own degradation, and would be resumed at pleasure. Finding that Austria treated all his promises and proffered gifts with scorn, he, the moment the campaign began, pushed on after the allied army, in the same headstrong and regardless manner which he had done during the preceding year in Russia, in order, if possible, to destroy their chief force; after which he imagined, that he would be able either to intimidate or dictate to Austria. In this the cautious policy of the allies completely disappointed him.

Nevertheless, though Austria and the allied powers were determined to establish the independence of Europe, upon what they at that time conceived to be a firm foundation; there is no reason to doubt, that the terms of Peace intended to be offered to the enemy in the Congress at Prague, were much

\* "He even acknowledged them, (the Austrian preparations,) as necessary, and justified them in more than one instance." Austrian declaration..

† Austrian declaration, August, 1813.

‡ Do. do.

more advantageous than any which they were ever likely to offer to France again. It was generally supposed, that they would have allowed the Rhine to be the boundary of France, thus leaving all the Netherlands, and perhaps Holland also under her controul; but any point to relinquish, or concession to make by France, was instantly rejected by Bonaparte with menace and disdain. "At one time with menacing indignation, at another *with bitter contempt*; as if it had not been possible to declare in terms sufficiently distinct, the resolution of the Emperor Napoleon, *not to make to the repose of the world even one single nominal sacrifice*."\* In vain it was expected by Europe, that the terrible disasters of the preceding year, "the effect of Divine Vengeance, would have inclined the Emperor of France to a less murderous system, and that he would have consented to let the world be at peace; but this hope has been disappointed, and *that peace which all governments desire, and which every government has proposed, has been rejected by the Emperor Napoleon*."† With such a government all negotiation was vain. Surprise was attempted to be feigned by many at the time, with regard to the conduct of Austria. Much doubt was also expressed of her sincerity in the cause in which she was about to embark, originating from the dread of that influence, which it was supposed the family connexion between the Emperor of Austria and the French ruler might occasion; as if family connexions were ever known to have any decisive influence upon the interests and politics of nations, and still less so could any thing of that kind be expected to be the case in the present instance, where direful necessity alone had sealed the bond, and the unfeeling arm of the haughty conqueror dictated the contract. That Austria would have the smallest feeling for the prosperity of Bonaparte, was utterly impossible. The man whose ambition had stripped her of half her dominions—who had trampled upon and insulted her illustrious head in his low estate, was by no means likely to obtain her regard. Accordingly, his disasters in Russia were the signal for her defection.

\* Austrian declaration, August, 1813.

† Crown Prince's address to his army, Oranienburgh, Aug. 15th, 1813.

tion. She was broken storms which when her aid doned him negotiations duct ever be him too well Rubicon, and She therefore assembled at time threw her tier. Foiled over the Russian preparations longer to appear began not only to take measures the French army by him with defend Italy, same time, he ordered up to

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tion. She perceived with satisfaction, that the gigantic arm was broken by Russian patriotism, and withered by Siberian storms which had beat her to the ground; and at the moment when her aid was of the most vital importance to him, she abandoned him to his fate, recalled her troops, and entered into negotiations with his victorious antagonists.—Could such conduct ever be forgotten or forgiven by Bonaparte? Austria knew him too well to suppose that it would. She had passed the Rubicon, and in reality she must proceed to pass the Rhine. She therefore, augmented her troops on the side of Italy, she assembled an army on the frontiers of Bavaria, and at the same time threw her main force into Bohemia upon the Saxon frontier. Foiled in his object of obtaining any decisive advantage over the Russian and Prussian armies, before the Austrian preparations were become so complete as to enable her no longer to appear as a power of a secondary rank, Bonaparte began not only to look upon her preparations with alarm, but to take measures to meet them. For this purpose, soon after the French army passed the Elbe, Beauharnois was dispatched by him with the utmost haste, in order to collect an army to defend Italy, and attack Austria from the South, while at the same time, every re-enforcement which he could obtain, was ordered up to Dresden.\*

\* Re-enforcements to the French Army, during the armistice, 1813:

*Frankfort, June 17th.*—"20,000 French troops will pass the Rhine during this and the following week."

*Dresden, June 18th.*—"To-day the Emperor reviewed 15,000 troops, just arrived from France."

*Paris, Jan. 31st, 1813.*—"20,000 Italians wait for orders to join the Grand Army," &c. Official address to Bonaparte from the kingdom of Italy.

*Dresden, July 6th.*—"Considerable re-enforcements of more regiments of infantry and cavalry daily arrive from Mayence."

*Strasbourg, July 3d.*—"There has passed this city 'battalions of the 2d, 11th, 5th, 16th, 24th, 67th, 79th, 81st, 95d, and 105th, regiments of the line, and of the 7th and 18th, light infantry. Strong detachments of the 7th and 10th light infantry; of the 153d and 154th of the line; of the 6th, 8th, and 16th mounted chasseurs; of the 6th light horse, and 11th battalion of artillery. All these corps have now their full complement.'" These re-enforcements could not be less than 15,000.

*Frankfort, July 2d.*—"The 27th and 60th of the line passed yesterday for the

That the armistice was of advantage to Bonaparte it were folly to deny. It, through his usual methods of deception, established him in the opinion of those over whom he ruled, and a few others, that he was still the strongest. It enabled him to collect with more facility, and to organize with greater lei-

Bavarian army: also strong marching columns and numerous convoys of artillery pass daily for Saxony."

Frankfort, *J. y 5th.*—"The day before yesterday above 15,000 French troops were in Mayence. Yesterday 5 battalions of infantry, and several detachments of cavalry arrived here."

Frankfort, *July 8th.*—"The 8th light infantry, 54th, 64th, and 95th of the line, have left this; replaced in the garrison by the 5th, 11th, 32d, and 60th of the line; at this moment the arrival of 6 more regiments, which are crossing the Rhine, are announced."

Dresden, *July 6th.*—"Considerable re-enforcements of more regiments of infantry and cavalry daily arrive from Mayence, by the military roads of Erfurt and Leipsic."

Dresden, *July 18th.*—"On the 20th a considerable number of troops are to commence arriving here; the roads from Eisenach are covered with them. The Emperor has lately reviewed many."

Frankfort, *July 8th.*—"Nearly 3000 more infantry, and several numerous detachments of cavalry, arrived yesterday."

Wurtzburg, *July 4th.*—"Augereau reviewed in one of the squares of this town, 15,000 men, of the Bavarian Army of Observation. *July 5th.* Troops to this army arrive daily." The above 15,000 men must be those whom Sir C. Stewart's dispatch mentions having arrived at Dresden, under St. Cyr, from Wurtzburg.

Augsburgh, *July 5th.*—"The Italian corps received orders to proceed to the Bavarian Army of Observation at Wurtzburg to-morrow."

Augsburgh, *July 9th.*—"Several columns of French and Italian troops are traversing the Tyrol for the Bavarian army. They are accompanied by several regiments of cavalry, remarkable for their fine appearance." These, however, may more properly be accounted an exchange than re-enforcements, as they would be replaced by other troops sent to Italy; and accordingly we find this was the case, from the following: (still, however, it augmented the force in Germany)

Milan, *July 3d.*—"The 52d and 67th regiments arrived at Mantua on the 29th and 30th, proceeding to the Adige. The 7th, 42d, and 101st regiments are immediately expected at Mantua. To-day the troops from this begin to march."

Augsburgh, *July 9th.*—"We expect in this place a Neapolitan corps for the Grand Army."

Frankfort, *July 14th.*—"The number of troops which pass this is almost unbelievable. Yesterday so many cavalry and infantry arrived, that our town and the villages were crowded with them."

Frankfort, *July 18th.*—"Several more regiments of cavalry and infantry arrived in our city yesterday."

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sure, numerous re-enforcements, and to fortify Dresden, and the line of the Elbe, with such care, as to render it a truly formidable position in such hands. Still, this was altering the plan and former conduct of Bonaparte; it was preparing to defend himself, not to conquer, a measure he had hitherto been little accustomed to. But of whatever advantage it was to him, it was of still more benefit to the allies: it gave time to the more distant Russian re-enforcements to approach the scene of action, completely prepared; it enabled them to organize the resources of Prussia, and to array her population, heart and hand, in a more effectual manner against her oppressors. It did more, it brought together a numerous army, under an experienced leader, from the "fields of Germany—from the banks of the Wolga and the Don, from the shores of Britain, and

*Frankfort, August 1st.*—"Notwithstanding the passages of French troops through this place, we are to see a still greater number pass during the next fortnight."

*Frankfort, August 5d.*—"A column of French and Polish troops, commanded by General Axamitowsky, to-day marched for the army."

*Frankfort, Aug. + 10th.*—"The passage of troops through our city continues uninterruptedly. Yesterday 4000 infantry and cavalry passed for their destination."

*Leipsic, August 10th.*—"The passage of troops from the Rhine to Silesia is more numerous than ever. The number of troops which have passed through Bautzen, since the conclusion of the armistice, is estimated at more than 80,000 men."

*Frankfort, August 17th.*—"Yesterday strong detachments of the old and young guards, and a squadron of mounted grenadiers of the Imperial guards passed this place."

*Leipsic, October 2d.*—"Our garrison has become very numerous, and the re-enforcements which have been collected here for the army already form a superb corps." *Moniteur, October 6th.*

"French forces between Jena and Magdeburgh, 150,000 men. *Paris, October 12th.*

To the above, selected from the *Moniteur*, and other Paris Journals, many more might be added, but the present is judged sufficient to shew the re-enforcements which at that time pressed forward to the army in Saxony. These were treated as fabrications of the enemy at the time, but it was found to be real, when the allies had to fight them. Nothing concerning the army durst appear in any Journal, without the orders or the permission of the Government, and it was the only account wherein they adhered to any thing like truth. Indeed, the military force of France was in reality still so great, that no exaggeration was necessary to make it appear formidable.

from the mountains of the North."\* It also arrayed, with a tremendous energy, the whole resources of the Austrian Empire, completely organized and prepared, on the side of Justice, without the enemy daring to move to prevent it; and last, but not least, it threw, with irresistible strength, the sword of the illustrious Wellington into the mighty scale; for, the *only* remaining gun that they had, and every thing else which belonged to them, taken at Vittoria, formed a weight which, suspended in the stupendous balance, made the scale of tyranny and oppression, in a moment "*kick the beam.*"

Things were in this situation, approaching fast to a crisis, when two new characters made their appearance upon this important theatre. The first was the Crown Prince of Sweden, himself a Frenchman, but now about to embark with others in the cause of nations, so long and so grievously oppressed by his countrymen. Bonaparte, by his foolish conduct, had made this man and Sweden also his foe. He landed at Stralsund with about 30,000 excellent Swedish troops, to which were joined about 10,000 British. Immediately after landing, he set out, and had an interview with the Allied Sovereigns; and was, without delay, appointed to the high and important command of the army destined to cover Berlin, under the name of the "*Army of the North of Germany.*" To him were joined a vast number of Prussian, Russian, and other troops, from different parts of Germany. The name of Bernadotte was well known, and was held in general respect over the North of Germany, and his standard now became the rallying point of patriotism from every State; so that, in a short time, he found himself at the head of a most formidable army, to a man, burning with vengeance against the oppressors of their country, and ready to march wherever he chose to lead it. Of all the armies which Bonaparte had to oppose or to attack him, this was perhaps the most dangerous. Though composed of different nations, and speaking so many different languages, each was animated with a spirit which was understood by all—learned or unlearned—which communicated

\* Crown Prince's address to his army, August 16th, 1813.

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its ardour from each to all, and from whose commanding frown tyranny shrunk with dismay. Whatever danger it had to encounter it was still likely to augment; like the snow-ball as it rolled along, it would continue to increase till it overwhelmed its opponents. The position it was destined to occupy was one of the greatest importance, and it will be shewn in the sequel how well they discharged the duty left to them. The doubts and fears expressed by many with regard to the conduct and intentions of the Crown Prince were now at an end, and his junction with the armies in Germany was hailed with satisfaction and hope.

The next personage was, the brave and virtuous Moreau. The name of Moreau was famous throughout Europe, as a general: as a man, he was respected and esteemed by his enemies, and regarded, amongst the population of France, with affection and regret. Bonaparte was his inveterate enemy, and would have taken his life, if he had not dreaded the indignation of France, even at the moment that he made it appear that Moreau was engaged in a conspiracy against his throne and his life. Moreau had been banished to America by the tyrant's orders, where he had now lived several years in retirement, mourning in silence over the miseries which his country endured. The awful disasters of the Russian campaign called forth all his feelings for his distracted country, groaning under the most awful tyranny; and being invited by his old friend Bernadotte, and also by the Emperor Alexander, he left America, and arrived at Gothenburgh during the armistice. From thence he proceeded without delay to the head-quarters of the Allied Sovereigns, where he was welcomed with respect and regard, and immediately appointed to the high command of Major-General to the allied armies. What were Moreau's precise views we know not, but it is extremely probable that he had the deliverance of France in view, from her late odious government; and had he lived he would have seen his plan successful. Moreau's talents, as a General, were acknowledged to be of the highest order, and perhaps there was no man whom Bonaparte dreaded more to see fighting

against him. His arrival, therefore at this moment was certainly a great acquisition to the allies.

The negotiations at Prague, if such they could be called, had now lingered on for several weeks, without advancing any nearer the object which they had in view. The allies clearly perceived that the object of Bonaparte was merely to gain time, without any wish for an accommodation upon just and equitable terms. While he conceived that he was diverting their attention from the great point which they had in view, he was at the same time most strenuously collecting every means for their destruction. But they were not to be deceived. Their resolution was taken: "The negotiations were not to be protracted beyond the 10th of August,"\* unless every thing at that time was truly pacific. France endeavoured to procrastinate; she sent a minister to the Congress, but he had no instructions; and it was not till sixteen days after the time proposed for the opening of this assembly, that the first French Plenipotentiary arrived at Prague. His powers were then found to be insufficient; and when at length he received others on the 6th of August, these either tended to leave things as they were, or, what was worse, to render them more confused.† The 10th of August arrived, without any thing being done, from the unblushing chicanery and evasion of the French Minister. The allies, therefore, without hesitation, took a firm and decided step, which cut short all intermission, and shewed to the French Minister and his Master that they were not in a situation to be trifled with, by unmeaning words and insincere professions. They, on the 10th, caused the armistice to be denounced, with the six days previous notice; and, at the same time, the accession of Austria to the Grand Cause was notified to the French Minister. This important event was hailed with general joy throughout Europe. To Bonaparte it was a terrible blow, and what he durst not disclose to the people of France for a considerable time. He had previously made it a boast that no Continental Power would separate itself from France. Addressing himself to Britain, "fortunately for the

\* Austrian declaration, Aug. 1813.

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Continent (said he) France and Austria are *inseparable*. No Continental Power will separate itself from France; all will be deaf to your intrigues."\* The Russian snows had impaired the French Emperor's optics sadly; from that period he could foresee nothing.

It was now obvious to the most inattentive observer, that a crisis of great and awful importance was at hand. The die was cast—the sword was once more unsheathed—the scabbard was thrown away—accommodation was altogether impossible, and the fate of Europe, for ages to come, was about to be decided on the plains of Saxony. No middle course remained for either party to steer. No temporary measures could any longer be adopted. Europe must either lose her independence, or Napoleon his power. "The necessity of this war is engraven on the heart of every Austrian, of every European, under whatever dominion he may live, in such legible characters, that no art is necessary to distinguish them."† "Nothing," said Schwartzenberg, "could bring the minds of the French government to reason. We do not singly undertake this combat. We stand in the same ranks with all that Europe has to oppose of greatness and activity, against the powerful opponent of her peace and liberty. Europe expects from you great deeds, and great happiness after great sufferings. *Remember you must conquer.*"‡ The ambition and power of Bonaparte had long been incompatible with the safety and independence of Europe. "*The Emperor Napoleon cannot live at peace with Europe, unless Europe be his slave.*"§ Europe was determined that this should be the case no longer. "Every where the ardent desires of the people anticipated the regular proceedings of their Governments. Their impatience to live in independence, under their own laws, the sentiment of wounded and national honour, and the hatred of a foreign dominion, broke out in bright flames on all sides."¶

\* *Moniteur*, Dec. 31st, 1812.

† Austrian declaration, Aug. 1813.

‡ Schwartzenberg's address to the Army, August 7th.

§ Crown Prince's address, Aug. 15th.

¶ Austrian declaration, Aug. 1813.

Bright, indeed, and far did these flames shed their animating influence, proclaiming woe to the sacrilegious hand which opposed them. Never had mankind witnessed such a prospect as Europe at this time exhibited. The whole military means and resources of the most civilized quarter of the world were now collected together, and fairly pitched against each other on the field of war. The scene was awful, but magnificent: from the Adriatic to the mouth of the Elbe—from the Pillars of Hercules to the snow-clad summits of the Pyrenees, a million and a half of combatants stood ready to commence the dreadful combat, the effects of which was to be felt to the uttermost corners of the earth, and by ages yet unborn. It was not the rights and liberties of one people which depended upon the issue of this struggle, but the liberty and independence of the world which now hung in the balance; and while the accomplishment of this object for the security of the present, and the repose of future generations, was committed to talents and resources which afforded the strongest grounds for hope, still it was clear that these had to contend with means and abilities, which filled the minds of the most confident with fear and apprehension. From the spirit, however, which animated the allied nations, it was obvious that reverses would only be momentary evils to them, and the cause of protracting the struggle. To their enemies, however, defeat was irretrievable ruin, and the blow which should lay the French eagles prostrate on the plains of Saxony, would, it was obvious, compel them to wing their way behind the Rhine and the Adige, and make the Seine fear and the Po tremble.

During the armistice the enemy had not been inactive. He saw the storm which was collecting from all quarters for his destruction, and fearlessly prepared to meet its fury. According to the accounts of a press which durst insert nothing without his directions, at least 150,000 men had joined the formidable force which he had previously assembled round Dresden; and besides these, further armies of reserve were forming upon the Mayne. On the Bavarian frontier a strong force under General Wrede was assembled, in order to invade Upper Austria. In the Illyrian Provinces, and on the side of

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Italy, Beauharnois had assembled a formidable army. On the Lower Elbe the force under Davoust was considerable, and further augmented by the iniquitous accession of Denmark to the cause of France. On the Vistula Bonaparte still held the strong and important fortress of Dantzic, as well as Modlin and Zamosce. He still possessed the strong Prussian fortresses along the whole line of the Oder, viz. Great Glogau, Custrin, and Stettin; but his position on the Elbe was of a more formidable and extensive nature: from the Bohemian frontier to the mouth of that noble river, he held the whole of the strong places upon it. Hamburgh he had fortified in such a manner as to render it a fortress of the first rank; Magdeburgh, Wittenberg, and Torgau, were well supplied and strongly garrisoned; and last, Dresden, the pivot of all his operations, was strengthened in such a manner, that from thence to Konigstein was one complete fortress, and of such formidable strength, that the enemy, exulting in it, informed the world, that "a camp of 60,000 men, leaning upon the fortress of Konigstien, and being able to manœuvre upon both banks of the river, (which his army was), would be *unattackable by any force whatever*." Two bridges have been thrown over the Elbe, opposite the fortress of Konigstien. The rock of Si-lienstiet, which is upon the right bank, within half-cannon shot of Konigstien, has been occupied and fortified: magazines, and other military establishments, have been prepared in that interesting position,"\* &c. On the fate of Dresden depended the fate of French domination in Germany; and, therefore, "the ever-sublime genius of the Emperor was carried to the *foreseeing thought* of fortifying, during the armistice, that capital of Saxony, in order to make it the bulwark of the Confederation of the Rhine, and the most solid guarantee of his victories. The fate of Germany depended upon this great military measure, which, by reducing our enemies to the defensive, transported into their own states all the scourges of war."† The Cardinal here made a trifling mis-

\* Bonaparte's dispatch, June 25th, 1813.

† Cardinal Maury's address, Paris, Sept. 18th.

take, for it was not his enemies but his friends who were now reduced to the *defensive*; and it was amongst friends, not amidst enemies, where his Master had fixed the scourges of war. However, considering the importance of this place, of which the enemy was so fully aware, and the formidable disposable force which he had to defend it, or to issue from it to second all his operations, it was obvious that the allies had a most arduous task to accomplish; and their conduct in bringing the contest to such a glorious issue, deserves every praise which an admiring and grateful world can bestow.

On their side, also, the allies had been actively employed. They knew the enemy which they had to contend with, and duly appreciating his strength, and also his want of principle, had strained every nerve to meet both. Under the orders of the Crown Prince, the army of the North of Germany was assembled, consisting of, perhaps, 170,000 men, (including those besieging the fortresses from the Vistula to the Elbe), 90,000 of whom covered Berlin, while the rest watched the fortifications at Stralsund, the lower Elbe, and the fortresses on the lower Oder; 100,000 more, under the gallant Blücher, formed the "*glorious army of Silesia*," which covered that important province, and blockaded Great Glogau. From Schweidnitz, in Silesia, the allied Sovereigns entered Bohemia, with 80,000 men, the flower of the army, which they joined to the grand Austrian army assembled near Prague, and their united forces, about 240,000 strong, advanced to the northern frontier of Bohemia, near Dresden. 40,000 men, under Prince Reuss, opposed General Wrede, and covered Upper Austria; and Generals Nugent and Hillier upon the Illyrian and the Italian frontiers, with perhaps 70 or 80,000 men, opposed the projects of the Viceroy in that quarter, and were ready to enter Italy. The hearts and good wishes of the inhabitants of the Tyrol, and the former Austrian possessions in Italy were with them, and the whole population of Germany, from the Elbe to the Rhine, awaited only success on the part of the allies to hurl their fetters against the heads of their oppressors. The individual wrongs every man had suffered,

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the misery and oppression which each nation had so long endured were now collected into one tremendous focus of opposition, and overwhelming mass of resistance. Individually and collectively, one sentiment animated the confederate armies, and Death or Victory was the watchword of this formidable host. Awaking from their dream of lethargy "*their waking was terrible*"—each individual exclaimed, in the language of Hector,

"The coward counsels of a tim'rous throng  
Of reverend dotards check'd our glory long;  
Too long Jove lull'd us with lethargic charms,  
But now, in peals of thunder, calls to arms."<sup>\*</sup>

Their objects and views were expressly declared and explicitly stated. No desire of conquest—no wish to oppress or injure their neighbours, in their persons, their properties, or their institutions, occupied the thoughts of this Confederation. "It is not against France, but against the domineering power of France out of her own borders that this great alliance has raised itself."<sup>†</sup> The nations of Europe "have no designs against France; but they are determined to be governed by their own princes and their own laws."<sup>‡</sup> These sentiments, while they cheered, electrified Europe; and, notwithstanding the idle railings and profligate assertions of unprincipled democracy, alleging the utter contempt and detestation in which the people of the Continent held their old governments, still "their own princes and their own laws" formed the rallying point of their exertions—the stone which, issuing from the mountain, and which, guided by an arm unseen, struck with irresistible force the tremendous image of Gallic despotism, and, in a moment, dashed it into ten thousand pieces.

Before proceeding with the narrative of the military events, it may not be uninteresting here to collect into a short table

<sup>\*</sup> Pope's Homer's Iliad, Book 15th, verses 874-879.

<sup>†</sup> Schwarzenberg's address, August 17th, 1813.

<sup>‡</sup> Crown Prince's address, August 15th, 1813.



the population and arms now arrayed against each other. Nothing like the present situation of affairs had ever occurred in Europe, and it is hardly possible that any thing similar ever can again. It may serve to give the reader a clearer idea of the magnitude of this contest than any words can.

### CONTENDING PARTIES, AUGUST 1813.

#### BRITAIN AND HER ALLIES.

|                                          |                   |
|------------------------------------------|-------------------|
| Great Britain and Ireland, .....         | 17,000,000        |
| Russia, .....                            | 49,000,000        |
| Prussia, as she stood before 1807, ..... | 10,000,000        |
| Austria, .....                           | 20,000,000        |
| Spain, .....                             | 11,000,000        |
| Portugal, .....                          | 3,000,000         |
| Sweden, .....                            | 3,000,000         |
| Sicily, .....                            | 1,500,000         |
|                                          | <hr/> 114,500,000 |

#### FRANCE AND HER ALLIES.

|                                                |                  |
|------------------------------------------------|------------------|
| France and her acquisitions, without Italy, .. | 36,000,000       |
| Italy and the Illyrian provinces, .....        | 12,000,000       |
| The whole Rhenish Confederation, .....         | 12,000,000       |
| Switzerland, .....                             | 2,000,000        |
| Denmark, .....                                 | 2,500,000        |
| United States of America, .....                | 8,000,000        |
|                                                | <hr/> 72,500,000 |
| In favour of the allies, .....                 | <hr/> 42,000,000 |

So that Austria fairly turned the scale; while she remained united to France, the numbers were nearly equal. The following is also nearly the extent of the military strength which each nation had on foot at this period.

|                                        |                 |
|----------------------------------------|-----------------|
| France, Italy, and Rhenish League, and |                 |
| Switzerland, .....                     | 1,150,000       |
| United States army and navy, .....     | 70,000          |
| Denmark, do. do. ....                  | 60,000          |
|                                        | <hr/> 1,260,000 |

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## BRITAIN AND HER ALLIES.

|                                              |                 |
|----------------------------------------------|-----------------|
| Great Britain, army, navy, and militia, ~~~~ | 450,000         |
| Russia, do. do. ~~~~                         | 600,000         |
| Prussia, do. do. ~~~~                        | 200,000         |
| Spain, do. do. ~~~~                          | 150,000         |
| Portugal, do. do. ~~~~                       | 120,000         |
| Sweden, ~~~~~~                               | 60,000          |
|                                              | <hr/> 1,580,000 |
| In favour of the allies, ~~~~~~              | <hr/> 320,000   |

But then I do not include the national guards in France, which amounted to a great number, in fact the national guards were the nation armed, and from whose ranks any number of men might have been raised.

The following was the military force immediately engaged against each other in active operations in Germany and Italy, taken from official authority.

## FRENCH ARMIES.

|                                                                           |               |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
| Remains escaped from Russia, ~~~~~~                                       | 24,000        |
| Re-enforcements advancing through Poland and Prussia, about ~~~~~~        | 90,000        |
| Garrison of Dantzic, before joined by remains of MacDonald's army, ~~~~~~ | 20,000        |
| Supposed in other places at re-passing the Niemen, about ~~~~             | 30,000        |
| Total, ~~~~~~                                                             | <hr/> 164,000 |
| Lost at battle Kalisch with Regnier ~~~~~~                                | 3,000         |
|                                                                           | <hr/> 161,000 |
| Garrisons re-enforced, (as per Moniteur, different dates), ~~~~~~         | 111,000       |
| Besides fresh re-enforcements, remains upon the Elbe, (a) ~~~~~~          | 50,000        |

## FRENCH RE-ENFORCEMENTS.

|                                                                                                               |              |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------|
| By Moniteur of March 18th, and other dates—35th division of Grand Army, 5 brigades 6,220 men each, (b) ~~~~~~ | 31,100       |
| Carry over                                                                                                    | <hr/> 81,100 |

(a) The Moniteur, April 4th, stated the Viceroy's force on the Elbe to be at that time 100,000 men. If we add the present to Laurieston's force as afterwards mentioned, which was near Magdeburg, we will find, that including the Westphalian division it was 106,000.

(b) Moniteur, July 26th. Nuremberg, Dec. 30th; 1812.

| <i>Brought forward</i>                                                                                            |         | 21,100  |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------|---------|
| Poniatowski's corps re-organized, (a) 30,000                                                                      | 18,000  |         |
| Davoust's first corps, on lower Elbe,                                                                             | 30,000  |         |
| Victor's 2d corps, near lower Elbe,                                                                               | 30,000  |         |
| Regnier, re-enforced by Saxons, who were completed to their full establishment, (b)                               | 30,000  |         |
| Bavarian division on his left, (c)                                                                                | 6,000   |         |
| Lauriston five new divisions old troops,                                                                          | 30,000  |         |
| With do. 1 Westphalian division,                                                                                  | 6,000   |         |
| 1st Corps of cavalry with Lauriston,                                                                              | 10,000  |         |
| Marmont, 16th, 17th, 18th, and 19th divisions, (d)                                                                | 24,000  |         |
| Ney, 8th, 9th, 10th, 39th, 38th, and 39th divisions, (e)                                                          | 48,000  |         |
| Vandamme's corps in 32d military division, 50 battal. (f)                                                         | 50,000  |         |
| Bertrand, five divisions from Italy,                                                                              | 30,000  |         |
| Recalled from Spain four entire regiments foot guards,                                                            | 12,000  |         |
| Legion <i>Gens de Armes</i> ,                                                                                     | 3,200   |         |
| 7th Regiment Polish light horse,                                                                                  | 800     |         |
| Officers furnished by <i>Gens de Armes</i> ,                                                                      | 3,000   |         |
| Reserve in the interior, 150 battalions,                                                                          | 150,000 |         |
| Do. Guarding 32d military division, (g)                                                                           |         |         |
| Do. Illyria, Venice, and coast of Adriatic,                                                                       | 40,000  |         |
| Cavalry preparing for Germany, one half ready, besides 20,000 old horsemen fully equipped, and, then on the Elbe, | 60,000  |         |
| Imperial guards, (h)                                                                                              | 39,000  |         |
| <i>*Carry forward</i>                                                                                             |         | 701,100 |

(a) *Moniteur* February 1st.—“Of this corps, only 18,000 men passed through the Austrian territories and joined Bonaparte at Dresden, (see disp. June 21st,) the remainder must have been lost in skirmishes with Sacken, by sickness, or thrown into garrisons in Poland,

(b) Regnier's Saxon corps continues to receive numerous re-enforcements. *Frontiers Saxony*, July 1st.—“Saxon army in two brigades is at its full complement.” Dresden, July 30th.—It was 12,000 men when it joined the French after the battle of Lutzen.

(c) “Besides the corps on the Inn, we have garrisons in Bavaria, and 6000 men in Saxony,” &c.—Augsburgh, August 16th.

(d) These divisions were probably more than 6000 each, as the next number as well as a previous one shews. The division consisted of from 6 to 7000 men. The division of a corps being 10,000 or more.

(e) “Corps of observation commanded by Ney, consists of four divisions of 12,000 men each.”—Paris April 9th.

(f) When estimated by battalions these are generally 1000 each. The *Moniteur* April 14th, says “By the 15th, 50,000 men would be in the 32d military division.”

(g) The 32d military division comprehended all the country along the German Ocean from Holland to the Elbe, and therefore the force here mentioned is supposed to be that under Vandamme already given.

(h) Imperial guards, five divisions infantry and 9000 cavalry.—*Bonaparte's Offi-*

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|--------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------|---------|
|                                                              | <i>Brought forward.</i> | 701,100 |
| Bavarian army at Nymphenburgh, .....                         |                         |         |
| Do. army of observation at Wurtzburgh, .....(a)              | {                       | 25,000  |
| Do. do. assembled at Munich, .....                           |                         | 46,000  |
| Danes joined Davoust, .....(b)                               |                         | 10,000  |
| Garrison Bremen, .....                                       |                         | 15,000  |
| Westphalian corps ready at Cassel, .....(c)                  |                         | 2,000   |
| Army of Italy, 3 corps, including those guarding coasts, (d) |                         | 14,000  |
| Wurtemberg, Baden, Hessian, Swiss quotas, .....(e)           |                         | 50,000  |
| Garrisons over Prussia and Poland, &c. at that date, ...     |                         | 40,000  |
|                                                              |                         | 81,000  |
|                                                              |                         | <hr/>   |
|                                                              |                         | 984,100 |
| Deduct guarding interior, .....(f)                           |                         | 150,000 |
| Lost till Armistice, .....                                   |                         | 78,000  |
|                                                              |                         | <hr/>   |
|                                                              |                         | 228,000 |
| Total in the field at the rupture of the armistice, .....    |                         | <hr/>   |
|                                                              |                         | 756,000 |

*patch June 25th.* Another account says, "The Imperial guards, alone a formidable army—consist of 34 regiments, 32 of which have three battalions." *Dresden, July 18th French Papers.* And by French Exposé February 25th 1813, their number is officially stated at 90 regiments infantry, and 44 squadrons cavalry, which would give 68,800 men, but a number of these were in Spain and Italy.

(a) "25,000 Bavarians at Nymphenburgh; Bavarian army of observation at Wurtzburgh under Augereau, consists of six divisions of infantry and 2 divisions of cavalry." *Bonaparte's dispatch, June 25th.* And besides this army, another corps of observation is assembling at Munich of 10,000 men. *French Papers, &c.*

(b) Danes joined Davoust, 15,000. *Bonaparte's dispatch, June 25th.*

(c) "Westphalian corps in the neighbourhood prepared for the army, 14,000 strong." *Cassel, April 21st, Moniteur.*

(d) "Army of Italy assembling between the Piave and the Adige, composed of 3 corps." *Bonaparte's dispatch, June 25th.* 40,000 were before enumerated. How this army was raised, the following will shew us, *Official decree, Milan November 25th, 1813.*—"15,000 conscripts for the kingdom of Italy, to join by the 15th December.

*Naples, December 25th, 1812.* Decree dated the 3d, at Molodetchino, for 26,000 conscripts to be called out to join the army.

(e) The quota of Wurtemberg was 12,000, Baden, 8000, Switzerland 12,000, Hessa at least 8000 besides others. This number is not overstated. These powers furnished many more than their quotas, of which the following is an instance. "12,000 infantry and a train of artillery marched for the Grand army, to re-enforce the contingent of the Grand Duchy." *Carlsruhe, December 23d, 1812.*

(f) This was the number besides garrisons. "With the garrisons in the fortresses of France and Italy, your Majesty has therefore, in the interior of your dominions, a force of more than 300,000 men. *Bassano's report to Senate, January 16th, 1813.* At this time, the conscription ordered in Sept. 1813, were all in arms, *do. do.*

## HOW DISPOSED OF.

|                                                    |   |   |             |
|----------------------------------------------------|---|---|-------------|
| Opposing Crown Prince, 3 corps,                    | - | - | 90,000      |
| Do. Blucher, 3 do.                                 | - | - | 90,000      |
| With Bonaparte, at Dresden, 6 corps,               | - | - | 180,000     |
| Do. do. Imperial Guards,                           | - | - | 39,000      |
| With Davoust, 1 corps, and at Bremen,              | - | - | 32,000      |
| Danes, with do.                                    | - | - | 15,000      |
| Illyria, Italy, &c. 3 corps, Beauharnois,          | - | - | 90,000      |
| On the Inn, under Wrede,                           | - | - | 25,000      |
| At Munich,                                         | - | - | 10,000      |
| Army of Observation, under Augereau, at Wurtzburg, | - | - | 46,000      |
| Garrisons in Prussia, Poland, Saxony, &c. (a)      | - | - | 139,000     |
|                                                    |   |   | (b) 756,000 |

(a) The following were the number of men in the different garrisons, viz.

|             |                                                                                                                                                       |
|-------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Dantzic,    | 30,000—Moniteur, March 18th.                                                                                                                          |
| Stettin,    | 9,000—Do. do.                                                                                                                                         |
| Custrin,    | 9,000—Do. do.                                                                                                                                         |
| Modlin,     | 7,100—Do. do.                                                                                                                                         |
| Glogau,     | 6,000—Do. do.                                                                                                                                         |
| Zamocse,    | 4,000—Do. do.                                                                                                                                         |
| Thorn,      | 4,500—Do. do.                                                                                                                                         |
| Spandau,    | 5,200—Surrendered, besides loss in the siege. Allied Off. Acct.                                                                                       |
| Zentochan,  | 3,200—Do. do. do. Russian Official.                                                                                                                   |
| Turgau,     | 10,000—By Moniteur, 18th March, 6,000: by some Paper, <i>Nuremberg</i> , Sept. 24th, it was then 10,000                                               |
| Wurtemberg, | 4,000—German Official Accounts.                                                                                                                       |
| Magdeburg,  | 20,000—When it surrendered, from 18 to 20,000. Berlin Gazette. French Papers, said that it was so strong it sent out detachments of 10 or 12,000 men. |
| Leipsic,    | 8,000—Austrian Official report, Aug. 31st; and re-enforced.                                                                                           |
| Bremen,     | 3,000—When Tettenborn first took it, this was about the number.                                                                                       |
| Erfurt,     | 15,000                                                                                                                                                |
|             | 134,000                                                                                                                                               |
|             | 1,500—Spandau and Zentochan, during sieges, suppose.                                                                                                  |
|             | 135,500                                                                                                                                               |

Numbers in the garrisons of Dresden and Koningstein, at least, 14,700

Total, - - - 150,200

## DEDUCT.

|                                                   |        |
|---------------------------------------------------|--------|
| Spandau and Thorn, included in loss to Armistice, | 7,700  |
| Do. allowed for loss in do. during sieges,        | 1,500  |
| Bremen included in Davoust's force,               | 2,000  |
|                                                   | 11,200 |

Garrisons after rupture of the Armistice, - - - 139,000

But it is probable that the numbers even exceeded this. In Dantzic 18,360 surrendered; and it was estimated that one half more had been killed, wounded, or died by sickness and famine during the siege.

(b) Thus said the French Government "we will have an army of 400,000 men on the Elbe; 200,000 partly on the Rhine, partly in the 32d military division; and

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The force of the allies was still more considerable, and animated by a spirit of patriotism and independence which was altogether irresistible. The great number of fortified places, however, still held by Bonaparte, and the very favourable and formidable position occupied by him, rendered him, though inferior in numbers, still superior in strength. At the rupture of the armistice the force of his opponents stood nearly as follows, viz.

|                                                         |             |         |
|---------------------------------------------------------|-------------|---------|
| Austrian army in Bohemia, . . . . .                     | (a) 160,000 |         |
| Joined by allies from Silesia, . . . . .                | 80,000      |         |
| Main army of the allies, . . . . .                      |             | 240,000 |
| Under Crown Prince's orders:—                           |             |         |
| Covering Berlin, . . . . .                              | 90,000      |         |
| Opposing Davoust, about . . . . .                       | 30,000      |         |
| Stralsund, &c. . . . .                                  | 10,000      |         |
| Besieging Stettin, Custrin &c. . . . .                  | 30,000      |         |
| Observing Magdeburg, Wittenberg, &c. . . . .            | 15,000      |         |
| Blucher and garrison of Breslaw, &c. . . . .            |             | 165,000 |
| Army of Reserve under Beningsen, . . . . .              |             | 100,000 |
| Italy, Illyria, &c. . . . .                             |             | 80,000  |
| In upper Austria, to oppose Wrede, . . . . .            |             | 80,000  |
| Reserve near Vienna, . . . . .                          |             | 35,000  |
| Besieging Dantzic, Modlin, Zamocse, Glogau, &c. . . . . |             | 40,000  |
| Cossacks with different armies, . . . . .               |             | 80,000  |
|                                                         |             | 40,000  |
|                                                         | (b) 860,000 |         |

partly in Italy, and 200,000 in Spain. *Senatus-consultum, Paris, April 6d, 1815.* Deducting 139,000 in garrisons, and 15,000 Danes, we find the number remaining in Germany and Italy were exactly 602,000 men. The losses previous to the armistice were much more than made up by re-enforcements during the armistice. The French papers enumerated at least 150,000 men, re-enforcements during that period, which replaced the numbers lost, and which augmented the old or formed new garrisons.

(a) The Cabinet of Vienna promised the enemies of France to be on the 20th June upon the field of battle with 150,000 men.—*Bassano's report, Dresden, August 20th.*

(b) Petersburg Gazette, August 17th, 1813. *Official.* "Besides the Russian army of reserve, the allied force in Germany, for the field, is at least 500,000 men, and the Crown Prince's bulletin, Sept. 12th, says, that the allied force then on the Elbe was 400,000 strong. By the present table it would be 460 or 470,000, but from which their losses from the rupture of the armistice to 12th Sept. must be deducted.

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| In which force there were Austrians, | (a) 315,000   |
| Russians,                            | (b) 300,000   |
| Prussians,                           | (c) 300,000   |
| British and Swedes,                  | 40,000        |
|                                      | <hr/> 860,000 |

All eyes were now directed to Saxony, from whence every moment was expected to bring intelligence of the greatest and most decisive importance. Hostilities re-commenced upon the most gigantic scale. From the mouths of the Po, to the shores of the German Ocean, every valley rung with the *song of war*—every mountain reverberated the roar of artillery; and from the Caspian to the Atlantic the voice of the trumpet called the combatants to battle, and filled the breasts of millions with fear and sorrow. The plans of the enemy were, as usual, of the most daring and imposing kind. Every thing was arranged to commence hostilities, with one of those decisive events which he calculated would appal his enemies, and drown the voice of suffering amongst the people of France, by a gratification of their national vanity. But times were changed with Bonaparte. New principles opposed him, whose effects he had never anticipated, and had not calculated upon. From the Illyrian Provinces and the ancient Venetian States, Beauharnois was appointed to penetrate to Vienna from the South. From the confines of Bavaria, Wrede was to march down the Danube, in the same direction. On the North, Davoust, with the Danes, were directed to penetrate to Stralsund, in order to cut off the Swedish supplies, and communications with Sweden; but all these, however, were, comparatively

(a) Vienna, July 27th, "Including the Landwehr, above half a million of men will be in arms;" and a subsequent Gazette stated the regular army at 320,000.

(b) Petersburg, Sept. 23th, *Russian Bulletin*. "The Russian army is at present stronger than ever it has been on the left bank of the Vistula.

(c) Besides Landstrum and Landwehr. Crown Prince's bulletin, Sept. 26th, says, "Landstrum between the Oder and the Vistula 55,000, and between the Oder and the Elbe as many; together 110,000.

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\* Vienna Gaz



speaking, but minor operations. From Dresden the grand push was to be made which was to decide the fate of Europe. From thence Oudinot, with three corps, 80,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry, diverged, in order to seize upon Berlin. Lauriston, Macdonald, and Ney, with 3 corps more, at least an equal number, were to push on through Silesia, and occupy Breslau; while Bonaparte, with the remaining six corps, 180,000, and the Imperial guards 40,000, together 220,000, were to protect Dresden, penetrate into Bohemia, and seize Prague, the depot of the grand allied army. Such were the gigantic plans of the enemy; those which were to counteract them will be best elucidated in the sequel.

In every part, however, of this daring plan ~~the~~ was most conspicuously worsted. Scarcely had he penetrated into Bohemia, in the direction of Rumbourg and Gabell, with a superior force, when the rapid advance of Blucher with the Silesian army to the Bober, compelled him, on the 19th, to relinquish his hold of Bohemia, and to hasten with an overwhelming force to crush the army under Blucher. In his advance that General had several warm affairs with the enemy, in which they lost a considerable number of men. On the 21st, Bonaparte arrived upon the Bober, with a very superior force, amounting to 140,000.\* The allied troops contested the ground with great bravery, but as "Blucher had received orders to avoid a general engagement,"† he prudently withdrew beyond the Katzbach, after having inflicted a severe loss upon the enemy. The accounts, however, of these bloody combats were but imperfectly known, and little attended to at the moment; and though in any other contest they would have appeared as battles of the greatest importance, they were lost amidst the tremendous occurrences which took place immediately after in every quarter, and which were first published to the world. The engagements, however, at this time, on the side of Silesia, were upon a large scale, and most obstinate and bloody. In his rapid advance, Blucher drove the whole French army opposed to him across the Bober, with

\* Vienna Gazette, August 28th.

† Sir C. Stewart's dispatch, August 27th.

great loss. The arrival of Bonaparte, however, with the force already mentioned, obliged Blücher to fall back in his turn, after severe engagements. That on the 23d, at Goldsberg, was particularly severe. "The very superior fire of the enemy," said Blücher, "*had dismounted cannon, and made vacancies in the masses of the troops.*"\* The enemy seized the moment, took a battery, and surrounded two battalions. Some squadrons of Prussian cavalry, and the Mecklenburgh hussars, threw themselves against the enemy's cavalry, drove their 1st line back on the 2d and 3d, and released the infantry and artillery. The Prince of Mecklenburgh, when he saw his men giving way, seized a standard, rushed forward, rallied them, and led them again against the enemy. At other points the combat raged with similar fury, and on other days with proportionate bloodshed. These actions cost both sides a great number of men. From the 19th to the 26th, the indefatigable Silesian army fought eight great actions, besides smaller affairs. The loss on the part of the allies was perhaps 10,000: on the 19th the killed and wounded amounted, on their part, to 2,000,† and from the 21st to the 23d, 3,000. That of the enemy was about 15,000 men, without acquiring any material advantage. Bonaparte, in his account of these actions, estimates the loss of the allied army, besides that on the 19th which is not given, to have been 10,000 men on the 23d, and altogether, to the 25th, it was, by the French papers, rated at 18,000 men. But these accounts deserve little credit, formed as they were for the purpose of deception. To this date Bonaparte had not been able to collect satisfactory materials for a bulletin, and as the people of France might be expected to be impatient, Count Daru took up the pen to inform them, that the reason of their not receiving details was, because "*the Emperor was extremely occupied, sometimes upon the banks of the Bober, and sometimes upon the debouches from Bohemia, and sometimes upon*

\* Blücher's 3d report, August 26th.

† Prussian report, August 24th.—And their "loss was very small in comparison of that of the enemy."

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*the Elbe.*"\* The Emperor was, indeed, extremely occupied; and while endeavouring to bring Blücher to a general engagement, an event occurred which changed the whole face of affairs—which had a decisive influence upon the war, and reduced the enemy to the painful necessity, for the future, to act at every point only on the defensive. The grand allied army, under the chief command of Prince Schwartzberg, with its respective Sovereigns, broke up from Toplitz, about 200,000 strong, besides a force left in that quarter; passed the defiles, on the 20th and 21st, which separate Saxony from Bohemia, and marched towards Dresden. The enemy defended every inch of ground, during the advance of the allies upon the place, but were successively driven from every position with considerable loss. On the 24th the allies approached Dresden, where, at that time, there was not a sufficient force to oppose them, for any length of time. These movements compelled Bonaparte to relinquish, with the utmost haste, his operations against the Silesian army, and to march immediately to the relief of that city. He took with him his guards, 40,000 strong, and Marshal Ney, and directed Marmont and his corps to follow as fast as possible;† he made his guards march ten leagues in one day, and with them he entered Dresden at eight o'clock in the morning of the 26th, the day on which the attack was made, and only a few hours before the assault took place, yet in sufficient time to save the city.

Dresden, the capital of the kingdom of Saxony, is an ancient, fortified, and beautiful town, built upon both banks of the Elbe, a short distance from the place where that river issues through the mountains which divide Saxony from Bohemia. The buildings are very elegant; and over the river is one of the finest stone bridges in Europe. The old town is situated on the left bank of the Elbe, and was built in 808. The new town is on the opposite bank, and was built in the year

\* Daru's letter, August 24th, 1813.

† Marmont was at Leignitz when the campaign began, but we find him and his corps in the battle of the 27th, having arrived that morning.

1020. The number of inhabitants are supposed to exceed 50,000. This celebrated city was now the bone of contest.

The allies, unacquainted with the arrival of Bonaparte, advanced against the place. "All was tranquil at noon," said Napoleon; "but to the skilful eye this calm was the precursor of a storm; an attack appeared imminent."\* He prepared to meet it. At 4 o'clock, P. M. the allied army, in six columns, each preceded by 50 pieces of cannon, advanced with the most determined resolution to the attack. "In less than a quarter of an hour," said the enemy, "the fire became terrible." The batteries being planted in a circular manner, round that part of the city which is built on the west side of the Elbe, they commenced a most tremendous cannonade upon the place. "The effect," said Sir C. Stewart, "was magnificent, and the fine buildings in Dresden were soon enveloped in smoke."† The allies, in the most perfect order, advanced on all sides to the town. The Austrians marched foremost. They took a redoubt of great strength, within 60 yards of the wall of the city. The enemy fled behind the ramparts of the place, which were so strong, that it was impossible, without a long fire of heavy artillery, to make breaches in them, sufficient to enable the troops to storm the place. "It was near five o'clock," said Bonaparte, "some shells fell into the town; the moment appeared pressing."‡ The cannonade increased—the battle became more severe—some of the houses were already set on fire §—night was approaching—Dresden trembled at the danger which now surrounded and threatened her, when Bonaparte ordered a sortie by 30,000 of his guards, together with the cavalry under Murat, the corps of Mortier, and that of Ney, and endeavoured to separate the allied troops, and take one wing in flank and rear. Aware of his intention, and seeing that it was totally impracticable to make any impression upon the city, at least for that night, the troops were withdrawn, without disorder, to their several encampments. The fire, said Bonaparte, "immediately got to a distance, from the centre to the circumference,

\* Bonaparte's dispatch, August 28th.

† Bonaparte's dispatch, August 28th.

‡ Sir C. Stewart's dispatch August 28th.

§ Schwartzenberg's dispatch, August 31.

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and was soon driven back upon the hills."\* In this attack, the allies lost 4000 men, killed and wounded, but no officer of distinction. The loss of the enemy must have been great, and from the number of Generals (five) wounded, perhaps more. He asserted that he found 2000 prisoners on the field of battle, but as none of the official dispatches of the allies take any notice of the loss of any prisoners, this may be doubted. The allied army encamped during the night of the 26th in their strong position near the town. On the 27th, the weather was dreadful. The rain fell in torrents, and the soldiers of both armies were constantly in midst of mud and water. Nevertheless, Bonaparte determined to attack the allied army in their position. He had now a very large force in Dresden. His guards had arrived, 40,000 strong. Ney's corps, perhaps 30,000, and Marmont's as many, were, besides all the force originally in and around it, now assembled in Dresden.† His force in this quarter was little less than 200,000 men. He attacked the allies, according to Sir C. Stewart, on the 27th, with 130,000 men;‡ and to these we must add the garrison in the town, whose business it was to occupy it, and all Vandamme's corps from 30 to 40,000 strong, which, according to the accounts of the enemy, had, on the 25th, arrived from Rumbourg and Zittau, and on the 26th was at Pirna, having driven back the duke of Wirtemberg, who, with 15,000 Russians had been left to defend the passage of the river at this place; during which operation the enemy claimed 2000 prisoners and 6 pieces of cannon. The attack before the city began early in the forenoon, and was carried on principally with artillery and charges of cavalry. The enemy made repeated attempts to separate the allied army, but in vain, though he would have us believe otherwise. According to him, the left wing, composed of six divisions, was broken, scattered, and overthrown, with the loss of half their numbers. The Russian, Prussian, and Austrian cavalry made several charges with great effect, and took a considerable number of prisoners. In the

\* Bonaparte's dispatch, August 28th.

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‡ Sir C. Stewart's dispatch, do.

early part of the day, the allied left was hard pressed, and were losing ground, when the division under Aloysius Lichtenstein soon restored the battle in their favour. His attack was impetuous and successful; but two Austrian regiments, viz. those of the Archduke Rainer and Lusignan, having advanced too far, were surrounded by three regiments of the enemy, and suffered severely. The rain had rendered their muskets useless, and they could only use the bayonet in their defence. This affair was no doubt the origin of the gasconading story of the enemy, of the whole left wing being scattered and destroyed. After this the enemy attempted with a formidable artillery, to force the centre and right of the allied army, but every effort failed. Count Wittgenstein made several charges at the head of the allied cavalry, and always overthrew that of the enemy. The enemy finding, at last, that he could make no impression upon the position of the allies, the action ceased.—The allied army, however, perceiving that they could effect nothing against Dresden, and, certain that, from the force brought against them, the enemy must have withdrawn his overwhelming force from Silesia, and other quarters, which was one object\* of the present operations, they resolved to return into Bohemia, and choose a field of battle† there, more convenient for their operations. They were necessitated, however, in some degree, to adopt this plan, lest the enemy should throw a strong force in their rear, by means of his position at Konigstein, while the roads, but indifferent at any time, were now rendered almost impassible, from the incessant rains, it having rained for several days, particularly on the 27th, when it fell in torrents for 24 hours, without ceasing. “At two o’clock p. m.” said the enemy, the allies decided upon making their retreat;‡ and, according to Daru’s letter of the 27th, 6 p. m. Bonaparte, at the moment when he wrote, returned to Dresden. The loss of the allies in this affair was about 7000 men, “while the enemy must have suffered more.”§ On the 27th, the allied army suffered

\* Schwartzenberg’s bulletin, August 31st.

† Cathcart’s dispatch September 1st.

‡ Bonaparte’s dispatch, August 28th. § Sir C. Stewart’s dispatch, August 28th.

a severe loss, passing along in company, struck by the also passing rendered the consequences the great result of Russia in the character, raised his voice, and she, during her, from this day, reproach, and act of Divinity.

The failure of the retreat of the opportunity people of France victory that instance, favored his own set down that when he had prodigious victory he would, and prisoners, and cannon, 1500 baggage wagons the Moniteur, not easily as should be as learn the reason and ruin

\* Bonaparte’s dispatch.

a severe loss in the person of Gen. Moreau. That officer, while passing along the line on the right of the allied army, and while in company and conversation with the Emperor Alexander, was struck by a cannon ball, which, passing through one thigh, and also passing through his horse, shattered the other leg, which rendered the amputation of both necessary, above the knee. In consequence of this, he died in about six days afterwards, to the great regret of the whole army, and of the Emperor of Russia in particular, who, in a manner most honourable to his character, caused every honour to be paid to his memory, and raised his widow to the rank of a Princess of the Russian Empire, and settled a pension of 100,000 roubles, per annum on her, during her life. Bonaparte rejoiced to be so soon freed from this dangerous rival. He loaded his memory with every reproach, and eagerly and impiously proclaimed his fall as the act of Divine Justice, for opposing him.

The failure of the attack upon Dresden, and the subsequent retreat of the allied army into Bohemia, gave the enemy an opportunity which he eagerly embraced, to blazon forth to the people of France this repulse of his enemies, as the greatest victory that he had ever gained; and, accordingly, he, in this instance, far exceeded all his former violations of truth. He rated his own loss at 4000, killed, wounded and taken;\* and set down that of his antagonists, first at 60,000, and afterwards, when he had no success to communicate as the result of this prodigious victory, he, as it was but reasonable to expect that he would, augmented it to 30,000 killed and wounded, 30,000 prisoners, and 20,000 sick, in all 80,000 men; 100 pieces of cannon, 1500 ammunition and artillery waggons, and 3000 baggage waggons.† “*Our successes astonish ourselves,*” said the *Moniteur*, and other Paris Journals, who certainly were not easily astonished. Indeed it was no wonder that they should be astonished at such a relation, and still more to learn the reason why the Emperor came to let this scattered and ruined army return into Bohemia, without further

\* Bonaparte's dispatch, August 28th.

† Bonaparte's dispatch, September 2d,

‡ Paris, September 3d,



annoyance. These desperate and deliberate falsehoods succeeded, however, to an astonishing degree in alarming the minds of the unthinking and unwary; and, taking the enemy's narrative as perfectly correct, the ruin of the allies was confidently predicted, with a satisfaction and assiduity which, if not actually sincere, was in many places disgraceful and injurious. Those who adopted these ideas never reflected, that, the campaign did not begin at Dresden, but 70 miles from it: and although the project of the allies was not successful at this point, yet the consequences of it were scarcely less fatal to the enemy. This attack was generally supposed to have been planned by Moreau, but be this as it may, and whoever was its author, it was the plan of a comprehensive mind, and was of the very first importance. Had the allies succeeded, they would have terminated the war at one blow, by catching the Lion in his den. The whole French force in Saxony would inevitably have been surrounded and destroyed. How near this was to have been the case, we have already seen. The circumstance of Bonaparte's sudden return from such a distance, with such an overwhelming force, alone prevented the completion of this grand design. Notwithstanding its failure, this operation changed the whole face of affairs to Bonaparte, and was the beginning of those fresh woes which this disturber of Europe was destined to feel from the hands of indignant nations.

In his attack upon the allied army before Dresden, the enemy had with him the 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 6th, and 14th corps of the French army, under Marshals and Generals Vandamme, St. Cyr, Ney, Marmont, Mortier, and Victor, with all the guards, and the principal part of the cavalry under Murat, together with the garrison of Dresden, the whole certainly exceeding 200,000 men; a circumstance which has been but little attended to. "The young guards," said he, "have merited the praise of the whole army."\* They paid dear for "*The new guards*," said S. C. Stewart, "and particularly the artillery, have suffered dreadfully in the battles of Dresden.

\* Bonaparte's dispatch, September 28th, 1813.

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General Vachot and Silbier were killed, and Generals Dumontier, Dental, Gros, Boeldieu, Maison, Veer, and Aubert, severely wounded.\* It is obvious, from this list, that what the enemy said was correct, namely, that "the city of Dresden ran great risks of danger."† In the midst of this scene of uncertainty, the inhabitants of Dresden and the King of Saxony remained firmly devoted to the cause of France. "The inhabitants," said Daru, "express their joy in the most lively manner at the sight of these trophies,"‡ (*prisoners and flags of the allies.*) "The conduct of the inhabitants has been such as we should expect from an allied people. The King of Saxony and his family remained at Dresden, and have shewn the *example* of confidence."§

As the allied army had foreseen and wished to guard against, the enemy, had sent a strong force, under General Vandamme, "consisting of about 52 battalions, and about 5000 horse," together, about 37,000 men, to fall upon their rear. This force passed the Elbe at Pirna, and advancing by Konigstein, Hollendorf, and Peterswalde, they, on the 28th, obtained possession of the great road in that defile, leading from Dresden to Toplitz. General Vandamme, said the French dispatch, "possessed military ardour, but it was *badly directed*." Schwarzenberg, however, expressed the matter clearer. The enemy, said he, mistook completely the causes which prompted us to our retrograde movement. Strong in his error, he thought of nothing but "*taking all*;"|| conceiving, no doubt, that the Emperor, who had gained such a great victory, would as usual, follow it up by pursuing the beaten enemy: dearly, however, did he pay for his temerity; scarcely had he arrived near Kulm, and found himself in a situation, where he conceived he would "*take all*," than he found himself in the very situation in which he supposed he had placed his enemy. On the 29th, a small division of the allied army, about 8000 strong, arrested his progress; at which time he lost

\* Sir C. Stewart's dispatch, Prague, Sept. 17th, 1813.

† Bonaparte's dispatch, August 28th, 1813.

‡ Daru's letter, Dresden August 27th, 6 P. M.

§ Bonaparte's dispatch, August 28th.

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about 6000 men, and the allies 3000. The action was obstinate and sanguinary, but not equal to what followed. On the 30th, he found himself again attacked both in front and rear, without any prospect of assistance or escape. After a most desperate resistance, he was completely routed, his corps almost cut to pieces, himself and six other general officers, and 15,000\* men taken prisoners. The Prince of Reuss, and an immense number were killed and wounded. Eighty-two pieces of cannon, 6 standards, and all their baggage were also taken. *The 1st corps de armée*, under General Vandamme, ceased to exist.† On the side of the allies, General Sir C. Stewart was slightly wounded. This Vandamme was the General who committed such cruelties on the inhabitants of Bremen. Wherever he went it was with difficulty that his guards could restrain the indignation of the populace. A Westphalian Colonel, who, with his regiment had deserted to the allies, asked him, in French, "If he had not some commissions for Bremen, Hamburg, and Lubeck, where his humanity was still remembered." Vandamme knit his brows and pretended not to hear him.‡ For his insolent conduct to the Emperor of Russia, he was sent a prisoner into Russia, and there committed to the care of the gallant Rostopchin, at Moscow, who made a show of him like another monster.

But this was only the beginning of the bitter cup of indignation, which the French army was doomed to drink, and also, to wring out the bitterest drops of, unpitied. No sooner did the gallant Blucher perceive that part of the force that was opposed to him, was withdrawn, than he immediately turned upon his pursuers, and on the 26th August he was attacked by them in a strong position, near the river Katzbach; when after a hard contested action, principally decided with the bayonet, he succeeded in defeating the three corps of the French army, commanded by Lauriston, Macdonald, and Sebastiani, with prodigious slaughter. Blucher retired behind a rising ground,

\* Crown Prince's bulletin, September 10th, 1813.

† Schwartzberg's dispatch, August 31st, 1813.

‡ Petersburg Gazette, September 26th, 1813.

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on the right bank of the Katzbach, in order to draw the enemy on, who, from that circumstance, conceived that he fled before him, but the allies turning, advanced with irresistible impetuosity and overthrew every thing before them. The rain, which fell in torrents, rendered the musquets useless. The allied troops had recourse to their bayonets alone. The carnage, therefore, amongst the enemy's ranks was dreadful, because the allied "troops fought with *uncommon animosity*, and employed principally the bayonet."\* The enemy were driven into the Katzbach, which at that moment overflowed all its banks. Every river was swelled in a similar manner. All the bridges had been broken down or carried away by the floods, so that the French army was in a most deplorable situation. Thousands were swept away in endeavouring to pass the different streams, and great numbers were taken prisoners. The roads were flooded to such a degree, that in many places they were four feet under water. The Prussian troops waded to the shoulders after the enemy. All the villages were deserted—no food was to be found—no supplies could be brought up. They were therefore days without food—hourly engaged with the enemy—days and nights constantly in mud and water. But the soldiers bore all without a murmur, and reaped a rich reward. The fruits of this victory were, that the enemy fled in all directions; and the army of Silesia continued the pursuit with unremitting ardour, notwithstanding the dreadful state of the weather, and numerous rivers rendered almost impassible, by torrents of rain, until they drove the enemy across the Niesse with the loss of 18,000 prisoners, and upwards of 100 pieces of cannon. From that period, the remainder of this corps, once so formidable, could no longer make head against the Prussian army; and the attention of Bonaparte, at Dresden, became completely absorbed, distracted, and divided, by the movements of this army under Blücher, and that from Bohemia. The loss of the enemy could not be fully ascertained. The killed and wounded were very great, and vast numbers of the unhappy fugitives perished in the raging waves of the Katzbach.

\* Austrian bulletin, August 51st, 1813.

and the Bober. So complete was the destruction and dispersion of this French army, that of 80,000 men, of which it was composed on the 26th, it was calculated that scarcely 10,000 remained in an organized state after passing the Niessé.\* The gallant General, Blücher, paid high and deserved praise to the army which achieved this great victory. "I did more," "Let us," said he, "send up our thanks to the Lord of Hosts, by whose aid you have defeated the enemy; and assembled in divine service, prostrate ourselves before him for the glorious victory he has granted us. *Let your devotions close with three hours; and then, once more against the enemy.*"† These are principles which will always render him who practises them victorious.

While these things were taking place in Silesia, equally important and favourable events were occurring near Berlin. Oudinot had been detached with three corps, amounting to 80,000 infantry, and 10,000 cavalry under the Duke of Padua, to make himself master of that city; and according to Darn and Maret, he was to be in it on the 23d or 24th. The Crown Prince, however, had timely notice of his designs, and assembling about 90,000 men in the vicinity of Berlin, the tables were instantly turned against Oudinot, who has never yet reached his destination. Various actions took place betwixt divisions of the army, of which that of Gross Beren, on the 22d, was the chief, in all of which the enemy was defeated, and obliged to measure back his steps upon Wittenberg. On the 27th, a serious engagement took place, between the Crown Prince's army and a French force under General Gerard, who had advanced from the direction of Magdeburg, in which that General was killed, and about 3600 men taken prisoners. Up to this date, the army of the North of Germany had caused a loss to the enemy of 5000 killed, 10,000 wounded, and 7000 prisoners, but no general action had yet taken place between them. The Crown Prince having left General Tauenzien with 40,000 men, principally Prussian troops, near Jüterboch, to cover Berlin, prepared himself with the main body of his ar-

\* Austrian bulletin, August 31st, 1813.

† Blücher's address, Sept. 2d, 1813.

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my to pass the Elbe, near Dessau, and make a dash at Leipsic, where the enemy's principal magazines were established, and which would, in all probability, have fallen into his hands. But, Bonaparte, chagrined at the defeat of Oudinot, and vexed that he had not been able to fulfil his promise to the *lads of Paris*, by obtaining possession of Berlin, sent Marshal Ney to assume the command of the army under Oudinot, and make another attempt upon that place. This General advanced from Torgau, at the head of 70,000 men and 300 pieces of artillery, full of confidence, and on the 6th attacked Tauenzien's corps with great fury. When advancing to the combat, Ney endeavoured to encourage his troops, by pointing out the Prussian capital as the reward of their labours. "*Victory is ours,*" said he, "*in two days we shall be in Berlin.*" The contest here, said the Crown Prince, was unequal and murderous. The Prussians fought with the most undaunted courage, "and if some battalions were obliged, for an instant to quit the ground which they had gained, it was only for the purpose of re-occupying it the moment after."\* The Prussians nobly maintained their post against this fearful odds; while the Crown Prince, who had received notice of Ney's movements, abandoned his designs upon Leipsic, and advancing by forced marches with 70 battalions of infantry, 10,000 cavalry, and 150 pieces of cannon, arrived in time to take the enemy in the flank and rear, who was immediately routed with great slaughter, and compelled to take refuge under the walls of Torgau. The appearance of this formidable force alarmed the French Marshal. "*He slackened his pace,*" said the Crown Prince, and soon after commenced a precipitate retreat. "The cavalry charged them with a boldness resembling fury, and carried disorder into their columns." The field of battle, and the road over which the enemy fled, were strewed with dead and wounded, and 6000 of the former were already counted on the 8th. General Regnier, during the flight of the French army, remained a long time exposed to the fire of the sharpshooters, in the situation of a man desirous of death. Half

\* Crown Prince's bulletin, Jutterboch, September 8th, 1813.

of the escort of the Prince de la Moskwa was killed,\* and perhaps half his corps, for only 16,000 of it escaped.† This engagement cost the French army upwards of 21,000 men, killed, wounded, and prisoners, 80 pieces of cannon, and 400 ammunition waggons, with the further mortification to Bonaparte of the defeat of another of his best Generals, without it having been in his power to retrieve his disasters. The loss on the side of the allies fell principally on the Prussians, and amounted on their part to 5000 men, and including the others to 8000 men. In the account which Ney gave of this action, he estimated his loss at 8000 men, and supposes that of the allies to be as much. He mentions also a curious circumstance of his having taken a number of prisoners, but that, unfortunately the "*whole disappeared during the night march*" after the battle.‡

Davoust, whose orders were to make himself master of Stralsund, having been joined by 15,000 Danes, assembled a disposable force of about 35,000 men, with which he commenced his operations against the duchy of Mecklenburgh, the capital of which fell into his hands on the 29d August, without any serious opposition. The troops of the allies, inferior in number, fell back upon their resources; but being quickly re-enforced from all quarters, the enemy's army, the advanced divisions of which had reached as far as Rostock, were compelled to fall back in their turn, and were reduced to the necessity of taking up a position behind the river Steiknitz, on the confines of Holstein. Several sharp skirmishes took place between the contending parties, during these operations, attended with considerable loss to the enemy; but no action of any moment until the 18th, when General Walmoden fell in with a division of the enemy's army, under General Pecheux, near Domitz, consisting of about 6000, which he completely routed, and almost totally destroyed. "Pecheux brought back," said Davoust, "all who were not put *hors de*

\* Crown Prince's 8th and 12th bulletin.

† Sir C. Stewart's dispatch, September 17th, 1813.

‡ Ney's official report, Sept. 7th, 1813.

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*combat.*" In plain English, all that he did not leave behind. The fact was, he escaped with from 5 to 600 men.\* From this period Davoust was obliged to confine himself to Hamburg and its environs, where his arbitrary and unfeeling arm employed itself in inflicting every privation and distress upon the unfortunate inhabitants. To such an height had this system of tyranny and oppression risen, that an edict was issued by which, even females, if seen conversing on the streets, were liable to be dragged to prison by a set of armed spies, and profligate douaniers, the curse and scourge of every place which they had entered.

On the side of Italy affairs were equally favourable to the allied arms. Beauharnois was successively driven from the banks of the Drave, through the Illyrian provinces, and compelled to take refuge behind the Isonzo. Like his Master, he was constantly gaining victories; and like him too, he was always getting farther from the object he had in view. Trieste and Fiume, two important sea-ports in the Adriatic, reverted to the Austrian sceptre, and in the reduction of which the British naval force stationed there, under the command of Commodore Rowley, signalized themselves greatly. The Croats eagerly flocked to the Austrian standard, and swore to protect their country from all further attempts on the part of France to subdue it. Nor were the Tyrolese behind; that gallant people quickly threw off the French yoke, and declared for their ancient Sovereign.

Scarcely had Bonaparte recovered from the chagrin and disappointment which Vandamme's disasters had occasioned, and which completely paralyzed his efforts in that quarter, when his attention was called off to Lusatin, by the rapid advance of General Blucher, and complete defeat of the corps opposed to him. With a strong corps he left Dresden on the 3d, and advanced to the Niesse; Blucher, upon the approach of this superior force, retired across that river, and continued to fall back to the Silesian frontier, in excellent order, without the enemy being able to gain the smallest advantage

\* Crown Prince's bulletin, Sept. 22d.

† Sir C. Stewart's dispatch, Sept. 14th,

over him. No sooner had the main army, again assembled at Toplitz, heard of Bonaparte's leaving Dresden, than they once more advanced against that place, having previously detached 50,000 men upon Zittau, to open a communication with General Blücher. Again Bonaparte was forced to measure back his steps, to defend his "*unattackable*" position upon the Elbe; and no sooner had he arrived with a superior force, than the allied army broke up, and on the 10th, retired into Bohemia\*. As the enemy advanced, however, the allies retired fighting, and disputed every inch of ground. On the 10th, Bonaparte having advanced with a large force, with the intention of making a general attack upon the allies near Kulm, found them, in that place, 100,000 strong, with 800 pieces of artillery, advantageously posted, and ready to receive him. He no sooner found this to be the case, than he began a precipitate retreat, and on the 13th, retired towards Dresden, breaking up the roads†, and declining the engagement he sought; though he had the hardihood, in his dispatch, to assert, that it was the allies who declined the combat.

The retreat of Bonaparte from the Niesse was the signal for Blücher again to advance. He drove the enemy across the Spree, and, on the 12th, captured Bautzen, in the neighbourhood of which, the Russian Colonel Prince Motadoff, blew up 200 ammunition waggons, part of Bonaparte's baggage, and took 1200 prisoners.† Blücher having now opened a communication on his right with the army of the Crown Prince, and on his left with that of Count Bubna, who had been detached from the main army, continued to advance upon Dresden from the East. Again Bonaparte was preparing to march against him, when he was prevented by the re-advance of the Bohemian army on the 14th; these having made strong reconnoissances amongst the mountains towards the Saxon frontier, in which some sharp skirmishing took place amongst the advanced parties of the respective armies, on the morning of the 16th they found

\* Sir C. Stewart's dispatch, Sept. 14th.

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the enemy in considerable force occupying the heights in front of Nollendorf. The enemy made an attempt to turn the right of the allies before Kulm, while he also assailed their centre and left. In this affair Bonaparte assisted in person: "15,000 men were detached to turn the right, eight thousand advanced in front, and on the left: about 30,000 men and 8,000 cavalry, in reserve; formed the attack on the part of the enemy."\* On the 17th, under cover of a dense fog, and having advanced through a thick wood, the enemy gained unperceived the flank of the allies. The Russians and Prussians were forced from the village of Nollendorf, but the enemy was kept in check on the left; General Colleredo, with an Austrian corps, fell on the enemy's advanced column, which had gained the right, in the boldest and most determined manner; put it completely to the rout, killed and wounded a great number, and took above 2000 prisoners. The Hesse Homburgh hussars, and Prussian cavalry, cut into the enemy's ranks with the most determined bravery, and were followed by the Austrian infantry in the coolest manner. The loss of the allies was about 1000 killed and wounded. During the last two days, the enemy sustained a loss of 4,000 prisoners.† The enemy, defeated at all points, commenced his retreat, and took up his old positions in the mountains. Bonaparte had a horse shot under him in this affair, which was the last of those numerous attacks on the Bohemian frontier in which Bonaparte endeavoured either to extricate himself out of the perilous situation in which he was placed, or "*to manœuvre the allies out of their position.*"‡

Thus discomfited, Bonaparte was obliged to retrace his steps to Dresden, where he arrived on the 21st, and was immediately obliged to leave it again, in order to oppose Blücher, now advanced to within a short distance of that city. In this attempt, however, he had no better success than the former, and after losing about 2000 men, all the advantage he gained was, that he "*led Blücher fighting to the Spree.*" From thence

\* Sir C. Stewart's dispatch, Sept. 19th, 1813.

† Crown Prince's bulletin.

‡ Sir C. Stewart's dispatch, Sept. 17th, 1813.

he was again immediately compelled to retrace his steps to Dresden, where dangers of the most formidable description began to assail him from all quarters.

In the meantime the Crown Prince did not remain inactive. He sent detachments in the direction of Hoyerswerda, to communicate with General Blücher; opposed a sufficient force to the enemy at Torgau, and advancing with the rest of the army to Zerbst, he commenced the siege of Wittemberg, and sent a considerable force across the Elbe, which captured Dessau and threatened Leipsic. Against this force Ney was dispatched, but without any success; while Murat and the Duke of Ragusa, who, from Dresden, had been sent to Grossen Hayn with 25,000 men, besides cavalry, to repel the advance of the divisions of the northern army in that quarter, were not able to accomplish any thing which could make matters wear a more favourable aspect for their Master's cause. It is foreign to my purpose, and would far exceed the limits of this work, to detail at length every movement and operation of the army at this period, in which the allies had generally the advantage, and by which they continued on every side to press the enemy closer and closer. His communications with France were, in a great measure, cut off by the troops under the command of the indefatigable General Thielman, and by other detached corps, who captured Wiessensfels and Freyberg, with a considerable number of prisoners, and advancing from the south upon Leipsic, communicated with the advanced parties of the Crown Prince's army to the north of that city. In the meantime the indefatigable and venerable Platoff, after a long absence, again appeared upon the scene. He had arrived with the Russian army of reserve, about 80,000 strong, which had now joined the grand army, and immediately commenced his operations against the enemy, with his usual success. On the 28th, near Altenburgh, he fell in with 8000 of the enemy's cavalry, which he attacked and defeated with very great loss. Chernicheff, with a detachment of Cossacks, being detached from Zerbst, succeeded in surprising Cassel on the 28th, as did Plettenborn Bremen; but upon the advance of superior forces they were after-

wards obliged to retreat. The troops remained inactive, though the situation was otherwise favourable; their nature; their Their dress did him g Crown P likewise fig infantry, s rear, where

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wards obliged to abandon both these places. While the regular troops remained for a short time, comparatively speaking, inactive, the one side re-organizing his shattered forces, and the other forming plans of the most comprehensive and decisive nature; the Cossacks were on the alert in all directions. Their dreadful *hourra* kept the enemy in constant alarm, and did him great mischief. "These undaunted troops," said the Crown Prince, "are not only the *eyes of the army*, but they likewise fight in the ranks, break squadrons, attack squares of infantry, swim over rivers, and put themselves in the enemy's rear, where they spread dread and disorder."\*

On the side of Hamburg nothing of importance had occurred for some time. Dantzic, and the other fortresses in possession of the enemy, continued to hold out. In Italy the Viceroy, according to the French accounts, continued to be successful, and yet continued to fall back, and from the Isonzo had found his way behind the Tagliamento, and was preparing to gain the Piave.

The strength of the enemy's position at Dresden was such, that the allies had no hopes of carrying it by main force, except at an enormous expense of human life. To drag him from his den, however, was absolutely necessary; and to accomplish this purpose, one of the boldest manœuvres, and upon the most extensive scale, ever recorded in the annals of war, was determined upon, and put in immediate execution. The whole army of the allies, from different points, were to put themselves in motion, and march upon Leipsic—throw their whole force in the rear of the enemy—cut off his communications with France—compel him to abandon the position of Dresden—and bring him to a general engagement. Accordingly, all the divisions of the army were in motion, at the same moment. On the South, the grand army consisting of at least 200,000 men, besides Beningsen's corps, broke up from Toplitz, and marching on its left by Brix and Commau, on the 3d, advanced by Marienburg and Chemnitz, and pushed their light troops and detached corps upon Leip-

\* Crown Prince's bulletin, Dessau, October 4th, 1813.



sic, and westward of it down the Saale. At the same time, Blucher broke up from the Spree, and advancing down the Elster, he, after a march unparalleled for rapidity in the annals of war, on the 3d forced the Elbe at Elster, a little above Wittemberg, in presence of Bertrand's corps, attacked and carried the entrenched village of Wartenberg, with a loss to the enemy of 1000 prisoners, besides killed and wounded, 16 pieces of cannon, and 70 tumbrils, advanced his head-quarters to Kemberg, and pushed his cavalry as far as Duben. The Crown Prince, who was at Zerbst, having obtained notice of these operations, after leaving a strong force under Tauenzien and Thumen to besiege Wittemberg and watch Magdeburg, commenced his march, passed his whole army across the Elbe near Achen upon the 4th, and drove the enemy from the neighbourhood of Dessau. Continuing to advance on the direct road to Leipsic, he, on the 7th, formed a complete junction with General Blucher, their united forces amounting to 130,000 men, with 600 pieces of artillery. With this force they advanced towards Leipsic, upon which place Ney, Bertrand, and the other French troops, fell back. Still following their preconcerted plan, Blucher threw himself, with all his forces, upon the line of the Saale, and on the west side of that city, so that, by the 11th, he found his communication quite open with the advanced corps of the grand army, advancing from Bohemia. The circle was now completed round their formidable antagonist, who, by an unaccountable fatality, continued to cling to his boasted position at Dresden; upon which, at the same moment, another strong corps under Beningsen was also advancing from Bohemia. A crisis of great and awful importance was now rapidly approaching, and the blow which was to determine the fate of Europe was about to be struck upon the plains of Leipsic.

In the meantime, an event of the most favourable nature, and of the greatest importance to the cause of the allies, took place. Bavaria renounced her alliance with France, and joined the cause of nations contending for their independence. On the 8th October, a convention was signed at Braunau, be-

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tween General Wrede commanding the Bavarian troops, and Prince Reuss commanding those of Austria, by which Bavaria agreed to join the good cause, and unite her troops with those of the allies. Their united forces, amounting to from 60 to 70,000 excellent troops, immediately commenced their march to Bamberg upon the Mayne, to act as might be required. This was a dreadful blow to French interest;—Bavaria had been the sworn friend of France for ages back, and her defection could not fail to impress upon the minds of other powers, and the mind of France herself, the desperate state of her power and interests in Germany; and, accordingly, we find that, in his official dispatch of the 24th October, Bonaparte confessed, he saw, in the defection of Bavaria, the principal member of the Rhenish Confederacy, the rapid defection of other Princes. Besides the great force it brought immediately to the assistance of the confederates, while it lessened that of France, it laid open the country to the Rhine, and was an example to the Swiss to follow, thereby exposing a great extent of the *sacred* territory of France to invasion. The conduct of the French ruler at this moment was altogether unaccountable; he seemed neither to dread an extension of his danger, nor yet to take any measures to prevent it. By clinging to Dresden, in the manner he did, he not only enabled the confederates to draw a strong circle around him; but, placed in it, he had it not in his power either to cajole or intimidate Bavaria, as he might otherwise have done, had he fallen back upon the line of the Saale, with his army, comparatively speaking, undiminished. But the hour of retribution was approaching upon him, and that invisible arm which paralyzed his energies, and that power which confounded his understanding at Moscow, had equally benighted his mental powers at Dresden.

“Leipsic,” said the slavish press of Paris, “has suddenly become the centre of important operations.” \* It had so.—The simultaneous movements of the combined armies awakened Bonaparte from his dream of security and vain confidence

\* Paris papers, October, 1813

in Dresden; and, accordingly, he left that city on the 7th Oct. leaving a strong garrison of 35,000 men in it, under Govion St. Cyr, and in company with the king of Saxony, his family and court, proceeded with his army towards Leipsic. Upon his arrival in the neighbourhood of that place on the 9th, he found every avenue of escape towards the Rhine closed against him, and no alternative left but to fight his way through his antagonists. According to his own accounts, finding himself thus situated, he formed the bold project of marching upon Berlin. Abandoning the Upper Elbe, he intended to make the lower part of that river the scene of his operations, the centre of the whole to be the important fortress of Magdeburg. Accordingly, on the 14th, Ney advanced with a strong force in that direction; he recaptured Dessau, destroyed the bridges which the Crown Prince had erected there, compelled General Thumen to raise the siege of Wittenberg, who immediately marched to join General Tauentzien, whose forces, when united to other re-enforcements, amounted to nearly 40,000 men, with which they fell back to cover Berlin, where no small degree of alarm prevailed upon the approach of the enemy. From this attempt, however, Bonaparte was soon obliged to desist, and in all probability, the whole was only a feint, in order to induce the Crown Prince to recross the Elbe, for the succour of the Prussian capital, thereby weakening the circle around Leipsic, through which the enemy would have more easily forced his way. The manoeuvre, however, did not succeed. The allied army retained its commanding attitude; and as "*the annihilation of the French army*"\* was what they had in view, so, to accomplish it, they were resolved to sacrifice Berlin, should the enemy be mad enough to march in that direction. Finding his efforts vain, Bonaparte, on the 14th, recalled Ney, and collecting his army, concentrated the whole in the neighbourhood of Leipsic,

\* "The momentary loss of our communications, across the Elbe, below Magdeburg, may be a temporary inconvenience, but the annihilation of the French army being the sole object of the Crown Prince," &c. Sir C. Stewart's dispatch, October 14th, 1813.

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having, since the 12th, been joined by Augereau, with the reserves from the Mayne, who had effected his junction, after considerable loss in rencounters with the advanced divisions of the Bohemian army.\* As an excuse for not persevering in his plan of marching upon Berlin, Bonaparte brought forward the unexpected defection of Bavaria, which obliged him to alter all his plans, and endeavour to reach the Rhine. This was a miserable though a plausible excuse, and at any rate shewed, if he was really ignorant until that moment of the sentiments of Bavaria and others, that he no longer had access to their councils, by the means he formerly found so successful—of her intentions, however, there is little doubt that he was previously aware, and nothing shews more clearly the dreadful state in which he was placed, or the distraction of his thoughts thereat, than the pretended or intended march upon Berlin, a thing which, as Sir C. Stewart observed, “seems so desperate, and so little in military calculation, that until this interesting crisis develops itself, it is impossible to pronounce an opinion.”†

While a strong force watched Dresden and another covered Berlin, now relieved from immediate danger, the combined armies of the allies, in formidable array, from the North, the West, the South, and the North-East, continued to press the enemy closer and closer, and hem him in on all sides, so that, by the 16th, his most advanced divisions were only a few leagues from Leipsic. So admirably were all the plans of the confederates laid, and so punctually executed, that no opportunity was afforded to their wary antagonist, with his most expert commanders, to take advantage of a single error. The utmost confidence prevailed amongst the allies as to the result of their operations. “If,” said Lord Aberdeen, “Bonaparte cuts his way through the surrounding hosts, it is impossible

\* “And Marshal Augereau, who had been much harassed and impeded in his march, and had lost part of his corps, reached Leipsic with the remainder.” Cathcart’s dispatch, October 19th. Sir C. Stewart stated one division of this corps to have been 15,000 men.

† Sir C. Stewart’s dispatch, October 14th, 1813.

he can reach the Rhine but with the wreck of an army. In this attempt he may probably succeed, but there is every reason to hope that it will be accompanied by the destruction of a great part of his army.\* "And when all the armies shall be united (said Sir C. Stewart) it will be indeed strange if your Lordship does not receive a *good account* of the enemy." The event justified their predictions and more than fulfilled their utmost expectations.

The alarm which seized the minds of the timid, and the gloom which dispondence and disaffection had produced, and had eagerly laid hold of, in order to raise the fallen fortunes of their idol, upon his demonstration against Berlin, was of short duration, and was quickly dissipated by the arrival of very different intelligence. Europe, at length, "*approached her deliverance*," and the hour was nearly arrived when the armies of the tyrant were destined to feel the effects of that universal spirit of patriotism, which the outrageous conduct of France had aroused against her. No Russian tempests here overwhelmed his armies—no *Saxon* rains swelled the Bober to separate his haughty legions, and afford a handle to lessen his disgrace or palliate his defeat. No! on equal fields, with equal arms, and *in the climate of Jena*, he now fought to preserve the acquisitions of twenty years of success—of twenty years of crimes. At no period had Europe ever seen such numerous armies assembled in one place. Near 600,000 men, with 2000 pieces of cannon, and all the other necessary weapons for war and destruction, stood ready to embrace their hands in each others' blood. The allies saw their enemy and the scourge of Europe, within their grasp, and the tyrant on his part was fully aware of the perils which his pride, obstinacy, and self-confidence had brought him into, and, to meet the danger, called forth every energy of his mind. It was not for the dominion of Germany, but for the salvation of his army—not for empire, but for life that he was now about to contend. A short time had changed his situation

\* Lord Aberdeen's dispatch, October 9th, 1813.

† Sir C. Stewart's dispatch, October, 14th, 1813.

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and lowered his hopes. To the Rhine, he himself informed us, he meant to retrace his steps, in order that he might be better able to appreciate the defection of Bavaria, and other princes.\* What different language and prospects were these to Bonaparte, who, but a few weeks before, sported the following menacing predictions: "Could the Austrian cabinet think, after the serious proofs which it has had of the power of the French armies, to drive us, in some months, into our ancient limits? *Twenty years of victory would be requisite to destroy what twenty years of victory have erected.*"† A few months! How arrogant Austria! how stable France!—two months, however, did the business.

Notwithstanding these boasts and these menaces, it appears, however, that in their sober moments, the French government began to be alarmed at the perils which surrounded it. "It is necessary," said Bassano, "that at your Majesty's voice, numerous battalions arise in the bosom of France, to place your powerful armies in a condition to carry on the war with new vigour."‡ Accordingly, on the 7th October, the Empress, who was dragged forward on the occasion, in imitation of the conduct of her grandmother Maria Theresa, in a better cause, explained to the Senate the number of these battalions, which were wanted to augment the armies, by demanding a fresh conscription of 280,000 men from that infatuated country. This was immediately decreed by the servile Senate. The Empress, who, on this occasion, no doubt spoke only what was set down to her, endeavoured to rouse the national vanity, prejudices, and fears of the French people, by stating that the object of the allies was the destruction of France, and by trying to impress on their minds the miseries which they would endure, if conquered by their enemies. "They wished," said she, "to carry the war into the bosom of our *beautiful* country, to revenge the triumphs which led our victorious eagles into the midst of their States. *I know better than any one* what our people have to dread, if they ever


\* Bonaparte's dispatch, October 24th, 1813.



† Bassano's report, 20th August, 1813.

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











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suffer themselves to be conquered."\* If, in her Father's court, she had heard vows of vengeance against France, (for that was no doubt the object which he who dictated the speech wished should be understood by it) could France be astonished at it? There was, indeed, no necessity to have recourse to what other nations said against them, in order to make them dread the consequences. No nation could speak any good of them; and the bosom of every Frenchman must have told him what France merited, for her atrocious conduct in every country in Continental Europe. Bitter, indeed, is the cup of retribution, and doubly so when it is presented unexpectedly to unhallowed lips; yet, still, the determination of the nations of Europe to place that cup in the hand of France, and compel her to drink it, or, in other words, to revenge on her country, however beautiful, the misery which her sons had inflicted on Europe, was neither extraordinary nor unjust. But it was not so much what France might suffer in such a contest, but what the ambitious plans and bosoms of Bonaparte and his unprincipled followers would suffer and feel from its consequences, that now terrified and engaged the attention of the French government. "Accquainted," said the Empress, "for four years with the most intimate thoughts of my spouse, *I know with what sentiments he would be agitated on a degraded throne, and under a crown without glory.*"† That these feelings could not be of the most pleasant kind, under such circumstances, there can be no doubt, but that was a very trifling punishment to what he merited,—a small recompense for the woes and miseries which that throne had heaped upon the world; nor could his agitation appease offended Justice, nor all the strength of France shield either herself or her Emperor from the punishment decreed by the Counsels of unerring Wisdom, or turn aside the weapons of His indignation.

Scarcely was this extraordinary demand made by Bonaparte, when it was hailed as an incontestible sign of his great popularity in France, of the solidity of his power, and the immensity of his means; and it was haughtily predicted, that,

\* The Empress's speech, October 7th, 1813.

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if he chose, he might carry on the contest to an unlimited period, and, at all events, till he rendered Great Britain the victim of his obstinacy. So his supporters sung, while, on the same day on which this demand was made by him, he was abandoning Dresden—so he calculated, with what success a short period was to determine.

At length that important period arrived which had been so long—so anxiously looked for, and expected by weeping millions and oppressed nations:

“ That day was come, when Heav’n design’d to shew  
His care and conduct of the world below.”\*

To enter into every particular of the occurrences of these eventful days would as far exceed the limits of this work, as they surpass my powers to describe them. Every hour decided the fate of nations, and every day afforded materials to fill volumes. No scene had ever appeared like it—none is ever likely to occur similar to it again. There was no individual, however low—no personage, however exalted, that was not deeply interested in the issue of the contest. It appeared as if the usual occupations of mankind stood still, while they watched the progress of those events which had collected “Europe in arms” round the walls of Leipsic, and while they listened with an anxiety which was felt, but cannot be described, to catch every breath and every whisper from Saxony.

• We left the armies of the allies in formidable array, around Leipsic, in a situation where they could compel the enemy to fight without the advantage of an “unattackable” position. The object was mighty, and the means upon a proportionate scale. The flower of the youth of Europe, and the hopes of indignant nations, stood eager for the combat. The command was given. The Sovereigns and Schwartzemberg led the way. Blucher quickly followed their example. On the morning of the 16th, the army of Silesia, under the command of this gal-

\* Addison’s *Blenheim*.

lant veteran, advanced from Kroskugel, Mersberg, and Skenditz, and about noon attacked the 4th, 6th, and 7th corps of the French army, and a great number of the guard, commanded by Marshal Ney and Bertrand, who were strongly posted amidst vast batteries of cannon at Freyroda, Radeffeld, and Lindenthal. The battle was most obstinate and bloody, and was terminated only by the approach of night. The enemy soon gave up the advanced villages, and that without any serious resistance; but he held, in the most obstinate and determined manner, some woody ground on his right, the villages of Gros, and Klien Witteritz, and of Mockern and Mockau. At Mockern a bloody combat took place. It was taken and retaken by the corps of D'York five times. The fire of the musquetry was at this point incessant and galling, and many of the superior officers on the side of the allies were either killed or wounded. At last the brave Silesian army carried every point, and drove the enemy beyond the Partha. The enemy also on the right, at Great and Little Witteritz, and Ilchhausen, and in the woody ground around them, sustained a severe combat; and after the allies had forced their left, continued to bring forward additional numbers of troops belonging to Ney's corps, advancing from Duben, against Count Langeron. The brave Russians, however, withstood their utmost efforts; and finally succeeded in overpowering their antagonists, who, seeing the battle completely lost, drew off at the close of day, by Seigeritz, and passed the Partha river. The enemy, who was never at a loss for a reason to disguise a defeat, stated that all this was owing to the 3d corps, which, hearing a dreadful cannonade, early in the morning, at the point where the Emperor was, and before the attack began by Blucher, marched to the assistance of the grand army, from which they were quickly recalled by the roar of Blucher's cannon, and that, owing to this "*fatal circumstance*," this corps spent the whole day in marching; in consequence of which, the Duke of Ragusa, (Marmont) who was left to defend Leipsic with his own forces, "suffered losses which were not compensated by those he inflicted upon the enemy, however great they were;" and being slightly wounded,

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"was obliged to *contract* his position upon the Partha."\* General Sacken's corps very much distinguished itself, when opposed to Bonaparte, who about the dusk of the evening arrived from the opposite part of the line to direct the operations in this part. General D'York's corps also signalized itself in a very particular manner, and had many of its most gallant officers killed and wounded. The loss of the Silesian army was 7000 men; that of the enemy, 12,000 men, 40 pieces of cannon, 1 eagle, and many caissons.† Such was the battle of Lindenthal, where the "glorious army of Silesia" and its veteran leader acquired fresh laurels.

While these operations were going on, beyond the Partha, and on the north side of Leipsic, a more sanguinary combat, of much greater length, and upon a more extensive scale, took place in the opposite direction. The grand army under Prince Schwartzberg, with its respective Sovereigns, was posted in front of Wachau and Liebert Wolkowitz. The corps of General Guilay, Prince Maurice Lichtenstien, Thielman and Platoff, were collected at Markraestadt, and were to move upon Leipsic, keeping up the communication with General Blucher, on the North, and with the Bohemian army, on the South side of that city. The divisions of Mereveldt and Bianchi Weissendorf were to attack Zwackau and Connevit, at which latter place the bridge across the Pleisse was to be carried. The reserves of the Russian and Prussian guards, of the Prince of Hesse Homberg, Generals Mereveldt and Wittgenstein, were to move on Rotha, where they were to pass the Pleisse, and form in columns on its right bank. In advancing to the attack, the force under General Mereveldt marched between the Elster and the Pleisse, that under the Prince of Hesse Homberg, on the right bank of the Elster in the same direction, to support General Wittgenstein towards Wachau. Generals Wittgenstein, Kliest, and Klenau, were appointed to advance on Leipsic. General Kliest supporting the right of Wittgenstein towards Liebert Wolkowitz, and General Klenau on the extreme right

\* Bonaparte's dispatch, October 16th, 1813.

† Sir C. Stewart's dispatch, October 17th, 1813.



towards Fuchshayn on the Grimma road. The Russian guards were to form the reserve, and General Colleredo to advance from Borna as reserve to General Klenau. The army of General Beningsen was to advance upon Grimma and Wurtzen. Such were the positions of the main army before the battle of the 16th, the enemy being at the same time advantageously posted in their front, occupying the only ridge in this plain, behind the centre of which, towards Leipsic, Bonaparte's tent was pitched, and within a few miles of that city. On every part of their line, the enemy presented a formidable force, but he was particularly strong on his left, on the side of Liebert Wolkowitz, from which point, he perhaps hoped to throw himself on the right flank of the allied army, and separate it from that under Beningsen, while at the same time he should endeavour to force the centre of the allies, and thus place their right wing betwixt the fire of his centre and his left. The order of battle in these mighty armies, was considerably different from the accustomed mode. "The received dispositions for troops in these plains," said Lord Cathcart, "is now, to form *immense solid columns* of infantry and cavalry, which are denominated *masses*, and which are distributed according to the ground, in one or more lines, always with reserves; in front are great quantities of artillery within reach of support. All villages, and broken or covered ground, are occupied by detachments, furnished by the nearest masses, and supported by them; and which, being defended by musquetry, *always occasion great slaughter.*"\* Such was the order of battle at the tremendous conflicts of Leipsic. At nine o'clock in the morning a general attack commenced along the whole line of this immense army, and continued without intermission till dark. The ground in this part of the field was particularly favourable for cavalry; and accordingly it was with this species of force, and an incessant and tremendous cannonade, that this battle was principally sustained. The allies advanced in three grand columns, one against Dœlitz, the second against the village of Wachau, and the third against Liebert Wolkowitz.

\* Cathcart's dispatch, Oct. 19th, 1813.

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About 600 pieces of cannon were engaged on each side, and on both, about 340,000 men. By ten o'clock the cannonade was become general and dreadful. In the course of the two succeeding hours no less than six different attacks had been made upon the villages already mentioned; and a solitary building, in the centre of the enemy's position, occupied by several battalions, was taken by the Russian infantry, after several repulses, and with "*an amazing carnage*." The allies continued to press forward in the face of every opposition. Wittgenstein, in the centre, "almost immediately drove the enemy from the heights opposed to him; and the whole ridge was, for some time, occupied by the allies."\* On the right, however, the large force of infantry and cavalry opposed to General Kliest, rendered the contest most obstinate and doubtful, during the whole morning, and for some time arrested his progress. At this moment, which Bonaparte characterized as decisively favourable for him, he endeavoured to put in practice his favourite manœuvre of breaking the centre of the opposing army. For this purpose, the whole of his cavalry under Murat, was brought forward in an immense body, supported by Drouet, with a battery of 150 pieces of cannon. "Judging," said Lord Cathcart, "that he had time to attack before the Russian reserve could come up to him, he sent on the light artillery of the guards, and immediately after charged with his masses of cavalry."† The attack was most determined and severe, and directed against the right of Wittgenstein's force, placed in the centre of the whole army. For the moment the advance was checked, and the allies were compelled to give way. For a short period, said Sir C. Stewart, the enemy succeeded in forcing the centre of the allied position. "The enemy's cavalry," said Bonaparte, "were defeated; two entire regiments remained on the field of battle. General Latour Maubourg took some hundreds of the Russian guard."‡ But this success was but of short duration. The cavalry of Wittgenstein's corps, and that attached to it, attacked Murat's force,

\* Lord Cathcart's dispatch, October 19th, 1813. † Do. do. do.

‡ Bonaparte's dispatch, October 16th, 1813.

in flank, "and he retired with as much precipitation as he advanced."\* General Merevelidt having advanced to Connevitze, beyond the right of the force opposed to Wittgenstein, and having also repaired the bridge over the Plesse, at Dörlitz, was preparing to pass the river, when his horse being shot under him, he was made prisoner by a column of the retreating enemy, which he mistook for a division of the allied army. Nevertheless, the troops continued to press forward in that quarter; but the quantity of water, and the number of gardens and summer houses near Connevitze, rendered the task allotted to them extremely arduous. At this moment, and during the preparation of Murat's attack, a desperate action took place in this quarter, by a large force of the allied cavalry. The cavalry of the Russian guard, and six regiments of Austrian cuirassiers, were brought forward to the assistance of the others. These latter troops charged with a desperate and irresistible valour, overthrew every thing opposed to them, and destroyed whole regiments.† "They precipitated themselves by their left on our right, they seized upon Dörlitz, and came wheeling upon the Duke of Belluno's squares,‡" said the enemy. Lord Cathcart, however, gives us a clearer view of this dreadful wheeling which seized upon Dörlitz. These six regiments of Austrian cuirassiers, said he, made no fewer than "nine different charges on the enemy's right, in some of which they swept his whole front with great slaughter."§ In one of these charges the French line was broken through, near where Bonaparte was, and he owed his safety to the fleetness of his horse: Dreadful, indeed, must have been the carnage at this point. Of the nature of these destructive charges, the reader may have some idea, by the following short extract, from a dispatch from Sir C. Stewart, relating the consequences of one charge upon a trifling scale, and against a trifling number, when compared to the present. "To give your Lordship," said he, "some idea of these attacks, from a return which has been found, of the loss of the regiment of infantry, when the

\* Lord Cathcart's dispatch, October 19th, 1813.

† Lord Cathcart's dispatch, Oct. 19th. ‡ Bonaparte's dispatch, Oct. 16th.

§ Lord Cathcart's dispatch, Oct. 19th, 1813.

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\* Sir C. Ste  
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Russian cavalry in Count Osterman's action charged, they had 730 killed and 820 wounded; the residue of the fugitives remaining were 600.\* Compare this with the still more fatal charges which so often, at Leipsic, swept the enemy's front and destroyed whole regiments, and we may form some idea of the enemy's loss on this occasion. Dœlitz was, however, retaken by the enemy a short time after. Poniatowski, who defended a village to the right of it, being hard pressed, General Curial was sent to his relief, who took the village of Dœlitz, and, according to the enemy, 1200 prisoners. Affairs, said the enemy, were thus established on our right; and there seems no reason to doubt his relation in this instance, as Lord Cathcart expressly states, that "the heads of the columns of the French cavalry and infantry were on their right, on the same ridge, next morning."† Wittgenstein only occupied that in the centre from which he had driven the enemy. The desperate charges made by the allied cavalry succeeded, in arresting at this point, and in driving back at other points, the efforts of the enemy. No other attack was afterwards made by him, though the cannonade and fire of the tirailleurs continued till after it was dark. The advance of the allies again, in the centre, after he had so completely defeated them, was thus, curiously, but very lamely, accounted for by the enemy. "The reserve artillery of the guards, which General Drouet commanded, were with the tirailleurs. *The enemy's cavalry came and charged them.* The artillerymen formed their pieces in a square, which they had the precaution to load with grape shot, and fired with *so much agility*, that in an instant the enemy was repulsed."‡ How the allied cavalry came and attacked them, he left the world to conjecture; but Lord Cathcart has, fortunately, supplied the deficiency, by informing us that Murat "retired with as much precipitation as he had advanced." In this manner terminated the sanguinary and undecisive combats of the 16th. Both parties slept on nearly the same ground which they had occupied previous

\* Sir C. Stewart's dispatch, September 17th, 1813.—An intercepted letter from an officer in the French regiment gave the same number.

† Lord Cathcart's dispatch, Oct. 19th.

‡ Bonaparte's dispatch, Oct. 23th.

to the battle. The loss on both sides, as may very readily be conceived, was severe, and probably nearly equal, and has been estimated at 25,000 men, killed and wounded, on each side. Bonaparte, who, as usual, claimed the victory, estimated his own loss at only 2500, while he rated that of his adversaries at 25,000. He merely omitted another cypher in the right side of the account of his own loss, which he was very apt to do when three cyphers were requisite, if the number exceeded 10,000. On his side, General Latour Maubourg, the best cavalry officer which he had, was mortally wounded. From the numbers engaged on each side, in close and compact columns, and from the dreadful fire of artillery and charges of cavalry, it is evident that the carnage must have been dreadful. The French army spent 80,000 cannon balls, 20,000 more than at Borodino. It has generally been accounted a drawn battle, though the advantage from the subsequent operations arising out of it, clearly remained with the allies.

While the combat was maintained with such destruction and loss, on the South and the North sides of Leipsic, a severe engagement, though upon a smaller scale, was, at the same time, maintained on the West side of that city. General Guilay, with the divisions of Thielman and Lichtenstien, attacked the French force under Bertrand, stationed at Lindenau, at which place was the bridge over the Elster. For six hours the combat continued, without any advantage on either side; but, finally, the French maintained their ground, and night also at this point, alone put an end to the battle. What the loss was on either side, at this place, is nowhere mentioned; but, as the force engaged was considerable on both sides, and as the action was so long and so obstinate, it must, from a comparison with the others, have been severe in proportion, and could hardly be less than 2 or 3000 men on each side.

Persisting in their resolution, to bring matters to a final issue, the 17th was destined, by the allies, for the grand and decisive attack from every quarter, against the whole of the enemy's forces now collected in the immediate vicinity of Leipsic; but as part of the Crown Prince's army was still in the rear,

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and as General Beningsen with the troops under his command, 40,000 strong, could not arrive near enough the scene of action before the evening of that day, it was resolved to wait till the following, (the 18th,) to renew the struggle which was to decide the fate of Europe. Napoleon could not escape, neither could he "ward of the blow." On the part of the enemy, according to his account, a day's repose was necessary, in order to bring up his parks of reserve, and to replace the 80,000 cannon balls which had been expended in the battle of the 16th. Front to front, and in threatening array, the mighty hosts stood opposed to each other; "*the cannon on each side, within musquet shot, and the videttes within pistol shot; and in this attitude the armies remained a whole day without firing a shot, except some accidental skirmishing by the advanced men.*"\*

What a magnificent but a portentuous prospect! This day, (Sunday) therefore, passed in quietness and peace; still as the calm which pervades the torrid clime, before the hurricane arises which sweeps the face of nature with irresistible destruction.

The Crown Prince and Beningsen having arrived in the position allotted for them, and General Bubna also marching to join the army, having been relieved before Dresden by General Tolstoy; on the morning of the 18th the grand attack commenced in the following order, viz. The main army, under Schwartzenberg, from its positions already mentioned, attacked, on the South-west and South; General Beningsen, from Grimma, on the South-east; the Crown Prince, with the army of the North of Germany, re-enforced by 30,000 men, under Count Langeron, from Blücher's army, were to attack by the position of Taucha, on the North-East and North, extending their right to meet General Beningsen's left, thereby completing the circle on this side. General Blücher, with the glorious army of Silesia from the North, was to pass the Partha, and attack the suburbs of Leipsic on the Halle road, the Pleisse, forming his right. General Guilay and Thielman, with 25,000 men, manœuvred on the left of the main army, between the Pleisse and Elster. On the side of the ene-

\* Lord Cathcart's dispatch, Oct. 19th, 1813.

my he placed his right at Connevit, composed of the troops under Poniatowski and Leval, supported by the corps of Oudinot. The centre was placed at Probstheyda, composed of the guards, the 2d corps and cavalry under Murat, and the corps of Augereau. Bonaparte himself was at the mill of Ta. The left, under Macdonald, was placed at Holtzhansen. Ney, with the 3d, 6th, and 7th corps of the French army, was placed, viz. the 6th corps at Schoenfeld, the 3d and 7th along the Partha, at Neuitsch and St. Teekla. The Duke of Padua (Arrighi) and General Dombrowski guarded the position and suburb of Leipsic upon the Halle road.\* The armies thus formed nearly three-fourths of a circle, whose diameter might be about six miles, the line of which approached Leipsic, one-half nearer on the North than on the South side. The tremendous field of battle, therefore, on which above 500,000 warriors now stood, extended fully 18 English miles.† In the centre stood the fierce and still formidable Napoleon, whose heart never melted at human carnage, nor eye moistened at human misery;‡ and, within this circle, now contending for all his glory—for all the labours of 20 years. Around him, breathing vengeance, were collected four of the mightiest Sovereigns of Europe, with their heroes, from the Wolga and the Oder—from the banks of the Thames and Danube, and from the mountains of the North, contending for all that they had previously recovered, for all that they had yet to gain—for all that was dear to mankind.

Bonaparte having claimed the victory on the 16th, found some difficulty to reconcile that claim with the positions from which he was obliged to commence the action on this day, which

\* Bonaparte's dispatch, October 24th, 1813.

† "The field of battle extended three miles in length, and as many in breadth." (German miles.) Austrian official report.

‡ In passing over the bloody field of Eylau, after the retreat of the Russian army, Bonaparte came with his suite to a spot where whole files of Russian and French soldiers lay dead together. The blood had run in such streams from their bodies, that it had penetrated the deep banks of snow which then covered the fields, and had made frightful caverns in it. A horse belonging to one of his attendants became terrified at this horrid scene: "that horse must be a coward," said the unfeeling Emperor, and passed on unmoved!!!

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were considerably in the rear, and nearer Leipsic. His reason, therefore, was, that as the allies had been re-enforced, and "knowing that the enemy's position was very strong, the Emperor determined upon *drawing him upon different ground*, and, on the 18th, at two in the morning, he approached within two leagues of Leipsic, and placed his army, the right at Conneville, the centre at Probstheyda, and the left at Stettoritz, being himself at the mill of Ta; there the Emperor *firmly awaited the enemy.*"\* Lord Cathcart's account, however, of the battle of the 16th, affords a much better and more probable reason for this movement on the part of the enemy. Wittgenstein having driven back the French centre, and occupied the ridge on which they had stood, thus interposed between the left and right wings of the French army, on whose flanks Generals Guizy and Thielman was advancing on the one side, and Beningsen on the other, and thus situated the enemy was compelled to do on the night of the 17th what he informed us Marmont was obliged to do on the 16th, namely, "*contract his position;*" or in other words, fall back to keep his communications clear on every part of his line. However, on this stronger ground, which was picked out by the enemy himself, he was attacked by the allied army. The village of Leibert Wolkowitz was the point to which all the attacks of the army under Schwartzberg were to be directed, "*thereby becoming gradually more closely connected, and the more distant corps on the right advancing first.*"† At 9 A. M. the French scouts announced that the allies were marching against the whole line. At 10 A. M. the engagement began in all directions. Every part of the vast plan of the allies succeeded. After a desperate resistance, they finally carried every thing before them. Every village was defended by cannon, and, in the contest reduced to ashes. Each army fought in compact columns. *The cannonade became terrible.* Leipsic shook to its foundations. The earth trembled to a vast distance by the effects of this tremendous conflict—2,000 pieces of cannon, at this mo-

\* Bonaparte's dispatch, October 24th, 1813.

† Lord Cathcart's dispatch, October 19th, 1813.

ment, thundered along this immense line of battle. Poniatowski, who defended Connevitze, was obliged to give way. Oudinot was sent to his support, but without effect. Macdonald, on the left was overthrown, and compelled to abandon Holtzhausen. "*The Duke of Tarentum*," said the enemy, "*was reached at Holtzhausen. The Emperor ordered him to place himself at Stoeteritz.*"\* This also he was forced to abandon after an obstinate struggle. The village of Stetteritz, on the enemy's left, was taken and retaken several times, and finally was wrested from the enemy. In the centre the contest was still more obstinate and bloody. The allies attacked the village of Probstheyda four different times, and were as often repulsed. It held out till dark, when the enemy being defeated on every other part of the line, was compelled to abandon this place. Napoleon was, for several hours, betwixt these two latter villages, animating his men, and repeatedly bringing up fresh troops to their support. Every village, as has already been mentioned, was defended by formidable batteries of cannon, which rendered the action general all over the plain; and those villages nearest Leipsic were most obstinately disputed. Every thing that bravery and skill could effect was tried, but in vain. The French troops fought bravely. "It must be confessed," said Lord Cathcart, "that they (the villages) were most gallantly defended."† General Beningsen with the force under his command, having been joined by Count Bubna during the action, had taken all the villages on the right bank of the Reutschowe, and continuing to advance against the enemy's force on that side, he turned the flank of Macdonald's corps, stationed at Holtzhausen, compelled him to fall back to Stoeteritz, and at the same time came in close contact with the army under the command of the Crown Prince. The operations on this side had also been successful. The Crown Prince advanced, and forced the position of Taucha. General Blucher and Langeron, after severe efforts, forced the Partha lower down; and the former attacked the suburbs of Leipsic, and the places ad-

\* Bonaparte's dispatch, October 24th, 1813.

† Lord Cathcart's dispatch, Leipsic, October 19th, 1813.

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




**FOUGHT UPON**

*A. Adirps et*  
*B. Gould. A.*  
*C. Huming*  
*D. Green A.*  
*E. Lawrence*  
*F. Blucher*

The circus  
Abolition  
being told



**A PLAN**  
OF THE  
**BATTLES OF LEIPSI**  
FOUGHT UPON THE 16<sup>th</sup> 18<sup>th</sup> & 19<sup>th</sup> OCTOBER  
1813.

*Drawn by James M. Smith.  
R. Scott Sc.*

*A. Corps of Morvold Gilly &c.*

*B. Grand Army under Schwartzenberg*

*C. Saxonian's Army*

*D. Crown Prince's A?*

*E. Langerons A?*

*F. Bluchers A?*

*..... denotes French Retreat*

*..... denotes opening the Passage for A?*

*..... denotes French Columns*

*..... denotes Allied A?*


*The Circular lines includes within them the positions of the ALLIES on the 18<sup>th</sup>. The armies on the North side only being nearer the PARTHA than the Circular lines*




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jacent, while Count Langeron marched against Schoenfeld, where he met with the most obstinate resistance, and was forced to give way; "Thrice," said the enemy, "he succeeded in placing himself upon the left bank, and thrice did the Prince of Moskwa drive him from it, and overthrew him at the point of the bayonet."\* But the brave Russian, with his corps, returning again to the charge, carried every thing before him. The enemy, who had at first abandoned Paunsdorff, again occupied that village, endeavouring to interpose a force between the Crown Prince and Blucher. General Bulow was sent against it, but was driven back. In a moment, he received the most positive orders to make himself master of the place. It was carried at the point of the bayonet, and the enemy driven back upon Leipsic. It was at this moment that the British rocket brigade, under the command of Capt. Bogue, rendered such essential service. Its operations were directed by Sir C. Stewart in person. Whole squares of the enemy's infantry, terrified at the destructive effects of this formidable weapon, surrendered themselves prisoners. At this moment Captain Pogue was killed. He fell on a glorious and a memorable field. The enemy continued to make efforts, by large bodies of troops from Leipsic, to turn the left of the army under the command of the Crown Prince, and intercept his communication with the Bohemian army; and also in another direction, against Count Langeron, to separate him from Blucher; but the firmness and perseverance of the allied troops, amongst which the Russian cavalry conspicuously distinguished themselves, finally triumphed over all opposition, and defeated every attempt of the enemy. It was now about three P. M. when the battle, in every part of his extended line, was beginning to be decisively against the enemy, when an event occurred which gave him an opportunity to attribute his defeat to a different cause than the true one, while at the same time it rendered it more complete. The whole Saxon and Wirtemberg troops, amounting to 10 or 12,000 men, which were in that part of the French line, with all their cannon, ammunition, and bag-

\* Bonaparte's dispatch, Oct. 24th, 1813.

gage, came over in a body to the allies, and their cannon were immediately turned against their former friends; and, headed by the Crown Prince, it is said, that part of their artillery was led against the enemy. This was a terrible and unexpected blow to Bonaparte. To retrieve his disasters was impossible; but to render them as little fatal as possible he made every effort. He immediately dispatched General Nansouty, with his mounted guard and 20 pieces of artillery, and soon after marched himself, with another division of his guard, to that point where the opening was left in his line, and where the allies were arrived within two miles of Leipsic. This movement on their flank, checked their advance for the moment; and, as night was now approaching, no further operations could take place on this side. Worst of all in every part of this vast line, by the close of day the enemy had been driven into a circle, whose limits were within cannon shot of Leipsic. Aware of his perilous situation, he had, early in the morning,\* sent General Bertrand with a strong force to clear the defiles of Lindenau, and the road to Weissenfels, which he effected; and, accordingly, during the night, the French army began to file off in that direction, and the whole field of battle remained in the possession of the allies. The results of this glorious day, when Europe in arms, contended in the environs of Leipsic, was a loss to the enemy of 40,000 men, killed, wounded, and prisoners, 65 pieces of artillery, and 17 battalions of German infantry, with all their Generals, &c. &c. which came over during the battle to the allies.† The loss on the part of the allies was also severe, and could hardly be less than 15 or 20,000 men, as will be stated more at large in another place.

Such is a feeble sketch of this gigantic and decisive combat. Nothing now remained for the French army but a precipitate

\* "Three o'clock."—Bonaparte's dispatch, October 24th. Sleep that night, fled his pillow. The ship boy on the mast head, rocked asleep by the swelling surge, was happier than he.

† Sir C. Stewart's dispatch, October 19th.—The official bulletin of the allies stated the number of killed and wounded at 25,000, and on the 19th 25,000 prisoners; but these increased every moment. It seems that the enemy's loss on this day was 25,000 killed and wounded, and 15,000 prisoners, which the Crown Prince's bulletin states as the number.

flight, if such a flight was even possible. Night had clad the world with her sable mantle, but to them she brought no comfort nor repose. The allied armies hung around them in lowering clouds, foreboding a still more dreadful tempest.

" Their numerous watch-fires lighted all the sky,"

and cast a dreadful glare over the turrets of Leipsic. There was but one road by which the enemy could pass, and that was through a narrow defile, for nearly six miles, and in it five or six bridges, but only one over the Elster. All these, except the latter, Bonaparte had previously caused to be destroyed. The Pleisse and the Elster, with their numerous branches, intersect the whole of this space, in a thousand meanders. The ground is level, woody, and extremely marshy. But one road passes through it, which is in some places, as at the Kuthurm, barely wide enough to admit a single carriage; and the two principal passes in it are only 30 feet broad. Through this difficult and dangerous road the French army alone could effect its escape. No time was to be lost—Blucher had already marched for Merseberg, on the North side, and the Cossacks were sent forward on the other. At the dawn of the morning it was perceived that the French army was filing off in the above direction. The enemy, however, still held Leipsic and the suburbs, with a very strong force. Wishing to gain time, at six, A. M. he sent, as from the King of Saxony, a flag of truce to Alexander, offering to capitulate to save the town. Aware of the enemy which they had to deal with, the allied Sovereigns returned the determined answer, that they could not be stopped in their career by any such negotiation; but, that, if Leipsic opened its gates, the inhabitants should be protected. To the messenger, said Lord Cathcart, who bore this flag of truce to the Emperor Alexander, "*His Imperial Majesty gave his answer aloud in the hearing of many hundred officers, with remarkable force and dignity: he said in substance, that an army in pursuit of a flying enemy, and in the hour of victory, could not be stopped a moment by considerations for the town; that, therefore, the gates must be immediately opened, and, in*

that case, the most strict discipline should be observed; that if the German troops in the place chose to join their countrymen in this army, they should be received as brothers; but, that he considered any proposal sent, while Napoleon was at hand, *as extremely suspicious, as he well knew the enemy he had to deal with*; that, as to the king of Saxony, personally, *who had taken a line of determined hostility*, HE GAVE NO ANSWER, AND DECLINED MAKING ANY COMMUNICATION.\* This was proper and decided language, and in order to secure the correct delivery of this answer, General Toll was ordered to accompany the Saxon officer back, who brought the flag of truce. What promise, therefore, did the allied Sovereigns make to the king of Saxony, and what compact with him have they violated? What was the conduct of this hostile Prince at this moment? Though he saw with his own eyes, Bonaparte totally overthrown, still he did not abandon him. He sent a flag of truce, not to submit, or demand a treaty of friendship, but to capitulate as a vanquished enemy. He did more, he did this to deceive the allies, and to save his friend. A great part of his army had forsaken the cause for which he fought, but he remained faithful. At the conduct of his troops who had abandoned the standard of Napoleon, he was indignant, "*he was*," said Bonaparte himself, "*sensibly affected by the conduct of his army*."† Even after the message referred to had been delivered to him, he shewed no wish to abandon the tyrant's cause. But why then did he not accompany him? Let us hear the reason given by the tyrant himself, and which has scarcely ever been attended to. "At nine o'clock," said the French dispatch, "the Emperor mounted his horse, entered Leipsic, and paid a visit to the king. He left this prince, at full liberty to do as he pleased, and *not to quit his dominions, leaving them to be exposed TO THAT SEDITIOUS SPIRIT which had been fomented amongst the soldiers*."‡ In other words, he left this prince, who had "taken a line of determined hostility," to pursue the same course, and to remain amongst his subjects, to keep them faith-

\* Lord Cathcart's dispatch, October 19th, 1813.

† Bonaparte's dispatch, October 24th, 1813.

‡ Do. do.



ful to French interests—to those principles which had oppressed Europe, but which she was now resolved to get clear of. Bonaparte knew, that to leave him behind, was more conducive to French interests than to carry him off, or there can be little doubt, but that the “King of Saxony and all his Court, had crossed the bridge before the corporal got his orders. Events have justified these French calculations. But what favour this Prince can *demand as a right* from the allies, I confess I am at a loss to determine—a prince, which to the last moment that he had it in his power, did all he could, against the liberties of Europe, which was the utmost, as it concerned this point, that ever Napoleon was accused of. Both therefore deserved the same, or a similar fate. While we pity the man, we cannot forgive the sovereign. From the generosity of the allied sovereigns, that deluded prince may expect something, but from their justice nothing.

The demand of the allies, to open the gates of Leipsic not being complied with, the troops advanced on every side in order to storm the place. Poniatowski, and Macdonald commanded the French troops in the city, and were directed to defend it as long as possible, in order to give time for the army and the baggage to escape before they attempted to leave the town. The city was surrounded with ramparts. The gates were protected by a pallisade, and the walls were loopholed. General Bulow was the first ordered to carry the place: after repeated attempts, he succeeded in forcing his way into the city. General Sacken succeeded, and stormed the Halle gate, and the other divisions followed on the other sides of the place, the grand army forcing the Grimma gate. The enemy occupied all the houses; and “the conflict now became very violent, and remained undecided for some time.”\* Re-enforcements of some Swedish battalions, and other troops, with more artillery, having come up, the city was taken, “and such of the enemy as did not surrender were put to the sword.”† The carnage in the city was very great, particularly in the suburbs, where in some houses 60 dead and wounded were found

\* Crown Prince's bulletin, October 21st.

† Do. do. do.

in each. Every street was covered with them; and hundreds of the wounded were there crushed to death, by the artillery, the waggons, and the cavalry, passing over them. In order to save the city, the allied Sovereigns had caused the place to be stormed with as little assistance from the artillery as possible, though this occasioned a considerably greater loss on their part. Would Bonaparte have acted thus? The remainder of the French army, which endeavoured to effect its escape, fled in the greatest confusion: the streets towards the Pleisse were crowded with artillery, baggage, and equipages, so that no order could be maintained. Each endeavoured to save himself in the best manner he could. About 10 A. M. Bonaparte left the city, after an interview with the King of Saxony; and with some difficulty made his way through this scene of confusion, and set off for Lindenau, there to wait till the army had extricated itself from the defile. The allied army continued to press the flying fugitives. The cavalry overtook them between the city and the Pleisse, where there is an open space covered with gardens and intersected with mill-streams. They cut in amidst the trembling ranks, and made a dreadful slaughter. The ground was covered with slain; the streams and ponds were choked with mutilated bodies, human heads, legs, and arms, lopped off by the cavalry. The enemy, terrified, endeavoured to escape in every direction. But the deep and sullen waters of the Pleisse lay before them. This river is narrow, but sluggish and deep. Its banks marshy, and of difficult access. Cavalry and infantry rushed forward, they overturned each other, and perished in the fatal stream. The unhappy fugitives, however, who had escaped destruction on the banks and in the waves of the Pleisse, had still equal dangers to encounter at the Elster, and the branches of these rivers, which lay before them. The Saxon troops which had not abandoned the enemy, on the 18th, now turned their arms against him. They fired from the ramparts upon the French army effecting its escape. Danger was thus before, Terror in the midst, and Death behind them. Bonaparte had ordered the great bridge between Lindenau and Leipsic, over the Elster, to be mined and to be blown up, in order to retard the progress of the allies.

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To secure his own safety, he once more determined to sacrifice part of his unfortunate army. But he took care to lay the blame off his own shoulders. This operation had been committed to the care of Colonel Montfort, who, said Bonaparte, in place of remaining upon the spot himself, in order to give the necessary signals, committed the business to a corporal and four sappers. "*The corporal, an ignorant fellow, and but ill comprehending the nature of the duty with which he was charged,*"\* instead of waiting till all the French army had passed the bridge, the moment he heard the first shot fired from the ramparts, he set fire to the train, and blew up the bridge, while part of the army, with 80 pieces of cannon, remained on the other side. The confusion and dismay amongst the French fugitives now became indistinguishable. It was another Berezina. They imagined, said the enemy, that the bridge was in the hands of their enemies. "*A cry of dismay spread from rank to rank. 'The enemy is upon our rear, and the bridges are cut off.' The unfortunate soldiers dispersed, and endeavoured to effect their escape as well as they could.*"† The Duke of Bassano escaped on foot. Macdonald swam across the river, and with difficulty escaped. "*Lauriston, less happy, was drowned. Prince Poniatowski, mounted upon a fiery horse, darted into the water and appeared no more.*"‡ General Dumourestier also perished; thousands more shared the same fate:

"Troops of bold youths born on the distant Saone,  
Or sounding borders of the rapid Rhone;  
Or where the Seine his flowery fields divides;  
Or where the Loire through winding vineyards gilds," §  
Approach, in terror, Elster's sullen roar,  
Dart in the water, and appear no more.

Such was the miserable end of these brave men: and such the

\* Bonaparte's dispatch, Oct. 24th, † Do. do. do.

‡ Bonaparte's dispatch, Oct. 24th.—The body of this brave man was found some days after the battle, and buried with military honours. He received two wounds in endeavouring to cross the Pleisse, where his horse perished. Mounted on another, he proceeded to the Elster, already lined with Prussian riflemen, to escape whom, he, with several other officers, "darted" into the water, where they perished.

§ Addison's battle of Blenheim.

base reward from their unprincipled leader, for their bravery, their toils, and their blood shed for his ambition on the gory plains of Leipsic. The loss of the enemy was very great: owing to this event alone, he admits that his loss may be carried by "*approximation*," to 12,000 men. The Colonel and the Corporal were transferred to a council of war; but who can doubt, for a moment, that both obeyed punctually the orders which they had received, and that the poor Corporal but too faithfully did his duty.

About 11 A. M. the allied Sovereigns entered Leipsic from different sides, and met at the same moment in the great square, immediately opposite the apartments of the unfortunate but guilty King of Saxony, and amidst the unbounded acclamations of the people. All the magazines, artillery, and stores of the place fell into the hands of the conquerors. The King of Saxony and all his court were made prisoners, but treated with every respect due to their rank. The garrison of Leipsic,\* the rear guard of the French army, and all the enemy's wounded, amounting to 30,000,† which were in the place, also fell into the hands of the victors. The loss, on the part of the enemy, in killed, wounded, and drowned on this day, must have been very considerable, and it is certainly not over-rating it to state this loss at 10,000 men. The number of prisoners must also have been very great and must have exceeded 20,000. Three hundred pieces of cannon, 1000 caissons, and 27 Generals were also taken: amongst whom were, Count de Hohberg, Baron de Hokern, Prince Emile de Hessed, Baden and Hessian Generals; Dhesnain, Delmas, Regnier, Aubry, Charpentier, Bony, Krasinski, Vallery, Brunc, &c. &c. French Generals. Poniatowski and Lauriston were drowned. Generals Vial and Rochambeau were killed, Latour Mabourg, and Souham mortally, and Ney and Marmont slightly wounded.

Never was there a victory in modern times more complete

\* The Austrian official report, August, 31st.—Stated the garrison of Leipsic at that time at 8,000 men, but there is no doubt, but it was afterwards considerably augmented. The rear guard of the French army could hardly be less than 12 or 15,000.

† Sir C. Stewart's dispatch, October 19th, 1815.

and decisive, and never did such extensive ruin, by the hand of man, overtake, in one place, such a mighty army. The collected loss on the part of the enemy was most prodigious, and certainly exceeded what the official dispatches state it to have been. The scene which Leipsic and its environs now presented to the eyes of the survivors, was dreadful beyond all description. Borodino, that grave of tyranny, alone could be put into competition with it. Six hundred thousand men, the flower of the youth of Europe, had entered those dreadful fields, where they had for three days been employed, with all their might and all their skill, in the work of blood and destruction. Both sides had suffered much; but one was almost annihilated. Around Leipsic, is one of the most fertile, populous, and best cultivated spots in Europe. For 12 or 15 miles around it, in every direction, every thing was destroyed. Scarcely a house was left standing, and none that was not rendered uninhabitable. Sixty flourishing villages were mostly consumed in those tremendous conflicts, and the inhabitants lost their all. Every vegetable substance that was fit for food, had been either eaten up or destroyed by the French army. Famine had indeed reached the greatest length, previous to the battles. Hundreds of the sick and wounded perished for want, and lay in heaps in every corner. The situation of these wretched creatures was truly pitiable. The dirtiest bones were picked off the streets by them and gnawed with avidity. The dunghills were searched for undigested fragments to devour. The wounded French soldiers were seen crawling to the carcases of the dead horses, and with their feeble hands tearing the putrid flesh for their miserable repast; nay, they even tore the flesh from the limbs of their dead comrades, and broiled it to satisfy their hunger.\* The consequence was, that disease soon became more fatal than the sword—Every thing that had life was slaughtered for food. Every thing that could burn, had been consumed for fire in those dreadful *bivouaques* and gloomy nights; houses, trees, fences, every thing was swept away. The church and the cot-

\* Narrative of the Battle of Leipsic, by Frederick Scholbert; pages 57 and 59.

tage shared the same fate; all were stripped bare, and filled with dead and dying. Nor did the abodes of the dead escape the general wreck. Their silent mansions were laid open. The vaults were stripped of the mouldering remains of mortality, the skulls and bones scattered in all directions, and their former peaceful abodes, were converted into chambers and dwelling places, to shelter the soldiers from the rain or the cold. Every thing was destroyed, every thing defaced—affection sought in vain for any relic which could guide them to the spot, which once contained the remains of those they loved. From the deepest graves the coffins were dug up to make fire for the suffering French soldiers; and around these melancholy mansions, hundreds were found expiring of wounds, of sickness and of want. But in vain would I pursue this melancholy subject. No language is adequate to convey a just idea of these horrors. Speaking of the field of battle on the 18th, on the side where the Bohemian army was, Lord Cathcart thus proceeds, “the *whole* plain is covered with bodies of dead men and horses, and the ruins of the villages are *full of heaps of dead and dying*.”\* Three days after this, when it may be supposed that many of them had been buried, Lord Aberdeen discloses to our view, a still more dreadful picture. “Since the day before yesterday,” said he, “*several thousand bodies have been taken from the river. The streets and high roads are heaped with dead bodies and with wounded, whom hitherto, it has been found impossible to remove.*”† And nearly a month after this, an intelligent traveller writes, that even then, “the plains around Leipsic had the appearance of *straw yards*, strewn with the carcasses of man and beast.”‡ What numbers were reduced to ashes in the flames which consumed the different villages, cannot be known; and how many besides all these were swept away by the bloody waves of the Parthia, Pleisse, and Elster:

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“Where they lie, the food  
Of curling eels and fishes of the flood.”

\* Lord Cathcart's dispatch, Oct. 19th.

† Lord Aberdeen's dispatch, Oct. 22d.

‡ John Hobhouse, Esq.

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